Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 90.803 (2025)

Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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90.803 Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.—The provision of s. 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding, the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(1) SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT.—A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, except when such statement is made under circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.

(2) EXCITED UTTERANCE.—A statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.

(3) THEN-EXISTING MENTAL, EMOTIONAL, OR PHYSICAL CONDITION.—

(a) A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation, including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health, when such evidence is offered to:

1. Prove the declarant’s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when such state is an issue in the action.

2. Prove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant.

(b) However, this subsection does not make admissible:

1. An after-the-fact statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed, unless such statement relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant’s will.

2. A statement made under circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.

(4) STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT.—Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment by a person seeking the diagnosis or treatment, or made by an individual who has knowledge of the facts and is legally responsible for the person who is unable to communicate the facts, which statements describe medical history, past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inceptions or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

(5) RECORDED RECOLLECTION.—A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge, but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. A party may read into evidence a memorandum or record when it is admitted, but no such memorandum or record is admissible as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.

(6) RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED BUSINESS ACTIVITY.—

(a) A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or as shown by a certification or declaration that complies with paragraph (c) and s. 90.902(11), unless the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes a business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.

(b) Evidence in the form of an opinion or diagnosis is inadmissible under paragraph (a) unless such opinion or diagnosis would be admissible under ss. 90.701-90.705 if the person whose opinion is recorded were to testify to the opinion directly.

(c) A party intending to offer evidence under paragraph (a) by means of a certification or declaration shall serve reasonable written notice of that intention upon every other party and shall make the evidence available for inspection sufficiently in advance of its offer in evidence to provide to any other party a fair opportunity to challenge the admissibility of the evidence. If the evidence is maintained in a foreign country, the party intending to offer the evidence must provide written notice of that intention at the arraignment or as soon after the arraignment as is practicable or, in a civil case, 60 days before the trial. A motion opposing the admissibility of such evidence must be made by the opposing party and determined by the court before trial. A party’s failure to file such a motion before trial constitutes a waiver of objection to the evidence, but the court for good cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.

(7) ABSENCE OF ENTRY IN RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED ACTIVITY.—Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, of a regularly conducted activity to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness.

(8) PUBLIC RECORDS AND REPORTS.—Records, reports, statements reduced to writing, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth the activities of the office or agency, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to matters which there was a duty to report, excluding in criminal cases matters observed by a police officer or other law enforcement personnel, unless the sources of information or other circumstances show their lack of trustworthiness. The criminal case exclusion shall not apply to an affidavit otherwise admissible under s. 316.1934 or s. 327.354.

(9) RECORDS OF VITAL STATISTICS.—Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if a report was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law. However, nothing in this section shall be construed to make admissible any other marriage of any party to any cause of action except for the purpose of impeachment as set forth in s. 90.610.

(10) ABSENCE OF PUBLIC RECORD OR ENTRY.—Evidence, in the form of a certification in accord with s. 90.902, or in the form of testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose a record, report, statement, or data compilation or entry, when offered to prove the absence of the record, report, statement, or data compilation or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation would regularly have been made and preserved by a public office and agency.

(11) RECORDS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS.—Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, parentage, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.

(12) MARRIAGE, BAPTISMAL, AND SIMILAR CERTIFICATES.—Statements of facts contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, when such statement was certified by a member of the clergy, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and when such certificate purports to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.

(13) FAMILY RECORDS.—Statements of fact concerning personal or family history in family Bibles, charts, engravings in rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.

(14) RECORDS OF DOCUMENTS AFFECTING AN INTEREST IN PROPERTY.—The record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the contents of the original recorded or filed document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorized the recording or filing of the document in the office.

(15) STATEMENTS IN DOCUMENTS AFFECTING AN INTEREST IN PROPERTY.—A statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.

(16) STATEMENTS IN ANCIENT DOCUMENTS.—Statements in a document in existence 20 years or more, the authenticity of which is established.

(17) MARKET REPORTS, COMMERCIAL PUBLICATIONS.—Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information and method of preparation were such as to justify their admission.

(18) ADMISSIONS.—A statement that is offered against a party and is:

(a) The party’s own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity;

(b) A statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth;

(d) A statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment thereof, made during the existence of the relationship; or

(e) A statement by a person who was a coconspirator of the party during the course, and in furtherance, of the conspiracy. Upon request of counsel, the court shall instruct the jury that the conspiracy itself and each member’s participation in it must be established by independent evidence, either before the introduction of any evidence or before evidence is admitted under this paragraph.

(19) REPUTATION CONCERNING PERSONAL OR FAMILY HISTORY.—Evidence of reputation:

(a) Among members of a person’s family by blood, adoption, or marriage;

(b) Among a person’s associates; or

concerning a person’s birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.

(20) REPUTATION CONCERNING BOUNDARIES OR GENERAL HISTORY.—Evidence of reputation:

(a) In a community, arising before the controversy about the boundaries of, or customs affecting lands in, the community.

(b) About events of general history which are important to the community, state, or nation where located.

(21) REPUTATION AS TO CHARACTER.—Evidence of reputation of a person’s character among associates or in the community.

(22) FORMER TESTIMONY.—Former testimony given by the declarant which testimony was given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, or a person with a similar interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination; provided, however, the court finds that the testimony is not inadmissible pursuant to s. 90.402 or s. 90.403.

(23) HEARSAY EXCEPTION; STATEMENT OF CHILD VICTIM.—

(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emotional, or developmental age of 17 or less describing any act of child abuse or neglect, any act of sexual abuse against a child, the offense of child abuse, the offense of aggravated child abuse, or any offense involving an unlawful sexual act, contact, intrusion, or penetration performed in the presence of, with, by, or on the declarant child, not otherwise admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:

1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. In making its determination, the court may consider the mental and physical age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child to the offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the child victim, and any other factor deemed appropriate; and

2. The child either:

a. Testifies; or

b. Is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is other corroborative evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the child’s participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).

(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10 days before trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written statement of the content of the child’s statement, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.

(24) HEARSAY EXCEPTION; STATEMENT OF ELDERLY PERSON OR DISABLED ADULT.—

(a) Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by which the statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement made by an elderly person or disabled adult, as defined in s. 825.101, describing any act of abuse or neglect, any act of exploitation, the offense of battery or aggravated battery or assault or aggravated assault or sexual battery, or any other violent act on the declarant elderly person or disabled adult, not otherwise admissible, is admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding if:

1. The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. In making its determination, the court may consider the mental and physical age and maturity of the elderly person or disabled adult, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the victim to the offender, the reliability of the assertion, the reliability of the elderly person or disabled adult, and any other factor deemed appropriate; and

2. The elderly person or disabled adult is unavailable as a witness, provided that there is corroborative evidence of the abuse or offense. Unavailability shall include a finding by the court that the elderly person’s or disabled adult’s participation in the trial or proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe emotional, mental, or physical harm, in addition to findings pursuant to s. 90.804(1).

(b) In a criminal action, the defendant shall be notified no later than 10 days before the trial that a statement which qualifies as a hearsay exception pursuant to this subsection will be offered as evidence at trial. The notice shall include a written statement of the content of the elderly person’s or disabled adult’s statement, the time at which the statement was made, the circumstances surrounding the statement which indicate its reliability, and such other particulars as necessary to provide full disclosure of the statement.

History.—s. 1, ch. 76-237; s. 1, ch. 77-77; s. 1, ch. 77-174; ss. 20, 22, ch. 78-361; ss. 1, 2, ch. 78-379; s. 4, ch. 85-53; s. 11, ch. 87-224; s. 2, ch. 90-139; s. 3, ch. 90-174; s. 12, ch. 91-255; s. 498, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 95-158; s. 2, ch. 96-330; s. 1, ch. 98-2; s. 2, ch. 2003-259; s. 1, ch. 2013-98; s. 1, ch. 2014-200; s. 1, ch. 2024-71.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 1,308 cases (94 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008).

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Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008). · cites it 25× “Compare § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2004), with § 90.”

State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994). · cites it 37× “Before the enactment of the child hearsay exception at issue in this case, section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1987), the hearsay testimony of a child was generally excluded in criminal trials.”

Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2001). · cites it 23× “Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.”

Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988). · cites it 24× “On July 26, 1985, Glendening was charged by information with sexual battery upon a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of section 794.”

Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988). · cites it 28× “The petitioner, Paul Perez, was charged with a lewd assault upon a three-and-one-half-year-old child, in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1985).”

Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007). · cites it 14× “The exception for spontaneous statements in section 90.803(1) is limited to statements " describing or explaining an event or condition," but section 90.”

Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2008). · cites it 13× “803(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the two pertinent exceptions to the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence: (1) SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT.A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or…”

Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006). · cites it 14× “The hearsay exceptions statute, section 90.803 provides that various types of evidence are not inadmissible, including spontaneous statements, defined as follows: (1) Spontaneous statement.”

Cabrera v. State, 206 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). · cites it 41× “, § 90.803(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter .”

Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). · cites it 20× “That testimony, offered under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1985), was relied on as substantive evidence.”

State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006). · cites it 37× “[5] Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), is nearly identical to section 90.”

Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992). · cites it 11× “5th DCA 1991), and certified the following question of great public importance: [1] Where a child victim's hearsay statements satisfy subsection 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1989), and the child is able to testify fully at trial, must the hearsay statements be excluded solely…”

Show all 1,308 citing cases →

— 90.803(1) — 69 cases

Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2008).

Vantavia B. Jackson-Johnson v. State of Florida, 188 So. 3d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1988).

Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006). “The hearsay exceptions statute, section 90.803 provides that various types of evidence are not inadmissible, including spontaneous statements, defined as follows: (1) Spontaneous statement.”

Khalid Ali Pasha v. State of Florida, 225 So. 3d 688 (Fla. 2017).

— 90.803(1)(2) — 3 cases

Budget Rent a Car Sys., Inc. v. Jana, 600 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

Quiles v. State, 523 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).

Vanevery v. State, 980 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

— 90.803(1)(b) — 1 case

CA v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 958 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

— 90.803(1)(c) — 1 case

State v. Shearod, 992 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

— 90.803(10) — 5 cases

Riggins v. State, 67 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

State v. Malarney, 617 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

Debiasi v. S & S Builders, Inc., 593 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

Florida Citizens' All., Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Indian River Cnty. (Fla. 4th DCA 2024).

State v. Malarney, 617 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).

— 90.803(13) — 1 case

RAB v. State, 399 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

— 90.803(13)(e) — 1 case

Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2001). “Section 90.803 provides an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.”

— 90.803(14) — 2 cases

Ray v. Rotella, 425 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).

Pimentel v. Alamo, 555 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

— 90.803(17) — 2 cases

HEALTH OPTIONS v. Palmetto Pathology Servs., 983 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Hardy v. State, 140 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

— 90.803(18) — 103 cases

Steven Anthony Cozzie v. State of Florida, 225 So. 3d 717 (Fla. 2017).

Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2000).

Moore v. State, 530 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Tavares David Calloway v. State of Florida, 210 So. 3d 1160 (Fla. 2017).

— 90.803(18)(a) — 59 cases

Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2001).

Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 2010).

Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007). “The exception for spontaneous statements in section 90.803(1) is limited to statements " describing or explaining an event or condition," but section 90.”

Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2000).

CA v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 958 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

— 90.803(18)(a)(c) — 1 case

In Re of Rk, 38 So. 3d 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

— 90.803(18)(b) — 18 cases

Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2010).

Philip Morris USA Inc., & R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Rose Pollari, Etc, 228 So. 3d 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2004).

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 788 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1999).

— 90.803(18)(c) — 7 cases

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 788 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

Herrera v. State, 532 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

Chao v. State, 478 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1985).

State v. Edwards, 536 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Dias v. State, 890 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

— 90.803(18)(d) — 29 cases

Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 93 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Castillo v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 854 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2003).

Lee v. Dhrs, 698 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1997).

Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Yearby, 580 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

Chaney v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 605 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

— 90.803(18)(e) — 65 cases

Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005).

Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1996).

& SC13-706 Lamar Z. Brooks v. State of Florida & Lamar Z. Brooks v. Julie L. Jones, etc., 175 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 2015).

Allen v. State, 137 So. 3d 946 (Fla. 2013).

— 90.803(18)(e)(1990) — 1 case

Sanders v. Moore, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2001).

— 90.803(2) — 148 cases

Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2008). “803(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the two pertinent exceptions to the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence: (1) SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT.A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or…”

Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 2009).

State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1988).

Beckman v. State, 230 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

— 90.803(2)(e) — 1 case

Romani v. State, 528 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

— 90.803(21) — 6 cases

Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2011).

Johnson v. State, 108 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

Hunt v. State, 429 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).

Webster v. State, 500 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Raulerson v. State, 544 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

— 90.803(22) — 24 cases

In Re Commitment of Cartwright, 870 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Richard DeLisle v. Crane Co., 258 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 2018).

Grabau v. Dept. of Health, Bd. of Psycho., 816 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

State v. Abreu, 837 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2003).

Marquard v. State, 850 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2002).

— 90.803(23) — 286 cases

State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994). “Before the enactment of the child hearsay exception at issue in this case, section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1987), the hearsay testimony of a child was generally excluded in criminal trials.”

Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988). “On July 26, 1985, Glendening was charged by information with sexual battery upon a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of section 794.”

Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1988). “The petitioner, Paul Perez, was charged with a lewd assault upon a three-and-one-half-year-old child, in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1985).”

Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992). “5th DCA 1991), and certified the following question of great public importance: [1] Where a child victim's hearsay statements satisfy subsection 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1989), and the child is able to testify fully at trial, must the hearsay statements be excluded solely…”

Elwell v. State, 954 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

— 90.803(23)(1) — 2 cases

Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).

Kertell v. State, 649 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

— 90.803(23)(1)(e) — 1 case

Frazier v. State, 250 So. 3d 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

— 90.803(23)(2)(a) — 1 case

Cherryhomes v. State, 635 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

— 90.803(23)(2)(b) — 1 case

Baugh v. State, 862 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

— 90.803(23)(a) — 76 cases

Delacruz v. State, 734 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). “That testimony, offered under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1985), was relied on as substantive evidence.”

Jones v. State, 728 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

Cabrera v. State, 206 So. 3d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). “, § 90.803(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter .”

— 90.803(23)(a)(1) — 26 cases

Fricke v. State, 561 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

Beber v. State, 887 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2004).

Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007).

— 90.803(23)(a)(2) — 7 cases

State v. Pardo, 582 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

In the Interest of A.B. v. R.B., 186 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

— 90.803(23)(a)(2)(a) — 1 case

Fricke v. State, 561 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

— 90.803(23)(a)(2)(b) — 12 cases

State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2008).

Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

In the Interest of A.B. v. R.B., 186 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

Cunningham v. State, 801 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

— 90.803(23)(a)(2)(c) — 1 case

Fincher v. State, 137 So. 3d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

— 90.803(23)(a)(c) — 1 case

Diaz v. State, 980 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

— 90.803(23)(a)(l) — 6 cases

In the Interest of A.B. v. R.B., 186 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

G.H. v. State, 896 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Evans v. State, 813 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

J.B. & M.W. v. Dept. of Child. & Families, 229 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

— 90.803(23)(b) — 21 cases

Bertram v. State, 637 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

Distefano v. State, 526 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Fuller v. State, 540 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).

Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). “That testimony, offered under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1985), was relied on as substantive evidence.”

— 90.803(23)(c) — 43 cases

Weatherford v. State, 561 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Feller v. State, 637 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1994).

Elwell v. State, 954 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Fuller v. State, 540 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).

— 90.803(24) — 15 cases

State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006). “[5] Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), is nearly identical to section 90.”

Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).

Sprouse v. State, 208 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 210 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2017).

State v. Hosty, 835 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

— 90.803(24)(a) — 6 cases

Sprouse v. State, 208 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).

State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006). “[5] Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), is nearly identical to section 90.”

State v. Hosty, 835 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

State v. Brocca, 979 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

— 90.803(24)(a)(2)(b) — 1 case

State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006). “[5] Section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), is nearly identical to section 90.”

— 90.803(24)(b) — 2 cases

Sprouse v. State, 208 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

State v. Hosty, 835 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

— 90.803(24)(c) — 1 case

Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999).

— 90.803(28) — 1 case

To v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 21 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

— 90.803(28)(a)(1) — 1 case

Paul Frank Small, Jr. v. State of Florida, 179 So. 3d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

— 90.803(3) — 56 cases

Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001).

Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 2006).

Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2004).

— 90.803(3)(a) — 47 cases

Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001).

Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1999).

Correll v. State, 523 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1988).

Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1994).

Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2003).

— 90.803(3)(a)(1) — 7 cases

Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997).

State v. Bradford, 658 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

Tanner v. Robinson, 411 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

Morris v. State, 456 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

— 90.803(3)(a)(2) — 8 cases

Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 2006).

Jones v. State, 440 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1983).

Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

Bauer v. State, 528 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).

— 90.803(3)(a)(l) — 1 case

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Alexander, 123 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

— 90.803(3)(b) — 9 cases

Jenkins v. State, 422 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Reed v. State, 438 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

In Re Est. of Hatten, 880 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

Alexander v. State, 627 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Michael Jordan Lipp, Etc. (Fla. 3d DCA 2025).

— 90.803(3)(b)(1) — 1 case

Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Michael Jordan Lipp, etc. (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).

— 90.803(3)(b)(2) — 2 cases

Jones v. State, 440 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1983).

Brendan Sigismondi v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2024).

— 90.803(4) — 66 cases

Flanagan v. State, 586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Conley v. State, 620 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1993).

Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988).

State v. Ochoa, 576 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

Hernandez v. State, 946 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

— 90.803(5) — 33 cases

Polite v. State, 41 So. 3d 935 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Polite v. State, 116 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 2013).

Montano v. State, 846 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Hernandez v. State, 31 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Bartholomew v. State, 101 So. 3d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

— 90.803(6) — 219 cases

Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Berdecia, 169 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).

Bank of New York v. Andrew Calloway, 157 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

Martin v. State, 936 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

State v. Johnson, 982 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 2008).

Love v. Garcia, 611 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

— 90.803(6)(a) — 131 cases

Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008). “Compare § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2004), with § 90.”

Cayea v. Citimortgage, Inc., 138 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

Bank of New York v. Andrew Calloway, 157 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

Yisrael v. State, 986 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 2008).

Lloyd Steve Burdeshaw & Teresa Burdeshaw v. The Bank of New York Mellon etc., 148 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

— 90.803(6)(b) — 6 cases

Hitchcock v. State, 755 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2000).

Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 891 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2004).

Love v. Garcia, 611 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

Gutierrez v. State, 739 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

Vereb v. Sardoni, 795 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

— 90.803(6)(c) — 16 cases

Hidden Ridge Condo. Homeowners Ass'n v. Onewest Bank, N.A., 183 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).

Deck v. State, 985 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Washburn v. Washburn, 211 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

Mazine v. M & I Bank, 67 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

Margaret Sajiun v. Daniel Hernandez, 226 So. 3d 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

— 90.803(7) — 11 cases

Garcia v. State, 564 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1990).

Rae v. State, 638 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Hughes v. Slomka, 807 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

Neiner v. State, 875 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

Williams v. State, 406 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

— 90.803(8) — 56 cases

Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008). “Compare § 90.803(6), Fla. Stat. (2004), with § 90.”

Yisrael v. State, 986 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 2008).

Burgess v. State, 831 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2002).

Yisrael v. State, 938 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Sikes v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 429 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

— 90.803(a) — 1 case

Brendan Sigismondi v. State of Florida (Fla. 2d DCA 2024).

— 90.803(b) — 2 cases

T.J.N. v. State, 977 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

TJN v. State, 977 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

— 90.803(l) — 1 case

Gosciminski v. State, 994 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2008).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.