de facto doctrine (Florida) · Go Syfert
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de facto doctrine in Florida

5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Frederick Keith Singletongreen
ca4 · 1997 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025See United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ourts have assumed that the right to self- representation and the right to representation by counsel, while independent, are essentially inverse aspects of the Sixth Amendment and thus that assertion of one constitutes a de facto waiver of the other.”).

11
Bell v. Stategreen
fla · 2013 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016We disagree. *632 As the Florida Supreme Court has noted, “[w]here the evidence is uncontra-dicted on a point that witnesses other than the defendant can contradict, a comment on the failure to contradict the evidence is not an impermissible comment on the failure of the defendant to testify.” Bell v. State, 108 So.3d 639, 648 (Fla.2013).

11
Gulle v. Boggsgreen
fla · 1965 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See Eppler, 752 So.2d at 594 (explaining that the rear-end presumption is a rebuttable presumption constructed by law to give effect to a certain group of facts in the absence of further evidence); see also Gulle, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (explaining that “[pjresumptions disappear when facts appear; and facts are deemed to appear when evidence is [produced] from which [facts] may be found” by the trier of fact).

11
Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc.green
fla · 2000 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See Eppler, 752 So.2d at 594 (explaining that the rear-end presumption is a rebuttable presumption constructed by law to give effect to a certain group of facts in the absence of further evidence); see also Gulle, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (explaining that “[pjresumptions disappear when facts appear; and facts are deemed to appear when evidence is [produced] from which [facts] may be found” by the trier of fact).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Bundy v. Rudd green
fla · 1978
1 sentence

1998When the State Attorney began to address the truth of the matters asserted, as opposed to the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, he precipitated a de facto violation of the court’s holding in Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So.2d 440 (Fla.1978).

11998–1998
Powell v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. green
gactapp · 1932
2 sentences

1975For instance, in the case of Powell v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, 1932, 45 Ga.App. 88 , 163 S.E. 239 , involving strikingly similar facts as presented in the instant case, the court held: “Where one acts as a deputy sheriff with the consent, approval and acquiescence of the sheriff, who holds him out to the public as his deputy, his acts as such deputy .although he was not appointed in writing as required by law and did not take the oath of office required of a deputy sheriff and did not otherwise legally qualify as a deputy sheriff, are acts of a deputy sheriff de facto, and poss

1975For instance, in the case of Powell v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, 1932, 45 Ga.App. 88 , 163 S.E. 239 , involving strikingly similar facts as presented in the instant case, the court held: “Where one acts as a deputy sheriff with the consent, approval and acquiescence of the sheriff, who holds him out to the public as his deputy, his acts as such deputy .although he was not appointed in writing as required by law and did not take the oath of office required of a deputy sheriff and did not otherwise legally qualify as a deputy sheriff, are acts of a deputy sheriff de facto, and poss

11975–1975

Where else courts name it

PA 38 (1976–2026) CA 28 (1991–2025) IL 22 (1928–2020) NY 14 (1968–2026) NJ 13 (1900–2022) UT 12 (1983–2017) VA 10 (2002–2025) LA 10 (1961–2026) MO 8 (1882–2019) MI 8 (1903–2023) CT 7 (1983–2019) TN 7 (1930–2009) CO 6 (1918–2023) FL 5 (1975–2025) TX 5 (1948–2015) IA 5 (1960–2022) AZ 4 (1973–2024) MN 4 (1948–2003) MD 4 (2013–2022) IN 4 (1975–2005) NM 4 (1943–2003) WA 4 (1984–2016) NV 4 (2015–2015) AR 4 (1927–2000) MS 3 (1995–2016) HI 3 (2013–2025) NC 3 (2003–2022) AK 3 (1977–1994) VT 2 (1983–1990) SD 2 (1954–1986) ME 2 (1909–2011) WI 2 (1998–2024) MA 2 (1916–2020) MT 2 (1918–2005) OK 2 (1962–1967)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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