O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-8-15 (2019)

Objections to petition for adoption

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) As used in this Code section, the term “family member” shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 19-7-3. (b) If a legal mother and biological father, whether he was a legal father or not, of the child who is the subject of the proceeding are both deceased, regardless of whether either individual had surrendered his or her parental rights or had his or her rights terminated, it shall be the privilege of any individual related by blood to such child to file objections to the petition for adoption. (c) A family member with visitation rights to a child granted pursuant to Code Section 19-7-3 shall have the privilege to file objections to the petition for adoption if neither parent has any further rights to the child and if the petition for adoption has been filed by a blood relative of the child. The court, after hearing such objections, shall determine, in its discretion, whether or not such objections constitute a good reason for denying the petition for adoption and the court shall have the authority to grant or continue such visitation rights of the family member of the child in the adoption order in the event the adoption by the blood relative is approved by the court.

History

Code 1981, § 19-8-15, enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 1572, § 5; Ga. L. 2016, p. 87, § 3/HB 229; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 19/HB 323; Ga. L. 2018, p. 19, § 1-1/HB 159.

Annotations

Law reviews. For comment on “Grandparents’ Visita-

tion Rights in Georgia,” see 29 Emory L.J. 1083 (1980). For note on permissive intervention of grandparents in divorce proceedings, see 26 Ga. L. Rev. 787 (1992). For annual survey on domestic relations, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2018).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1941, p. 300, § 9 and former § 19-8-10, as last amended by Ga. L. 1988, p. 864, § 2, are included in the annotations for this Code section. One who objects to proceeding must establish blood relationship to child. McDonald v. Hester, 115 Ga. App. 740, 155 S.E.2d 720, 1967 Ga. App. LEXIS 1231 (1967) (decided under Ga. L. 1941, p. 300, § 9 prior to revision of chapter by Ga. L. 1977, p. 201). Standing to object when babies inadvertently switched in hospital. - Parents who adopted petitioner’s child, after the child had been inadvertently exchanged with another woman’s baby in the hospital shortly after delivery, were

not “related by blood” to the other woman’s child and had no authority to object when petitioner sought to adopt the other woman’s child, whom she had loved and cared for since she left the hospital with that child. Pope v. Moore, 261 Ga. 253, 403 S.E.2d 205, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 186 (1991) (decided under former § 19-8-10, as last amended by Ga. L. 1988, p. 864, § 2). Relatives of child may not object to adoption as long as one natural parent is living and has consented, and may not intervene in action as they lack required interest in adoption. Lockey v. Bennett, 244 Ga. 339, 260 S.E.2d 56, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1227 (1979) (decided under Ga. L. 1941, p. 300, § 9); Brant v. Bazemore, 173 Ga. App. 294, 325 S.E.2d 905, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1511 (1985) (decided under

former § 19-8-10, as last amended by Ga. L. 1988, p. 864, § 2). Relatives had standing to object when “legal father” not established. - Maternal great aunt and uncle had standing to file objections to an adoption petition of aunt and uncle who had obtained a written surrender of rights from the child’s putative biological father; the latter was not the “legal father” as defined by O.C.G.A. § 19-8-1. Echols v. Cochran, 214 Ga. App. 348, 447 S.E.2d 700, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 868 (1994). Former husband lacked standing to object to adoption. - When former husband had no blood relationship to the child, the natural father had surrendered his parental rights to present husband, and his wife, the natural mother, consented to the adoption, the former husband had no standing to object to the adoption. Kelly v. Silverstein, 207 Ga. App. 381, 427 S.E.2d 851, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 211 (1993). O.C.G.A. § 19-8-15 does not limit the court’s authority to award grandparent visitation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-15 pertains to objections that certain relatives of the child sought to be adopted may make to the petition to adopt in those circumstances when both of the child’s parents are either deceased or no longer have parental rights. Evans v. Sangster, 330 Ga. App. 533, 768 S.E.2d 278, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 7 (2015). Grandparent lacks standing to object to adoption while natural parent is in life, and it is error to allow a grandparent to file objections to a petition, even if the grandparent has an interest in seeing his blood line continue into the future. Hester v. Mathis, 147 Ga. App. 257, 248 S.E.2d 538, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2639 (1978) (decided under Ga. L. 1941, p. 300, § 9). Grandparents may file objections to petitions for adoption only if there is no father or mother living; otherwise, they have no standing to object. Mead v. Owens, 149 Ga. App. 303, 254 S.E.2d 431, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1826 (1979) (decided under Ga. L. 1941, p. 300, § 9). Grandparents were not statutorily authorized to intervene in adoption proceedings brought by a married couple who

were not blood relatives of the child since the child’s parents were living, and the grandparents did not intervene to seek visitation rights, but instead intervened to object to the adoption and to seek to adopt the child themselves. Murphy v. McCarthy, 201 Ga. App. 101, 410 S.E.2d 198, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1207 (1991). Grandmother who was temporary legal custodian of child under juvenile court deprivation order did not have standing to intervene in adoption proceedings. Edgar v. Shave, 205 Ga. App. 337, 422 S.E.2d 234, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1137 (1992). O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) did not give grandparents the right to intervene in adoption proceedings brought by third parties after the parents had voluntarily surrendered their parental rights and agreed to the adoption. Baum v. Moore, 230 Ga. App. 255, 496 S.E.2d 307, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 99 (1998). Superior court erred in permitting the paternal grandparents of a minor child to intervene in the third party’s petition to adopt the child because O.C.G.A. § 198-15 did not give the grandparents standing to object to the adoption as the child’s legal mother was alive and the legal mother had consented to the adoption; the grandparents’ objections could only be made when a blood relative filed for adoption of the minor child, and the third party was not a relative; and the grandparents did not establish any visitation rights to the child. McDowell v. Bowers, 342 Ga. App. 811, 805 S.E.2d 136, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 415 (2017). Construction with other law. - Superior court properly dismissed a grandmother’s adoption petition on collateral estoppel grounds based on the juvenile court’s previous order granting temporary custody to the maternal grandfather and grant of visitation rights to the grandmother; as a result, the superior court was not authorized to readjudicate the issue of permanent custody involving the child at issue. Smith v. Hutcheson, 283 Ga. App. 117, 640 S.E.2d 690, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1563 (2006). Standing to appeal. - Appellate court denied the adoptive parents’ motion to dismiss the appeal filed by a blood relative because the relative was a party

and had standing to appeal as the relative was served with a summons, the relative filed a response to the adoptive parents’ petition, and the trial court ordered the relative to undergo a psychological exami-

nation and submit to a home evaluation. Parker v. Stone, 333 Ga. App. 638, 773 S.E.2d 793, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 419 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1897, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 10 (Ga. Jan. 11, 2016).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, § 148. C.J.S. 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Persons, § 121. ALR. Sum set apart in connection with self-

insurance as deductible in computing income tax, 76 A.L.R. 1067. Who, other than natural or adopting parents, or heirs of latter, may collaterally attack adoption decree, 92 A.L.R.2d 813.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1991–2025 · leading case: Baum v. Moore, 496 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
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Baum v. Moore, 496 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 10× “The grandparents appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, alleging in part that OCGA § 19-8-15 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Georgia ordered the case transferred to this Court, holding that no constitutional issue was raised or ruled on by the trial court.”
Parker v. Stone, 702 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 12× “through the biological father’s purported surrender of parental rights, he still had standing to object to the adoption petition under OCGA § 19-8-15 because he is a blood relative of the child.”
Murphy v. McCarthy, 410 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 4× “Any blood relatives may object when the legal parents are not living, and grandparents “with visitation rights to a child granted pursuant to Code Section 19-7-3 shall have the privilege to file objections to the petition of adoption if neither parent has any further rights to…”
Evans v. Sangster, 768 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 6× “Contrary to Jason’s argument, OCGA § 19-8-15 does not limit the court’s authority to award visitation granted pursuant to OCGA § *540 19-7-3.”
Edgar v. Shave, 422 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “101, 102 ( 410 SE2d 198 ) (1991), neither OCGA § 19-7-3 nor OCGA § 19-8-15 confers standing on appellant to intervene in the adoption proceedings.”
Echols v. Cochran, 447 S.E.2d 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 6× “OCGA § 19-8-1 defines legal father as a male who has legally adopted a child; who was married to the biological mother at the time the child was conceived or born; who married the legal mother after the child was born and recognized the child as his own; who has been adjudicated…”
Matherly v. Kinney, 489 S.E.2d 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “Instead, she argues only that the trial court abused its discretion because its order will “exclude the child from one side of her extended family.”
Smith v. Hutcheson, 640 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “Smith’s first enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition by allowing Hutcheson to intervene in her adoption proceeding because he lacked legal standing to object.”
Kelly v. Silverstein, 427 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “In addition, contrary to appellant’s contention that the Georgia court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings because of the previously filed proceedings in North Carolina, OCGA § 19-9-46 (a) provides as follows: “A court of this state shall not exercise…”
Parker v. Stone Et Al., 773 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 27× “In an earlier appeal, we vacated the decree and reversed, holding that the superior court erred in granting the motion to quash Parker’s pleadings without determining whether he is a blood relative of A.”
Mcdowell v. Bowers Et Al., 805 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 6× “Rather, OCGA § 19-8-15 governs when objections by grandparents are allowed in adoption proceedings.”
In the Interest of A. G. Q., a Child (Ga. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 6× “For example, OCGA § 19-8-15 (c) allows certain family members with pre-existing visitation rights to the child being adopted to object to adoption, and in such cases, the trial court may “grant or continue” those pre-existing visitation rights after the adoption.”
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