Refusal to testify.

- One can be convicted of perjury only for knowingly and willfully making materially false statement under oath and not for refusal to testify. King v. State, 238 Ga. 386, 233 S.E.2d 340 (1977).

Perjury defined.

- Perjury is the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge, made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of the witness's evidence, either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, whether such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such assertion being known to such witness to be false, and being intended by the witness to mislead court, jury, or person holding proceeding. Hicks v. State, 67 Ga. App. 475, 21 S.E.2d 113 (1942).

"Knowingly" refers to time when witness gave alleged false testimony. Oxford v. State, 40 Ga. App. 511, 150 S.E. 466 (1929).

Gist of offense of perjury is disregard and corrupt violation of an oath. Black v. State, 13 Ga. App. 541, 79 S.E. 173 (1913); Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

Offense consists in swearing falsely and corruptly without probable cause of belief; not in swearing rashly or inconsiderately, according to belief. Hicks v. State, 67 Ga. App. 475, 21 S.E.2d 113 (1942).

Both intent to testify falsely and fact of false testimony are prerequisites to offense of perjury. Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 252 (1883).

False oath to affidavit knowing that it will be used in judicial proceeding constitutes perjury. Rowe v. State, 99 Ga. 706, 27 S.E. 710 (1896); Davis v. State, 7 Ga. App. 680, 67 S.E. 839 (1910).

False verification of pleadings by oath is false swearing and constitutes perjury. Williford v. State, 53 Ga. App. 334, 185 S.E. 611 (1936), later appeal, 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937); Watson v. State, 235 Ga. App. 381, 509 S.E.2d 87 (1998).

False affidavits in support of pleadings.

- Perjury may be committed by making false affidavits required in support of pleadings in civil matters. Williford v. State, 53 Ga. App. 334, 185 S.E. 611 (1936), later appeal, 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937).

Opinion in affidavit as to existence of fact as basis for offense of perjury. See Hicks v. State, 67 Ga. App. 475, 21 S.E.2d 113 (1942).

Charge of perjury may be predicated on affidavit made to procure issuance of arrest warrant. Williford v. State, 53 Ga. App. 334, 185 S.E. 611 (1936), later appeal, 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937).

Perjury may be assigned on false testimony going to credit of witness. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

To establish perjury of one whose testimony was suborned, state must show: (1) that person alleged to have been suborned testified substantially to matters charged; (2) willful and absolute falsity of testimony; (3) that testimony was material; (4) that testimony was given in judicial proceeding and (5) that lawful oath was administered. Jones v. State, 70 Ga. App. 431, 28 S.E.2d 373 (1943).

Distinction between perjury and false swearing.

- Perjury must be in some judicial proceeding and testimony must relate to matter material to issue or point in question, whereas false swearing may occur in proceeding other than judicial proceeding and apparently testimony need not be with respect to some material question. Plummer v. State, 90 Ga. App. 773, 84 S.E.2d 202 (1954).

Offense of perjury is not cumulative; a number of false swearings in same trial creates only one crime, but repetition of offense may be met with a heavier penalty. Black v. State, 13 Ga. App. 541, 79 S.E. 173 (1913).

Separate false statements by same witness in same proceeding do not constitute separate perjury offenses. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

Two trials, same statement, two offenses.

- Because two separate trials occurred, with administration of the oath for each trial, two separate acts of perjury were committed after defendant made the same false statement in each trial. West v. State, 228 Ga. App. 713, 492 S.E.2d 576 (1997).

Acquittal on charged offense irrelevant to perjury.

- Prior acquittals in two trials for child molestation had no probative value in a trial for perjury committed at those trials because evidence of the acquittals was neither relevant nor material to any issue in the perjury case. West v. State, 228 Ga. App. 713, 492 S.E.2d 576 (1997).

Cited in Richards v. State, 131 Ga. App. 362, 206 S.E.2d 93 (1974); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Dansby v. State, 140 Ga. App. 104, 230 S.E.2d 64 (1976); Y.C. v. State, 146 Ga. App. 293, 246 S.E.2d 518 (1978); Bromley v. State, 259 Ga. 377, 380 S.E.2d 694 (1989); State v. Lampl, 296 Ga. 892, 770 S.E.2d 629 (2015).

Presumption that lawful or statutory oath was administered.

- When there is evidence that an oath was administered to the witness, it will be presumed in absence of proof to the contrary that lawful or statutory oath was administered. Kirkland v. State, 140 Ga. App. 197, 230 S.E.2d 347 (1976).

Oath materially different from prescribed statutory oath.

- When it is affirmatively shown that an oath administered to the witness was materially different in both form and substance than the prescribed statutory oath, the administered oath is not a lawful one and cannot properly be the basis for a perjury prosecution. Kirkland v. State, 140 Ga. App. 197, 230 S.E.2d 347 (1976).

No particular oath is required for witnesses in civil investigations, thus, it was error to dismiss a perjury indictment on the basis of a deficient oath where the oath administered named the grand jury, specified the type of investigation, named the subject entities being investigated, and contained accepted language regarding the promise and obligation to testify truthfully. State v. Bartel, 223 Ga. App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 4 (1996).

Burden of proof that witness was duly sworn rests upon state. Cox v. State, 13 Ga. App. 687, 79 S.E. 909 (1913).

Oath must be lawful, but no greater formality than to render it legal is required. See Pennaman v. State, 58 Ga. 336 (1877); Johnson v. State, 76 Ga. 790 (1886); Cox v. State, 13 Ga. App. 687, 79 S.E. 909 (1913); Sistrunk v. State, 18 Ga. App. 42, 88 S.E. 796 (1916).

Conduct and language of defendant signifying defendant consciously took upon oneself obligation of oath.

- If at time of tendering papers upon which perjury indictment is based to officer administering oath, defendant used language signifying that defendant consciously took a personal obligation of an oath, and officer so understood, and immediately signed jurat, this amounts to such concurrence of act and intention as will constitute a legal swearing. Williford v. State, 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937).

Termination of judicial proceedings not necessary.

- Judicial proceeding from which perjury charge stems need not be finally terminated before indictment for perjury will lie. Williford v. State, 53 Ga. App. 334, 185 S.E. 611 (1936), later appeal, 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937).

Lack of jurisdiction.

- Fact that evidence adduced at trial of defendant for perjury may disclose that disbarment proceeding is subject to general demurrer, or must fail for some reason other than jurisdiction of court over subject-matter or legality of court in which it was filed, does not remove its character as a "judicial proceeding," so as to prevent conviction for perjury committed in pleadings filed therein. Williford v. State, 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937).

Hearing before State Board of Workers' Compensation.

- Indictment does not legally charge defendant with having committed offense of perjury, where hearing was before State Board of Workmen's (now Workers') Compensation, an administrative body and not a judicial tribunal. Plummer v. State, 90 Ga. App. 773, 84 S.E.2d 202 (1954).

Knowledge of falsity at time of oath is element of perjury.

- Gist of offense of perjury is not only that what was sworn to was false, but that swearer knew, at time the swearer made oath, that it was false and that oath was itself false. Stokes v. State, 59 Ga. App. 878, 2 S.E.2d 674 (1939).

Scienter is tested like intention generally, by sound mind and discretion, and by all circumstances. McCord v. State, 83 Ga. 521, 10 S.E. 437 (1889); Rowe v. State, 99 Ga. 706, 27 S.E. 710 (1896).

Swearing to something consciously thought to be false constitutes perjury although it turns out to actually be true. Davis v. State, 7 Ga. App. 680, 67 S.E. 839 (1910).

Efforts by defendant to ascertain whether facts justify oath as precluding perjury conviction.

- When one accused of perjury or false swearing has in good faith, before instance alleged, and without seeking thereby to be cloaked personally with immunity, laid before counsel facts, to best of accused's knowledge, and has been advised by counsel that facts in law will justify oath or affirmation, it cannot be said that oath or affirmation is willfully, knowingly, and corruptly false, and charge of perjury cannot be predicated thereon. Stokes v. State, 59 Ga. App. 878, 2 S.E.2d 674 (1939).

False statement need not necessarily be material to main issue in case.

- It is not essential that fact sworn to should be material to main issue in case, but it is sufficient if it relates to issue which is only collaterally involved. Wilson v. State, 115 Ga. 206 (1860) (decided prior to codification of this principle).

Matter relevant to credibility of witness testifying on material issue in case becomes collaterally material to issue, upon which perjury may be assigned. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

Whether particular statements were material depends upon nature of proceeding and matters at issue, and can be determined in each case for that case only. Black v. State, 13 Ga. App. 541, 79 S.E. 173 (1913); Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

Showing materiality by direct averment or necessary inference.

- In indictment for perjury, materiality of alleged false oaths, may be shown by a direct averment of that fact, or by setting forth facts from which materiality is made apparent or necessarily inferred. Williford v. State, 53 Ga. App. 334, 185 S.E. 611 (1936), later appeal, 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937).

How materiality of false testimony may be shown.

- Materiality of false testimony may be shown by record of proceedings in which testimony was given, or by testimony there given, or by all or so much of pleadings therein as show issues, together with such other facts proved on trial as tend to show testimony to be on a material issue. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

One test of materiality is whether alleged false statements could have influenced decision on question at issue. Black v. State, 13 Ga. App. 541, 79 S.E. 173 (1913); Darnell v. State, 63 Ga. App. 582, 11 S.E.2d 692 (1940).

Material issue found.

- In a prosecution for child molestation, defendant's false statement as to the time defendant's alibi witness was with defendant was a material issue of fact constituting an essential element of the crime of perjury. West v. State, 228 Ga. App. 713, 492 S.E.2d 576 (1997).

False statement was material.

- In a prosecution for perjury under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-70, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's false statement given in the defendant's trial on a charge of running a red light about the location of the officer's patrol car was material as the defendant's false statement went to the issue of whether the officer could have observed the alleged red light violation and, thus, whether the officer's testimony was credible. As such, the defendant's testimony clearly could have influenced the jury's decision over whether the defendant actually ran the red light. Walker v. State, 314 Ga. App. 714, 725 S.E.2d 771 (2012).

False statements immaterial.

- Defendant's allegedly false testimony in a will contest was immaterial to the issues presented in the proceeding in which it occurred and was not sufficient to support defendant's conviction for perjury. DeVine v. State, 229 Ga. App. 346, 494 S.E.2d 87 (1997).

Jury instruction on materiality.

- Since the trial judge's jury charge on the element of materiality in the perjury charge included an instruction on the principle that, when a witness gave testimony material to an issue in the case, the witness's credibility became collaterally material to the issue and, therefore, false testimony going to the credibility of that witness likewise could be considered material, nothing in the trial judge's charge to the jury assumed facts with respect to the issue of materiality or expressed an opinion that materiality had been proved. Sneiderman v. State, 336 Ga. App. 153, 784 S.E.2d 18 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (2016).

Sufficiency of indictment for perjury arising from false statements in pleadings.

- When an indictment for perjury sets out and charges the defendant with perjury in that certain parts of the defendant's pleas and answers which were under oath, contained false statements, it is not necessary to attach to indictment or set out therein the entire plea or plea and answer of defendant. Williford v. State, 53 Ga. App. 334, 185 S.E. 611 (1936), later appeal, 56 Ga. App. 40, 192 S.E. 93 (1937).

Indictment need only set out substance of alleged false statement.

- In indictment for perjury it is not necessary that exact language of defendant in former trial be set out; substance of false statement is all that is necessary. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

Indictment must indicate truth of matter to which alleged perjury related.

- Though it is not indispensable to validity of indictment for perjury that it should, after stating what alleged false testimony, in terms set out what was truth in that regard, it is essential that an indictment for this offense wanting in this respect should, by clear and necessary implication, show what must have been truth of matter to which alleged false testimony related. Darnell v. State, 65 Ga. App. 582, 11 S.E.2d 692 (1940).

Materiality of testimony need not be demonstrated by argument incorporated in indictment. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

It is generally sufficient in indictment for perjury to charge that testimony alleged to have been false was in relation to matter material to point or question in issue, without setting forth in detail facts showing how such testimony was material. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936); Darnell v. State, 63 Ga. App. 582, 11 S.E.2d 692 (1940).

Indictment may join a number of statements in single count.

- In prosecution for perjury, it is permissible to join in a single count of indictment a number of separate and distinct material statements alleged to have been falsely sworn to by defendant in same legal investigation. Clackum v. State, 55 Ga. App. 44, 189 S.E. 397 (1936).

Application to divorce proceeding.

- Assuming a charge requested by a wife in a domestic proceeding on the elements of the crime of perjury was apt, correct, and pertinent, it was not error to fail to give the requested charge as the charge given by the trial court sufficiently and substantially covered the principles of law. Chubbuck v. Lake, 281 Ga. 218, 635 S.E.2d 764 (2006).

Perjury in swearing out warrants for bad checks.

- Owners of a small loan company committed perjury when the owners swore out warrants under O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(a) on customers who gave the owners checks as collateral for loans and then failed to repay the loans, when the checks were not intended to be deposited and honored by banks, rendering impossible the requisite knowledge/intent required under the bad check statute. Watson v. State, 235 Ga. App. 381, 509 S.E.2d 87 (1998).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- See Williams v. State, 244 Ga. App. 692, 536 S.E.2d 572 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of perjury because there was evidence that the man that the defendant was romantically involved with shot and killed the husband; during the man's murder trial, the defendant wilfully and knowingly gave false statements under oath denying that the defendant had any romantic relationship with the man; and the defendant's false statement denying any romantic relationship with the man was material as it could have influenced the decision on the man's insanity defense. Sneiderman v. State, 336 Ga. App. 153, 784 S.E.2d 18 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (2016).

Evidence insufficient, lack of corroboration.

- A single witness is insufficient to sustain a perjury conviction unless there are other independent, corroborating circumstances. In the Interest of C.H., 262 Ga. App. 630, 585 S.E.2d 921 (2003).

Evidence insufficient.

- There was no evidence that a motorist intentionally provided an incorrect answer to an interrogatory concerning the motorist's employment or conspired with the motorist's employers to prevent them from being added as parties; therefore, no perjury was shown. M.J.E.S. Enters. v. Martin, 265 Ga. App. 652, 595 S.E.2d 367 (2004).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 60A Am. Jur. 2d, Perjury, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 70 C.J.S., Perjury, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- Assignment of perjury on affidavit for continuance, 1 A.L.R. 1138.

False statement made under fear or compulsion as perjury, 4 A.L.R. 1319.

May conviction of perjury rest on circumstantial evidence, 15 A.L.R. 634; 27 A.L.R. 857; 42 A.L.R. 1063; 88 A.L.R.2d 852.

Fraud or perjury as to physical condition resulting from injury as ground for relief from or injunction against a judgment for personal injuries, 16 A.L.R. 397.

Rule against conviction of perjury upon contradictory statements as affected by defendant's admission in second statement, 25 A.L.R. 416.

Perjury as predicated upon statements upon application for marriage license, 101 A.L.R. 1263.

Corroboration by circumstantial evidence of testimony of single witness in prosecution for perjury, 111 A.L.R. 825.

Former jeopardy as regards successive prosecutions for perjury charged to have been committed in the same action or proceeding, 120 A.L.R. 1171.

Necessity and sufficiency of proof, in prosecution for perjury during trial, that oath was administered, 132 A.L.R. 1311.

Right of defendant in prosecution for perjury to have the "two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances," rule included in charge to jury, 156 A.L.R. 499.

Imputation of perjury or false swearing as actionable per se, 38 A.L.R.2d 161.

Recantation as defense in perjury prosecution, 64 A.L.R.2d 276.

Statement of belief or opinion as perjury, 66 A.L.R.2d 791.

Conviction of perjury where one or more of elements is established solely by circumstantial evidence, 88 A.L.R.2d 852.

Perjury or false swearing as contempt, 89 A.L.R.2d 1258.

Invalidity of statute or ordinance giving rise to proceeding in which false testimony was received as defense to prosecution for perjury, 34 A.L.R.3d 413.

Offense of perjury as affected by lack of jurisdiction by court or governmental body before which false testimony was given, 36 A.L.R.3d 1038.

Rights and duties of attorney in a criminal prosecution where client informs him of intention to present perjured testimony, 64 A.L.R.3d 385.

Incomplete, misleading, or unresponsive but literally true statement as perjury, 69 A.L.R.3d 993.

Acquittal as bar to prosecution of accused for perjury committed at trial, 89 A.L.R.3d 1098.

Admonitions against perjury or threats to prosecute potential defense witness, inducing refusal to testify, as prejudicial error, 88 A.L.R.4th 388.

Right of defendant in prosecution for perjury to have the "two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances," rule included in charge to jury - state cases, 41 A.L.R.5th 1.

What amounts to habitual intemperance, drunkenness, excessive drug use, and the like within statute relating to substantive grounds for divorce, 101 A.L.R.6th 455.