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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 52 — Civil ActionsChapter 901 — Damages, Costs and Fees

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-251c (2025)

Limitation on attorney contingency fees in personal injury, wrongful death and property damage actions. Waiver of limitation by claimant

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1992–2025 26citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 26 opinions since 1992, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (1 case).

(a) In any claim or civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, the attorney and the claimant may provide by contract, which contract shall comply with all applicable provisions of the rules of professional conduct governing attorneys adopted by the judges of the Superior Court, that the fee for the attorney shall be paid contingent upon, and as a percentage of: (1) Damages awarded and received by the claimant; or (2) the settlement amount received pursuant to a settlement agreement.

(b) In any such contingency fee agreement such fee shall be the exclusive method for payment of the attorney by the claimant and shall not exceed an amount equal to a percentage of the damages awarded and received by the claimant or of the settlement amount received by the claimant as follows: (1) Thirty-three and one-third per cent of the first three hundred thousand dollars; (2) twenty-five per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; (3) twenty per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; (4) fifteen per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; and (5) ten per cent of any amount which exceeds one million two hundred thousand dollars.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, a claimant may waive the percentage limitations of said subsection if the claim or civil action is so substantially complex, unique or different from other wrongful death, personal injury or property damage claims or civil actions as to warrant a deviation from such percentage limitations. Factors that may indicate that a claim or civil action is substantially complex, unique or different from other wrongful death, personal injury or property damage claims or civil actions include, but are not limited to, if the claim or civil action (1) involves complex factual medical or legal issues, (2) involves serious permanent personal injury or death, (3) is likely to require extensive investigation and discovery proceedings, including multiple depositions, or (4) requires independent expert witness testimony. For the purposes of this subsection, “independent expert witness testimony” means testimony, whether at trial or in a deposition, from an expert who has not participated in the care of the claimant and has not participated in any official investigation of the incident involved.

(d) Prior to a claimant entering into a contingency fee agreement that provides for a fee that exceeds the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section, the attorney shall (1) explain the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section to the claimant and the reasons the attorney is unable to abide by those limitations; (2) advise the claimant of the claimant's right to seek representation by another attorney willing to abide by the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section; and (3) allow the claimant a sufficient period of time to review the proposed contingency fee agreement and, if the claimant wishes, seek representation by another attorney prior to entering into such agreement.

(e) No waiver of the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section shall be valid unless the contingency fee agreement (1) is in writing, (2) sets forth in full the fee schedule of subsection (b) of this section, (3) contains a conspicuous statement, printed in boldface type at least twelve points in size, in substantially the following form: “I UNDERSTAND THAT THE FEE SCHEDULE SET FORTH IN SECTION 52-251c OF THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES LIMITS THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES PAYABLE BY A CLAIMANT AND THAT THE STATUTE WAS INTENDED TO INCREASE THE PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT OR SETTLEMENT THAT WAS ACTUALLY RECEIVED BY A CLAIMANT. NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING THAT FEE SCHEDULE WAS TO CONFER A BENEFIT ON A CLAIMANT LIKE MYSELF, I KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THAT FEE SCHEDULE IN THIS CLAIM OR CIVIL ACTION.”, and (4) is signed and acknowledged by the claimant before a notary public or other person authorized to take acknowledgments.

(f) If a claimant waives the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section pursuant to this section, in no event shall (1) the total fee under the contingency fee agreement exceed thirty-three and one-third per cent of the damages awarded and received by the claimant or of the settlement amount received by the claimant, and (2) the claimant be required to repay any costs that the attorney incurred in investigating and prosecuting the claim or civil action if there is no recovery.

(g) No fee shall be payable to any attorney who seeks a fee that exceeds the percentage limitations of subsection (b) of this section unless the claimant has waived such limitations pursuant to this section and the contingency fee agreement complies with the requirements of subsection (e) of this section.

(h) For the purposes of this section, “damages awarded and received” means in a civil action in which final judgment is entered, that amount of the judgment or amended judgment entered by the court that is received by the claimant; “settlement amount received” means in a claim or civil action in which no final judgment is entered, the amount received by the claimant pursuant to a settlement agreement; and “fee” shall not include disbursements or costs incurred in connection with the prosecution or settlement of the claim or civil action, other than ordinary office overhead and expense.

(P.A. 86-338, S. 1; P.A. 87-227, S. 1; P.A. 91-380, S. 1; P.A. 04-257, S. 131; P.A. 05-275, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 87-227 amended Subsec. (a) to change the applicability of the section from “In any claim or civil action accruing on or after October 1, 1986, seeking damages as compensation for personal injury or wrongful death” to “In any claim or civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987”, to require the contract to comply with applicable provisions of the rules of professional conduct and to replace “damages awarded pursuant to a determination by the trier of fact” with “damages awarded and received by the claimant” and “amounts pursuant to a settlement agreement” with “settlement amount pursuant to a settlement agreement”, amended Subsec. (b) to replace “percentage of the award or settlement amount” with “percentage of the damages awarded and received by the claimant or of the settlement amount received by the claimant”, and added Subsec. (c) to define “damages awarded and received”, “settlement amount received” and “fee”; P.A. 91-380 amended Subsec. (c) by revising the definitions of “damages awarded and received” and “settlement amount received” to provide that the amount received by a claimant in a claim or civil action brought pursuant to Sec. 38a-368 shall be reduced by any basic reparations benefits paid to the claimant pursuant to Sec. 38a-365; P.A. 04-257 attempted to make changes to provisions added by vetoed P.A. 04-155 and therefore such changes were void and not given effect, and added Subsec. (d) defining “medical malpractice claim or civil action” and “health care provider”, effective June 14, 2004; P.A. 05-275 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to replace “settlement amount” with “the settlement amount received”, amended Subsec. (b) to replace “arrangement” with “agreement”, added new Subsec. (c) authorizing a claimant to waive the percentage limitations of Subsec. (b) if the claim or civil action is so substantially complex, unique or different from other wrongful death, personal injury or property damage claims or civil actions as to warrant a deviation from such percentage limitations and specifying factors that may indicate such complexity, uniqueness or difference, added new Subsec. (d) specifying the responsibilities of an attorney before a claimant enters into a contingency fee agreement that provides for a fee that exceeds the percentage limitations of Subsec. (b), added new Subsec. (e) specifying the requirements that a contingency fee agreement must comply with in order for a waiver of such percentage limitations to be valid, added new Subsec. (f) providing that if the claimant waives such percentage limitations the amount of the total fee is limited to 33.33% and the claimant is not required to repay any costs incurred by the attorney if there is no recovery, added new Subsec. (g) prohibiting payment of a fee to an attorney who seeks a fee that exceeds such percentage limitations unless the claimant has waived such limitations and the agreement complies with Subsec. (e), redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (h) and amended said Subsec. to delete from definitions of “damages awarded and received” and “settlement amount received” provision that in a claim or civil action brought pursuant to Sec. 38a-368 such amount shall be reduced by any basic reparations benefits paid to the claimant pursuant to Sec. 38a-365 and deleted former Subsec. (d) defining “medical malpractice claim or civil action” and “health care provider”, effective July 13, 2005, and applicable to causes of action accruing on or after that date.

Cited. 214 C. 1; 223 C. 786; Id., 484; Id., 786; 231 C. 77; 235 C. 107. Plaintiff's failure to comply with section does not preclude him from recovering under doctrines of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, regardless of whether bad faith by the successor attorney or client's waiver of section has been established. 255 C. 390.

Cited. 28 CA 693; 43 CA 184; 45 CA 237. Section intended to regulate the attorney-client relationship in order to protect plaintiffs from excessive legal fees, and defendant insurer may assert section as a special defense in action by an attorney for interference with a contractual relation. 48 CA 699. Complaint filed by counsel against hospital was a civil action that sought recovery of damages resulting from personal injury which falls within the ambit of section; fee cap does not constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to contract. 139 CA 147. Attorney who is barred from contract recovery because of fee agreement's failure to comply with section cannot recover from client under doctrine of quantum meruit. 163 CA 273.

Benefits of section can be waived. 42 CS 526.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-251c most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENGagne v. Vaccaro, 766 A.2d 416 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 52-251c 28×cited by 115 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“The principal issue in this appeal is whether, in the absence of a written contingency fee agreement between an attorney and his client, as required by General Statutes § 52-251c, 1 recovery by that attorney *392 against a successor attorney should be permitted on the basis of…”
The case’s holding
An attorney may recover reasonable fees from a successor attorney under the doctrines of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment despite the absence of a written contingency fee agreement.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the defendant was benefitted, (2) the defendant unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for the benefits, and (3) the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs detriment.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENBerry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 52-251c 22×cited by 267 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“The plaintiff appeals separately from the trial court’s ruling limiting the amount of punitive damages awarded on the sixth count of the complaint to one third of the jury’s verdict on that count, in accordance with General Statutes § 52-251c. We affirm the judgment of the trial…”
The case’s holding
Punitive damages are limited to litigation expenses less taxable costs and require evidence of reckless indifference or intentional and wanton violation of the rights of others.
Later courts cite it for
“common law punitive damages serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and, thus, are properly limited to the plaintiff's litigation expenses less taxable costs.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENParnoff v. Yuille, 57 A.3d 349 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
cites § 52-251c 32×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“” General Statutes § 52-251c (a). Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, the complaint filed on behalf of the defendant against her hospital employer sought damages for personal injury.”
Later courts cite it for
“quantum meruit generally applies 'in a situation in which the plaintiff has provided services to the defendant for which the defendant has refused to pay.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENSilver v. Jacobs, 682 A.2d 551 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
cites § 52-251c 12×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“General Statutes § 52-251c (a) provides in pertinent part: “In any claim or civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury .”
5
GREENBhatia v. Debek, 948 A.2d 1009 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 52-251c 4×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“The court calculated the damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-251c (a), which sets forth limits for contin *421 gency fees in personal injury actions.”
The case’s holding
A claim for malicious prosecution fails without proof that the defendant acted without probable cause, defined as knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable belief in prosecuting an action.
Later courts cite it for
“a private citizen who knowingly provides false information to a public officer is not entitled to the limited immunity provided under the initiation element, even if that person brought no pressure to bear on the public officer and left the decision to prosecute entirely in the hands of that public officer.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREEND'Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 188 A.3d 727 (Conn. 2018).
cites § 52-251c 5×subsections: (g)cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“64 percent fee cap set by General Statutes § 52-251c, which governed their retainer agreement, as well by charging more than $600,000 in litigation expenses for which they had no original invoices or other proof of validity.”
7
GREENSchoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 828 A.2d 64 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 52-251c 2×cited by 189 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“” We note that the reasonableness of the contingent fee percentage itself may also be influenced by statutory requirements; see General Statutes § 52-251c (limiting fees to enumerated percentages in personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property actions); or, by factors…”
The case’s holding
An assignment of claims for collection does not transfer ownership of the underlying right to sue, allowing the assignor to retain equitable ownership and pursue legal claims.
Later courts cite it for
“if the agreement, is, by its terms, reasonable, then- the trial 'court may depart from its terms only when necessary to prevent substantial unfairness to the party, typically a defendant, who bears the ultimate responsibility for payment of the fee.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENGagne v. Vaccaro, 835 A.2d 491 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 52-251c 3×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“On March 6, 2001, the Supreme Court decided whether a per se rule precluding recovery on the basis of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, despite the absence of bad faith or client consent, is appropriate when an attorney fails to put into writing a contingency fee agreement…”
The case’s holding
An action for restitution is legal in nature rather than equitable when the only relief sought is the collection of money damages.
Later courts cite it for
“ordinarily a money judgment is obtained by an action at law.... an action is to be deemed legal in nature, rather than equitable, where the only relief sought is the collection of money damages.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENHorner v. Bagnell, 154 A.3d 975 (Conn. 2017).
cites § 52-251c 3×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“5 (e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, on which the defendant relies for the proposition that the trial court's order of fee sharing as a remedy for unjust enrichment was barred as a matter of law.”
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of a contract between the partners providing to the contrary, a contingency fee matter pending at the time of dissolution is an asset of the partnership.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENDisciplinary Couns. v. Parnoff, 152 A.3d 1222 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 52-251c 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“In August, 2004, shortly after the arbitration award, Yuille questioned the defendant's fee agreement, claiming that the 40 percent contingency fee was excessive because it violated General Statutes § 52-251c (b), 2 Connecticut's fee cap statute, *1226 and that a portion of the…”
11
GREENStatewide Grievance Comm. v. Dixon, 772 A.2d 160 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 52-251c 3×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“The amount of the attorney’s fee was unreasonable pursuant to General Statutes § 52-251c, which provides in relevant part: “(a) In any claim or civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property .”
12
GREENIn re Est. of Salerno, 630 A.2d 1386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993).
cites § 52-251c 10×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“This appeal from the Probate Court for the district of North Branford presents certain issues of first impression concerning General Statutes § 52-251c, the attorney’s fee cap statute, enacted in 1986 as part of the tort reform legislation adopted by the legislature.”
13
GREENGreco v. United Tech. Corp., 890 A.2d 1269 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 52-251c 2×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care” [emphasis added]); General Statutes § 52-225d (“[p]ayment of damages in lump sum and periodic installments in personal injury, wrongful death and property damage actions” [emphasis added]); General Statutes § 52-251c (a)…”
The case’s holding
The general wrongful death statute governs claims for toxic exposure because specific hazardous substance statutes and federal CERCLA provisions do not preempt the general statute or apply to enclosed areas.
Later courts cite it for
“we review de novo the trial court's construction of the relevant statutory provisions” · 1 citing court
14
GREENPerkins & Mario, P.C. v. Annunziata, 694 A.2d 1388 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
cites § 52-251c 3×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“2 As we stated in Silver, General Statutes § 52-251c 3 “protects injured persons from excessive legal fees.”
cites § 52-251c 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“, General Statutes § 52-251c (setting caps on attorney contingency fee agreements); see also, e.”
16
GREENMcCullough v. Waterside Assocs., 925 A.2d 352 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 52-251c 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“” General Statutes § 52-251c (a). The agreement, the terms of which are not being contested by the parties, contained a compensation provision for a contingency fee on the basis of one third of any favorable settlement or recovery.”
17
GREENBeizer v. Goepfert, 613 A.2d 1336 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
cites § 52-251c 1×cited by 104 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“During the interim between the oral contract and the signing of the standard form contract, the legislature enacted § 52-251c which required that all contingent fee agreements be reduced to writing.”
The case’s holding
The statutory authorization for factfinders in contract actions broadly includes mixed contract and tort claims when the core dispute is contractual.
Later courts cite it for
“great deference is given to the trial court's findings because the trial court is responsible for weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses.” · 26 citing courts
18
NEUTRALBrunswick v. Safeco Ins., 711 A.2d 1202 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 52-251c 10×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“General Statutes § 52-251c provides in relevant part: “Limitation on attorney contingency fees in personal injury, wrongful death and property damage actions, (a) In any claim or civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property…”
19
GREENMarcus v. DuPerry, 611 A.2d 859 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 52-251c 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“See General Statutes § 52-251c, which provides in pertinent part: “(a) In any claim or civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, the attorney and the claimant may provide by…”
20
GREENDisciplinary Couns. v. Smigelski, 4 A.3d 336 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
cites § 52-251c 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 52-251c
“The court noted that this retainer agreement was not governed by General Statutes § 52-251c, which governs only contingency fee agreements for legal services in civil actions for personal injury, wrongful death or property damage.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199220082025

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1992. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.14Conn.10Conn. Super. Ct.1E.D. La.1
By subsection
(b)1 case
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. La. 2008).
(g)1 case
D'Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 188 A.3d 727 (Conn. 2018).“64 percent fee cap set by General Statutes § 52-251c, which governed their retainer agreement, as well by charging more than $600,000 in litigation expenses for which they had no original invoices or other proof of validity.”

Show all 26 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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