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Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-302 (2024)

Second trial barred by former prosecution for different offense

Edition and currency
C.R.S. 2024: the 2025 and 2026 sessions are not included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTC.R.S. 2024: the 2025 and 2026 sessions are not included cited 1977–2026 12citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 12 opinions since 1977, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1)(b) (3 cases).

(1) Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of law than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances:

(a) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction as defined in section 18-1-301 (1)(a) and (1)(c) and the subsequent prosecution is for:

(I) Any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted under the allegation of the complaint, information, or indictment of the first prosecution; or

(II) The same conduct, unless the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil or the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.

(b) The former prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established for conviction of the second offense.

(c) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination is defined in section 18-1-301 (1)(d) and (2), and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly terminated.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 397, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-402.

The 12 cases that cite Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-302 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENPeople v. Hines, 572 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1977).
cites § 18-1-302 4×cited by 218 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“Section 18-1-302 must be read to deal with multiple prosecutions in the same jurisdiction, i.”
The case’s holding
A finding of bodily injury requires proof that the kidnapping caused at least some physical pain, illness, or physical or mental impairment, however slight.
Later courts cite it for
“to support a finding of bodily injury the prosecution must prove that at least some physical pain, illness, or physical or mental impairment, however slight, was caused by the kidnapping.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 18-1-302 2×cited by 78 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“The compulsory joinder requirement of section 18-1-408(2) is broader than both the “same offense” principle of double jeopardy as codified in section 18-1-301 and the collateral estoppel effect of a prior determination of an ultimate fact as outlined in section 18-1-302. The…”
The case’s holding
Compulsory joinder applies to offenses arising from the same criminal episode if the prosecutor knows of the offenses when jeopardy attaches to the initial prosecution.
Later courts cite it for
“a series of acts arising from the same criminal episode” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENPeople v. Williams, 651 P.2d 899 (Colo. 1982).
cites § 18-1-302 3×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“*901 dated section 18-1-302, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.”
4
GREENPeople v. Matheson, 671 P.2d 968 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 18-1-302 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“” When defendant remonstrated, the court further stated: “Apparently you did a little more than go by permission this time because there was a sexual assault involved in addition to simply going in.”
5
GREENPeople v. Allen, 944 P.2d 541 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 18-1-302 3×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“Alternatively, defendant argues that, under principles of collateral estoppel, codified at § 18-1-302, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), the prosecution for criminal trespass was barred because it involved the same conduct as the order of contempt of court.”
6
GREENPeople v. Smith, 938 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1997).
cites § 18-1-302 1×subsections: (1)(b)cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“§ 18-1-302(l)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that collateral estoppel is to be applied by the courts with realism and rationality.”
Later courts cite it for
“ordinarily, a prosecutor has discretion to charge any applicable offense.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENPeople v. Rogers, 742 P.2d 912 (Colo. 1987).
cites § 18-1-302 1×subsections: (1)(a)(II)cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“(1986) (prosecution for violation of different provision of law than former prosecution is barred, and also prosecution based on different facts is barred, when former prosecution results in acquittal or conviction and subsequent prosecution is for same conduct, unless offense…”
Later courts cite it for
“properly focuses the trial court's inquiry on the degree to which the defendant is harassed and judicial resources wasted by successive prosecutions.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENPeople ex rel. Gallagher v. Arapahoe Cnty. Court, 772 P.2d 665 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 18-1-302 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“County Court, supra. *667 We reject the People’s assertion that double jeopardy and compulsory join-der considerations require a C.”
9
cites § 18-1-302 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“We there stated: “The compulsory joinder requirement of section 18-1-408(2) is broader than both the ‘same offense’ principle of double jeopardy as codified in section 18-1-301 and the collateral estoppel effect of a prior determination of an ultimate fact as outlined in section…”
The case’s holding
Offenses arising from practically the same time and place constitute the same criminal episode, so a later prosecution for an offense not joined in the earlier proceeding is barred by compulsory joinder.
Later courts cite it for
“function only by virtue of the district attorney's authority ...” · 2 citing courts
10
REDPeople v. Smith, 919 P.2d 843 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 18-1-302 3×subsections: (1)(b)cited by 1 case
Reversed by People v. Smith (1997): the Supreme Court of Colorado's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“The concept of collateral estoppel has been embodied by the General Assembly in §§ 18-1-302 and 18-1-303, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.”
11
GREENCorr v. Dist. Ct. in & for Eighth Jud. Dist., 661 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1983).
cites § 18-1-302 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“We there stated: "The compulsory joinder requirement of section 18-1-408(2) is broader than both the `same offense' principle of double jeopardy as codified in section 18-1-301 and the collateral estoppel effect of a prior determination of an ultimate fact as outlined in section…”
cites § 18-1-302 3×subsections: (1)(b) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 18-1-302
“In these motions, Gottorff alleged that his trial, conviction, and confinement violated various criminal statutes and were barred by collateral estoppel, see § 18-1-302 (1) (b) , C.R.S. (2025) , and by double jeopardy, see § 18-1-301 (1) (a) , C.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197720012026

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1983. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Colo.8Colo. Ct. App.4
By subsection
(1)(a)(II)1 case
People v. Rogers, 742 P.2d 912 (Colo. 1987).“(1986) (prosecution for violation of different provision of law than former prosecution is barred, and also prosecution based on different facts is barred, when former prosecution results in acquittal or conviction and subsequent prosecution is for same conduct, unless offense…”
(1)(b)3 cases
People v. Smith, 938 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1997).“§ 18-1-302(l)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that collateral estoppel is to be applied by the courts with realism and rationality.”
People v. Smith, 919 P.2d 843 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).“The concept of collateral estoppel has been embodied by the General Assembly in §§ 18-1-302 and 18-1-303, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.”
David J. Gottorff v. Jason Lengerich & Moses Stancil. David J. Gottorff v. Bryan Coleman, Warden of the Buena Vista Corr. Facility, & Moses Stancil, Exec. Dir. of Colorado Dep't of Corr.., 2026 CO 37, 590 P.3d 296.“In these motions, Gottorff alleged that his trial, conviction, and confinement violated various criminal statutes and were barred by collateral estoppel, see § 18-1-302 (1) (b) , C.R.S. (2025) , and by double jeopardy, see § 18-1-301 (1) (a) , C.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: C.R.S. 2024: the 2025 and 2026 sessions are not included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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