When a plaintiff in any civil action has failed to obtain judgment by reason of failure to name the right person as defendant therein, the plaintiff may bring a new action and the statute of limitations shall not be a bar thereto if service of process in the new action is made within one year after the termination of the original action. If service of process in the original action has been made upon an agent of the defendant named in the new action, or if the defendant in the new action is a corporation and service in the original action has been made upon an officer or agent of the corporation, notice of any claim for damage shall be sufficient if given in the original action, pursuant to statutory provisions, to any officer or agent of the defendant in the new action.
(1949 Rev., S. 8333; P.A. 82-160, S. 252.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
Where defendant in second suit is a street railway company upon whom no process was served in original action, statute does not cure lack of statutory notice. 105 C. 96. New action may be brought within 1 year regardless of originally applicable statute of limitations. Id., 94; 109 C. 460. New action may set up different allegations if cause of action remains the same. 108 C. 444. Appeal from architectural examining board not a “civil action” within meaning of section. 153 C. 124. Cited. 169 C. 646; 183 C. 504; 191 C. 150; 214 C. 464; 225 C. 13; 234 C. 169. Where only one right person is named as defendant, failure to name all defendants from whom recovery is possible does not constitute failure to name the right person as defendant. 276 C. 1. Action was untimely and savings provision does not apply in municipal liability action under Sec. 52-557n because plaintiff could have recovered from defendants in original action, based on the factual allegations and causes of action in the original complaint. 315 C. 821.
Cited. 18 CA 515; 22 CA 625; 42 CA 345. Where plaintiff's suit against a state officer was dismissed due to immunity under Sec. 4-165, the 2-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-584 applies in subsequent suit against the state and the exception under this section for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply. 62 CA 545. Plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as result of defendant's alleged negligence could not be saved from being time barred by statute because plaintiff named the proper party in his previous action which was not dismissed for failure to name the proper party but was stayed pending resolution in arbitration; statute applies only in circumstances in which plaintiff's original action failed by reason of naming the wrong defendant and such naming was the product of a reasonable and honest mistake of fact as to identity of the truly responsible individual. 67 CA 668. Plaintiff could not avail herself of statute's savings clause because dismissal of her first action was for dormancy, not for failure to name the right person as defendant. 72 CA 302. Plaintiff not eligible for relief under section since she withdrew her action in favor of a settlement and did not obtain judgment in the original action. 83 CA 843. Plaintiff's initial failure to name all presumptively factually correct defendants, whom plaintiff eventually did name, did not constitute failure to name the right person as defendant under section. 123 CA 583; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 306 C. 107. No exception to the principles of res judicata for an action brought under section. 165 CA 857.
Effect of section on statute of limitations where proper party was sued in corporate rather than individual name. 9 CS 307. The original action was terminated at the date judgments of nonsuit were rendered and not at the date of determination of later motions to set aside. 31 CS 302. Cited. 33 CS 176; 40 CS 266.
Notes of Decisions
DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 2 A.3d 963 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 50× “The plaintiff brought the actions underlying her appeal against the defendants in two separate actions, each pursuant to General Statutes § 52-593, the so-called "wrong defendant" statute.”
Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Fin. Corp., 882 A.2d 597 (Conn. 2005).
· cites it 26× “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that her action was barred by the applicable statute *3 of limitations and could not be saved under General Statutes § 52-593, 2 which permits a new action to be filed beyond the applicable statute of…”
Rocco v. Garrison, 848 A.2d 352 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 8× “The defendant finally argues that because the plaintiffs’ complaint in the present action expressly relied upon General Statutes § 52-593 14 rather than § 52-592 in seeking relief for the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, the plaintiffs are not entitled to bring their claim under §…”
Isidro v. State, 771 A.2d 257 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
· cites it 16× “The plaintiffs sole claim is that the court improperly concluded that General Statutes § 52-593 2 did not apply to save her *547 action from the running of the two year statute of limitations.”
Finkle v. Carroll, 37 A.3d 851 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 26× “On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly concluded that her action, which was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations, could not be saved by General Statutes § 52-593. 1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”
Billerback v. Cerminara, 805 A.2d 757 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 28× “The issue presented is whether the court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment when it determined that the plaintiff could not bring her action under General Statutes § 52-593 1 after her first action had been dismissed for dormancy.”
Vessichio v. Hollenbeck, 558 A.2d 686 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
· cites it 6× “The plaintiffs’ next claim is that the trial court erred in concluding that General Statutes § 52-593 was inapplicable to save the plaintiffs’ action against the defend *520 ants.”
Russell v. Thomas O'connor & Co., 679 A.2d 420 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
· cites it 8× “They claim that the trial court improperly concluded that their complaint was not filed within the one year time period of General Statutes § 52-593. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.”
Perzanowski v. City of New Britain, 440 A.2d 763 (Conn. 1981).
· cites it 4× “The trial court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, § 52-577 of the General Statutes.”
Jacob v. Dometic Origo AB, 916 A.2d 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
· cites it 5× “A product liability claim must be brought within three years from the date the injury is first sustained or discovered. General Statutes § 52-577a (a).”
Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Fin. Corp., 851 A.2d 407 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
· cites it 8× “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly failed to apply General Statutes § 52-593, which can save an action from being barred by the statute of limitations when the plaintiff has filed the original action against the wrong defendant.”
Kronberg v. Peacock, 789 A.2d 510 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 15× “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the saving provisions of General Statutes § 52-593 1 did not apply to the facts of this case and that the plaintiff’s cause of action was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”
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