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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 31 — LaborChapter 568 — Workers' Compensation Act

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-308 (2025)

Compensation for partial incapacity

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1966–2026 97citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 97 opinions since 1966, 8 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (2 cases).

(a) If any injury for which compensation is provided under the provisions of this chapter results in partial incapacity, the injured employee shall be paid a weekly compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of the difference between the wages currently earned by an employee in a position comparable to the position held by the injured employee before his injury, after such wages have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act in accordance with section 31-310, and the amount he is able to earn after the injury, after such amount has been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act in accordance with section 31-310, except that when (1) the physician, physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse attending an injured employee certifies that the employee is unable to perform his usual work but is able to perform other work, (2) the employee is ready and willing to perform other work in the same locality and (3) no other work is available, the employee shall be paid his full weekly compensation subject to the provisions of this section. Compensation paid under this subsection shall not be more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309, and shall continue during the period of partial incapacity, but no longer than five hundred twenty weeks. If the employer procures employment for an injured employee that is suitable to his capacity, the wages offered in such employment shall be taken as the earning capacity of the injured employee during the period of the employment.

(b) With respect to the following injuries, the compensation, in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation, shall be seventy-five per cent of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, calculated pursuant to section 31-310, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage pursuant to said section 31-310, but in no case more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309, or less than fifty dollars weekly. All of the following injuries include the loss of the member or organ and the complete and permanent loss of use of the member or organ referred to:

MEMBER

INJURY

WEEKS OF
COMPENSATION

Arm

 

 

Master arm

Loss at or above elbow

208

Other arm

Loss at or above elbow

194

Hand

 

 

Master hand

Loss at or above wrist

168

Other hand

Loss at or above wrist

155

One leg

Loss at or above knee

155

One foot

Loss at or above ankle

125

Hearing

 

 

 

Both ears

104

 

One ear

  35

One eye

 

 

 

Complete and permanent

 

loss of sight in, or

 

reduction of sight to

 

one-tenth or less

 

of normal vision

157

Thumb*

 

 

 

On master hand

  63

 

On other hand

  54

Fingers**

 

 

 

First finger

  36

 

Second finger

  29

 

Third finger

  21

 

Fourth finger

  17

Toes***

 

 

 

Great toe

  28

 

Other toes

    9

Back

 

    Number of weeks

 

   which the

 

   proportion of

 

   incapacity

 

   represents to a

 

   maximum of 374

 

   weeks

Heart

 

520

Brain

 

520

Carotid artery

 

520

Pancreas

 

416

Liver

 

347

Stomach

 

260

Loss of bladder

 

233

Speech

 

163

Lung

 

117

Cervical spine

 

117

Kidney

 

117

Rib cage

Bilateral

  69

Ovary

 

  35

Testis

 

  35

Mammary

 

  35

Nose

Sense and respiratory

  35

  

function

Jaw

Mastication

  35

Uterus

 

        35-104

Vagina

 

        35-104

Penis

 

        35-104

Coccyx

Actual removal

  35

Sense of smell

 

  17

Sense of taste

 

  17

Spleen

In addition to scar

  13

Gall bladder

 

  13

Tooth

Minimum

    1

Loss of drainage duct of eye

 

  

(If corrected by prosthesis)

 

    17 for each

Loss of drainage duct of eye

 

  

(If uncorrected by prosthesis)

 

    33 for each

Pelvis

 

           percentage of back

*The loss or loss of use of one phalanx of a thumb shall be construed as seventy-five per cent of the loss of the thumb.

**The loss or loss of use of one phalanx of a finger shall be construed as fifty per cent of the loss of the finger. The loss of or loss of use of two phalanges of a finger shall be construed as ninety per cent of the loss of the finger.

***The loss or loss of use of one phalanx of a great toe shall be construed as sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the loss of the great toe. The loss of the greater part of any phalanx shall be construed as the loss of a phalanx and shall be compensated accordingly.

If the injury consists of the loss of a substantial part of a member resulting in a permanent partial loss of the use of a member, or if the injury results in a permanent partial loss of function, the administrative law judge may, in the administrative law judge's discretion, in lieu of other compensation, award to the injured employee the proportion of the sum provided in this subsection for the total loss of, or the loss of the use of, the member or for incapacity or both that represents the proportion of total loss or loss of use found to exist, and any voluntary agreement submitted in which the basis of settlement is such proportionate payment may, if otherwise conformable to the provisions of this chapter, be approved by the administrative law judge in the administrative law judge's discretion. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the complete loss or loss of use of an organ which results in the death of an employee shall be compensable pursuant only to section 31-306.

(c) In addition to compensation for total or partial incapacity or for a specific loss of a member or use of the function of a member of the body, the administrative law judge, not earlier than one year from the date of the injury and not later than two years from the date of the injury or the surgery date of the injury, may award compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, calculated pursuant to section 31-310, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage pursuant to said section 31-310, but not more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309, for up to two hundred eight weeks, for any permanent significant disfigurement of, or permanent significant scar on, (A) the face, head or neck, or (B) on any other area of the body which handicaps the employee in obtaining or continuing to work. The administrative law judge may not award compensation under this subsection when the disfigurement was caused solely by the loss of or the loss of use of a member of the body for which compensation is provided under subsection (b) of this section or for any scar resulting from an inguinal hernia operation or any spinal surgery. In making any award under this subsection, the administrative law judge shall consider (1) the location of the scar or disfigurement, (2) the size of the scar or disfigurement, (3) the visibility of the scar or disfigurement due to hyperpigmentation or depigmentation, whether hypertrophic or keloidal, (4) whether the scar or disfigurement causes a tonal or textural skin change, causes loss of symmetry of the affected area or results in noticeable bumps or depressions in the affected area, and (5) other relevant factors. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, no compensation shall be awarded for any scar or disfigurement which is not located on (A) the face, head or neck, or (B) any other area of the body which handicaps the employee in obtaining or continuing to work. In addition to the requirements contained in section 31-297, the administrative law judge shall provide written notice to the employer prior to any hearing held by the administrative law judge to consider an award for any scar or disfigurement under this subsection.

(d) Any award or agreement for compensation made pursuant to this section shall be paid to the employee, or in the event of the employee's death, whether or not a formal award has been made prior to the death, to his surviving spouse or, if he has no surviving spouse, to his dependents in equal shares or, if he has no surviving spouse or dependents, to his children, in equal shares, regardless of their age.

(1949 Rev., S. 7431; 1949, 1951, 1953, S. 3044d; 1957, P.A. 463, S. 3; 1958 Rev., S. 31-162; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 7; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 31; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 15; P.A. 75-48; P.A. 79-376, S. 75; P.A. 89-36; 89-346; P.A. 91-32, S. 26, 41; 91-339, S. 28; P.A. 93-228, S. 19, 35; P.A. 00-8; P.A. 12-197, S. 37; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; 21-196, S. 59.)

History: 1959 act replaced $45 maximum weekly benefit with reference to rate established by Sec. 31-309 (i.e. 55% of average production wage in state for year in which injury occurred raised to next even dollar, to be determined annually), raised minimum benefit from $15 to $20, added special provisions re loss of master hand and master thumb in Subdivs. (b) and (h) and allowed compensation for serious and permanent disfigurement of upper arms and legs below the knees; 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act raised compensation rate from 60% to 66.66% of difference between average weekly earnings before injury and amount person can earn afterward, added exceptions re payment of full compensation, increased compensation period for loss of master arm from 296 to 312 weeks, for loss of master hand from 42 to 52 weeks and for loss of master thumb from 87 to 95 weeks, deleted reference to normal vision “with glasses”, added Subdiv. (m) re loss of use of the back, specified commissioners' discretionary powers, replaced reference to disfigurement of specific body parts with reference to disfigurement or scarring of any body part, specifically including scarring from hernial or spinal surgery and deleted limit of 780 weeks for compensation; P.A. 75-48 specified scarring from “inguinal hernia”; P.A. 79-376 divided section into Subsecs. and changed alphabetic Subdiv. indicators to numeric ones, used wages currently earned by employee in comparable position rather than incapacitated person's earnings at time of injury in calculating benefits, specified “significant” disfigurement or scarring and replaced “workmen's compensation” with “workers' compensation”; P.A. 89-36 raised minimum benefit from $20 to $50; P.A. 89-346 added Subsec. (e) providing for the payment of benefits in the event of an employee's death; P.A. 91-32 made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 changed the compensation formula in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (e) from 66.66% of average weekly earnings to 80% of average weekly earnings reduced by deductions for federal taxes and FICA, limited compensation to 100% of the average weekly production wage in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (e), provided that awards under Subsec. (e) shall not be made earlier than one year from the date of the injury, and added considerations to be made by the commissioner, notice requirements and provisions re discernible scars or disfigurements in Subsec. (e); P.A. 93-228 changed the compensation formula in existing Subsecs. (a), (b) and (e) from 80% to 75% of average weekly earnings less deductions for state and federal taxes and FICA, reduced maximum duration of temporary and permanent partial disability benefits provided under Subsecs. (a) and (b), modified the schedule of injuries listed in Subsec. (b), deleted Subsecs. (c) and (d) authorizing commissioner to make discretionary awards, relettering former Subsecs. (e) and (f) accordingly, amended relettered Subsec. (c) to prohibit commissioner from awarding scarring benefits later than two years from the injury or surgery date and for scar located on any area of the body other than the face, head or neck, unless it handicaps the employee in obtaining or continuing to work, and amended relettered Subsec. (d) to entitle a deceased employee's dependents to collect compensation due the deceased employee under an informal or formal agreement or award, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 00-8 amended Subsec. (b) to include injuries to ovary, uterus and vagina and to make technical changes; P.A. 12-197 amended Subsec. (a)(1) by adding provision allowing certification by an advanced practice registered nurse; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioner's” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judge's” respectively in Subsecs. (b) and (c), effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 21-196 amended Subsec. (a) by adding reference to physician assistants and making a technical change.

See Sec. 31-259(c) re withdrawals from Employment Security Administration Fund.

See Sec. 31-349 re compensation for second disability and payment of insurance for totally incapacitated persons.

May recover for total incapacity for a time, plus the specific award for subsequent amputation. 93 C. 19; 96 C. 37. May recover for total incapacity for a time plus partial incapacity for a further time resulting from the same accident, but not total and partial for the same period. 93 C. 22. Specific award for loss of a member bars claim for subsequent period exceeding the specific term. Id., 28. If loss of a member results in incapacity of another member, additional compensation may be allowed. 94 C. 628. So also if incapacity distinct from loss of the member and not a normal incident thereof. 99 C. 550. For incapacity naturally following amputation, only the statutory award for loss of the member can be given. 95 C. 300. Specific statutory award does not apply if the injury, because of prior disability, creates total incapacity. Id., 354. Statutory award for specified injury does not expire with employee's death. 100 C. 421. Injury caused partial loss of sight in one eye; prior defect in the other eye not to be considered. 104 C. 577. Payments after death go to dependents, not to administrators. 105 C. 305. Payments accrued during life go to administrator. Id., 400. Computation of partial loss of sight discussed. 106 C. 406. Hernia was compensable under 1927 act. 108 C. 309. Cited. 110 C. 284; 112 C. 132. Where evidence conflicting, amount of disability is question of fact for commissioner. Id., 432; 113 C. 532; Id., 747; 116 C. 707. Pending award for specific loss of second eye, claimant is entitled to total incapacity. 112 C. 627. Cited. 113 C. 707. “Inability to work” means inability to do customary work. 119 C. 556. Cited. 120 C. 285. Under former statute, “snap” not equivalent to feeling of pain when related to hernia. 123 C. 43. Loss of eye resulting from infection year after injury not causally connected with original injury. Id., 405. Cited. Id., 513. Inability to obtain work must exist because of defect which is personal to workman and a direct result of the injury. 125 C. 140. Specific indemnity starts on date maximum of improvement is reached even though total incapacity continues. Id., 563. When several years after total disability and specific indemnity payments for total loss of vision of one eye were completed eye had to be removed, final disability compensable. 127 C. 294. Cited. 128 C. 578. Evidence of pain accompanied by injury. Id., 608. Whether pay specific, or total or partial compensation is discretionary with commissioner. 129 C. 591. Cited. 130 C. 383; Id., 403. Commissioner has discretion to make award for partial incapacity rather than specific indemnity; award must be confined to such proportion of sum provided for incapacity as shall represent proportion of total loss or loss of use found to exist. 137 C. 228. “Average weekly earnings” defined; “amount he is able to earn thereafter” limited to employment in which he was injured or substitute employment. 145 C. 101. Award for disfigurement may be made even though claimant is unable to prove disfigurement likely to cause any loss of earnings or earning capacity; disfigurement, to be serious, must be of such character that it substantially detracts from appearance of person disfigured. 148 C. 87. Injury not excludable merely because it is not clinically or objectively demonstrable. 152 C. 214. Cited. 154 C. 1, 11. Under former section, phrase “legs below the knees”, as used in disfigurement provision of section, held not to include the feet. Id., 162. History discussed. Id., 164. Cited. 171 C. 577. A claim for disability, resulting from partial incapacity, under this statute, is not translatable into an initial claim for liability under Sec. 31-297(b) encompassing a “preclusion of defense” situation. 177 C. 107. Cited. 203 C. 34; 208 C. 576; Id., 709; 209 C. 59; Id., 808; 210 C. 580. Plain language of statute precludes recovery for surgical scars. 211 C. 116. Cited. Id., 166. Award of special benefits not precluded by provisions of Sec. 7-433c. 214 C. 181. Cited. Id., 189; Id., 394; Id., 552; 215 C. 206. Rule against double compensation prohibits concurrent payment of specific indemnity benefits for permanent partial impairment under section and benefits for total incapacity under Sec. 31-307 as a result of same incident. 217 C. 42. Concurrent payment of benefits for death caused by heart disease under Sec. 31-306 and benefits for permanent partial impairment of one's heart under this section is prohibited. Id., 50. Cited. 218 C. 9; Id., 19; Id., 531; 220 C. 721; Id., 739; 221 C. 29; Id., 920; 223 C. 376; 224 C. 8; 226 C. 569; 227 C. 261; 231 C. 287; Id., 529. Remedial nature of statute does not relieve plaintiff of burden of establishing all elements of claim by competent evidence. 294 C. 132. Employee's right to permanent partial disability benefits vests when employee reaches maximum medical improvement and does not depend on an affirmative request for such benefits; entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits for surviving spouse of a deceased employee vested when deceased employee reached maximum medical improvement and did not require that deceased employee make an affirmative request for such benefits. 299 C. 185. A determination that the estate of a deceased employee does not have standing to pursue workers' compensation benefits does not violate the right to redress guaranteed by article first, section 10 of the Connecticut constitution. 323 C. 26.

Cited. 12 CA 138; 15 CA 615; 21 CA 63; 25 CA 350; 26 CA 466; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 261; 27 CA 699; 28 CA 113; Id., 226; 29 CA 432; 34 CA 307; 39 CA 28; 40 CA 409; Id., 562. Test for determining whether particular conduct is a proximate cause of permanent partial loss of function is whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result; commissioner's conclusion that plaintiff's employment was not a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's permanent partial loss of function is conclusive, provided it is supported by competent evidence and is otherwise consistent with the law. 61 CA 131. Temporary partial disability benefits are available until the injured worker has reached maximum medical improvement. 114 CA 210. A commissioner's authority to award temporary partial disability payments to a claimant is extinguished upon a claimant's reaching of permanent partial disability status. 223 CA 221.

The word “hand” does not include disfigurement of the forearm. 10 CS 470. Loss of function of reproductive and urinary members of the body are not further compensable under section. 13 CS 182. Cited. 38 CS 648. Benefits under statute are payable contemporaneously with those under Sec. 31-308(d). 39 CS 449. Payments under section are neither in lieu of wages nor based on loss of earnings; therefore are not includable as income for purpose of determining child support. 42 CS 34.

Subsec. (b):

Following the amendments in Sec. 19 of P.A. 93-228, Subsec. does not provide commissioner with discretion to award compensation for loss or permanent partial disability of an unscheduled body part or organ; Subsec. does not violate equal protection clauses of either fourteenth amendment to U.S. Constitution or Art. I, Sec. 20, of state constitution because it does not involve either a fundamental right or a suspect class, and because rational justification can be found for constructing a statute such that the loss or permanent partial disability of many organs and body parts is compensable, but permanent partial disability of the skin is not. 248 C. 793. Phrase “in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation” was intended to prohibit double payment of permanency awards and to address case law precluding claimant suffering incapacity following a permanent disability from being able to thereafter collect total incapacity benefits. 263 C. 328. A claimant who undergoes a heart transplant is entitled to an indemnity award for permanent partial disability under Subsec. based on the rated function of claimant's new, transplanted heart and not for the total loss of claimant's native heart. 336 C. 654.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-308 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMarandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 986 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-308 50×subsections: (b) 19× (a) 2×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“"On April 24, 2002, the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement and entered into a voluntary agreement to receive permanent partial disability benefits, in accordance with General Statutes § 31-308, *1029 on the basis of a 41 percent permanent partial impairment of her…”
The case’s holding
A claimant may receive total incapacity benefits for a subsequent disability if the disability is distinct from and caused by a condition not normally incident to the original loss.
Later courts cite it for
“although legislative silence is not always indicative of legislative affirmation, we have routinely considered legislative inaction for a significant period of time to be significant” · 1 citing court
2
GREENBarton v. Ducci Elec. Contractors, Inc., 730 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 31-308 79×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“The sole issue in this case is whether General Statutes § 31-308 (b), which contains a schedule of compensation for loss or permanent partial disability of enumerated body parts and organs that does not include the skin, violates either the equal protection or due process…”
The case’s holding
A challenge to a statute on constitutional grounds imposes a difficult burden on the challenger.
Later courts cite it for
“if a party does not provide an independent analysis asserting the existence of greater protection under the state constitutional provision than its federal counterpart ... we will not of our own initiative address that question” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENRayhall v. Akim Co., 819 A.2d 803 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 31-308 28×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“4 ; see General Statutes § 31-308 (b) (loss of or loss of use of member) and (d) (scarring); see also 4 A.”
The case’s holding
An employee with multiple injuries receives temporary incapacity benefits until all injured body parts reach maximum medical improvement.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that we do not defer to the review board's construction of a statute-a question of law-when, as in the present case, the provisions at issue previously have not been subjected to judicial scrutiny or when the review board's interpretation has not been time tested.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENPizzuto v. Comm'r of Mental Retardation, 927 A.2d 811 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 31-308 33×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“ion of the workers’ compensation review board (board) reversing the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner for the fifth district (commissioner), which had ordered the named defendant, the commissioner of mental retardation, 3 to pay the plaintiff § 31-308a benefits…”
Holding on this section
A workers' compensation commissioner may award § 31-308a benefits based on a prior disability if that disability is a substantial cause of the claimant's loss of earning capacity following a subsequent injury.
cites § 31-308 74×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“1 The Appellate Court 1 Although § 31-308 has been amended since the compensable injury took place in the present case; see, e.”
6
GREENVitti v. Milford, 249 A.3d 726 (Conn. 2020).
cites § 31-308 33×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“1 General Statutes § 31-308 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘With respect to the following injuries, the compensation, in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation, shall be seventy-five per cent of the average…”
7
GREENGurliacci v. Mayer, 590 A.2d 914 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 31-308 6×cited by 1,137 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“hat the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that the plaintiff was not required to reimburse Stamford for that portion of her salary which it claims was paid as temporary total disability because the court concluded that the plaintiff received her salary pursuant to a…”
The case’s holding
A trial court must determine attorney fees on remand following a finding that a statute serves to recover costs from a culpable third party while avoiding double recovery.
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the court.” · 17 citing courts
8
GREENStitzer v. Rinaldi's Restaurant, 557 A.2d 1256 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 31-308 18×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the plaintiff’s *117 scars were compensable under General Statutes § 31-308 (d) of the Workers’ Compensation Act.”
Later courts cite it for
“this court cannot, by judicial construction, read into legislation provisions that clearly are not contained therein.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENPaternostro v. Edward Coon Co., 583 A.2d 1293 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 31-308 19×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“The sole issue in this appeal is whether specific indemnity workers’ compensation benefits under General Statutes § 31-308 (b) 1 for permanent partial impairment of one’s arm as a result of a shoulder injury are payable concurrently with benefits for temporary total incapacity…”
Later courts cite it for
“statutes must be construed to avoid illogical, irrational results” · 1 citing court
10
GREENStarks v. Univ. of Connecticut, 850 A.2d 1013 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 31-308 17×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“80-12 ([permanent partial schedule awards are based on medical condition after maximum improvement has been reached and ignore wage loss entirely).”
11
GREENAncona v. City of Norwalk, 584 A.2d 454 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 31-308 21×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“, supra (concurrent payment of benefits for total incapacity under General Statutes § 31-307 and partial incapacity under General Statutes § 31-308 [b] is prohibited as double compensation); see also Olmstead v.”
Later courts cite it for
“we have generally taken the position that we do not sit de novo on civil cases for arguments that have not been raised in the agency whose action we are reviewing.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENCappellino v. Town of Cheshire, 628 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 31-308 15×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“to 1975) § 31-308 1 after he reached maximum medical *571 improvement in 1978.”
The case’s holding
Permanent partial disability awards survive the death of an employee and pass to his dependents, and temporary total disability benefits do not discharge the obligation to pay them.
13
REDGardner v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 308 A.3d 550 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024).
cites § 31-308 59×cited by 1 case
Reversed by Gardner v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services (2025): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 31-308
“,3 and denying the plaintiff’s claim for ongoing temporary partial disability benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-308 (a).4 The plaintiff claims that the board improperly determined as a matter of law that, in light of the undisputed fact that she had reached maximum…”
14
GREENRydingsword v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 615 A.2d 1032 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 31-308 9×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“51 2 *11 pursuant to General Statutes § 31-308 (d). 3 The plaintiff did not pursue a workers’ compensation claim for specific indemnity for the 20 percent disability of the lumbar spine as provided in § 31-308 (b).”
The case’s holding
An underinsured motorist insurer may set off the value of an unrealized workers' compensation indemnity award to prevent double recovery even if the claimant bypasses the workers' compensation forum.
Later courts cite it for
“the public policy established by the underinsured motorist statute is that every insured is entitled to recover for the damages he or she would have been able to recover if the underinsured motorist had maintained an adequate policy of liability insurance.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENAdzima v. UAC/Norden Div., 411 A.2d 924 (Conn. 1979).
cites § 31-308 8×cited by 80 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“Finally, it is evident that the claim of the plaintiff in this case was for further disability payments under General Statutes § 31-308 (m). Recovery of benefits under that section, which allows further payments of compensation for partial incapacity arising out of, inter alia,…”
The case’s holding
A claimant has not reached maximum medical improvement when weighing conflicting medical opinions in the record favors the claimant (finding that deceased claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement).
Later courts cite it for
“the conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” · 7 citing courts
16
GREENSafford v. Owens Brockway, 816 A.2d 556 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 31-308 18×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“The sole issue in this appeal 1 is whether, under General Statutes § 31-308 (b), 2 the workers’ com *528 pensation review board (board) properly affirmed an award of benefits by the workers’ compensation commissioner for the fourth district (commissioner) that was based solely…”
17
GREENFaraci v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 558 A.2d 234 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 31-308 13×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“The sole issue in this case is whether General Statutes § 31-308 (d), which excludes workers’ compensation for any scar resulting from spinal surgery, violates the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 20 of…”
Later courts cite it for
“always imposes a difficult burden on the challenger.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENMisenti v. Int'l Silver Co., 575 A.2d 690 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 31-308 13×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“The sole issue in this workers’ compensation appeal is whether the plaintiff, Joseph Misenti, is entitled to receive permanent partial disability-benefits, under General Statutes § 31-308 (b), 1 for the partial loss of use of his hands.”
Later courts cite it for
“because the workers' compensation act is a remedial statute, this court should not impose limitations on the benefits provided for a disabled worker that the statute itself does not clearly specify.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENCochran v. Dept. of Transp., 327 A.3d 901 (Conn. 2024).
cites § 31-308 9×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“nt or advanced practice registered nurse attending an injured employee certifies that the employee is unable to perform his usual work but is able to perform other work, (2) the employee is ready and willing to perform other work in the same locality and (3) no other work is…”
20
GREENBrennan v. City of Waterbury, 207 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2019).
cites § 31-308 6×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 31-308
“" (Emphasis added.) Public Acts 1989, No. 89-346 (P.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196619962026

One bar per year. Tallest: 11 cases in 1992. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.61Conn. App. Ct.32Conn. Super. Ct.3D. Conn.1
By subsection
(a)2 cases
Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 986 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 2010).“"On April 24, 2002, the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement and entered into a voluntary agreement to receive permanent partial disability benefits, in accordance with General Statutes § 31-308, *1029 on the basis of a 41 percent permanent partial impairment of her…”
Diaz v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 195 A.3d 400 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
(b)1 case
Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 986 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 2010).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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