percentage standard (California) · Go Syfert
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percentage standard in California

5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1970–2007 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. George T.green
cal · 2004 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007(In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630-631 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 93 P.3d 1007 ].) 2 For purposes of evidentiary breath testing, the third digit of the percentage test result reading is disregarded. 3 The jury’s note is not part of the record on appeal, and the information regarding its content is gleaned only from the trial court’s comment about it while the note was discussed with counsel in connection with appellant’s postconviction motion for new trial. 4 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presum

2007(In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630-631 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 93 P.3d 1007 ].) 2 For purposes of evidentiary breath testing, the third digit of the percentage test result reading is disregarded. 3 The jury’s note is not part of the record on appeal, and the information regarding its content is gleaned only from the trial court’s comment about it while the note was discussed with counsel in connection with appellant’s postconviction motion for new trial. 4 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presum

11
People v. Mooregreen
calctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Code, § 23152, subd. (b).) 6 In Moore , the jury was instructed using CALJIC No. 16.152, as follows: “If the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent of a child abandoned or deserted such child, or that the parent omitted to furnish the necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance or other remedial care, you may infer that such omission was willful and without lawful excuse.” (Moore, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 936, fn. 2 .) 7 CALCRIM No. 2100 contains similar bracketed and Bench Notes language regarding the permissive inference permitted under Vehicle Code sec

11
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen
scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007(In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630-631 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 93 P.3d 1007 ].) 2 For purposes of evidentiary breath testing, the third digit of the percentage test result reading is disregarded. 3 The jury’s note is not part of the record on appeal, and the information regarding its content is gleaned only from the trial court’s comment about it while the note was discussed with counsel in connection with appellant’s postconviction motion for new trial. 4 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presum

2007(In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630-631 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 93 P.3d 1007 ].) 2 For purposes of evidentiary breath testing, the third digit of the percentage test result reading is disregarded. 3 The jury’s note is not part of the record on appeal, and the information regarding its content is gleaned only from the trial court’s comment about it while the note was discussed with counsel in connection with appellant’s postconviction motion for new trial. 4 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presum

11
Wall v. Sonora Union High School Districtgreen
calctapp · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Dist. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 870, 872 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 178 ].) Second, the Supreme Court did not rely on percentage, and the majority opinion in Bowen does not set a percentage standard.

1989Dist. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 870, 872 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 178 ].) Second, the Supreme Court did not rely on percentage, and the majority opinion in Bowen does not set a percentage standard.

11
Wieser v. Board of Retirementgreen
calctapp · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

11
Bixby v. Piernogreen
cal · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

11
Petrucci v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen
calctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

11
Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com.green
calctapp · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
1 sentence

1989Dist. (1966) 240 Cal. App.2d 870, 872 [ 50 Cal. Rptr. 178 ].) Second, the Supreme Court did not rely on percentage, and the majority opinion in Bowen does not set a percentage standard. (3c) Bowen did establish the substantial contribution test requiring substantial evidence of a "real and measurable" connection between the disability and employment. (47 Cal.3d at p. 578.) (1c) The parties having stipulated Glover had a permanent disability and Glover, not being entitled to the heart trouble presumption, the burden was on him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such disability was

11
Guymon v. Board of Accountancygreen
calctapp · 1976 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

11
Lindsay v. County of San Diego Retirement Boardgreen
calctapp · 1964 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

1989Bd. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 156, 162 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 737 ].) (5a) The superior court properly having exercised its independent judgment and weighed the evidence ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139-140 [ 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]), our task is to review the record to determine whether the trial court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence. ( Wieser v. Board of Retirement (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 775, 783 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 720 ].) (6a) In a factual argument better left for the referee and the trial court, appellant picks and chooses her evidence, mainly the report of Dr. Dic

11
Jenness v. Fortsongreen
scotus · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982(See Jenness v. Fortson, supra, 403 U.S. 431, 442 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 554, 562-563 ]; Communist Party v. Peek (1942) 20 Cal.2d 536, 552-553 [ 127 P.2d 889 ].) The percentage requirement of section 6661, subdivision (a) advances those goals in a meaningful way and is in no sense invidious or arbitrary.

1982(See Jenness v. Fortson, supra, 403 U.S. 431, 442 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 554, 562-563 ]; Communist Party v. Peek (1942) 20 Cal.2d 536, 552-553 [ 127 P.2d 889 ].) The percentage requirement of section 6661, subdivision (a) advances those goals in a meaningful way and is in no sense invidious or arbitrary.

11
Communist Party of United States of America v. Peekgreen
cal · 1942 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982(See Jenness v. Fortson, supra, 403 U.S. 431, 442 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 554, 562-563 ]; Communist Party v. Peek (1942) 20 Cal.2d 536, 552-553 [ 127 P.2d 889 ].) The percentage requirement of section 6661, subdivision (a) advances those goals in a meaningful way and is in no sense invidious or arbitrary.

1982(See Jenness v. Fortson, supra, 403 U.S. 431, 442 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 554, 562-563 ]; Communist Party v. Peek (1942) 20 Cal.2d 536, 552-553 [ 127 P.2d 889 ].) The percentage requirement of section 6661, subdivision (a) advances those goals in a meaningful way and is in no sense invidious or arbitrary.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council green
calctapp · 1996
1 sentence

1998We conclude the percentage requirement was included to show compliance with ... the specifications and was independent of the requirements of the Act.” ( 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440 .) The Court of Appeal simply refused to read into the Act an additional requirement not found in the Act itself.

11998–1998
Harrison v. Adams green
cal · 1942
2 sentences

1970(Harrison v. Adams, 20 Cal.2d 646 [ 128 P.2d 9 ].) It is A-C’s contention that the powers of the directors as set forth in Corporations Code section 4801, giving them the power to settle and compromise claims, are not inhibited by the solvency or insolvency of the corporation, and since the directors do have the power to compromise and *441 settle claims, it is clear that some creditors may be paid a greater percentage of their claim.

1970(Harrison v. Adams, 20 Cal.2d 646 [ 128 P.2d 9 ].) It is A-C’s contention that the powers of the directors as set forth in Corporations Code section 4801, giving them the power to settle and compromise claims, are not inhibited by the solvency or insolvency of the corporation, and since the directors do have the power to compromise and *441 settle claims, it is clear that some creditors may be paid a greater percentage of their claim.

11970–1970

Where else courts name it

WI 30 (1989–2026) PA 11 (1926–2022) KY 5 (1960–1972) CA 5 (1970–2007) NY 5 (1958–1987) WA 4 (1998–2000) NJ 4 (1983–2017) MI 3 (1975–2015) TX 3 (1983–2015) GA 2 (1978–2021) UT 2 (2012–2015) DC 2 (1972–2000) VA 2 (1959–1990) NE 2 (1972–1993) WV 2 (1997–2011) MD 2 (2019–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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