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5 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hydegreen2 sentences2017The court then established four exceptions to that general rule: (1) when a magistrate is misled by information that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false but for his or her reckless disregard for the truth; (2) when the issuing magistrate “wholly abandon[s]” his or her judicial role; (3) when a warrant is based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) when a warrant is “so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” State v. Hyde, 2017The court then established four exceptions to that general rule: (1) when a magistrate is misled by information that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false but for his or her reckless disregard for the truth; (2) when the issuing magistrate “wholly abandon[s]” his or her judicial role; (3) when a warrant is based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) when a warrant is “so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” State v. Hyde, | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences2017The court then established four exceptions to that general rule: (1) when a magistrate is misled by information that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false but for his or her reckless disregard for the truth; (2) when the issuing magistrate “wholly abandon[s]” his or her judicial role; (3) when a warrant is based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) when a warrant is “so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” State v. Hyde, 2017The court then established four exceptions to that general rule: (1) when a magistrate is misled by information that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false but for his or her reckless disregard for the truth; (2) when the issuing magistrate “wholly abandon[s]” his or her judicial role; (3) when a warrant is based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4) when a warrant is “so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” State v. Hyde, 1 | 1 | 2 |
United States v. John Spilotro Herbert Blitzstein and Joseph C. Blaskogreen2 sentences2017In United States v. Spilotro, the Ninth Circuit articulated a three-factor test to determine whether a description of items to be seized is 5Because we consider only the evidence admitted at the suppression hearing, Brown, 239 Ariz. 521, ¶ 4 , 373 P.3d at 540 , we do not consider whether a second search warrant, introduced into evidence at the trial, authorized the seizure. 4 STATE v. DEAN Opinion of the Court sufficiently particular to support an officer’s good-faith belief in the validity of the warrant: (1) whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in t 2017In United States v. Spilotro, the Ninth Circuit articulated a three-factor test to determine whether a description of items to be seized is 5Because we consider only the evidence admitted at the suppression hearing, Brown, 239 Ariz. 521, ¶ 4 , 373 P.3d at 540 , we do not consider whether a second search warrant, introduced into evidence at the trial, authorized the seizure. 4 STATE v. DEAN Opinion of the Court sufficiently particular to support an officer’s good-faith belief in the validity of the warrant: (1) whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. McClennen ex rel. County of Maricopa
green
2 sentences2017In United States v. Spilotro, the Ninth Circuit articulated a three-factor test to determine whether a description of items to be seized is 5Because we consider only the evidence admitted at the suppression hearing, Brown, 239 Ariz. 521, ¶ 4 , 373 P.3d at 540 , we do not consider whether a second search warrant, introduced into evidence at the trial, authorized the seizure. 4 STATE v. DEAN Opinion of the Court sufficiently particular to support an officer’s good-faith belief in the validity of the warrant: (1) whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in t 2017In United States v. Spilotro, the Ninth Circuit articulated a three-factor test to determine whether a description of items to be seized is 5Because we consider only the evidence admitted at the suppression hearing, Brown, 239 Ariz. 521, ¶ 4 , 373 P.3d at 540 , we do not consider whether a second search warrant, introduced into evidence at the trial, authorized the seizure. 4 STATE v. DEAN Opinion of the Court sufficiently particular to support an officer’s good-faith belief in the validity of the warrant: (1) whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in t | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Elerick v. Rocklin
green
2 sentences1967Elerick v. Rocklin, 102 Ariz. 78 , 425 P.2d 103 (March 15, 1967) The memorandum raises the inference that Mrs. Leon entered the property in 1936 as a tenant, and not adversely to the true owner. 1967Elerick v. Rocklin, 102 Ariz. 78 , 425 P.2d 103 (March 15, 1967) The memorandum raises the inference that Mrs. Leon entered the property in 1936 as a tenant, and not adversely to the true owner. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.