sanity hearing in California

2004(People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 91-92 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 648 P.2d 578 ]; People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 283 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 644 , 431 P.2d 228 ].) Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s competence to stand trial. (§ 1368; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 811 P.2d 757 ].) Once the evidence raises such a reasonable doubt, the trial court is required to, “on its own motion, suspend proceedings in the case until the question is *1021 determined in a sanity hearing.” (People v. Tomas (1977) 74 Cal.App.3

2004(People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 91-92 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 648 P.2d 578 ]; People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 283 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 644 , 431 P.2d 228 ].) Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s competence to stand trial. (§ 1368; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 811 P.2d 757 ].) Once the evidence raises such a reasonable doubt, the trial court is required to, “on its own motion, suspend proceedings in the case until the question is *1021 determined in a sanity hearing.” (People v. Tomas (1977) 74 Cal.App.3

1967Denial of their motion for a present sanity hearing was held to be prejudicial error since “the circumstances here were such that it should be held as a matter of law that a doubt was or should have been created. ...” (Italics added.) ( 25 Cal.App. at p. 373 .) An examination of decisions falling into the second category leaves us with the conviction that even under the substantial evidence test of Pate and Pennington more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions (People v. Kroeger (1964) 61 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 593 , 390 P.2d 369 ]) or bizarre statements (People v.

1967Denial of their motion for a present sanity hearing was held to be prejudicial error since “the circumstances here were such that it should be held as a matter of law that a doubt was or should have been created. ...” (Italics added.) ( 25 Cal.App. at p. 373 .) An examination of decisions falling into the second category leaves us with the conviction that even under the substantial evidence test of Pate and Pennington more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions (People v. Kroeger (1964) 61 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 593 , 390 P.2d 369 ]) or bizarre statements (People v.

1967Denial of their motion for a present sanity hearing was held to be prejudicial error since “the circumstances here were such that it should be held as a matter of law that a doubt was or should have been created. ...” (Italics added.) ( 25 Cal.App. at p. 373 .) An examination of decisions falling into the second category leaves us with the conviction that even under the substantial evidence test of Pate and Pennington more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions (People v. Kroeger (1964) 61 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 593 , 390 P.2d 369 ]) or bizarre statements (People v.

1967Denial of their motion for a present sanity hearing was held to be prejudicial error since “the circumstances here were such that it should be held as a matter of law that a doubt was or should have been created. ...” (Italics added.) ( 25 Cal.App. at p. 373 .) An examination of decisions falling into the second category leaves us with the conviction that even under the substantial evidence test of Pate and Pennington more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions (People v. Kroeger (1964) 61 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 593 , 390 P.2d 369 ]) or bizarre statements (People v.

1967Denial of their motion for a present sanity hearing was held to be prejudicial error since “the circumstances here were such that it should be held as a matter of law that a doubt was or should have been created. ...” (Italics added.) ( 25 Cal.App. at p. 373 .) An examination of decisions falling into the second category leaves us with the conviction that even under the substantial evidence test of Pate and Pennington more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions (People v. Kroeger (1964) 61 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 593 , 390 P.2d 369 ]) or bizarre statements (People v.

1967Denial of their motion for a present sanity hearing was held to be prejudicial error since “the circumstances here were such that it should be held as a matter of law that a doubt was or should have been created. ...” (Italics added.) ( 25 Cal.App. at p. 373 .) An examination of decisions falling into the second category leaves us with the conviction that even under the substantial evidence test of Pate and Pennington more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions (People v. Kroeger (1964) 61 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 593 , 390 P.2d 369 ]) or bizarre statements (People v.

1967(See People v. Kramer, 227 Cal.App.2d 199, 201 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 487 ].) 4 Although counsel at the present sanity hearing called no witnesses, presented no evidence, did not seek to cross-examine Drs.

1967(See People v. Kramer, 227 Cal.App.2d 199, 201 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 487 ].) 4 Although counsel at the present sanity hearing called no witnesses, presented no evidence, did not seek to cross-examine Drs.

2018Code,] § 1368 ; Drope v. Missouri [ (1975) ] 420 U.S. [162,] 181 [ 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ].)" ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 , 847, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ( Rogers ).) " '[A]bsent a showing of "incompetence" that is "substantial" as a matter of law, the trial judge's decision not to order a competency hearing is entitled to great deference, because the trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant during trial.' " ( People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446 , 465, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 ( Sattiewhite ).) "Whether to order a present sanity hea

2018Code,] § 1368 ; Drope v. Missouri [ (1975) ] 420 U.S. [162,] 181 [ 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ].)" ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 , 847, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ( Rogers ).) " '[A]bsent a showing of "incompetence" that is "substantial" as a matter of law, the trial judge's decision not to order a competency hearing is entitled to great deference, because the trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant during trial.' " ( People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446 , 465, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 ( Sattiewhite ).) "Whether to order a present sanity hea

2018Code,] § 1368 ; Drope v. Missouri [ (1975) ] 420 U.S. [162,] 181 [ 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ].)" ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 , 847, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ( Rogers ).) " '[A]bsent a showing of "incompetence" that is "substantial" as a matter of law, the trial judge's decision not to order a competency hearing is entitled to great deference, because the trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant during trial.' " ( People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446 , 465, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 ( Sattiewhite ).) "Whether to order a present sanity hea

2018Code,] § 1368 ; Drope v. Missouri [ (1975) ] 420 U.S. [162,] 181 [ 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ].)" ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 , 847, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ( Rogers ).) " '[A]bsent a showing of "incompetence" that is "substantial" as a matter of law, the trial judge's decision not to order a competency hearing is entitled to great deference, because the trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant during trial.' " ( People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446 , 465, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 ( Sattiewhite ).) "Whether to order a present sanity hea

2004(People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 91-92 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 648 P.2d 578 ]; People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 283 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 644 , 431 P.2d 228 ].) Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s competence to stand trial. (§ 1368; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 811 P.2d 757 ].) Once the evidence raises such a reasonable doubt, the trial court is required to, “on its own motion, suspend proceedings in the case until the question is *1021 determined in a sanity hearing.” (People v. Tomas (1977) 74 Cal.App.3

2004(People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 91-92 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 611 , 648 P.2d 578 ]; People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 283 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 644 , 431 P.2d 228 ].) Evidence is substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s competence to stand trial. (§ 1368; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 811 P.2d 757 ].) Once the evidence raises such a reasonable doubt, the trial court is required to, “on its own motion, suspend proceedings in the case until the question is *1021 determined in a sanity hearing.” (People v. Tomas (1977) 74 Cal.App.3

2018(See People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 , 768-769, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752 .) In changing the sanity test in Drew , we also recognized that the defendant was entitled to review of the jury's finding that he was sane under the M'Naghten standard, the standard prevailing at the time. ( Drew , at p. 349, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 .) As we noted, "Defendant Drew argues that even under the M'Naghten test the jury's finding of sanity is not supported by substantial evidence.

2018(See People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 , 768-769, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752 .) In changing the sanity test in Drew , we also recognized that the defendant was entitled to review of the jury's finding that he was sane under the M'Naghten standard, the standard prevailing at the time. ( Drew , at p. 349, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 .) As we noted, "Defendant Drew argues that even under the M'Naghten test the jury's finding of sanity is not supported by substantial evidence.

2018If Drew should prevail in this contention, he would be entitled to an order directing the trial court to find him insane, thus avoiding a retrial of the case" under the newly adopted test. ( Ibid . ) In undertaking a review of the jury's finding, we confirmed, quoting People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795 , 804, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271 , 394 P.2d 959 , that the applicable standard of review was substantial evidence. ( Drew , at p. 350, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 .) The only evidence introduced at the sanity trial of Drew was the testimony of two court-appointed psychiatrists, both of whom opine

2018If Drew should prevail in this contention, he would be entitled to an order directing the trial court to find him insane, thus avoiding a retrial of the case" under the newly adopted test. ( Ibid . ) In undertaking a review of the jury's finding, we confirmed, quoting People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795 , 804, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271 , 394 P.2d 959 , that the applicable standard of review was substantial evidence. ( Drew , at p. 350, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 .) The only evidence introduced at the sanity trial of Drew was the testimony of two court-appointed psychiatrists, both of whom opine

2017Miranda principles may not be used against the defendant at trial [citation], including to rebut a sanity defense [citations].” (Andreasen, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 86 .) However, the Andreasen court did not consider whether a statement obtained in violation of Miranda would be admissible to impeach an expert as to the basis for his or her opinion. ‘“[I]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. [Citations.]” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161 , 1176 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 , 46 P.3d 372 ].) Defendant next analogizes this case to People v. Weaver (200

2017Miranda principles may not be used against the defendant at trial [citation], including to rebut a sanity defense [citations].” (Andreasen, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 86 .) However, the Andreasen court did not consider whether a statement obtained in violation of Miranda would be admissible to impeach an expert as to the basis for his or her opinion. ‘“[I]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. [Citations.]” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161 , 1176 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 , 46 P.3d 372 ].) Defendant next analogizes this case to People v. Weaver (200

2014We reversed and remanded for re- sentencing because multiple murder special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) had been improperly imposed for each murder conviction (People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 315 ), and because it was unclear whether the trial court had exercised its discretion under section 190.5, subdivision (b) in choosing life without parole for the murder counts instead of sentences of 25 years to life (People v. Murray (May 11, 2009, B20344) [nonpub. opn.] (Murray I)).

2012We reversed and remanded for resentencing because multiple-murder special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) had been improperly imposed for each murder conviction (People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 315 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767 , 82 P.3d 1249 ]), and because it was unclear whether the trial court had exercised its discretion under section 190.5, subdivision (b) in choosing life without parole for the murder counts instead of sentences of 25 years to life.

2025Our Supreme Court has held that it is error under California law to instruct the jury on the presumption of sanity during a trial on the question of guilt because the issue of legal insanity is irrelevant.7 ( Mills, supra, 55 6 We note that, aside from Dr. Musacco discussing his background, which included evaluations for “competency or sanity,” it was the prosecutor who raised the issue of sanity.

2025(Mills, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 677 [“the jury was instructed on mental illness and its effect on defendant’s actual formation of the intent required for murder.

2023(See People v. Houser (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 930, 933 [“There occurs to us no cogent reason to expect that prejudice in a sanity hearing would be incited to the point of unfairness by knowledge of defendant’s criminal record”].) Furthermore, contrary to defendant’s suggestion that Dr. Faizi did not reach any conclusions based on this information, Dr. Faizi explained she “did not note any irrational explanations or psychotic driven explanations when [defendant] was . . . discussing the actual incident at hand, or any of 17 the past incidents.” (Italics added.) Rather, Dr. Faizi found defendant m

2018(See People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 , 768-769, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752 .) In changing the sanity test in Drew , we also recognized that the defendant was entitled to review of the jury's finding that he was sane under the M'Naghten standard, the standard prevailing at the time. ( Drew , at p. 349, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 .) As we noted, "Defendant Drew argues that even under the M'Naghten test the jury's finding of sanity is not supported by substantial evidence.

2018(See People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 , 768-769, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752 .) In changing the sanity test in Drew , we also recognized that the defendant was entitled to review of the jury's finding that he was sane under the M'Naghten standard, the standard prevailing at the time. ( Drew , at p. 349, 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 .) As we noted, "Defendant Drew argues that even under the M'Naghten test the jury's finding of sanity is not supported by substantial evidence.

2015(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 160 .) Here, Ettima’s expert at the sanity hearing, Kaser-Boyd, opined at the time of offenses, Ettima had a mental disease, schizoaffective disorder.