O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 44-1-13 (2019)

Removal of improperly parked cars or trespassing personal property; concurrent jurisdiction; procedure; automatic surveillance prohibited; penalty

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) ‘‘Commission’’ means the Public Service Commission. (2) ‘‘Private property’’ means any parcel or space of private real property. (a.1) Any person or his or her authorized agent entitled to the possession of any private property shall have the right to remove or cause to be removed from the property any vehicle or trespassing personal property thereon which is not authorized to be at the place where it is found and to store or cause to be stored such vehicle or trespassing personal property, provided that there shall have been conspicuously posted on the private property notice that any vehicle or trespassing personal property which is not authorized to be at the place where it is found may be removed at the expense of the owner of the vehicle or trespassing personal property. Such notice shall also include information as to the location where the vehicle or personal property can be recovered, the cost of said recovery, and information as to the form of payment; provided, however, that the owner of residential private property containing not more than four residential units shall not be required to comply with the posting requirements of this subsection. Only towing and storage firms issued permits or licenses by the local governing authority of the jurisdiction in which they operate or by the commission, and having a secure impoundment facility, shall be permitted to remove trespassing property and trespassing personal property at the request of the owner or authorized agent of the private property. (b)(1) The commission shall have the authorization to regulate and control the towing of trespassing vehicles on private property if such towing is performed without the prior consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the vehicle, including the authority to set just and reasonable rates, fares, and charges for services related to the removal, storage, and required notification to owners of such towed vehicles. No storage fees shall be charged for the first 24 hour period which begins at the time the vehicle is removed from the property, and no such fees shall

be allowed for the removal and storage of vehicles removed by towing and storage firms found to be in violation of this Code section. The commission is authorized to impose a civil penalty for any violation of this Code section in an amount not to exceed $2,500.00. (2) In accordance with subsection (d) of this Code section, the governing authority of a municipality may require towing and storage operators to charge lower maximum rates on traffic moving between points within such municipality than those provided by the commission’s maximum rate tariff and may require higher public liability insurance limits and cargo insurance limits than those required by the commission. The governing authority of a municipality shall not provide for higher maximum costs of removal, relocation, or storage than is provided for by the commission. (c) In all municipalities, except a consolidated city-county government, having a population of 100,000 or more according to the United States decennial census of 1970 or any future such census a person entitled to the possession of an off-street parking area or vacant lot within an area zoned commercial by the municipality shall have the right to remove any vehicle or trespassing personal property parked thereon after the regular activity on such property is concluded for the day only if access to such property from the public way is blocked by a sturdy chain, cable, or rope stretched at least 18 inches above grade across all driveways or other ways providing access to the off-street parking area or vacant lot and there is conspicuously posted in the area a notice, the location of which must be approved by the municipality’s police department, that any vehicle or trespassing personal property parked thereon which is not authorized to be in such area may be removed at the expense of the owner along with information as to where the vehicle or trespassing personal property may be recovered, the cost of said recovery, and information regarding the form of payment. (d)(1) In addition to the regulatory jurisdiction of the commission, the governing authority of each municipality having towing and storage firms operating within its territorial boundaries may require and issue a license or permit to engage in private trespass towing within its corporate municipal limits pursuant to this Code section to any firm meeting the qualifications imposed by said governing authority. The fee for the license or permit shall be set by such governing authority. The maximum reasonable costs of removal, relocation, and storage pursuant to the provisions of this Code section shall be compensatory, as such term is used in the public utility rate-making procedures, and shall be established annually by the governing authority of each municipality having towing and storage firms operating within its territorial boundaries; provided, however, that no storage fees shall be charged for the first 24 hour period which begins at the time the vehicle is removed from the property, and no such fees shall be allowed for the removal and storage of vehicles

removed by towing and storage firms found to be in violation of this Code section. (2) Towing and storage firms operating within a municipality’s corporate limits shall obtain a nonconsensual towing permit from the commission and shall file its registered agent’s name and address with the commission. (e) Any person who suffers injury or damages as a result of a violation of this Code section may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for actual damages, which shall be presumed to be not less than $100.00, together with court costs. A court shall award three times actual damages for an intentional violation of this Code section. (f ) It shall be unlawful and punishable by a fine of $1,000.00 for any towing and storage firm, permitted or unpermitted, licensed or unlicensed, to enter into any agreement with any person in possession of private property to provide automatic or systematic surveillance of such property for purposes of removal and relocation of any such vehicle or trespassing personal property except upon call by such person in possession of such private property to such towing and storage firm for each individual case of trespass; provided, further, that it shall be unlawful and punishable by a fine of $1,000.00 for any towing and storage firm to pay to any private property owner or one in possession of private property any fee or emolument, directly or indirectly, for the right to remove a vehicle or trespassing personal property from said private property.

History

(Ga. L. 1962, p. 146, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 321, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 2622, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, § 46; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1442, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 1230, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 8, § 44; Ga. L. 2003, p. 881, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 60, § 44/HB 95; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 26-1/HB 501; Ga. L. 2007, p. 228, § 1/HB 316.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article surveying recent legislative and judicial developments in Georgia’s real property laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 187 (1979).

Cross references. - Security interests in and liens on motor vehicles generally, see § 40-3-50 et seq. Traffic regulations pertaining to parking generally, see § 40-6-200 et seq. Code Commission notes. - The amendment of subsections (a), (a.1), and (b) of this Code section by Ga. L. 2005, p. 60, § 44(1), irreconcilably conflicted with and was treated as superseded by Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 26-1. See County of Butts v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417 (1921). Administrative rules and regulations. - Procedure for Imposing Civil Penalties and

JUDICIAL DECISIONS notifying one parked on the property that one’s vehicle is subject to removal, and where such property may be recovered, this

Section is a codification of the common law. Although this section does require the property owner to conspicuously post a sign

added statutory requirement was intended to aid the aggrieved party in recovering of one’s vehicle, and does not in any way alter or change what was allowed at common law. Reinertsen v. Porter, 242 Ga. 624, 250 S.E.2d 475 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-1-13).

Cited in Shaw v. Wheat St. Baptist Church, 141 Ga. App. 883, 234 S.E.2d 711 (1977); Littlejohn v. Tower Assocs., 163 Ga. App. 37, 293 S.E.2d 33 (1982); Porter v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526, 384 S.E.2d 631 (1989).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1970 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 70-157 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-1-13).

Department of Natural Resources may remove vehicles blocking public boat launching ramps in accordance with this statute.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Liens, §§ 3, 9, 11, 12, 52 et seq. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §§ 131, 149, 218 et seq., 398 et seq., 412 et seq. 63A Am. Jur. 2d, Property, §§ 3, 27.

C.J.S. - 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, §§ 1 et seq., 178 et seq. 73 C.J.S., Property, §§ 1 et seq., 39 et seq., 47, 49, 50 et seq. 87 C.J.S., Trespass, §§ 13, 21.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Rcc Wesley Chapel Crossing, LLC v. Allen, 867 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. 2021).
Rcc Wesley Chapel Crossing, LLC v. Allen, 867 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. 2021). · cites it 8× “Moreover, in Georgia, the common-law remedy of removing trespassing vehicles has been displaced, at least in part, by Georgia’s towing statute, OCGA § 44-1-13, which provides specific guidelines for the removal and impoundment of vehicles in this state.”
Porter v. City of Atlanta, 384 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. 1989). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 44-1-13. The law gives the towing company a great advantage over the owner of the towed car, and creates a great potential for unfair business practices and abuse of the public.”
Ingram v. State, 601 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 2× “Ingram next contends the court erred by failing to give a requested charge based on OCGA § 44-1-13. But Ingram has not explained how that Code section is applicable to his case, nor do we see any relation.”
Argote-Romero v. LAZ Parking LTD., L.L.C., 2025 Ohio 400 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025). “Relevant to the instant case, the RCC Wesley court found, “in Georgia, the common-law remedy of removing trespassing vehicles has been displaced, at least in part, by Georgia’s towing statute, OCGA § 44-1-13, which provides specific guidelines for the removal and impoundment of…”
Blakemore v. Dirt Movers, Inc. Et Al., 809 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “A § 40-1-100 (12) (A) (" 'Motor carrier' means [ ] [e]very person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, including the lessees, receivers, or trustees of such persons or receivers appointed by any court, used in the business of transporting for hire…”
Aundray Barnes v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 4× “6 nonconsensual towing pursuant to Code Section 44-1-13 for hire over any public highway in this state.”
Hammonds v. Gray Transp., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (M.D. Ga. 2019). · cites it 2× “The term "motor carrier" is currently defined in Georgia (subject to some exceptions) as: Every person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, including the lessees, receivers, or trustees of such persons or receivers appointed by any court, used in the…”
Fielder v. Superior Mason Prods. LLC (M.D. Ga. 2023). · cites it 2× “Georgia law defines a motor carrier as: Every person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, including the lessees, receivers, or trustees of such persons or receivers appointed by any court, used in the business of transporting for hire persons, household…”
Donald E. Neal v. Metro Contents, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 2× “”29 And importantly, a “motor carrier” is [e]very person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, including the lessees, receivers, or trustees of such persons or receivers appointed by any court, used in the business of transporting for hire persons,…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.