Connecticut General Statutes homeSearch Connecticut
Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 21 — LicensesChapter 412 — Mobile Manufactured Homes and Mobile Manufactured Home Parks. Park Owners and Residents

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21-80 (2025)

Grounds for summary process action or termination of rental agreement. Procedure. Rent increases. Stay of execution. Sale of abandoned homes

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1986–2026 19citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 19 opinions since 1986, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (3 cases).

(a) An action for summary process may be maintained by the owner of a mobile manufactured home park against a mobile manufactured home resident who rents a mobile manufactured home from such owner for the following reasons, which shall be in addition to other reasons allowed under chapter 832 and, except as otherwise specified, proceedings under this subsection shall be as prescribed in chapter 832 and sections 47a-15, 47a-20 and 47a-20a:

(1) A conviction of the resident of a violation of a federal or state law or local ordinance which the court finds to be detrimental to the health, safety and welfare of other residents in the park but no notice to quit possession shall be required;

(2) The continued violation of any reasonable rule established by the owner, provided a copy of such rule has been delivered by the owner to the resident prior to entering into a rental agreement and a copy of such rule has been posted in a conspicuous place in the park and, provided further the resident receives written notice of the specific rule or rules being violated at least thirty days before the time specified in the notice for the resident to quit possession of the mobile manufactured home or occupancy of the space or lot; or

(3) A change in use of the land on which such mobile manufactured home is located, provided all the residents affected are given written notice (A) at least three hundred sixty-five days before the time specified in the notice for the resident to quit possession of the mobile manufactured home or occupancy of the lot if such notice is given before June 23, 1999, or (B) at least five hundred forty-five days before the time specified in the notice for the resident to quit possession of the mobile manufactured home or occupancy of the lot if such notice is given on or after June 23, 1999, regardless of whether any other notice under this section or section 21-70 has been given before June 23, 1999; provided nothing in subsection (f) of section 21-70, section 21-70a, this subsection, subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section or section 21-80b shall be construed to invalidate the effectiveness of or require the reissuance of any valid notice given before June 23, 1999.

(b) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-23, an owner may terminate a rental agreement or maintain a summary process action against a resident who owns a mobile manufactured home only for one or more of the following reasons:

(A) Nonpayment of rent, utility charges or reasonable incidental services charges;

(B) Material noncompliance by the resident with any statute or regulation materially affecting the health and safety of other residents or materially affecting the physical condition of the park;

(C) Material noncompliance by the resident with the rental agreement or with rules or regulations adopted under section 21-70;

(D) Failure by the resident to agree to a proposed rent increase, provided the owner has complied with all provisions of subdivision (5) of this subsection; or

(E) A change in the use of the land on which such mobile manufactured home is located, provided all of the affected residents receive written notice (i) at least three hundred sixty-five days before the time specified in the notice for the resident to quit possession of the mobile manufactured home or occupancy of the lot if such notice is given before June 23, 1999, or (ii) at least five hundred forty-five days before the time specified in the notice for the resident to quit possession of the mobile manufactured home or occupancy of the lot if such notice is given on or after June 23, 1999, regardless of whether any other notice under this section or section 21-70 has been given before June 23, 1999; provided nothing in subsection (f) of section 21-70, section 21-70a, subsection (a) of this section, this subdivision and section 21-80b shall be construed to invalidate the effectiveness of or require the reissuance of any valid notice given before June 23, 1999.

(2) An owner may not maintain a summary process action under subparagraph (B), (C) or (D) of subdivision (1) of this subsection, except a summary process action based upon conduct which constitutes a serious nuisance or a violation of subdivision (9) of subsection (b) of section 21-82, prior to delivering a written notice to the resident specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than thirty days after receipt of the notice. If such breach can be remedied by repair by the resident or payment of damages by the resident to the owner and such breach is not so remedied within twenty-one days, the rental agreement shall terminate except that (A) if the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages and the resident adequately remedies the breach within said twenty-one-day period, the rental agreement shall not terminate, or (B) if substantially the same act or omission for which notice was given recurs within six months, the owner may terminate the rental agreement in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive. For the purposes of this subdivision, “serious nuisance” means (i) inflicting bodily harm upon another resident or the owner or threatening to inflict such harm with the present ability to effect the harm and under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such threat will be carried out, (ii) substantial and wilful destruction of part of the premises, (iii) conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other residents or the owner, or (iv) using the premises for prostitution or the illegal sale of drugs. If the owner elects to evict based upon an allegation, pursuant to subdivision (8) of subsection (b) of section 21-82, that the resident failed to require other persons on the premises with the resident's consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not constitute a serious nuisance, and the resident claims to have had no knowledge of such conduct, then, if the owner establishes that the premises have been used for the illegal sale of drugs, the burden shall be on the resident to show that the resident had no knowledge of the creation of the serious nuisance.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-23, termination of any tenancy in a mobile manufactured home park shall be effective only if made in the following manner:

(A) By the resident giving at least thirty days' notice to the owner;

(B) By the owner giving the resident at least sixty days' written notice, which shall state the reason or reasons for such termination, except that, when termination is based upon subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the owner need give the resident only thirty days' written notice, which notice shall state the total arrearage due provided, the owner shall not maintain or proceed with a summary process action against a resident who tenders the total arrearage due to the owner within such thirty days and who has not so tendered an arrearage under this subparagraph during the preceding twelve months.

(4) Except as otherwise specified, proceedings under this section shall be as prescribed by chapter 832.

(5) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit an owner from increasing the rent at the termination of the rental agreement if (A) the owner delivers a written notice of the proposed rent increase to the resident at least thirty days before the start of a new rental agreement; (B) the proposed rent is consistent with rents for comparable lots in the same park; and (C) the rent is not increased in order to defeat the purpose of this subsection.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 47a-35 and 47a-36, if judgment is entered in a summary process action against a mobile manufactured home owner and resident based upon subparagraph (D) of subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section, execution shall not issue until six months from the date of such judgment. The court shall condition such stay of execution upon a requirement that the mobile manufactured home owner and resident make payments to the plaintiff in the summary process action in such installments as the court may direct for the use and occupancy of the premises during the period of such stay at the rate for which such mobile manufactured home owner and resident was most recently liable as rent or in such other sum as is reasonable.

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 47a-35 and 47a-36, if judgment is entered in a summary process action against a resident who owns the mobile manufactured home, the resident may, prior to the expiration of the automatic stay of execution provided in section 47a-35 or 47a-36, as applicable, move for permission to exercise in good faith the resident's right to sell the mobile manufactured home in place in the mobile manufactured home park, subject to the provisions of section 21-79, and the court may stay execution upon such judgment pending sale of the home. Such stay may be ordered for a period or periods in an aggregate not to exceed twelve months from the date of the judgment in the summary process action, except that any such stay or stays extending beyond six months from the date of the judgment in the summary process action shall be reviewed every two months to determine that the resident is making a good faith effort to sell the home. The court shall condition such stay of execution upon a requirement that the resident make payments to the plaintiff in the summary process action in such installments as the court may direct for the use and occupancy of the premises during the period of such stay at the rate for which such resident was most recently liable as rent or in such other amount as is reasonable and may, in addition, impose other reasonable terms and conditions on the stay. If there is a rental arrearage at the time of the entry of the order, the court shall order that it be paid out of the proceeds of the sale, except that the court, upon finding that the resident has the present ability to pay the arrearage, may require that all or part of such arrearage be paid as a condition of the stay.

(e) (1) If (A) a judgment for possession has been entered against the resident and all occupants of a mobile manufactured home pursuant to chapter 832 and this section; (B) no rent or other payment has been received for the use and occupancy of the lot upon which the mobile manufactured home is situated for at least four months; (C) at least sixty days have passed since the expiration of the last stay of execution pursuant to chapter 832 and this section; and (D) notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-42, the mobile manufactured home remains upon the lot, the owner of the mobile manufactured home park may initiate a petition to the Superior Court pursuant to this section. Such petition may be brought as a supplemental proceeding in the summary process action, in which case no additional entry fee shall be required.

(2) The petition shall allege the acts specified in subdivision (1) of this subsection and, in addition, shall allege supporting facts which demonstrate that the owner of the mobile manufactured home has failed or refused to make reasonable efforts to remove the home from the lot or to sell the home in place or that, in spite of reasonable efforts to locate the owner of the mobile manufactured home or such owner's representative, the owner of the mobile manufactured home park has been unable to locate such owner. Reasonable efforts to locate the owner of the mobile manufactured home shall include, but not be limited to, reasonable inquiry of relatives or associates of the owner of the home, if known to the owner of the park, and of other residents of the park.

(3) A copy of the petition and the notice of the hearing on the petition shall be given to the owner of the mobile manufactured home, the municipality and all lienholders who have recorded a lien against the mobile manufactured home or of whom the owner of the mobile manufactured home park has actual knowledge. Notice to the municipality and to lienholders shall be by certified mail. Notice to the owner of the mobile manufactured home shall be designed to maximize the likelihood that the owner will receive actual notice of the petition, without regard to whether the owner appeared in the summary process action. Such notice to the owner of the mobile manufactured home shall be conspicuously posted at the entrance to the mobile manufactured home and also sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to the owner of the mobile manufactured home and to the attorney, if any, who appeared for such owner in the summary process action. Notice to the owner of the mobile manufactured home shall be sent to such owner at the owner's last-known address and also to such owner in care of any other person reasonably believed to know the location of the owner. The court may require supplemental notice if it finds that additional notice is likely to result in actual notice to the owner of the mobile manufactured home.

(4) At the hearing on the petition, the court shall determine whether all the requirements of subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) of this subsection have been satisfied and, if they have, shall also determine whether the home has been abandoned. If such requirements have been satisfied and such home has been abandoned, the court shall order the owner of the mobile manufactured home park to conduct a public sale of the home. Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from deferring the entry of an order requiring sale and from issuing other appropriate orders, if the court finds that, within a reasonable period of time, the owner of the mobile manufactured home will remove the home from the lot or dispose of the home by sale or will make other appropriate arrangements with the park owner. The order directing sale shall require notice which includes a conspicuous statement that the sale will extinguish all previous ownership and lien rights. Notice shall be given by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to all persons entitled to notice of the petition. Notice shall also be posted conspicuously at the entrance of the home and shall be advertised at least three times in the real estate section of a daily paper with general circulation in the area where the park is situated. Any person, including a lienholder or the owner of the mobile manufactured home park, may bid at the sale. The proceeds of such sale shall be applied first to the costs of the sale and then to the payment of lienholders in the order of the priority of their liens. If proceeds remain thereafter they shall be paid over to the owner of the mobile manufactured home. Upon conclusion of the sale, the park owner shall file an affidavit with the court setting forth the nature of its compliance with the court's order of sale. The court, upon finding compliance with its order, shall issue a conveyance of title and release of liens, if any, to the purchaser for filing in the land records, which shall constitute good title to the home, and no execution shall issue on the original summary process action.

(P.A. 74-333, S. 5, 12; P.A. 77-614, S. 609, 610; P.A. 78-347, S. 1, 2; P.A. 81-322, S. 6; P.A. 82-162, S. 3; 82-372, S. 2; P.A. 83-456, S. 2, 7; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-3, S. 14; P.A. 91-383, S. 5; P.A. 92-171, S. 9; P.A. 93-435, S. 27, 95; P.A. 99-57; 99-201, S. 3, 4, 6; P.A. 01-195, S. 88, 181; P.A. 10-32, S. 79.)

History: P.A. 77-614 repealed Sec. 21-80; P.A. 78-347 repealed the repealer of Sec. 21-80 in P.A. 77-614, changed reference from chapter 922 to chapter 832 where appearing, changed Subsecs. (a), (b) and (c) to Subdivs. (1), (2) and (3) and added new Subsec. (b) providing for a stay of execution of judgment entered in summary process action on certain conditions; P.A. 81-322 inserted new Subsec. (b) specifying grounds for summary process against a resident who owns his mobile home, relettering former Subsec. (b) accordingly, and specifying applicability of provisions to resident “who rents his mobile home from such owner”; P.A. 82-162 amended Subsec. (b)(5) by making technical corrections; P.A. 82-372 amended Subsec. (b)(3) providing that owner cannot maintain a summary process action against resident who pays total rent arrearage; P.A. 83-456 amended section to increase required notice period to residents in event of a change in land use from 90 days to 365 days; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-3 changed term “mobile home” to “mobile manufactured home”; P.A. 91-383 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “proceedings under this section shall be as prescribed in said chapter 832” with “proceedings under this subsection shall be as prescribed in chapter 832 and sections 47a-15, 47a-20 and 47a-20a”, amended Subsec. (b)(2) to add exception for a summary process action “based upon conduct which constitutes a serious nuisance” or a violation of Sec. 21-82(b)(8), to add provisions re termination of rental agreement when breach is not remedied by repair or payment of damages within 21 days or substantially the same act or omission recurs within 6 months, to add definition of “serious nuisance” and to add provision re resident's evidentiary burden when the premises have been used for the illegal sale of drugs, and amended Subsec. (c) to replace “or in such greater sum as is reasonable in such installments as the court may direct” with “or in such other sum as is reasonable”; P.A. 92-171 added Subsec. (d) authorizing the court to grant a stay of execution on certain conditions for up to 12 months to permit a resident who owns his mobile manufactured home to sell the home in place in the mobile manufactured home park; P.A. 93-435 made a technical change in Subsec. (b)(2), effective June 28, 1993; P.A. 99-57 added new Subsec. (e) to establish a procedure certain mobile manufactured home park owners can follow to have an abandoned home sold in an eviction action; P.A. 99-201 amended Subsec. (a) and (b)(1) to make gender neutral change and to increase amount of notice to vacate park owners must give to residents who own or rent from 365 to 545 days in cases where such notices are issued on or after June 23, 1999, effective June 23, 1999; P.A. 01-195 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a)(3), (b)(1)(E), (b)(2), (d) and (e)(3), effective July 11, 2001; P.A. 10-32 made technical changes in Subsec. (b)(2), effective May 10, 2010.

Cited. 208 C. 620; 209 C. 243; Id., 724; 215 C. 701; 217 C. 313.

Cited. 7 CA 639; 19 CA 564; 21 CA 40. Defendant resident who owned stock in plaintiff corporation was not an owner of the mobile manufactured home park and was subject to summary process proceedings pursuant to plain meaning of this section and Sec. 21-64. 161 CA 668.

Subsec. (e):

Subdiv. (4) clearly and unambiguously indicates that the legislature intended to provide the successful bidder at a public sale conducted pursuant to that statute with clear and good title to the abandoned mobile home, free from any and all encumbrances, including municipal tax liens. 293 C. 1.

The 19 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21-80 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENFairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).
cites § 21-80 38×subsections: (b)(1)(B) 6× (b)(1)(C) 6× (b)(1) 5× (a) 3×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“Because § 21-80a (b) expressly limits the application of the exceptions provided therein to summary process actions that are "permitted by subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 21-80," we first consider the statute in relation to § 21-80. [7] *634 Section 21-80…”
2
GREENFairchild Heights, Inc. v. Amaro, 976 A.2d 668 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 21-80 44×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“In this appeal, we consider whether a municipal tax lien on a mobile home was extinguished when that mobile home was determined to have been abandoned and then sold at a public auction pursuant to General Statutes § 21-80 (e). 1 The plaintiff, Fairchild *4 Heights, Inc.”
3
GREENLampasona v. Jacobs, 553 A.2d 175 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 21-80 16×cited by 135 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“The defendant claimed that the eight day notice to quit was insufficient under the dictates of General Statutes § 21-80, which requires notice of sixty days.”
The case’s holding
Proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity for summary process actions.
Later courts cite it for
“as a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity.” · 15 citing courts
4
GREENOssen v. Kreutzer, 563 A.2d 741 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
cites § 21-80 23×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a summary process action initiated pursuant to General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (3) (B), 1 the plaintiff must allege in his complaint a “preliminary and distinct thirty day written notice period.”
5
GREENEamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 546 A.2d 805 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 21-80 9×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“The restrictions that our mobile home park statutes impose upon the operator’s property rights consist of the option given by the statute to the original lessee to extend the term of the original lease indefinitely and to transfer this right to a purchaser of his mobile home. If…”
The case’s holding
A mobile home park owner cannot withhold approval of an on-site sale based solely on a failure to meet national standards unless the home is unsafe or unsanitary.
Later courts cite it for
“section 21-79 protects tenants at mobile home parks from being forced to sell to park owners at a substantial loss and as a consequence benefits many low income people who cannot otherwise afford to purchase more expensive housing.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENDaddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 550 A.2d 1061 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 21-80 5×cited by 150 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“the defendant’s actions constituted unfair or deceptive practices in three respects: (1) the defendant continuously refused to allow the plaintiff to resell “on-site” a safe, sanitary, and aes *254 thetically conforming mobile home, in violation of General Statutes § 21-79; (2)…”
The case’s holding
Statutory provisions protecting peaceable possession are designed to prevent disturbances and protect the peace of a neighborhood.
Later courts cite it for
“and whether a practice is unfair depends upon the finding of a violation of an identifiable public policy.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENLampasona v. Jacobs, 509 A.2d 1089 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
cites § 21-80 10×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“On July 10,1984, the defendant again moved for dismissal claiming the identical grounds but adding the claim that the notice given was also defective because the plaintiff had not complied with the sixty days’ notice requirement of General Statutes § 21-80. This motion to…”
8
GREENGibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
cites § 21-80 12×subsections: (b)(1)(A) 2× (b)(1)(E) 2× (b)(5) 2× (a)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“§ 21-80(a). Residents must be permitted to sell their mobile homes within the park development so long as the mobile home is safe, sanitary and in conformance with the aesthetic standards of the park, § 21-79(a), but any purchaser of the on-site mobile home must assume and be…”
9
NEUTRALColonial Investors, LLC v. Furbush, 167 A.3d 987 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 21-80 21×subsections: (b)(3)(B) 5× (b)(3) 4× (a) 3× (b)(1) 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. The notice to quit included the following disclaimer: "ANY PARTIAL PAYMENTS TENDERED WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR USE AND OCCUPANCY ONLY AND NOT FOR RENT, WITH FULL RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO CONTINUE WITH THE EVICTION…”
10
GREENFairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 983 A.2d 35 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 21-80 6×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“” 4 General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (1) provides in relevant part: “[A]n owner may terminate a rental agreement or maintain a summary process action against a resident who owns a mobile manufactured home only for one or more of the following reasons .”
11
GREENOssen v. Wanat, 585 A.2d 685 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 21-80 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“For example, General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (1) (A) contains a list of permitted circumstances in which a park owner may bring a summary process action and specifically states that “an owner [of a mobile home park] may terminate a rental agreement or maintain a summary process…”
12
GREENVisco v. Cody, 547 A.2d 935 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
cites § 21-80 1×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“In any action for summary process under this chapter or section 21-80 it shall be an affirmative defense that the plaintiff brought such action solely because the defendant attempted to remedy, by lawful means, including contacting officials of the state or of any town, city,…”
The case’s holding
A landlord's initiation of summary process within six months of a tenant's complaint creates a presumption of retaliation that the landlord must rebut.
Later courts cite it for
“section 47a-20 establishes retaliation as a presumption, if a summary process action is initiated within six months of a complaint, which the landlord must then successfully rebut.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENOssen v. Wanat, 571 A.2d 134 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990).
cites § 21-80 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (1) (A), on the other hand, specifically provides in pertinent part that “an owner [of a mobile manufactured home park] may terminate a rental agreement or maintain a summary process action against a resident who owns his mobile manufactured *45 home…”
Later courts cite it for
“we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the constitutional issues that the defendants attempted to raise 'are far beyond the scope of the statutory action that is before the court.” · 3 citing courts
14
YELLOWLeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 21-80 2×cited by 225 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Superseded by statute: 1 citing opinion says superseded.
Where it cites § 21-80
“In Lampasona , the issue was whether the general summary process statute; General Statutes § 47a-23; or the mobile home summary process statute; General Statutes § 21-80; applied to the defendant, who was the owner of a mobile home in the plaintiff’s park.”
The case’s holding
The statutory requirement to include a certificate of good faith in a medical malpractice complaint is a mandatory pleading necessity rather than a jurisdictional requirement.
Later courts cite it for
“every presumption is to be indulged in favor of jurisdiction,” · 10 citing courts
15
NO FLAGLongview Estates, LLC v. Woodin, 88 A.3d 615 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
cites § 21-80 24×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“The town of Canterbury (town) appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which granted the motion of the plaintiff, Longview Estates, LLC (Long-view), to convey title to a certain mobile home pursuant to General Statutes § 21-80 (e). 1 The town claims that the court erred in…”
16
NO FLAGDorsey v. Vernon Vill., Inc., 934 A.2d 882 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007).
cites § 21-80 14×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“General Statutes § 21-80 (b) (5) gives owners of manufactured mobile home parks guidelines for increasing rents.”
17
GREENTOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez, 357 A.3d 689 (Conn. 2026).
cites § 21-80 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“Moreover, even after a landlord has rebutted the presumption of retaliation, the tenant may still assert a special defense of retaliation under § 47a-33,7 which 7 General Statutes § 47a-33 provides: “In any action for summary process under this chapter or section 21-80 it shall…”
Later courts cite it for
“silence renders a statute ambiguous when the missing subject reasonably is necessary to effectuate the provision as written, and the missing subject renders the statute susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation,” · 1 citing court
18
NO FLAGKenosia Commons, Inc. v. DaCosta, No. AC37396 (Conn. App. Ct. Dec. 15, 2015).
cites § 21-80 4×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly con- cluded that by virtue of Cynthia DaCosta’s ownership of shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation she is not subject to summary process proceedings pursuant to General Statutes § 21-80. We reverse the…”
19
NO FLAGGibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 651 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Conn. 1987).
cites § 21-80 1×subsections: (b)(3)(B)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 21-80
“§ 21-70(a) (requiring notice of a mobile homeowner’s rights); § 21-79 (pre *1420 eluding restriction on mobile home owner’s right to sell); § 21-80(b)(3)(B) (precluding summary process under certain circumstances); § 21-82(e) and (f) (specifying mobile home owner’s rights to…”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198620062026

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1988. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.8Conn. App. Ct.8D. Conn.2Conn. Super. Ct.1
By subsection
(a)3 cases
Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).“Because § 21-80a (b) expressly limits the application of the exceptions provided therein to summary process actions that are "permitted by subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 21-80," we first consider the statute in relation to § 21-80. [7] *634 Section 21-80…”
Colonial Investors, LLC v. Furbush, 167 A.3d 987 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).“The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. The notice to quit included the following disclaimer: "ANY PARTIAL PAYMENTS TENDERED WILL BE ACCEPTED FOR USE AND OCCUPANCY ONLY AND NOT FOR RENT, WITH FULL RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO CONTINUE WITH THE EVICTION…”
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).“§ 21-80(a). Residents must be permitted to sell their mobile homes within the park development so long as the mobile home is safe, sanitary and in conformance with the aesthetic standards of the park, § 21-79(a), but any purchaser of the on-site mobile home must assume and be…”
(a)(1)1 case
Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).
(b)1 case
Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).
(b)(1)3 cases
Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
Colonial Investors, LLC v. Furbush, 167 A.3d 987 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
(b)(1)(A)1 case
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
(b)(1)(B)2 cases
Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
(b)(1)(C)2 cases
Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
(b)(1)(D)1 case
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
(b)(1)(E)1 case
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
(b)(3)1 case
Colonial Investors, LLC v. Furbush, 167 A.3d 987 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
(b)(3)(B)2 cases
Colonial Investors, LLC v. Furbush, 167 A.3d 987 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 651 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Conn. 1987).“§ 21-70(a) (requiring notice of a mobile homeowner’s rights); § 21-79 (pre *1420 eluding restriction on mobile home owner’s right to sell); § 21-80(b)(3)(B) (precluding summary process under certain circumstances); § 21-82(e) and (f) (specifying mobile home owner’s rights to…”
(b)(5)1 case
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
(c)1 case
Gibbs v. Se. Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1989).
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

Connecticut General Statutes Home  |  Search Connecticut  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com