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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 52 — Civil ActionsChapter 899 — Evidence

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146c (2025)

Privileged communications between psychologist and patient

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1983–2018 32citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 32 opinions since 1983. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (2 cases).

(a) As used in this section:

(1) “Person” means an individual who consults a psychologist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment;

(2) “Psychologist” means an individual licensed to practice psychology pursuant to chapter 383;

(3) “Communications” means all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to the diagnosis and treatment of a person between such person and a psychologist or between a member of such person's family and a psychologist;

(4) “Consent” means consent given in writing by the person or his authorized representative;

(5) “Authorized representative” means (A) an individual empowered by a person to assert the confidentiality of communications which are privileged under this section, or (B) if a person is deceased, his personal representative or next of kin, or (C) if a person is incompetent to assert or waive his privileges hereunder, (i) a guardian or conservator who has been or is appointed to act for the person, or (ii) for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality until a guardian or conservator is appointed, the person's nearest relative.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, in civil and criminal actions, in juvenile, probate, commitment and arbitration proceedings, in proceedings preliminary to such actions or proceedings, and in legislative and administrative proceedings, all communications shall be privileged and a psychologist shall not disclose any such communications unless the person or his authorized representative consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure. The person or his authorized representative may withdraw any consent given under the provisions of this section at any time in a writing addressed to the individual with whom or the office in which the original consent was filed. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect communications disclosed prior to notice of the withdrawal.

(c) Consent of the person shall not be required for the disclosure of such person's communications:

(1) If a judge finds that any person after having been informed that the communications would not be privileged, has made the communications to a psychologist in the course of a psychological examination ordered by the court, provided the communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the person's psychological condition;

(2) If, in a civil proceeding, a person introduces his psychological condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after a person's death, his condition is introduced by a party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the person, and the judge finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communications be disclosed than that the relationship between the person and psychologist be protected;

(3) If the psychologist believes in good faith that there is risk of imminent personal injury to the person or to other individuals or risk of imminent injury to the property of other individuals;

(4) If child abuse, abuse of an elderly individual or abuse of an individual who is disabled or incompetent is known or in good faith suspected;

(5) If a psychologist makes a claim for collection of fees for services rendered, the name and address of the person and the amount of the fees may be disclosed to individuals or agencies involved in such collection, provided notification that such disclosure will be made is sent, in writing, to the person not less than thirty days prior to such disclosure. In cases where a dispute arises over the fees or claims or where additional information is needed to substantiate the claim, the disclosure of further information shall be limited to the following: (A) That the person was in fact receiving psychological services, (B) the dates of such services, and (C) a general description of the types of services; or

(6) If the communications are disclosed to a member of the immediate family or legal representative of the victim of a homicide committed by the person where such person has, on or after July 1, 1989, been found not guilty of such offense by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, provided such family member or legal representative requests the disclosure of such communications not later than six years after such finding, and provided further, such communications shall only be available during the pendency of, and for use in, a civil action relating to such person found not guilty pursuant to section 53a-13.

(1969, P.A. 597, S. 13; P.A. 82-160, S. 63; P.A. 89-154, S. 1; P.A. 92-225, S. 3, 5.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 89-154 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine “person” and to add the definitions of “psychologist”, “communications”, “consent”, and “authorized representative”, amended Subsec. (b) to rephrase its provisions, to extend the prohibition on disclosure to “juvenile, probate, commitment and arbitration proceedings”, and to add provisions re the manner and effect of a withdrawal of consent, and amended Subsec. (c) to replace the introductory provision that “Relevant communications under this section shall not be privileged” with “Consent of the person shall not be required for the disclosure of such person's communications”, deleting reference to a “clinical” psychologist in Subsec. (c)(1) and adding Subsecs. (c)(3) to (5), inclusive, re exceptions when there is risk of imminent injury to person or property, when abuse is known or suspected, and when claim is made for collection of fees for services rendered; P.A. 92-225 added Subsec. (c)(6) re exception when communications are disclosed under limited circumstances to the immediate family or legal representative of certain homicide victims.

Cited. 191 C. 453; 203 C. 641. Erroneous denial of psychiatrist-patient privilege does not infringe upon right of any person other than the one to whom the privilege is given. 208 C. 683. Cited. 211 C. 555.

Cited. 18 CA 273; 23 CA 98; Id., 330; 24 CA 287. Court did not violate statute by ordering disclosure of substance abuse and psychiatric treatment records of parents in case involving termination of their parental rights. 48 CA 563.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146c most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Orr, 969 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 52-146c 22×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“[15] Additionally, General Statutes § 52-146c (b), enacted in 1969, which protects communications between psychologists and patients, provides in relevant part: "[I]n civil and criminal actions, in juvenile, probate, commitment and arbitration proceedings, in proceedings…”
The case’s holding
The statutory exception for preventing imminent physical injury does not authorize in-court testimony by a social worker.
Later courts cite it for
“when an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the impropriety was harmful. ... a nonconstitutional impropriety is harmless when an appellate court has a fair assurance that the impropriety did not substantially affect the verdict.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENCabrera v. Cabrera, 580 A.2d 1227 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990).
cites § 52-146c 27×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“I General Statutes § 52-146c, pursuant to which Joondeph’s testimony was excluded, provides that where any person consults a licensed psychologist for the purpose of securing psychological services, the psychologist shall not disclose, in civil and criminal cases or in…”
The case’s holding
The psychologist-patient privilege is not waived by limited releases of information or the presence of a spouse during joint counseling sessions.
3
GREENSafeco Ins. v. Vecsey, 259 F.R.D. 23 (D. Conn. 2009).
cites § 52-146c 13×subsections: (b) 4× (a)(3) 2× (c)(2) 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“Vecsey has not put her psychological condition “at issue” in either this declaratory-judgment action or in the underlying Negligence Action, she has not impliedly waived her psychologist-patient privilege under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-146c. These records being protected by the…”
Later courts cite it for
“where, as here, a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship, the court must apply state law to privilege issues.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENBerglass v. Berglass, 804 A.2d 889 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 52-146c 5×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“The plaintiff argues that the defendant’s records may be disclosed pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-146c (c) (2) 9 *786 and 52-146f (5).”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by modifying visitation schedules or drug testing requirements without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the best interests of the child.
Later courts cite it for
“we will, in the absence of a motion for articulation, assume that the trial court acted properly.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENIn re Jorden R., 979 A.2d 469 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 52-146c 3×cited by 78 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“” 22 The court relied on General Statutes § 52-146c and Practice Book § 32a-7 (b), which preclude disclosure of confidential materials without a court order or consent of the subject.”
The case’s holding
A finding that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts is an alternative sufficient to satisfy statutory requirements for terminating parental rights.
Later courts cite it for
“a finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . . great weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of the trial court's opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. . . . an appellate court does not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . rather every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Storlazzi, 464 A.2d 829 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 52-146c 4×cited by 100 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“2 The defendant did not testify and presented evidence bearing only on the victim’s credibility. 3 It is important to note that this case does not involve the question of whether or under what circumstances such a claim of access could overcome the assertion by the witness of…”
The case’s holding
A trial court may use in camera inspection to weigh the probative value of a witness's mental unsoundness against the interest in record confidentiality.
Later courts cite it for
“must be left to the discretion of the trial court which is better able to assess the probative value of such evidence as it relates to the particular case before it . . . and to weigh that value against the interest in confidentiality of the records.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Rollinson, 526 A.2d 1283 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 52-146c 4×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“” Conceding that none of these statements falls expressly within the statutory privilege of confidential communications with a psychiatrist or a psychologist; General Statutes § 52-146c; 9 the defendant maintains that they should nonetheless have been suppressed for *653 a…”
The case’s holding
The legislature lacks the power to enact rules governing court procedure, but may enact statutes implementing constitutional amendments that expressly delegate procedural authority to the legislature.
Later courts cite it for
“general assembly lacks the power to enact rules governing court procedure . . . .” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Delgado, 805 A.2d 705 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 52-146c 4×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“We begin our analysis by underscoring that, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-146c, 7 the victim has a conditional right of confidentiality in the records of her counseling sessions.”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not act arbitrarily or unreasonably when it denies a motion for a continuance that is supported by mere speculation.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court does not act arbitrarily or unreasonably when it denies a motion for a continuance that is supported by mere speculation.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 52-146c 4×subsections: (b) 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“See also General Statutes § 52-146b (communications made to clergymen not disclosable absent waiver “in any civil or criminal case or proceedings preliminary thereto, or in any legislative or administrative proceeding”); General Statutes § 52-146c (b) (communications between…”
Later courts cite it for
“the rules of discovery and the provisions of the act operate 'separately and independently' of each other” · 1 citing court
10
cites § 52-146c 2×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“” The defendants had asserted various privileges related to medical records, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-146c, 52-146d et seq.”
The case’s holding
A document filed with the court that the court may reasonably rely on in support of its adjudicatory function is a judicial document subject to public access.
Later courts cite it for
“any document filed that a court reasonably may rely on in support of its adjudicatory function is a judicial document” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENKyle S. v. Jayne K., 190 A.3d 68 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 52-146c 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“11 Additionally, both parties agreed that they shared the goal of protecting T's privacy. They then agreed that a mental health report regarding T, dated August 9, 2016, should be admitted into evidence.”
12
GREENCalcano v. Calcano, 777 A.2d 633 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 52-146c 2×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“We note, however, that an examination of the surrounding sections of chapter 899 of the General Statutes reveals that there are specific definitions for the term “consent” contained in the following: General Statutes § 52-146c, involving privileged communications between a…”
The case’s holding
The business records exception does not require a witness to have personal knowledge of the specific time a document was created.
Later courts cite it for
“to require the defendant to produce a witness that could testify from personal knowledge as to the specific time that a particular document was made would unduly constrain the use of the business records exception.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENGil v. Gil, 892 A.2d 318 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 52-146c 3×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“General Statutes § 52-146c (b), which pertains to psychologist-patient privilege, provides in relevant part: “Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, in civil .”
Later courts cite it for
“the fact that evidence may be subject to several interpretations does not affect its admissibility as long as it can be construed as relevant” · 1 citing court
14
GREENState v. Pierson, 546 A.2d 268 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 52-146c 2×cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“It is from the final ruling of the trial court that the defendant appeals claiming that the trial court erred in permitting the complaining witness to waive the psychiatric privilege, through counsel, without appearing personally before the court, in contravention of General…”
The case’s holding
A defendant lacks standing to challenge the procedure by which a witness against him waives a personal privilege, such as the psychiatrist-patient privilege.
15
GREENState v. Webb, 817 A.2d 122 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 52-146c 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“See General Statutes §§ 52-146c (communications between psychologist, patient); 52-146d et seq.”
Later courts cite it for
“we will not reveal specific details of the result of our in camera review because on remand the victim may withhold her consent to the disclosure of that additional material” · 1 citing court
16
REDState v. Jenkins, 807 A.2d 485 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 52-146c 4×cited by 5 cases
Reversed in part by State v. Jenkins (2004): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case ("The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed in part and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the de…
Where it cites § 52-146c
“I On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly gave the state access to a mental health record that was produced while the defendant was in the custody of the department of correction in violation of the psychiatrist-patient privilege and in violation of General…”
17
GREENSheiman v. Sheiman, 804 A.2d 983 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 52-146c 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“on to modify custody without finding a material change in the circumstances and conditions of the parties, (3) denied the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiffs motion to modify custody, (4) granted the oral motion in limine of the minor child’s counsel in violation of…”
cites § 52-146c 1×cited by 111 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“§ 13-90-107(g); Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 52-146c et seq.; Delaware Rules of Ev.”
The case’s holding
The psychotherapist-patient privilege does not protect a patient's identity or the fact and timing of their treatment from disclosure.
Later courts cite it for
“by balancing the interests protected by shielding the evidence sought with those advanced by disclosure.” · 7 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Albert, 719 A.2d 1183 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 52-146c 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“On appeal, the state claims that the statement at issue should be precluded because it is a privileged statement of a patient pursuant to General Statutes § 52-146c. The state claims that proper procedures were not followed prior to disclosing the statement.”
Later courts cite it for
“we may affirm a trial court's decision that reaches the right result, albeit for the wrong reason.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENDoe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989).
cites § 52-146c 4×subsections: (c)(2) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 52-146c
“Defendants’ argument is as follows: (1) disclosure is prohibited under Conn.Gen. Stat. §§ 52-146c to 52-146j absent written consent by each class member; (2) the Court has discretion under F.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320002018

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2002. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.17Conn.9D. Conn.36th Cir.1Conn. Super. Ct.1Md.1
By subsection
(a)(3)1 case
Safeco Ins. v. Vecsey, 259 F.R.D. 23 (D. Conn. 2009).“Vecsey has not put her psychological condition “at issue” in either this declaratory-judgment action or in the underlying Negligence Action, she has not impliedly waived her psychologist-patient privilege under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-146c. These records being protected by the…”
(b)2 cases
Safeco Ins. v. Vecsey, 259 F.R.D. 23 (D. Conn. 2009).
Dir. of Health Affairs Policy Plan. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 977 A.2d 148 (Conn. 2009).“See also General Statutes § 52-146b (communications made to clergymen not disclosable absent waiver “in any civil or criminal case or proceedings preliminary thereto, or in any legislative or administrative proceeding”); General Statutes § 52-146c (b) (communications between…”
(c)(2)2 cases
Safeco Ins. v. Vecsey, 259 F.R.D. 23 (D. Conn. 2009).
Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989).“Defendants’ argument is as follows: (1) disclosure is prohibited under Conn.Gen. Stat. §§ 52-146c to 52-146j absent written consent by each class member; (2) the Court has discretion under F.”

Show all 32 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

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Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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