Full faith and credit to decisions in other states.

- Full faith and credit clause in U.S. Const., Art. 4, Sec. I does not require that the decision in another state that a person is no longer entitled to benefits is a bar to an award under Georgia law when jurisdiction is invoked under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-242. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Warren, 163 Ga. App. 759, 295 S.E.2d 743 (1982).

Conflicts of laws principles.

- Award under the compensation law of one state will not bar an award under Georgia law when jurisdiction is invoked under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-242, general principles of conflicts of law notwithstanding. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Warren, 163 Ga. App. 759, 295 S.E.2d 743 (1982).

No independent right of action for employee injured out of state.

- Under Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., employee has no independent right of action for injury against an employer or any other person who is statutorily insulated from suit, even when the employee is injured outside of the state and benefits for that injury are recoverable pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-242. Karimi v. Crowley, 172 Ga. App. 761, 324 S.E.2d 583 (1984).

Insufficient evidence of representation to pay more for medical services due to location.

- Transactions at issue in the lawsuit involved only two states, Mississippi, the state in which the insurance policy was issued, the insurance company and the corporation were incorporated, and the corporation's employee was injured, and Georgia, the state in which the burn center rendered medical services, and there was no evidence in the record to support that any benefits were required under Georgia workers' compensation law, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-242. The only benefits required were the benefits required under Mississippi's workers' compensation law, which stated that reimbursement for out-of-state services shall be based on the workers' compensation fee schedule for the state in which services were rendered, and the burn center had been paid more than what was required under both Georgia's and Mississippi's workers' compensation medical fee schedules; therefore, because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the insurance company fully complied with the terms of the insurance contract, the insurance company and the corporation's motion for summary judgment was granted as to the burn center's third party beneficiary claim. Joseph M. Still Burn Ctrs., Inc. v. AmFed Nat'l Ins. Co., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (S.D. Ga. 2010).

Either execution of a contract or actual work within the state, is sufficient within itself to bring the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) into operation. Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 28 S.E.2d 280, answer conformed to, 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1943), cert. dismissed, 197 Ga. 856, 30 S.E.2d 822 (1944).

Jurisdiction in general.

- This section provided that for Georgia to have jurisdiction of an injury which occurred outside of the state, the contract must be entered into in Georgia, and the claimant must reside in Georgia or the employer have a place of business in Georgia. Home Ins. Co. v. Burnett, 146 Ga. App. 355, 246 S.E.2d 394 (1978).

An employee can invoke jurisdiction for workers' compensation either: (1) where the injury occurred; (2) where the employment was principally located; or (3) where the contract of employment was entered. Guinn v. Conwood Corp., 185 Ga. App. 41, 363 S.E.2d 271 (1987).

Dual jurisdiction of claim.

- When the work injury at issue occurred in Florida to a Florida resident employee and the employer was based in Georgia, it is uncontroverted that both Georgia and Florida would have jurisdiction of the claim for the incident at issue. Lumber Transp., Inc. v. International Indemn. Co., 203 Ga. App. 588, 417 S.E.2d 365, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 365 (1992).

Jurisdiction did not exist when injury in another state.

- When the decedent was exposed to asbestos while working in Alabama, and was diagnosed with mesothelioma after the decedent voluntarily resigned and moved to Georgia, the Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation did not err in finding that the Board did not have jurisdiction as O.C.G.A. § 34-9-242 excluded compensation for the decedent's injury because the contract of employment was entered into in Alabama for service exclusively in that state; and, although the decedent did not have a work-related injury under the Workers' Compensation Act until the decedent's 2015 diagnosis and disablement in Georgia, the accident that resulted in the decedent's injury was the decedent's exposure to asbestos while the decedent was employed in Alabama. Davis v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 344 Ga. App. 757, 811 S.E.2d 476 (2018).

Determination of principal locality.

- In deciding whether the State of Georgia has jurisdiction to award workers' compensation benefits to an employee who is injured outside of the state, a determination must first be made whether the principal locality of the employment relationship is in Georgia; if so, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-242 does not apply; if not, the contract for employment must be made within the state in order for jurisdiction to exist. Guinn v. Conwood Corp., 185 Ga. App. 41, 363 S.E.2d 271 (1987).

As to employees who have agreed to be bound by the act by the method prescribed in former Code 1933, § 114-110 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-7), and who have not engaged in any work within this state, it was essential that the contract of employment be executed within this state in order that such employees may receive compensation for injuries sustained while employed outside of the state. Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 28 S.E.2d 280, answer conformed to, 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1943), cert. dismissed, 197 Ga. 856, 30 S.E.2d 822 (1944); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Swain, 90 Ga. App. 615, 83 S.E.2d 345 (1954).

Word "damages" as used in this section was synonymous with "compensation." Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pitman, 70 Ga. App. 670, 29 S.E.2d 102 (1944).

"Damages" does not refer to damages recovered in tort action.

- Word "damages" as used in this section did not refer to damages recovered in an action for damages against a third-party tort-feasor and damages received from such a third party as compensation for an injury, whether resulting from a mere claim, an action or a judgment. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pitman, 70 Ga. App. 670, 29 S.E.2d 102 (1944).

Deduction of other state's award from Georgia award.

- The meaning of the second sentence is that if under the Workers' Compensation Laws of another state an employee receives compensation as the result of an award, for an injury for which the Georgia Compensation Law may also award compensation, the Georgia board must deduct the amount awarded in such other state from the maximum amount found to be due under the laws of Georgia. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pitman, 70 Ga. App. 670, 29 S.E.2d 102 (1944).

Jurisdiction held to exist.

- When claimant and all the employees of a partnership and their employers lived in Georgia, the partnership had a store in Georgia which furnished supplies to the employees of the partnership engaged in cutting, sawing, and hauling timber in South Carolina, and the contract of employment of the deceased by the partnership was entered into in Georgia, there being no evidence as to any contract between the parties stipulating that the deceased was to work exclusively outside of Georgia, the board had jurisdiction to render the award complained of. McDonald-Haynes v. Minyard, 69 Ga. App. 479, 26 S.E.2d 138 (1943), for comment, see 6 Ga. B.J. 252 (1944).

The board had jurisdiction to award compensation in a case in which a Georgia employer employed a Georgia resident in Ohio through an agent of the Georgia employer, to drive a truck loaded with freight from Ohio to Georgia, and the employee was killed in the course of employment in Kentucky while en route to Georgia. Martin v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 215 Ga. 476, 111 S.E.2d 53 (1959), for comment, see 22 Ga. B.J. 580 (1960).

Cited in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Menees, 46 Ga. App. 289, 167 S.E. 335 (1932); Murphey v. American Mut. Liab. Inc. Co., 70 Ga. App. 598, 28 S.E.2d 876 (1944); Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1944); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 100 Ga. App. 677, 112 S.E.2d 273 (1959); Johnson v. Great S. Trucking Co., 101 Ga. App. 472, 114 S.E.2d 209 (1960); Fenster v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 821, 131 S.E.2d 564 (1963); Security Ins. Group v. Plank, 133 Ga. App. 815, 212 S.E.2d 471 (1975); Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 71, 232 S.E.2d 609 (1977); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Suits, 150 Ga. App. 35, 256 S.E.2d 645 (1979); Ramirez v. Bradley Constr. Co., 161 Ga. App. 753, 288 S.E.2d 742 (1982).

ALR.

- Extraterritorial operation of workmen's compensation statutes; conflict of laws, 18 A.L.R. 292; 28 A.L.R. 1345; 35 A.L.R. 1414; 45 A.L.R. 1234; 59 A.L.R. 735; 82 A.L.R. 709; 90 A.L.R. 119.

Workmen's compensation: death or injury while traveling as arising out of and in the course of employment, 20 A.L.R. 319; 49 A.L.R. 454; 63 A.L.R. 469; 100 A.L.R. 1053.

Workmen's Compensation Act: applicability of state compensation act to injury within admiralty jurisdiction, 31 A.L.R. 518; 56 A.L.R. 352.

Application of state Workmen's Compensation Act to injury occurring on Federal property within the state or in connection with contracts in relation to such property, 86 A.L.R. 289; 92 A.L.R. 1263; 153 A.L.R. 1050.

Implied consent of nonresident or foreign corporation to jurisdiction in proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act as predicable upon facts which subject him or it to the substantive provisions of the act, 110 A.L.R. 1426.

Constitutionality of provisions of Workmen's Compensation Acts which are limited to residents of state, 147 A.L.R. 925.

Award under Workmen's Compensation Act as bar to, or ground for reduction of, claim under act of another state, 169 A.L.R. 1185.