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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 47a — Landlord and TenantChapter 833 — Entry and Detainer

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-43 (2025)

(Formerly Sec. 52-462). Complaint and procedure: Forcible entry and detainer; entry and detainer

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1982–2026 44citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 44 opinions since 1982, 5 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) When any person (1) makes forcible entry into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and with a strong hand detains the same, or (2) having made a peaceable entry, without the consent of the actual possessor, holds and detains the same with force and strong hand, or (3) enters into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and causes damage to the premises or damage to or removal of or detention of the personal property of the possessor, or (4) when the party put out of possession would be required to cause damage to the premises or commit a breach of the peace in order to regain possession, the party thus ejected, held out of possession, or suffering damage may exhibit his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court.

(b) Such judge shall forthwith issue a summons to the party complained of, directed to some proper officer, to notify him to appear at a specified time and place, within eight days from the exhibition of such complaint, in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the injury complained of was done, to answer to the matters contained in the complaint.

(c) Such summons shall be served upon the party complained of six days inclusive before the day appointed for trial.

(d) If, after service of such summons, the party complained of does not appear and defend, the judge shall proceed in the same manner as if he were present.

(1949 Rev., S. 8198; P.A. 76-95, S. 21, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82; 76-436, S. 409, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 79-571, S. 38; P.A. 80-483, S. 126, 186.)

History: P.A. 76-95 applied provisions to cases of persons damaging premises or damaging or detaining personal property or cases where person out of possession would have to damage premises or commit breach of peace to regain possession; P.A. 76-435 revised effective date section of P.A. 76-95; P.A. 76-436 removed provisions which had allowed complaints to judges of common pleas court and added reference to judicial districts, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties; Sec. 52-462 transferred to Sec. 47a-43 in 1979; P.A. 79-571 divided section into Subsecs., added references to dwelling units and rephrased provisions; P.A. 80-483 made technical corrections.

Annotations to former section 52-462:

The remedy for a forcible entry and detainer was originally (1698) by proceedings instituted before a justice of the peace; in 1722, it was provided that they must be brought before two assistants, or an assistant and a justice of the peace, or two justices of the peace, one of whom must be of the quorum; and the complaint might be a qui tam one. 4 C. 92. Upon the abolition of the office of assistant, consequent on the adoption of the constitution of 1818, the court consisted of a judge of the county court and a justice of the peace, and, after the abolition of county courts in 1855, the place of the judge was supplied by a county commissioner; such court was held to be one of limited jurisdiction. 18 C. 100. By the revision of 1875, the proceedings were to be before a single judge; actual violence, used or threatened, is necessary to constitute a forcible entry or detainer. 23 C. 515. If some of the defendants are not served with the process, the others cannot object. 4 C. 93. Necessary averments. 17 C. 212; 18 C. 95; 99 C. 127; 100 C. 577. A mere agent cannot sustain a complaint. 23 C. 514. Under former statute, a writ of error lay to the Superior Court from the judgment of a county commissioner and a justice of the peace. 46 C. 468. Landlord has no right to regain possession by force when his tenant is holding over. 52 C. 16. Dispossession under void execution may constitute. 79 C. 682. Defendant cannot show title or right of possession in himself or a third person. 85 C. 206. Statute makes it unlawful for dispossessed owner to retake possession of his land by force. 99 C. 126. Plaintiff's cause of action based on possession; defendant's denial of plaintiff's possession does not put title in issue. 100 C. 577. Cited. 150 C. 346.

A showing of force or threat of force is required for relief under section. 10 CS 100; 13 CS 409; 17 CS 19. Distinguished from civil action under Sec. 52-465. 30 CS 607.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 190 C. 364; 196 C. 390; 203 C. 103; 209 C. 243; 221 C. 674. Public policy underlying statute is to prevent self-help on part of landlords seeking to recover possession of premises and to avoid costs of disturbances to public that can result therefrom; the legality of individual's presence as a tenant is not at issue under statute; nothing in statute protects a possessor from being removed from premises by police in accordance with criminal law for a breach of the peace. 284 C. 502.

Boat slip not deemed an appurtenance of the office. 5 CA 235. Cited. Id., 302; 17 CA 285; 24 CA 124; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 674; 45 CA 46; 46 CA 112. In order to prevail under section, plaintiff must show that he was in actual possession of premises at the time of defendant's action, and in this case trial court's finding of possession was overruled because complainant did not possess keys to premises and only accessed premises for short periods every other month. 62 CA 517. Purpose of statute is to prohibit property owner from entering his or her property in the act of taking possession thereof from one not legally entitled to such possession but who, nonetheless, maintains actual possession of such property. 71 CA 859. Cited. 87 CA 180. Section protects peaceable possession from disturbance, and the removal of plaintiff from the premises by police after plaintiff caused a disturbance and court's subsequent no contact order which effectively kept plaintiff off the premises did not form a proper basis for a finding of an entry and detainer. 121 CA 760. Section seeks to discourage owner resorting to self-help tactics so that peace and good order may be maintained. Id., 790. Defendant's act of entering premises without the consent of plaintiff pursuant to a reasonable, but mistaken, belief that plaintiff had vacated the premises did not violate the public policy that section seeks to uphold, and therefore did not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. 133 CA 321.

Cited. 38 CS 1.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-43 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENFleming v. City of Bridgeport, 935 A.2d 126 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 47a-43 33×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The named plaintiff, Sylvia Fleming, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court holding that: (1) the individual defendants James Dixon and Susie Dixon (Dixons), the owners of a multifamily house in which the plaintiff occupied an apartment, did not violate Connecticut’s…”
The case’s holding
Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity if it is objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions do not violate a clearly established right under the circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their actions would not violate a clearly established right of the plaintiff's under the circumstances.” · 1 citing court
2
GREENWilcox v. Ferraina, 920 A.2d 316 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 47a-43 35×subsections: (a) 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The defendants argue that the court improperly found that Wilcox was in actual possession of the property at issue within the meaning of the entry and detainer statute, General Statutes § 47a-43. [2] In addition, the defendants dispute the court's finding that they dispossessed…”
3
REDFreeman v. Alamo Mgmt. Co., 586 A.2d 619 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
cites § 47a-43 20×cited by 19 cases
Reversed by Freeman v. Alamo Management Co. (1992): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The trial court also found (1) that because the plaintiff’s original possession of the premises was rightful, the only proper mode of eviction available to the defendants was that of summary process, (2) that the plaintiff had not abandoned the premises, (3) that the defend *127…”
Later courts cite it for
“indicates that the litigants should share equally the risk of error . . . because the interests at stake have roughly equal societal importance.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENDaddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 550 A.2d 1061 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 47a-43 7×cited by 150 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“343; see also General Statutes § 47a-43 (“Complaint and procedure: Forcible entry and detainer”).”
The case’s holding
Statutory provisions protecting peaceable possession are designed to prevent disturbances and protect the peace of a neighborhood.
Later courts cite it for
“and whether a practice is unfair depends upon the finding of a violation of an identifiable public policy.” · 5 citing courts
5
GREENReader v. Cassarino, 721 A.2d 911 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 47a-43 16×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant alleging that he had violated General Statutes § 47a-43, 4 *295 CUTPA and General Statutes 47a-16 et seq.”
Later courts cite it for
“a party seeking to recover damages under cutpa must . . . present evidence providing the court with a basis for a reasonable estimate of the damages suffered but this does not necessitate that the actual amount of ascertainable loss be proven.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENFreeman v. Alamo Mgmt. Co., 607 A.2d 370 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 47a-43 9×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether, in an action for unlawful entry and detainer under General Statutes § 47a-43 (a) (3), 1 entitlement to an award of statutory punitive damages, pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-46, 2 may be established by a preponderance of the…”
The case’s holding
The preponderance of the evidence standard applies to claims for statutory double damages unless the legislature expresses a specific intent to require a higher standard of proof.
Later courts cite it for
“general statutes 42-110g . . . permits a recovery of actual damages, attorneys' fees and punitive damages for violations of ct page 5495-y connecticut unfair trade practices act.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENBerlingo v. Sterling Ocean House, Inc., 523 A.2d 888 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 47a-43 12×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“Section 47a-43 definitively provides that when forcible entry and detainer occurs the party held out of possession may exhibit his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court. Such judge shall then issue a summons to the party complained of, notifying him to *105 appear within…”
The case’s holding
A forcible entry and detainer plaintiff must show actual possession of the premises at the time of the defendant's entry; a claimant lacking a right to possession cannot maintain the summary action.
Later courts cite it for
“plaintiff had a presence on the property . . . .” · 1 citing court
8
GREENSullivan v. Delisa, 923 A.2d 760 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 47a-43 8×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined that (1) they were not in possession of the premises at issue on September 7, 2000, pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-43 et seq., the entry and detainer statutes, (2) they were not tenants of the defendants on September…”
The case’s holding
Civil theft requires proof of intent beyond conversion, and an owner who revokes permission, gives reasonable notice, and uses reasonable means to remove property from her land does not act wrongfully.
Later courts cite it for
“the elements of civil theft are largely the same as the elements to prove the tort of conversion, but theft requires a plaintiff to prove the additional element of intent over and above what he or she must demonstrate to prove conversion.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENRieffel v. Johnston-Foote, 139 A.3d 729 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 47a-43 12×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“After Moger recommended to his clients the institution of a forcible entry and detainer action pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-43, the individual neighbor defendants authorized the action against the plaintiffs.”
10
GREENKarantonis v. Town of East Hartford, 804 A.2d 861 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 47a-43 8×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The plaintiff, Paul Karantonis, appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant, town of East Hartford (town), in this action for forcible entry and detainer brought pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-43. 1 On appeal, Karantonis claims that the trial court…”
Later courts cite it for
“the purpose of the connecticut entry and detainer statute . . . which is part of the landlord and tenant act, general statutes 47a-1 et seq., is to prohibit a property owner from entering his or her property in the act of taking possession thereof from one not legally entitled to such possession but who, nonetheless, maintains actual possession of such property.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENRowe v. Goulet, 875 A.2d 564 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 47a-43 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“” General Statutes § 47a-43 (a) provides: “When any person (1) makes forcible entry into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and with a strong hand detains the same, or (2) having made a peaceable entry, without the consent of the actual possessor, holds and detains the same…”
Later courts cite it for
“duplicated recoveries . . . must not be awarded for the same underlying loss under different legal theories” · 1 citing court
12
GREENMurphy, Inc. v. Remodeling, 772 A.2d 154 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 47a-43 6×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The defendant further argues that the plaintiffs evidence fails *520 to support a forcible entry and detainer action under General Statutes § 47a-43. 2 We agree. “The process of entry and detainer is in its nature an action by which one in the possession and enjoyment of any…”
The case’s holding
A written agreement granting only a right to service signs and access over another's land is a license, not a lease, conveying no possessory interest, even if captioned a lease.
Later courts cite it for
“a license in real property is a mere privilege to act on the land of another, which does not produce an interest in the property. . . . it does not convey a possessory interest in land . . . .” · 1 citing court
13
GREENFleming v. City of Bridgeport, 886 A.2d 1220 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 47a-43 8×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that (1) the Dixons did not violate General Statutes § 47a-43, 3 the entry and detainer statute, (2) the police defendants did not violate the entry and detainer statute and (3) the police defendants did not…”
14
GREENBourque v. Morris, 460 A.2d 1251 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 47a-43 8×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The plaintiff brought this action for forcible entry and detainer pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-43 after he was locked out of the room he occupied in a hotel owned by the defendant.”
Later courts cite it for
“the issue must be decided upon the basis of reasonable inferences to be drawn from the circumstances of the transaction between them.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENStuart v. Stuart, 996 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 47a-43 2×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“683 (applying preponderance of evidence standard to claim for statutory punitive damages under General Statutes §§ 47a-43 and 47a-46 and stating that “[a]bsent evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, we continue to presume that when a statutory private right of action…”
The case’s holding
The preponderance of the evidence standard applies to statutory theft claims in the absence of explicit legislative language mandating a higher burden of proof.
Later courts cite it for
“it is manifest to our hierarchical judicial system that this court has the final say on matters of connecticut law and that the appellate court and superior court are bound by our precedent” · 12 citing courts
16
GREENBalf Co. v. Exxon Corp., 682 F. Supp. 735 (D. Conn. 1988).
cites § 47a-43 20×subsections: (a)(3) 3×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the court is without original subject matter jurisdiction over the claim based on Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 47a-43 through -46; (2) a claim for damage to personal property fails to state a claim upon which relief…”
17
REDBerlingo v. Sterling Ocean House, Inc., 504 A.2d 516 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 47a-43 6×cited by 16 cases
Reversed by Berlingo v. Sterling Ocean House, Inc. (1987): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The defendant is appealing from the judgment for the plaintiff rendered in an action for forcible entry and detainer brought pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-43. 2 The facts found may be summarized as follows: In January, 1980, the defendant entered into a long term lease with…”
18
GREENEvans v. Weissberg, 866 A.2d 667 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 47a-43 5×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“On April 2, 2002, the plaintiff initiated this action pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-43 (a), 1 seeking to have her rights in the strip of land restored.”
19
GREENCommuniter Break Co. v. Scinto, 493 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 47a-43 4×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“The plaintiff brought this forcible entry and detainer action pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-43 after the defendant, manager of the Bridgeport parking authority, forcibly removed and thereafter detained the plaintiffs coin operated video machines from leased areas located in…”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff suing under the forcible entry and detainer statute must prove actual possession of the land or property from which they were dispossessed.
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff suing under the forcible entry and detainer statute must prove his actual possession of the land or property from which he claims to have been dispossessed.” · 4 citing courts
20
GREENCzaplicki v. Ogren, 868 A.2d 61 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 47a-43 5×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 47a-43
“Ogren (lockout case), the court improperly found that the defendant violated General Statutes § 47a-43, the entry and detainer statute, and improperly awarded damages that were not supported by the evidence.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198220042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2005. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.30Conn.8D. Conn.5Conn. Super. Ct.1
By subsection
(a)1 case
Wilcox v. Ferraina, 920 A.2d 316 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).“The defendants argue that the court improperly found that Wilcox was in actual possession of the property at issue within the meaning of the entry and detainer statute, General Statutes § 47a-43. [2] In addition, the defendants dispute the court's finding that they dispossessed…”
(a)(3)1 case
Balf Co. v. Exxon Corp., 682 F. Supp. 735 (D. Conn. 1988).“Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the court is without original subject matter jurisdiction over the claim based on Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 47a-43 through -46; (2) a claim for damage to personal property fails to state a claim upon which relief…”

Show all 44 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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