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5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1998–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moore v. Conliffegreen2 sentences1998Appellants argue that while this precise issue has not been resolved, the recent decision of our Supreme Court in Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 , 871 P.2d 204 ] found a private, contractual arbitration to be equivalent to a judicial proceeding and thus, to constitute a, prior action upon which a plaintiff may bring a claim of malicious prosecution. 1998Appellants argue that while this precise issue has not been resolved, the recent decision of our Supreme Court in Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 152 , 871 P.2d 204 ] found a private, contractual arbitration to be equivalent to a judicial proceeding and thus, to constitute a, prior action upon which a plaintiff may bring a claim of malicious prosecution. | 1 | 2 |
Zinermon v. Burchgreen1 sentence2023(Zinermon v. Burch (1990) 494 U.S. 113, 125 (Zinermon).) First, the plaintiff may bring a claim based on an alleged violation of one of the specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights. | 1 | 1 |
Rubin v. Greengreen2 sentences1998In Moore the court was faced with the issue of whether a witness whose testimony is elicited in discovery connected with a private, contractual arbitration proceeding is shielded from tort liability based upon that testimony to the same degree as if the witness had testified instead in a judicial proceeding, to which the litigation "privilege" of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(2) applies. ( Moore v. Conliffe, supra, at pp. 638-639 .) The effect of the so-called litigation privilege is, as the court noted, to limit liability or provide immunity from suit by "precluding use of the protec 1998In Moore the court was faced with the issue of whether a witness whose testimony is elicited in discovery connected with a private, contractual arbitration proceeding is shielded from tort liability based upon that testimony to the same degree as if the witness had testified instead in a judicial proceeding, to which the litigation "privilege" of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(2) applies. ( Moore v. Conliffe, supra, at pp. 638-639 .) The effect of the so-called litigation privilege is, as the court noted, to limit liability or provide immunity from suit by "precluding use of the protec | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commission
green
1 sentence2025(Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Comm. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 169-172 ; see also Muha v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. 2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 199 , 208 (Muha) [“[A]s a general rule, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered a concrete ‘injury,’ as that term 7 is used in Article III standing jurisprudence, to sue in state court.”]; Limon, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 696-698.) However, “the Legislature may authorize public interest lawsuits by a plaintiff even if that plaintiff has not been injured by the claimed violation.” (Limon, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 693-694 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014(City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439 ; Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253 .) A plaintiff may bring a claim 15 under title 42 United States Code section 1983 based on a violation of the right to equal protection. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Patricia Fuller v. City of Oakland, California George Hart Antonio Romero
green
1 sentence2014(Fuller v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1522, 1533-1534 .) To recover damages from a governmental unit for an equal protection violation under title 42 United States Code section 1983 , a plaintiff must show that the municipality’s action was motivated by a “discriminatory intent or purpose.” (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 265 .) “[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” (Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229, 240 .) “Unequal | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Snowden v. Hughes
green
1 sentence2014(Fuller v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1522, 1533-1534 .) To recover damages from a governmental unit for an equal protection violation under title 42 United States Code section 1983 , a plaintiff must show that the municipality’s action was motivated by a “discriminatory intent or purpose.” (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 265 .) “[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” (Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229, 240 .) “Unequal | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
green
1 sentence2014(Fuller v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1522, 1533-1534 .) To recover damages from a governmental unit for an equal protection violation under title 42 United States Code section 1983 , a plaintiff must show that the municipality’s action was motivated by a “discriminatory intent or purpose.” (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 265 .) “[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” (Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229, 240 .) “Unequal | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Cooley v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2014(City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439 ; Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253 .) A plaintiff may bring a claim 15 under title 42 United States Code section 1983 based on a violation of the right to equal protection. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Washington v. Davis
green
1 sentence2014(Fuller v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1522, 1533-1534 .) To recover damages from a governmental unit for an equal protection violation under title 42 United States Code section 1983 , a plaintiff must show that the municipality’s action was motivated by a “discriminatory intent or purpose.” (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 265 .) “[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” (Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229, 240 .) “Unequal | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ketchum v. Moses
green
1 sentence2014(Fuller v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1522, 1533-1534 .) To recover damages from a governmental unit for an equal protection violation under title 42 United States Code section 1983 , a plaintiff must show that the municipality’s action was motivated by a “discriminatory intent or purpose.” (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 265 .) “[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” (Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229, 240 .) “Unequal | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Murgia v. Municipal Court
green
1 sentence2014(Fuller v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1522, 1533-1534 .) To recover damages from a governmental unit for an equal protection violation under title 42 United States Code section 1983 , a plaintiff must show that the municipality’s action was motivated by a “discriminatory intent or purpose.” (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 265 .) “[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” (Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229, 240 .) “Unequal | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Baluyut v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2014(Fuller v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 1522, 1533-1534 .) To recover damages from a governmental unit for an equal protection violation under title 42 United States Code section 1983 , a plaintiff must show that the municipality’s action was motivated by a “discriminatory intent or purpose.” (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 265 .) “[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.” (Washington v. Davis (1976) 426 U.S. 229, 240 .) “Unequal | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.