(a) A persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order is a person who (1) stands convicted of assault under section
53a-61, stalking under section
53a-181d, threatening under section
53a-62, harassment under section
53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section
53a-223, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order under section
53a-223a, criminal violation of a restraining order under section
53a-223b or criminal trespass under section
53a-107 or
53a-108, and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime, (A) been convicted of a capital felony under the provisions of section
53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section
53a-86 or
53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section
53a-87,
53a-152 or
53a-153, or a class D felony under sections
53a-60 to
53a-60c, inclusive,
53a-72a,
53a-72b,
53a-95,
53a-103,
53a-103a,
53a-114,
53a-136 or
53a-216, assault under section
53a-61, stalking under section
53a-181d, threatening under section
53a-62, harassment under section
53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section
53a-223, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order under section
53a-223a, criminal violation of a restraining order under section
53a-223b, or criminal trespass under section
53a-107 or
53a-108, or (B) been convicted in any other state of any crime the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment, criminal violation of a protective order, criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order or criminal violation of a restraining order, the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a, as applicable, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 or section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor or felony, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section 53a-35a.
(P.A. 95-193, S. 2; P.A. 02-127, S. 4; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 9; P.A. 10-144, S. 12; P.A. 12-5, S. 20; P.A. 14-122, S. 58; 14-147, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 02-127 applied the provisions to criminal violation of a restraining order under Sec. 53a-223b and in Subsec. (b) added references to Sec. 53a-35a, specified “felony” in the provision concerning the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment authorized for the next more serious crime and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (b) to delete requirement for imposition of enhanced sentence that “the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest”, effective January 25, 2008; P.A. 10-144 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to delete limitation re 5 years preceding commission of the present crime, designate existing provisions as Subparas. (A) and (C), add Subpara. (B) re conviction in any other state of any crime substantially the same as crimes enumerated in Subpara. (A) and delete “whichever is later” in Subpara. (C); P.A. 12-5 amended Subsec. (a)(2)(A) to add reference to provisions of Sec. 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012, re conviction of a capital felony, effective April 25, 2012; P.A. 14-122 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 14-147 added references to criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order throughout and amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add “prior to the commission of the present crime,” and delete former Subpara. (C) re release from incarceration with respect to conviction, effective October 1, 2014, and applicable to convictions entered on or after that date.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases (
5 in the last 5 years), 2000–2025 · leading case:
State v. Bell, 931 A.2d 198 (Conn. 2007).
State v. Bell, 931 A.2d 198 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 2× “” 35 See General Statutes § 53a-29 (conditional discharge or probation for nonclass A felony); General Statutes § 53a-34 (unconditional discharge); General Statutes § 53a-40a (persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias); General Statutes § 53a-40d (persistent…”
State v. Lahai, 18 A.3d 630 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
· cites it 4× “2007) § 53a-40d. The defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on self-defense, (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and (3) he was deprived of his constitutional right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United…”
State v. Velasco, 751 A.2d 800 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 2× “See also General Statutes § 53a-40a (same language identifies fact finder under statute allowing enhanced penalty upon conviction of crime involving bigotry or bias); General Statutes § 53a-40d (utilizing similar language as it pertains to persistent offenders of crimes…”
State v. Murphy, 757 A.2d 1125 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 4× “Muiphy III, guilty of one count of criminal attempt to commit harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-183 (a) (2) 1 and 53a-49, 2 and, *563 subsequently, also found the defendant guilty of being a persistent offender under General Statutes §…”
State v. Adgers, 921 A.2d 122 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
· cites it 2× “1 In response to a second information filed February 1,2005, a jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of being a persistent offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40d. The trial court sentenced him to a total effective term of forty-eight months to be served…”
State v. Reeves, 985 A.2d 1068 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 2× “2 The defendant also was charged, in a part B information, with being a persistent offender of assault under General Statutes § 53a-40d. After the trial court’s finding of guilty, as to the substantive offenses, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of being a persistent…”
State v. Solomon, 60 A.3d 1039 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013).
· cites it 2× “The defendant also was charged in apart B information with being a persistent offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40d for having previously been convicted of assault in the third degree.”
State v. Lepeska, 149 A.3d 213 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 4× “That same day, the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to a part B information charging him with being a persistent offender pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40d. This appeal followed.”
James P. v. Comm'r of Corr., 312 A.3d 1132 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024).
“In accordance with the Garvin agreement, the court agreed to sentence the petitioner to a total effective sentence of seven years to serve, execution suspended after three years, of which one 1 The state initially charged the petitioner with breach of the peace in the second…”
State v. Ghant, 276 A.3d 1004 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022).
· cites it 2× “The defendant was sentenced to a total effective term of seven years of incarceration, execution suspended after four years, followed by three years of probation.”
State v. Pettigrew, 978 A.2d 159 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 2× “On July 19, 2005, the defendant was convicted as a persistent *175 offender of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40d. The court, Gold, J.”
State v. Moore (Order on Motion), No. SC240221 (Conn. July 8, 2025).
· cites it 4× “Moreover, after King, the legislature has not amended the phrase ‘‘essential elements’’ in any of these statutes. See State v. Evans, 329 Conn.”
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