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C.F.R.Title 8Chapter I—Department of Homeland SecuritySubchapter B—Immigration RegulationsPart 208—Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of RemovalSubpart A—Asylum and Withholding of Removal

8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2026)

Implementation of the Convention Against Torture

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1994–2026 1,345citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 1,345 opinions since 1994, 243 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(1) (23 cases).

(a) Definitions. The definitions in this subsection incorporate the definition of torture contained in Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture, subject to the reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United States Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention.

(1) Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity. Pain or suffering inflicted by a public official who is not acting under color of law shall not constitute pain or suffering inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity, although a different public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity could instigate, consent to, or acquiesce in the pain or suffering inflicted by the public official who is not acting under color of law.

(2) Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.

(3) Torture does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. Lawful sanctions include judicially imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions authorized by law, including the death penalty, but do not include sanctions that defeat the object and purpose of the Convention Against Torture to prohibit torture.

(4) In order to constitute torture, mental pain or suffering must be prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:

(i) The intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;

(ii) The administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;

(iii) The threat of imminent death; or

(iv) The threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or personality.

(5) In order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. An act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture.

(6) In order to constitute torture an act must be directed against a person in the offender's custody or physical control.

(7) Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity. Such awareness requires a finding of either actual knowledge or willful blindness. Willful blindness means that the public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity was aware of a high probability of activity constituting torture and deliberately avoided learning the truth; it is not enough that such public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity was mistaken, recklessly disregarded the truth, or negligently failed to inquire. In order for a public official to breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent activity constituting torture, the official must have been charged with preventing the activity as part of his or her duties and have failed to intervene. No person will be deemed to have breached a legal responsibility to intervene if such person is unable to intervene, or if the person intervenes but is unable to prevent the activity that constitutes torture.

(8) Noncompliance with applicable legal procedural standards does not per se constitute torture.

(b) Applicability of §§ 208.16(c) and 208.17(a)—(1) Aliens in proceedings on or after March 22, 1999. An alien who is in exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings on or after March 22, 1999 may apply for withholding of removal under § 208.16(c), and, if applicable, may be considered for deferral of removal under § 208.17(a).

(2) Aliens who were ordered removed, or whose removal orders became final, before March 22, 1999. An alien under a final order of deportation, exclusion, or removal that became final prior to March 22, 1999 may move to reopen proceedings for the sole purpose of seeking protection under § 208.16(c). Such motions shall be governed by §§ 3.23 and 3.2 of this chapter, except that the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen shall not apply and the alien shall not be required to demonstrate that the evidence sought to be offered was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. The motion to reopen shall not be granted unless:

(i) The motion is filed within June 21, 1999; and

(ii) The evidence sought to be offered establishes a prima facie case that the applicant's removal must be withheld or deferred under §§ 208.16(c) or 208.17(a).

(3) Aliens who, on March 22, 1999, have requests pending with the Service for protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. (i) Except as otherwise provided, after March 22, 1999, the Service will not:

(A) Consider, under its pre-regulatory administrative policy to ensure compliance with the Convention Against Torture, whether Article 3 of that Convention prohibits the removal of an alien to a particular country, or

(B) Stay the removal of an alien based on a request filed with the Service for protection under Article 3 of that Convention.

(ii) For each alien who, on or before March 22, 1999, filed a request with the Service for protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, and whose request has not been finally decided by the Service, the Service shall provide written notice that, after March 22, 1999, consideration for protection under Article 3 can be obtained only through the provisions of this rule.

(A) The notice shall inform an alien who is under an order of removal issued by EOIR that, in order to seek consideration of a claim under §§ 208.16(c) or 208.17(a), such an alien must file a motion to reopen with the immigration court or the Board of Immigration Appeals. This notice shall be accompanied by a stay of removal, effective until 30 days after service of the notice on the alien. A motion to reopen filed under this paragraph for the limited purpose of asserting a claim under §§ 208.16(c) or 208.17(a) shall not be subject to the requirements for reopening in §§ 3.2 and 3.23 of this chapter. Such a motion shall be granted if it is accompanied by a copy of the notice described in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) or by other convincing evidence that the alien had a request pending with the Service for protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture on March 22, 1999. The filing of such a motion shall extend the stay of removal during the pendency of the adjudication of this motion.

(B) The notice shall inform an alien who is under an administrative order of removal issued by the Service under section 238(b) of the Act or an exclusion, deportation, or removal order reinstated by the Service under section 241(a)(5) of the Act that the alien's claim to withholding of removal under § 208.16(c) or deferral of removal under § 208.17(a) will be considered under § 208.31.

(C) The notice shall inform an alien who is under an administrative order of removal issued by the Service under section 235(c) of the Act that the alien's claim to protection under the Convention Against Torture will be decided by the Service as provided in § 208.18(d) and 235.8(b)(4) and will not be considered under the provisions of this part relating to consideration or review by an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or an asylum officer.

(4) Aliens whose claims to protection under the Convention Against Torture were finally decided by the Service prior to March 22, 1999. Sections 208.16(c) and 208.17 (a) and paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section do not apply to cases in which, prior to March 22, 1999, the Service has made a final administrative determination about the applicability of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture to the case of an alien who filed a request with the Service for protection under Article 3. If, prior to March 22, 1999, the Service determined that an applicant cannot be removed consistent with the Convention Against Torture, the alien shall be considered to have been granted withholding of removal under § 208.16(c), unless the alien is subject to mandatory denial of withholding of removal under § 208.16(d)(2) or (d)(3), in which case the alien will be considered to have been granted deferral of removal under 208.17(a). If, prior to March 22, 1999, the Service determined that an alien can be removed consistent with the Convention Against Torture, the alien will be considered to have been finally denied withholding of removal under § 208.16(c) and deferral of removal under § 208.17(a).

(c) Diplomatic assurances against torture obtained by the Secretary of State. (1) The Secretary of State may forward to the Attorney General assurances that the Secretary has obtained from the government of a specific country that an alien would not be tortured there if the alien were removed to that country.

(2) If the Secretary of State forwards assurances described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section to the Attorney General for consideration by the Attorney General or her delegates under this paragraph, the Attorney General shall determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State, whether the assurances are sufficiently reliable to allow the alien's removal to that country consistent with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. The Attorney General's authority under this paragraph may be exercised by the Deputy Attorney General or by the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, but may not be further delegated.

(3) Once assurances are provided under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the alien's claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture shall not be considered further by an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or an asylum officer.

(d) Cases involving aliens ordered removed under section 235(c) of the Act. With respect to an alien terrorist or other alien subject to administrative removal under section 235(c) of the Act who requests protection under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, the Service will assess the applicability of Article 3 through the removal process to ensure that a removal order will not be executed under circumstances that would violate the obligations of the United States under Article 3. In such cases, the provisions of Part 208 relating to consideration or review by an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or an asylum officer shall not apply.

(e) Judicial review of claims for protection from removal under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. (1) Pursuant to the provisions of section 2242(d) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, there shall be no judicial appeal or review of any action, decision, or claim raised under the Convention or that section, except as part of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Act; provided however, that any appeal or petition regarding an action, decision, or claim under the Convention or under section 2242 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 shall not be deemed to include or authorize the consideration of any administrative order or decision, or portion thereof, the appeal or review of which is restricted or prohibited by the Act.

(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided, nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to create a private right of action or to authorize the consideration or issuance of administrative or judicial relief.

[64 FR 8490, Feb. 19, 1999; 64 FR 13881, Mar. 23, 1999, as amended at 85 FR 80389, Dec. 11, 2020]
The 20 cases that cite 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENJ-e, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 2002).
cites § 208.18 29×cited by 150 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“(2) Torture within the meaning of the Convention Against Torture and 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a) (2001) is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not extend to lesser forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”
The case’s holding
Torture requires an act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, distinguishing it from other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no evidence that haitian authorities are detaining criminal deportees with the specific intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” · 12 citing courts
2
GREENPierre v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008).
cites § 208.18 14×cited by 216 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“Before we ever addressed this issue, in 2002, the BIA considered whether indefinite detention, inhuman prison conditions, and police mistreatment constitute torture under 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a). Matter of J-E-, 23 I.”
The case’s holding
Specific intent under the Convention Against Torture requires the government official to have the goal or purpose of inflicting severe pain rather than mere knowledge of the outcome.
Later courts cite it for
“prospective torturer will have the goal or purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering” · 15 citing courts
3
GREENJean Neckson Cadet v. John M. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2004).
cites § 208.18 14×cited by 215 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“” See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(3) (CAT contains an exception for pain and suffering incident to lawful sanctions.”
The case’s holding
Federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to review Convention Against Torture claims despite the implementing statute's silence on habeas corpus, though review is limited to constitutional issues and legal errors.
Later courts cite it for
“an agency's interpretation is reasonable and controlling unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENPierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
cites § 208.18 13×cited by 210 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(5). In re J-E- construed the phrase “specifically intended” to require a showing of specific intent.”
The case’s holding
Substandard prison conditions constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture only if the deficits are extreme and inflicted intentionally rather than as a result of poverty, neglect, or incompetence.
Later courts cite it for
“a private actor's behavior can constitute torture under the cat without a government's specific intent to inflict it if a government official is aware of the persecutor's conduct and intent and acquiesces in violation of the official's duty to intervene.” · 26 citing courts
5
GREENLydia Garcia-Milian v. Eric Holder, Jr., 755 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2014).
cites § 208.18 8×cited by 893 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“§§ 1158 , 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 . Garcia-Milian testified at the removal proceedings and the IJ concluded that her testimony was credible.”
The case’s holding
A petitioner must establish state action to qualify for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
Later courts cite it for
“nor does evidence that a government has been generally ineffective in preventing or investigating criminal activities raise an inference that public officials are likely to acquiesce in torture, absent evidence of corruption or other inability or unwillingness to oppose criminal organizations.” · 41 citing courts
6
GREENTengiz Sevoian v. John Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2002).
cites § 208.18 7×cited by 794 cases
The case’s holding
An agency decision denying a motion to reopen for failure to establish a prima facie case is reviewed for substantial evidence regarding factual findings and abuse of discretion regarding the ultimate decision.
Later courts cite it for
“the board is not required to write an exegesis on every contention, but only to show that it has reviewed the record and grasped the movant's claims.” · 25 citing courts
7
GREENLi Chen Zheng v. John Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003).
cites § 208.18 8×cited by 497 cases
The case’s holding
Acquiescence under the Convention Against Torture requires that a public official has awareness of the torture, through actual knowledge or willful blindness, and fails to intervene.
Later courts cite it for
“acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” · 8 citing courts
8
REDTakky Zubeda v. John Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003).
cites § 208.18 7×cited by 640 cases
Abrogated by Auguste v. Secretary Homeland on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 208.18
“8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(1). “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.”
The case’s holding
Reports of generalized brutality within a country do not allow an applicant to sustain the burden of proof under the Convention Against Torture without additional evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“a reasonable person in the alien's circumstances would fear persecution if returned to the country in question.” · 29 citing courts
9
GREENFrancisco Ornelas-Chavez v. Alberto R. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).
cites § 208.18 8×cited by 222 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(7). In Zheng we reversed a BIA decision interpreting the regulations implementing CAT to require that public officials be “willfully accepting of’ torture.”
The case’s holding
An applicant need not report private persecution to authorities if doing so would be futile or dangerous.
Later courts cite it for
“where the bia applies the wrong legal standard to an applicant's claim, the appropriate relief from this court is remand for reconsideration under the correct standard, not independent review of the evidence.” · 13 citing courts
10
GREENNelson Andrade-Garcia v. Loretta E. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2016).
cites § 208.18 4×cited by 349 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“21, 1998); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18 , 1208.18. An alien with a reinstated removal order may be eligible for other forms of relief as well, including withholding of removal.”
The case’s holding
General ineffectiveness by a government to investigate and prevent crime is insufficient to establish government acquiescence to torture under the Convention Against Torture.
Later courts cite it for
“a general ineffectiveness on the government's part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.” · 131 citing courts
11
GREENRaul Barajas-Romero v. Loretta E. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2017).
cites § 208.18 3×cited by 696 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“sessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered, including, but not limited to: (i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the…”
The case’s holding
The statutory phrase a reason is a less demanding standard than one central reason for establishing a nexus in withholding of removal claims.
Later courts cite it for
“that it is more likely than not” · 24 citing courts
12
GREENLuz Marina Silva v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 448 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2006).
cites § 208.18 6×subsections: (a)(1) 2× (a)(6) 2× (b)(1) 2×cited by 349 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“See 8 C.F.R. Section 208.18(a)(1). The severe pain or suffering must be inflicted on the applicant or a third person for one of four purposes, specifically, one, for obtaining information or a confession, two, for punishing for an act committed or suspected of having been…”
The case’s holding
Death threats and anonymous threatening phone calls constitute mere harassment and do not qualify as persecution without additional evidence of harm.
Later courts cite it for
“to establish asylum based on past persecution, the applicant must prove (1) that she was persecuted, and (2) that the persecution was on account of a protected ground.” · 50 citing courts
13
GREENMohamed Kamara v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 420 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2005).
cites § 208.18 6×cited by 337 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(1) (stating that to receive protection under CAT, applicant must show that torture will be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”).”
The case’s holding
An applicant for relief under the Convention Against Torture must demonstrate that the cumulative probability of torture by both government and non-governmental actors exceeds fifty percent.
Later courts cite it for
“the government has a constitutional duty to protect a person against injuries inflicted by a third-party when it affirmatively places the person in a position of danger the person would not otherwise have faced.” · 7 citing courts
14
GREENAhmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2007).
cites § 208.18 6×cited by 247 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“2001) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(2)), amended by, 355 F.”
The case’s holding
Political opinion encompasses more than formal political ideology or electoral action, and the cumulative effect of multiple instances of harm can constitute persecution.
Later courts cite it for
“a political opinion encompasses more than electoral politics or formal political ideology or action.” · 7 citing courts
15
GREENNavaratwam Kamalthas v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 251 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 2001).
cites § 208.18 4×cited by 778 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“2000), FARRA § 2242(d), in concert with regulations codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (e) (2000), specifically provides for judicial review of the BIA’s denials of motions to reopen under the Convention.”
The case’s holding
Relief under the Convention Against Torture is not a subset of asylum or withholding of removal claims because country conditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief.
Later courts cite it for
“country conditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief under the convention.” · 22 citing courts
cites § 208.18 6×cited by 175 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“on: Torture is defined as an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a…”
The case’s holding
The Board of Immigration Appeals must provide a reasoned explanation when departing from prior precedent to define a particular social group for asylum purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“to qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must establish a 'clear probability of persecution,' i.e., that it is more likely than not, that s/he would suffer persecution upon returning home.” · 9 citing courts
17
GREENS-v, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000).
cites § 208.18 9×cited by 171 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(1). The respondent in the instant case does not allege that he fears torture inflicted by a government official.”
The case’s holding
Protection under the Convention Against Torture requires that the feared torture be inflicted by or with the acquiescence of a public official or person acting in an official capacity.
Later courts cite it for
“reveals a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied.” · 15 citing courts
18
GREENLuis Reyes-Reyes v. John Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004).
cites § 208.18 7×cited by 90 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
““Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for ... any reason based on discrimination of any kind .”
The case’s holding
Torture includes acts by private parties if the government is unable or unwilling to control those parties or provides consent or acquiescence through willful blindness.
Later courts cite it for
“only means that the bia deemed any errors by the ij to be harmless,' as a practical matter, we may review only the reasoning presented by the ij.” · 2 citing courts
19
YELLOWMu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003).
cites § 208.18 4×cited by 322 cases
Superseded by statute on other grounds (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4)): 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 208.18
“8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (a)(1). The regulations further provide that “[tjorture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment,” 8 C.”
Later courts cite it for
“authorizes a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever a petitioner is 'in custody in violation of the constitution or laws or treaties of the united states.” · 113 citing courts
20
cites § 208.18 7×cited by 200 cases
Where it cites § 208.18
“; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (b)(2)- (allowing aliens under final order of deportation, .”
The case’s holding
Relief from deportation is granted only if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.
Later courts cite it for
“where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” · 5 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199420102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 145 cases in 2006. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
9th Cir.3903rd Cir.22311th Cir.1835th Cir.1156th Cir.922d Cir.847th Cir.791st Cir.58

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 26 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)(1)23 cases
Luz Marina Silva v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 448 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2006).“See 8 C.F.R. Section 208.18(a)(1). The severe pain or suffering must be inflicted on the applicant or a third person for one of four purposes, specifically, one, for obtaining information or a confession, two, for punishing for an act committed or suspected of having been…”
Cruz Garcia v. Eric Holder, Jr., 756 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 2014).
Khan v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 573 (1st Cir. 2008).
Jimenez-Mora v. Atty Gen USA, 86 F. App'x 527 (3d Cir. 2004).
Showing the top 5 of 23. More in the list view →
(a)(1)(CAT)1 case
Sundari v. Ashcroft, 116 F. App'x 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
(a)(2)2 cases
Reyes-Sanchez v. Ashcroft, 261 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Quant v. Ashcroft, 61 F. App'x 386 (9th Cir. 2003).
(a)(5)1 case
Thelemaque v. Ashcroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Conn. 2005).
(a)(6)1 case
Luz Marina Silva v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 448 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2006).
(a)(7)7 cases
Jimenez-Mora v. Atty Gen USA, 86 F. App'x 527 (3d Cir. 2004).
Ramirez-Tepaz v. Bondi, No. 23-4146 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2025).
Glenda Alvarado-Paz v. Todd Blanche, 177 F.4th 532 (4th Cir. 2026).
Mercy A. Akem v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 194 F. App'x 648 (11th Cir. 2006).
Angelina E. Castillo-Hernandez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 297 F. App'x 894 (11th Cir. 2008).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(b)(1)2 cases
Luz Marina Silva v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 448 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2006).
Ifedolapo O. Ajibade v. John Ashcroft, 92 F. App'x 384 (8th Cir. 2004).
(b)(2)1 case
Aranda-Tercero v. Gonzales, 235 F. App'x 321 (5th Cir. 2007).
(b)(2)(I)1 case
Sobhi v. Gonzales, 150 F. App'x 691 (9th Cir. 2005).
(e)1 case
Zi Lin Chen v. John Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 611 (9th Cir. 2004).
(e)(1)1 case
Mortagy v. Ashcroft, 74 F. App'x 351 (5th Cir. 2003).
(e)(3)1 case
Phonetel Tech., Inc. v. Network Enhanced Telecom, 197 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Tex. 2002).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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