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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 17a — Social and Human Services and ResourcesChapter 319i — Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-593 (2025)

(Formerly Sec. 17-257n). Court order to discharge acquittee from custody

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laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
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CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1994–2026 46citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 46 opinions since 1994, 13 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (c) (1 case).

(a) The board, pursuant to section 17a-584 or 17a-592, may recommend to the court the discharge of the acquittee from custody or the acquittee may apply directly to the court for discharge from custody. The court shall send copies of the recommendation or application to the state's attorney and to counsel for the acquittee. An acquittee may apply for discharge not more than once every six months and no sooner than six months after the initial board hearing held pursuant to section 17a-583.

(b) The recommendation or application shall contain the dates on which any prior recommendations or applications for discharge had been filed with the court, the dates on which decisions thereon were rendered, and a statement of facts, including any change in circumstances since the determination on the most recent recommendation or application, sufficient to qualify the acquittee as a person who should be discharged. A recommendation by the board shall contain findings and conclusions to support the recommendation.

(c) If reasonable cause exists to believe that the acquittee remains a person with psychiatric disabilities or a person with intellectual disability to the extent that his discharge at the expiration of his maximum term of commitment would constitute a danger to himself or others, the state's attorney, at least one hundred thirty-five days prior to such expiration, may petition the court for an order of continued commitment of the acquittee.

(d) The court shall forward any application for discharge received from the acquittee and any petition for continued commitment of the acquittee to the board. The board shall, within ninety days of its receipt of the application or petition, file a report with the court, and send a copy thereof to the state's attorney and counsel for the acquittee, setting forth its findings and conclusions as to whether the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. The board may hold a hearing or take other action appropriate to assist it in preparing its report.

(e) Within ten days of receipt of a recommendation for discharge filed by the board under subsection (a) of this section or receipt of the board's report filed under subsection (d) of this section, either the state's attorney or counsel for the acquittee may file notice of intent to perform a separate examination of the acquittee. An examination conducted on behalf of the acquittee may be performed by a psychiatrist or psychologist of the acquittee's own choice and shall be performed at the expense of the acquittee unless he is indigent. If the acquittee is indigent, the court shall provide him with the services of a psychiatrist or psychologist to perform the examination at the expense of the state. Any such separate examination report shall be filed with the court within thirty days of the notice of intent to perform the examination. To facilitate examinations of the acquittee, the court may order him placed in the temporary custody of any hospital for psychiatric disabilities or other suitable facility or placed with the Commissioner of Developmental Services.

(f) After receipt of the board's report and any separate examination reports, the court shall promptly commence a hearing on the recommendation or application for discharge or petition for continued commitment. At the hearing, the acquittee shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.

(g) The court shall make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering that its primary concern is the protection of society and its secondary concern is the safety and well-being of the acquittee, make one of the following orders: (1) If the court finds that the acquittee is not a person who should be discharged, the court shall order the recommendation or application for discharge be dismissed; or (2) if the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged, the court shall order the acquittee discharged from custody. The court shall send a copy of such finding and order to the board.

(P.A. 85-506, S. 14, 32; P.A. 86-403, S. 38, 132; P.A. 87-486, S. 9; P.A. 95-257, S. 48, 58; P.A. 07-73, S. 2(b); P.A. 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 22-45, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (e); P.A. 87-486 replaced provisions authorizing board to “apply to the court for discharge of the acquittee” with provisions authorizing board to “recommend to the court the discharge of the acquittee” and added references to the board's “recommendation” to reflect this procedural change, amended Subsec. (c) to add reference to an acquittee who is mentally retarded and to authorize the state's attorney to petition the court for continued commitment at least 135, rather than 90, days prior to the commitment's expiration, amended Subsec. (d) to require the board to file a report within 90, rather than 45, days of receiving an application or petition, amended Subsec. (e) to authorize the court to place the acquittee with the commissioner of mental retardation, amended Subsec. (f) to delete provision that the board has the burden of proof when it applies for an order of discharge, and amended Subsec. (g) to replace provision that “if the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined, the court shall continue the initial order committing the acquittee to the jurisdiction of the board” with “if the court finds that the acquittee is not a person who should be discharged, the court shall order the recommendation or application for discharge be dismissed”; Sec. 17-257n transferred to Sec. 17a-593 in 1991; P.A. 95-257 replaced “mentally ill” and “mental illness” with varying phrases containing the words “psychiatric disabilities”, effective July 1, 1995; pursuant to P.A. 07-73 “Commissioner of Mental Retardation” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Commissioner of Developmental Services”, effective October 1, 2007; pursuant to P.A. 11-129, “mentally retarded” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “a person with intellectual disability” in Subsec. (c); P.A. 22-45 amended Subsec. (g) by adding requirement of consideration as a secondary concern of safety and well-being of the acquittee.

Annotations to former section 17-257n:

Cited. 211 C. 591; 215 C. 675.

Cited. 12 CA 32; 15 CA 74; judgment reversed, see 211 C. 591; 20 CA 96.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 230 C. 400. Meaning of “psychiatric disabilities” within definition of “person who should be discharged” is not governed by the standard in either Sec. 17a-495(c) or 17a-458(a) and trial court applied the correct standard, found in governing regulations, in its interpretation of the term; the determination of whether person is a danger to himself or others is a question of fact and is to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; trial court's finding that defendant suffered from a severe personality disorder and should therefore not be discharged did not violate defendant's substantive due process rights. 265 C. 697. Trial court's conclusions that Subsec. (c) violated defendant's due process rights under Connecticut Constitution and state and federal equal protection rights present questions of law over which Supreme Court's review is plenary. 268 C. 508. Defendant's further commitment under section is constitutional because state may subject insanity acquittees like defendant to recommitment procedure that is more restrictive than the procedure applicable to civilly committed inmates, and such difference does not violate right to equal protection. 307 C. 299.

Cited. 43 CA 592. Statute found not to be unconstitutionally vague; court rejected arguments that the lack of definition of “dangerous to himself and others” and burden of predicting future conduct made statute vague. 69 CA 666. Court may properly credit board's opinions and rely on its findings; such findings are not inadmissible hearsay. 100 CA 407.

Subsec. (c):

Section impliedly imposes same burden on the state at a hearing for continued commitment of an acquittee beyond his current definite period of commitment as is imposed in a civil commitment hearing under Sec. 17a-498(c). 230 C. 400. Subsec. neither affects a suspect group nor implicates a fundamental right for purposes of federal equal protection clause, and therefore must be analyzed under rational basis review. 268 C. 508.

Clearly erroneous standard applies to review of court's findings as to whether an acquittee is currently mentally ill to the point of posing a danger to himself or community if discharged. 77 CA 564. Does not violate defendant's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. 92 CA 206.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-593 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Long, 847 A.2d 862 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 17a-593 78×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“This appeal concerns the constitutionality of Connecticut’s statutory procedures governing the recommitment of insanity acquittees (acquittees), as set forth in General Statutes § 17a-593 (c), 1 which permits a court to extend the commitment of an acquittee past his initial term…”
The case’s holding
A state statute satisfies the equal protection clause if it treats persons in the same relation differently based on a rational basis rather than invidious discrimination.
Later courts cite it for
“to implicate the equal protection clause . . . it is necessary that the state statute or statutory scheme in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Metz, 645 A.2d 965 (Conn. 1994).
cites § 17a-593 46×cited by 115 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“*403 Sixty-eight days prior to the expiration of the maximum period of commitment, the state petitioned for its *404 extension, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593 (c), 2 on the ground that the defendant continued to be men *405 tally ill and a danger to himself or others.”
The case’s holding
The state bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that an acquittee is currently mentally ill and dangerous when seeking continued commitment beyond the maximum term.
Later courts cite it for
“by clear and convincing evidence that the acquittee is currently mentally ill and dangerous to himself or herself or others or gravely disabled.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Harris, 890 A.2d 559 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 17a-593 29×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“When the acquittee’s term of commitment approached its conclusion in 2002, the state’s attorney filed with the Superior Court a petition for continued commitment pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593 (c). 6 Thereafter, the board held a hearing to investigate whether the…”
The case’s holding
The sixth amendment confrontation clause does not apply to continued commitment proceedings because such proceedings are civil in nature.
4
GREENState v. Jacob, 798 A.2d 974 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 17a-593 37×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“On appeal, the acquittee claims that (1) General Statutes § 17a-593 violates the due process rights of Connecticut acquittees because it is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the court’s finding that the acquittee is currently mentally ill to the extent that his discharge would…”
5
GREENState v. March, 830 A.2d 212 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 17a-593 30×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“The defendant, Dawn March, who was acquitted of a manslaughter charge because of mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes *699 § 53a-13 (a), 1 appeals 2 from the trial court’s judgment denying her application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the psychiatric…”
The case’s holding
In discharge proceedings for insanity acquittees, the board's regulatory definitions of mental illness and dangerousness govern, and dangerousness is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.
6
GREENState v. Long, 19 A.3d 1242 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 17a-593 32×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“This appeal concerns the defendant’s second attempt to challenge, on equal protection grounds, the state’s most recent petition to continue his commitment under General Statutes § 17a-593 (c). 1 In a previous appeal, this court concluded, contrary to the determination of the…”
Later courts cite it for
“if reasonable cause exists to believe that the acquittee remains a person with psychiatric disabilities or a person with intellectual disability to the extent that his discharge at the expiration of his maximum term of commitment would constitute a danger to himself or others, the state's attorney . . . may petition the court for an order of continued commitment of the acquittee” · 1 citing court
7
GREENState v. Warren, 919 A.2d 465 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 17a-593 27×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“Warren, appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering his continued commitment to the psychiatric security review board (board) pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593. The acquittee claims that (1) the court did not apply the proper legal principles to the state’s…”
8
GREENState v. Dyous, 233 A.3d 1138 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
cites § 17a-593 17×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“Therein, the state represented that the acquittee remained mentally ill to the extent that his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others.”
Later courts cite it for
“it would be a better practice for the state to present evidence that an acquittee's diagnosis of a mental illness is based on the dms-5,” · 1 citing court
9
GREENState v. Vasquez, 222 A.3d 1018 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
cites § 17a-593 16×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“On October 26, 2017, the board filed its report with the court recommending that the acquittee not be discharged because ‘‘[a]lthough [the acquittee’s] psychotic symptoms have not been active since his commitment to the [b]oard, he has repeatedly demonstrated poor judgment,…”
10
GREENState v. Lindo, 955 A.2d 576 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 17a-593 23×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“On appeal, the acquittee claims that General Statutes § 17a-593 (c), 1 as applied to him, violated his right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution.”
11
GREENDuperry v. Solnit, 803 A.2d 287 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 17a-593 5×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“atric disabilities; (5) he must remain committed during any term of commitment imposed by the trial court unless the court finds that the defendant is a person who should no longer be committed and orders his discharge; (6) the maximum term of commitment ordered by the court can…”
The case’s holding
A new constitutional rule requiring a trial court to canvass a defendant entering a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect is not retroactively applicable.
Later courts cite it for
“questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact receive plenary review” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Corr, 867 A.2d 124 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 17a-593 13×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“On December 16, 2002, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17a-593 (a) 4 and 17a-580 (11), 5 the acquittee applied for a discharge from the jurisdiction of the board.”
13
GREENState v. Gillespie, 884 A.2d 419 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 17a-593 17×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“On August 7, 2003, the state filed a petition for an order of continued commitment of the acquittee in connection with the Weatherly case pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593 (c). That petition was filed under the wrong docket number, CR74-175185, the docket number from the…”
14
GREENSastrom v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., 968 A.2d 396 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 17a-593 7×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“” 13 General Statutes § 17a-593 (d) provides in relevant part: “The court shall forward any application for discharge received from the acquittee and any petition for continued commitment of the acquittee to the board.”
The case’s holding
A statute does not divest a court of jurisdiction unless the legislature expresses a clear intent to limit that jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“a determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, and therefore our review is plenary.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENState v. Maskiell, 918 A.2d 293 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 17a-593 8×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“Maskiell, appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering his continued confinement to the psychiatric security board of review (board) pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593. The acquittee claims that (1) the admission of the board’s report to the court violated his…”
16
GREENState v. Damone, 83 A.3d 1227 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
cites § 17a-593 7×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“y Review Board (board) since July 1, 1985, following his acquittal by reason of mental disease or defect on two counts of sexual assault in the first degree with a deadly weapon, two counts of kidnapping in the first degree and one count of attempt to commit sexual assault in…”
17
GREENState v. Leak, 998 A.2d 1182 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 17a-593 6×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“Thereafter, on April 20,2007, 5 the state filed a petition for an order of continued commitment pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593 (c) 6 and, on May 15, 2007, it filed a request for clarification, asking that the mittimus for each file be amended to show that the terms of…”
18
GREENState v. Cole, 718 A.2d 457 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 17a-593 7×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“” The defendant argues that the trial court’s instructions failed to refer specifically to the confinement and conditional release provisions of General Statutes § 17a-593 (c) 5 and (g), 6 and General Statutes § 17a-594 (a).”
Later courts cite it for
“our standard of review regarding challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings is that these rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there is an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice.” · 4 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Weathers, 205 A.3d 614 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
cites § 17a-593 4×subsections: (c) 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“Thus, this court has stated-albeit in the context of a petition by the state for an order of continued commitment of an insanity acquittee pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593(c) 23 -that "[t]he ultimate determination of mental illness .”
20
GREENState v. Ouellette, 859 A.2d 907 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 17a-593 2×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 17a-593
“witnesses against him; (4) he is exposing himself to the possibility of commitment to the jurisdiction of the board and of confinement in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities; (5) he must remain committed during any term of commitment imposed by the trial court unless the…”
The case’s holding
A defendant found competent to stand trial is competent to waive constitutional rights provided the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Later courts cite it for
“supervisory powers are exercised to direct trial courts to adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of the utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.” · 4 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199420102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 2005. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn. App. Ct.29Conn.16D. Conn.1
By subsection
(c)1 case
State v. Weathers, 205 A.3d 614 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).“Thus, this court has stated-albeit in the context of a petition by the state for an order of continued commitment of an insanity acquittee pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593(c) 23 -that "[t]he ultimate determination of mental illness .”

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