In Florida, the losing party gets fifteen days after an opinion comes down to ask for a rehearing — a chance for the court to reconsider, or fix something, or occasionally just change its mind. Until that window closes, or the motion gets resolved, the mandate hasn't issued and the opinion isn't final. It can still be amended. It can be withdrawn. It can vanish entirely and never happen, as far as the law is concerned.
So read these as first drafts of history, not as settled law. If one of these cases matters to your situation, check the docket before you build anything on top of it. The ink is still wet.
New opinions from the Florida Supreme Court and the six District Courts of Appeal, collected twice weekly, with summaries, practice areas, authoring judges, and the statutes each opinion construes. Click any judge's name to see every digested opinion they wrote or joined. Most recent opinions: July 31, 2026.
Summaries are drafted by an AI model reading each opinion and are provided for scanning convenience only. They are not legal advice and may contain errors: always read the opinion itself before relying on it.
Panel: Blocker, L.P, Boatwright
In a manufacturing defect case involving a vehicle explosion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's decision to allow a jury to use the Cassisi inference. The plaintiff, Robert Hetsler, suffered catastrophic injuries when his modified Roush Ford Mustang exploded. While the exact cause of the fire was disputed, evidence suggested a brake fluid leak ignited by engine heat. The trial court denied Ford's motion for a directed verdict and permitted the jury to use the inference because the vehicle had been driven less than one thousand miles and was early in its expected useful life. The court rejected Ford's arguments that the inference was improperly applied or that the loss of evidence precluded its use, noting that Ford failed to challenge the trial court's underlying reasoning on appeal. The court also found that Ford's briefing was deficient because it failed to provide a clear analytical framework for evaluating the common law doctrine and ignored persuasive authority from other jurisdictions.
Application of the Cassisi inference in a product liability case involving a vehicle fire.
Panel: Soud, Boatwright
The court reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Publix Super Markets, Inc. because there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the defendant's constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. While the court affirmed the summary judgment on the plaintiff's actual knowledge claim, it found that the evidence regarding the size of the puddle and the presence of an employee in the immediate vicinity of the fall created a jury question on constructive notice. Specifically, the plaintiff described the puddle as being approximately four feet by four feet and noted that a float was leaking water. The court determined that these factors, combined with the fact that an employee was in the area, could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the condition existed long enough that the business should have known of it. The case is remanded for further proceedings.
The court analyzed the requirements for constructive notice under Florida's premises liability statute, specifically determining that the size of a puddle and the proximity of employees are sufficient factors to create a genuine issue of material fact for a jury.
Statutes construed: § 768.0755
The appellate court reversed a trial court's order granting a directed verdict in favor of two defendants in a multivehicle negligence action. The trial court had granted the directed verdict after a jury deadlocked, reasoning that the plaintiff's expert testimony was physically impossible and that the defendant's version of events could not rebut the presumption of negligence for a rear-end driver. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by weighing the conflicting expert testimonies and deciding that one expert's testimony was impossible. Because the trial court failed to evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and instead weighed the evidence, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
The court clarified that a trial court cannot grant a directed verdict based on the determination that a non-moving party's evidence is 'impossible' based on the testimony of one of two conflicting experts. The court emphasized that the weighing of evidence and the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses are functions of the jury.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a nurse practitioner and a medical group in a medical malpractice wrongful death action. The case involved a patient who committed suicide after being unable to obtain a specific fentanyl medication following the termination of his physician-patient relationship with the defendants. The court held that the defendants owed no legal duty to the patient after he terminated the relationship and was discharged from their care. The court analyzed the existence of a duty under several sources, including statutes, common law, and the specific facts of the case. The court determined that while the patient's comments regarding suicide during his treatment were noted, the defendants were not required to provide specific follow-up actions once the relationship was severed. Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that a duty was created by providing a thirty-day prescription, noting that such a duty would not extend indefinitely or beyond the expiration of the prescription. The court concluded that the defendants were not the proximate cause of the patient's death and that no legal duty existed to sustain a claim for medical malpractice.
The court addressed the scope of a healthcare provider's duty of care following the termination of a patient's treatment and the specific limitations of liability regarding suicide prevention in an outpatient setting.
Statutes construed: § 766.102
Panel: Forst, Klingensmith, Lott
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, reversed a trial court order allowing a plaintiff to plead a claim for punitive damages in an automobile negligence case. The court held that the proffered evidence did not provide a reasonable basis for punitive damages because it failed to demonstrate intentional misconduct or gross negligence. While the trial court initially found the defendant's use of a cell phone while driving to be outrageous conduct, the appellate court clarified that a violation of a traffic law, such as the prohibition on texting while driving, is not sufficient on its own to support punitive damages. The court noted that while some instances of cell phone use may justify punitive damages, the evidence in this case did not include any additional facts to distinguish the defendant's conduct from cases where cell phone use was insufficient to meet the punitive threshold. The proffered evidence only showed a routine traffic accident and did not establish that the defendant's actions were so reckless or showed such a conscious disregard for safety that they would be considered outrageous to a member of the community.
The court clarifies the 'gatekeeper' role of the trial court in determining whether a plaintiff's proffered evidence provides a sufficient basis for punitive damages, specifically noting that a prima facie showing of ordinary negligence or a violation of a traffic statute is insufficient to meet the threshold for gross negligence.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's order of summary judgment in a negligence action involving the transmission of tuberculosis (TB).
The court addressed the distinction between actual and constructive knowledge in premises liability cases involving the transmission of infectious diseases and the proper weighing of expert testimony at the summary judgment stage.
Panel: Kelly, Rothstein-Youakim
The District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of claims against a medical group's answering service because the claims were based on ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice. The trial court had dismissed the claims because the plaintiff failed to comply with the presuit requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act. However, the appellate court determined that the presuit requirements only apply to claims directly related to the improper application of medical services requiring professional judgment or skill. Because the allegations involved the management and operation of a telephone system by non-medical staff, the claims were for ordinary negligence and did not require presuit notice.
The court clarified that the mere fact that a wrongful act occurs in a medical setting does not automatically make it a medical malpractice claim. Because the issues involved the management of a business by non-medical staff, the medical malpractice presuit requirements did not apply.
The third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's summary judgment in favor of a condominium association in a premises liability action. The plaintiff, a condominium owner, sued the association after she slipped and fell on wastewater and sewage in her bathroom. The plaintiff argued the issue was recurring and that the association had notice of the problem. The association moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff could not prove that the specific blockage causing the backup was located in the common area pipes maintained by the association rather than in the pipes within the plaintiff's unit, which were the plaintiff's responsibility to maintain. The court held that because the fall occurred inside the plaintiff's unit, which was not exclusively controlled by the association, the plaintiff was required to provide evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the backup was more likely than not caused by a failure in the common area pipes. Because all witnesses, including the plaintiff and the association's representative, testified that they did not know the source of the blockage, the plaintiff failed to meet her evidentiary burden to establish a material issue of fact.
The court clarified that when a slip and fall occurs in a private unit where the defendant's responsibility is limited to common area infrastructure, the plaintiff must provide specific evidence linking the hazard to the defendant's area of responsibility to survive summary judgment.
Panel: Lucas, Rothstein-Youakim
Wal-Mart Stores East, LP appeals a final judgment in favor of Joseph Johnson, an independent contractor who was injured by an ungrounded electrical junction box while installing a door at a Wal-Mart store. Wal-Mart argued that it should not be held liable because Johnson was an independent contractor and the store did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the independent contractor defense does not apply when a property owner negligently creates or approves a dangerous condition of which it has actual or constructive knowledge. The court found that evidence supported the existence of such a condition, as the junction box was not compliant with the National Electrical Code and was located in a restricted area managed by Wal-Mart. Because the evidence supported an exception to the independent contractor defense, the trial court properly denied Wal-Mart's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict.
The court clarifies the application of the independent contractor defense in premises liability cases, specifically identifying the two exceptions where a property owner can be held liable for injuries to an independent contractor's employee: when the owner actively participates in or controls the work, or when the owner negligently creates or approves a dangerous condition of which it has actual or constructive knowledge.