C.F.R. » Title 37 » CHAPTER I—UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE › SUBCHAPTER A—GENERAL › PART 1—RULES OF PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES › Subpart E—Supplemental Examination of Patents

37 C.F.R. § 1.601

Filing of papers in supplemental examination

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(a) A request for supplemental examination of a patent must be filed by the owner(s) of the entire right, title, and interest in the patent.

(b) Any party other than the patent owner (i.e., any third party) is prohibited from filing papers or otherwise participating in any manner in a supplemental examination proceeding.

(c) A request for supplemental examination of a patent may be filed at any time during the period of enforceability of the patent.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 36 cases, 1989–2011 · leading case: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Washington, 334 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Washington, 334 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2003). · cites it 12× “Because the Director of the PTO’s (“Director’s”) interpretation of 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (n) as establishing a “two-way” test for determining whether two parties are claiming the “same patentable invention” is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, and the…”
In Re Robert J. Gartside & Richard C. Norton, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000). · cites it 4× “37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (i) defines an "interference” in relevant part as follows: An interference is a proceeding instituted in the Patent and Trademark Office before the Board to determine any question of patent- *1309 ability and priority of invention between two or more parties…”
Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., Defendant-Cross, 353 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir. 2003). · cites it 5× “The district court turned next to the issue of interference-in-fact between the '100 and '827 patents, and announced that it was applying the two-way test for identifying an interference provided in the Patent and Trademark Organization’s (“PTO”) regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 1.601…”
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., Defendant-Cross, 376 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004). · cites it 2× “See 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (i) (2003) (“An interference is a proceeding .”
Randolph J. Noelle v. Seth Lederman, Leonard Chess, & Michael J. Yellin, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). · cites it 3× “37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (n). In order for an interference-in-fact to exist, invention A must anticipate or make obvious invention B, and invention B must anticipate or make obvious invention A, thereby meeting both prongs of the “two-way” test.”
In Re Kenneth L. Berger, 279 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 2002). · cites it 4× “” He contends that the PTO applied the wrong test and instead should have applied the comparison standard of 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (n). Berger argues that if the standard of § 1.”
Christopher J. Stevens v. Shigeru Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). · cites it 3× “” 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (g); see also Hyatt, 146 F.”
Conservolite, Inc. v. Don F. Widmayer, 21 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1994). · cites it 3× “3 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.601 , 1.606. The declaration of an interference thus prima facie establishes those prerequisite conditions.”
In Re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993). · cites it 3× “Van Geuns’ claim 42 and Brown’s claim 1 correspond exactly to the count, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (f) (1987), which is defined as follows: A magnet assembly comprising a first superconducting coil assembly defining a working volume and adapted to generate a first magnetic field in…”
Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001). · cites it 2× “§ 135 (1994); 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (i) (2000). A “count” defines the interfering subject matter, and each count corresponds to a separate patentable invention.”
Phillip W. Berman, Timothy J. Gregory, Laurence A. Lasky, Gerald R. Nakamura, Eric J. Patzer, John S. Patton, & Ellen S. Vitetta v. Gerard M. Housey, 291 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002). · cites it 2× “§ 103 ,” which is the standard that also governs whether an application claims the “same patentable invention” for purposes of establishing an interference under 35 U.”
Giese v. Pierce Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 1999). · cites it 2× “The standard for patentable separateness is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (n): Invention “A” is the same patentable invention as an invention “B” when invention “A” is the same as ( 35 U.”
Show all 36 citing cases →
— 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(f) — 1 case
Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
— 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i) — 1 case
Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
— 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(j) — 1 case
Randolph J. Noelle v. Seth Lederman, Leonard Chess, & Michael J. Yellin, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (n). In order for an interference-in-fact to exist, invention A must anticipate or make obvious invention B, and invention B must anticipate or make obvious invention A, thereby meeting both prongs of the “two-way” test.”
— 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(n) — 4 cases
Randolph J. Noelle v. Seth Lederman, Leonard Chess, & Michael J. Yellin, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (n). In order for an interference-in-fact to exist, invention A must anticipate or make obvious invention B, and invention B must anticipate or make obvious invention A, thereby meeting both prongs of the “two-way” test.”
In Re Roemer, 258 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators Of The Univ. Of Missouri, 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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