O.C.G.A. homeSearch Georgia
O.C.G.A.Title 5Chapter 4

O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6 (2019)

Time for application for writ; filing of petition; service of petition and writ

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2013 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1986–2025 38citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 38 opinions since 1986, 9 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) All writs of certiorari shall be applied for within 30 days after the final determination of the case in which the error is alleged to have been committed. Applications made after 30 days are not timely and shall be dismissed by the court.

(b) The certiorari petition and writ shall be filed in the clerk's office within a reasonable time after sanction by the superior court judge; and a copy shall be served on the respondent, within five days after such filing, by the sheriff or his deputy or by the petitioner or his attorney. A copy of the petition and writ shall also be served on the opposite party or his counsel or other legal representative, in person or by mail; and service shall be shown by acknowledgment or by certificate of the counsel or person perfecting the service.

History

(Laws 1838, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 528; Laws 1850, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 529; Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, § 16; Ga. L. 1858, p. 88, § 1; Code 1863, §§ 2861, 3965; Code 1868, §§ 2869, 3985; Code 1873, §§ 2920, 4057; Code 1882, §§ 2920, 4057; Ga. L. 1889, p. 84, § 1; Civil Code 1895, §§ 3771, 4642; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4365, 5188; Ga. L. 1924, p. 59, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, §§ 19-209, 19-210; Ga. L. 1961, p. 190, §§ 2, 3.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey on zoning and land use law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2018).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS General Consideration Time for Filing Application 1. In General 2. What Are Final Judgments Notice

General Consideration

Editor's note. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 19-212 are included in the annotations of this Code section.

Cited in Gregory v. Daniel & Son, 93 Ga. 795, 20 S.E. 656 (1894); Carson v. Mayor of Forsyth, 97 Ga. 258, 22 S.E. 955 (1895); Seagraves v. W.E. Powell Co., 143 Ga. 572, 85 S.E. 760 (1915); Hudson v. State, 21 Ga. App. 507, 94 S.E. 645 (1917); Bull & Son v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 26 Ga. App. 151, 105 S.E. 616 (1921); Johnson v. Barrett, 26 Ga. App. 781, 107 S.E. 168 (1921); Kirkland v. Luke, 30 Ga. App. 203, 117 S.E. 259 (1923); Russell v. Kennington, 160 Ga. 467, 128 S.E. 581 (1925); Towery v. City of McCaysville, 38 Ga. App. 85, 142 S.E. 702 (1928); Jordan v. State, 172 Ga. 857, 159 S.E. 235 (1931); Hudson v. Higgins, 45 Ga. App. 358, 164 S.E. 688 (1932); Nalley & Co. v. Moore, 51 Ga. App. 718, 181 S.E. 429 (1935); Quinn v. O'Neal, 58 Ga. App. 628, 199 S.E. 359 (1938); Howard v. Williams, 72 Ga. App. 822, 35 S.E.2d 389 (1945); Washburn v. Thompson, 78 Ga. App. 133, 50 S.E.2d 761 (1948); Taylor v. Golian Steel & Iron Co., 86 Ga. App. 639, 72 S.E.2d 196 (1952); Bickers v. Georgia Real Estate Comm'n, 89 Ga. App. 815, 81 S.E.2d 535 (1954); Hipp v. City of East Point, 105 Ga. App. 775, 125 S.E.2d 672 (1962); Allison v. City of Atlanta, 109 Ga. App. 114, 135 S.E.2d 524 (1964); Murdock v. Perkins, 219 Ga. 756, 135 S.E.2d 869 (1964); Barrett v. City of Chamblee, 117 Ga. App. 205, 160 S.E.2d 278 (1968); Bellew v. State Hwy. Dep't, 127 Ga. App. 301, 193 S.E.2d 202 (1972); Goldstein v. Smith, 141 Ga. App. 493, 233 S.E.2d 864 (1977); Schaffer v. City of Atlanta, 144 Ga. App. 702, 242 S.E.2d 288 (1978); Williams v. Brownlee, 147 Ga. App. 831, 250 S.E.2d 567 (1978); Fulton County v. Williams, 150 Ga. App. 496, 258 S.E.2d 155 (1979); Mulling v. Wilson, 245 Ga. 773, 267 S.E.2d 212 (1980); Kaplan v. City of Atlanta, 158 Ga. App. 58, 279 S.E.2d 307 (1981); Village Ctrs., Inc. v. DeKalb County, 248 Ga. 177, 281 S.E.2d 522 (1981); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeKalb County, 167 Ga. App. 577, 306 S.E.2d 924 (1983); City of Atlanta v. Houston, 221 Ga. App. 61, 471 S.E.2d 12 (1996); Buckler v. DeKalb County, 290 Ga. App. 190, 659 S.E.2d 398 (2008); City of Dunwoody v. Discovery Practice Management, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 135, 789 S.E.2d 386 (2016); Munye v. State, 342 Ga. App. 680, 803 S.E.2d 775 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 236 (Ga. 2018); Hous. Auth. of Augusta v. Gould, 305 Ga. 545, 826 S.E.2d 107 (2019).

Time for Filing Application

1. In General

Provisions of subsection (a) are mandatory. - Provisions of section are absolute and mandatory in respect of time within which writs of certiorari shall be applied for, and cannot be varied or departed from in exercise of any judicial discretion. Hitt v. City of Atlanta, 103 Ga. App. 717, 120 S.E.2d 339 (1961).

Petition must be presented within thirty days from rendition of verdict, if the petition does not complain of error in dismissing motion for new trial. Autrey & Peebles v. Carson Naval Stores Co., 29 Ga. App. 422, 115 S.E. 924 (1923).

Application for writ of certiorari must be made within 30 days of final determination of case in inferior court. Eisenberg v. Fuller, 148 Ga. App. 603, 252 S.E.2d 17 (1979).

Failure to obtain the requisite sanction from the appropriate judge is not an amendable defect if the 30-day time requirement for applying for certiorari under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6(a) has expired. Cobb County v. Herren, 230 Ga. App. 482, 496 S.E.2d 558 (1998).

Although a trial court's decision to dismiss an action by dismissed city employees was erroneously based on the court's determination that the employees had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies from their claim that the reduction-in-force ordinance, Atlanta, Ga., Code § 114-55, was not properly followed, as they had properly appealed to the Service Board and the Board had denied their claims on appeal, the dismissal was proper for other reasons; after the Board's final decision denying the employees' appeals, the employees failed to properly and timely file a writ of certiorari in the trial court pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 5-4-1(a) and 5-4-6 in order to obtain review of that decision. Jordan v. City of Atlanta, 283 Ga. App. 285, 641 S.E.2d 275 (2007).

When judgment is not final, subsequent judgments pertaining to it are not final. - When verdict and judgment rendered in Municipal Court of Atlanta is not a final judgment, neither judgment of trial judge overruling motion for new trial excepting to such verdict and judgment, nor judgment of appellate division of that court affirming such judgment of trial judge, is a final judgment. Reed v. V.H. Kriegshaber & Son, 44 Ga. App. 64, 160 S.E. 560 (1931).

Filing of mandamus action does not excuse compliance with section. - Because certiorari and mandamus are completely different remedies as to subject matter, procedure, and nature of relief, filing a mandamus action does not excuse compliance with requirements of this section. Richardson v. Rector, 134 Ga. App. 116, 213 S.E.2d 488 (1975).

Mandamus not appropriate remedy for homeowners denied building permit. - Mandamus was not the appropriate remedy for homeowners whose building permit had been denied by a city; rather, the homeowners were required to pursue the homeowners' appeal through the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari, pursuant to Statesboro, Ga., Zoning Ordinance § 1809 and O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a); moreover, the homeowners' appeal was untimely under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6(a). City of Statesboro v. Dickens, 293 Ga. 540, 748 S.E.2d 397 (2013).

Section does not deal with means of preserving exceptions to trial court rulings. - This section merely limits time after final judgment in which writ of certiorari may be applied for, but does not attempt to go into manner in which exceptions to orders and rulings prior to final judgment may be preserved. Taylor v. Golian Steel & Iron Co., 86 Ga. App. 639, 72 S.E.2d 196 (1952).

Certiorari from appeals in justice's court are from jury verdict. - It is from verdict of jury in appeal cases in justice's court that certiorari may be taken, not from judgment which justice may enter thereon. Western & A.R.R. v. Carson, 70 Ga. 388 (1883).

Fact of timely application must appear from record, unless answer of justice verifies that fact. Duke v. Story, 113 Ga. 112, 38 S.E. 337 (1901); Landrum v. Moss, 1 Ga. App. 216, 57 S.E. 965 (1907).

Section governs time for second application when first application dismissed for noncompliance. - When application for certiorari is a nullity, because of failure to comply with the requirement as to bond, time within which second application may be made was governed by former Civil Code 1910, §§ 4365, 5188 (see O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6), and was not extended by law as to renewal of cases within six months after dismissal under former Civil Code 1910, § 4381 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61). Tuten v. Showalter, 14 Ga. App. 690, 82 S.E. 154 (1914); Autrey & Peebles v. Carson Naval Stores Co., 29 Ga. App. 422, 115 S.E. 924 (1923).

Renewal of previously dismissed, but timely certiorari in same cause. - When certiorari is applied for after expiration of statutory period from date of judgment complained of, petition should show on the petition's face that the petition is a renewal of a previously dismissed certiorari sued out within proper time in same cause, and that renewal is within six months from date of dismissal of previous certiorari. Unless all of these facts appear in petition for certiorari, the judge of superior court has no jurisdiction of case, and should refuse to sanction petition; and, if such petition is sanctioned, it should be dismissed when proper motion therefor is made upon hearing of certiorari. Smith v. City of Atlanta, 48 Ga. App. 853, 174 S.E. 171 (1934).

Valid writ of error suspends running of time limit for application for writ of certiorari. Gavant v. Berger, 51 Ga. App. 628, 181 S.E. 210 (1935).

Time ran from denial of motion to set aside default judgment, not default judgment itself. - In a dispute between a seller of storage units and the buyer's spouse, resulting in a default judgment for the seller in magistrate court, the superior court erred in dismissing the spouse's petition for certiorari as untimely because the petition was filed within 30 days of the denial of the spouse's motion to set aside as required by O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6(a); it was not required that the motion be filed within 30 days of the default judgment. Jorree v. PMB Rentals, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 332, 825 S.E.2d 817 (2019).

Timely petition was improperly dismissed. - Superior court improperly dismissed as untimely appellant city's petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a civil service board's decision as the petition was timely filed for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6(a) since: (1) the last day to file the petition fell on Thanksgiving Day; (2) the Friday after Thanksgiving day, like Thanksgiving day, was a legal holiday as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 1-4-1; and (3) the petition was filed on the very next business day, as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(3). City of Atlanta v. Hector, 256 Ga. App. 665, 569 S.E.2d 600 (2002).

Eleventh of November, although a legal holiday, is included in computing 30-day period. - In computing 30 days within which petition for certiorari must be presented eleventh of November, although a legal holiday and last day, must be included. Freeman v. Beneficial Loan Soc'y, 42 Ga. App. 294, 155 S.E. 786 (1930).

2. What Are Final Judgments

Writ of certiorari lies only after rendition of judgment making final disposition of case, and then only to correct errors which affect such final judgment. It does not lie to correct errors affecting only judgment which is not final. Reed v. V.H. Kriegshaber & Son, 44 Ga. App. 64, 160 S.E. 560 (1931).

Writ of certiorari lies only after rendition of final judgment. Hayes v. Brown, 205 Ga. 234, 52 S.E.2d 862 (1949).

Final disposition of case in inferior court is prerequisite to writ of certiorari. Singer Mfg. Co. v. McNeal Paint & Glass Co., 117 Ga. 1005, 44 S.E. 801 (1903).

Absent final judgment, court is correct in refusing to act. - When there has been no final judgment rendered by the state court, the superior court is correct in refusing to exercise the superior court's supervisory powers through a writ of certiorari. Attwell v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 159 Ga. App. 811, 285 S.E.2d 199 (1981).

Judgment of justice of peace, refusing to allow amendment to petition is not final determination. Felker v. Freeman, 46 Ga. App. 767, 169 S.E. 247 (1933).

Verdict and judgment against special plea of no partnership is not a final judgment. Reed v. V.H. Kriegshaber & Son, 44 Ga. App. 64, 160 S.E. 560 (1931).

Judgment sustaining motion to dismiss and granting leave to amend is not final judgment, judgment sustaining demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to petition, which grants leave to plaintiff to amend on pain of dismissing suit, is not a final judgment, and certiorari does not lie thereto. Massengale v. Colonial Hill Co., 34 Ga. App. 807, 131 S.E. 299 (1926).

Notice

Service on the opposite party within five days is mandatory and in the absence of such service the application for certiorari is properly dismissed. City of Atlanta v. Saunders, 159 Ga. App. 566, 284 S.E.2d 77 (1981).

Provisions for notice to opposite party are mandatory. Glover v. Berry Sch., 90 Ga. App. 232, 83 S.E.2d 22 (1954);(decided under former Code 1933, § 19-212).

Notice to opposite party is required unless prevented by unavoidable cause or waived in writing. - Notice to be given to opposite party in interest, that party's agent, or attorney, unless prevented by unavoidable cause or unless waived in writing, and when such notice is not given and it is not shown to be due to unavoidable cause, certiorari shall be dismissed unless waived in writing. Attebery v. City of Manchester, 76 Ga. App. 265, 45 S.E.2d 781 (1947);(decided under former Code 1933, § 19-212).

Service must be made diligently. - Although an employee failed to serve the city with a copy of a petition for certiorari within five days as required by O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6(b), the trial court was required to determine whether service was made in a reasonable and diligent manner to effectuate service as quickly as possible. Mangram v. City of Brunswick, 324 Ga. App. 725, 751 S.E.2d 523 (2013).

Failure to serve writ on judge whose decision is to be reviewed. - When it appears that the writ of certiorari has not been served upon the judge, or other officer whose decision is sought to be reviewed, 15 days previous to the term of court to which the return is to be made, the proceeding should be dismissed, unless it clearly appears that the failure to serve was in no way attributable to the fault of the party making application for the writ. City of Atlanta v. Saunders, 159 Ga. App. 566, 284 S.E.2d 77 (1981).

Failure to serve judge, not basis for dismissal. - Failure to properly serve respondent, a municipal court judge whose decision was being reviewed, was not a basis for dismissal when the judge made a general appearance and addressed the merits of the case. Hudson v. Watkins, 225 Ga. App. 455, 484 S.E.2d 24 (1997).

Failure to serve city. - "Opposite party" in a case of certiorari from a municipal court was the city, not the municipal court judge, and failure to serve the city warranted dismissal of the petition. Hudson v. Watkins, 225 Ga. App. 455, 484 S.E.2d 24 (1997).

Superior court erred in denying the city board of appeals' motion to dismiss a petition for writ of certiorari because the service of the original petition upon the city attorney was not sufficient service upon the city as an opposite party when the city was not named as the opposite party, and only the board and the board's members were named in the original petition as the board (as respondent) and the city (as the proper opposite party) were two separate entities with possibly conflicting interests. City of Sandy Springs Bd. of Appeals v. Traton Homes, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 551, 801 S.E.2d 599 (2017).

Failure to serve board. - Superior court did not err in dismissing petition for certiorari from a decision of the Atlanta Civil Service Board, since the board was not named as a party as required by subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6, and service of the petition on the City of Atlanta was not service on the City of Atlanta Civil Service Board as a matter of law. Fisher v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. App. 635, 442 S.E.2d 762 (1994).

Although the city board of appeals was served with a copy of the petition for certiorari, a sanction of the writ by the superior court, and summonses, the superior court erred in denying the board's motion to dismiss because there was a failure to comply with the statutory requirements as no writ had been issued and served; and, while it was the clerk's duty to issue the writ, it was also separately the duty of the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel to ensure that a writ was served, and the petitioner could not completely divorce itself from the failure that occurred in the current case. City of Sandy Springs Bd. of Appeals v. Traton Homes, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 551, 801 S.E.2d 599 (2017).

Superior court erred in denying the city board of appeals' motion to dismiss a petition for writ of certiorari because there was a complete failure to even issue a writ of certiorari, let alone serve the same upon the board as the respondent; and the petitioner failed to name the city as an opposite party, and failed to serve the city with a copy of the petition and with a copy of the writ in the time required. City of Sandy Springs Bd. of Appeals v. Traton Homes, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 551, 801 S.E.2d 599 (2017).

O.C.G.A. § 5-4-10 may not be utilized to permit service beyond time permitted in O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6. City of Atlanta v. Saunders, 159 Ga. App. 566, 284 S.E.2d 77 (1981).

It is the actual filing of petition in clerk's office which gives the petition validity, but the petition cannot have any validity as such unless the petition is actually filed with the custodian upon whom the law casts duty of receiving the petition. Hunter v. City of Blue Ridge, 79 Ga. App. 719, 54 S.E.2d 510 (1949).

Giving of required notice must affirmatively appear from certiorari proceedings. - When it does not affirmatively appear from certiorari proceedings that required notice or a waiver thereof was given, proceedings are fatally defective, and superior court does not err in overruling and denying petition for certiorari. Williams v. State, 91 Ga. App. 124, 85 S.E.2d 91 (1954).

Personal service upon respondent is required. Gornto v. City of Brunswick, 119 Ga. App. 673, 168 S.E.2d 323 (1969).

Failure to comply with subsection (b) renders petition and writ invalid. - When certiorari was dismissed for want of compliance with provisions of former Civil Code 1910, §§ 4365, 5188 (see O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6), petition for certiorari and writ of certiorari were invalid, and for this reason there was no case pending which could be recommenced within six months as provided in § 9-2-61. Butters Mfg. Co. v. Sims, 47 Ga. App. 648, 171 S.E. 162 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 19-210, prior to amendment by Ga. L. 1961, p. 190, § 3, now embodied in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6).

Jurisdiction over appeal from dismissal of petition for failure of service. - When sole question for review on appeal is dismissal of petition for certiorari because of failure of service, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the appeal. Gornto v. City of Brunswick, 225 Ga. 128, 166 S.E.2d 349 (1969).

Failure to give notice to opposite party shall be mandatory ground for dismissal of certiorari unless prevented by unavoidable cause, or unless waived. Glover v. Berry Sch., 90 Ga. App. 232, 83 S.E.2d 22 (1954);(decided under former Code 1933, § 19-212).

Failure to give notice to opposite party is fatal to proceedings and subjects the proceedings to dismissal at any time before final judgment. Goldberg v. City of Atlanta, 71 Ga. App. 269, 30 S.E.2d 661 (1944);(decided under former Code 1933, § 19-212).

Acknowledgment of service does not estop one from claiming service was untimely. - Mere acknowledgment of service of notice of sanction of writ of certiorari does not estop person making acknowledgment from setting up that the same was, under the law relating thereto, served too late. Scott v. State, 75 Ga. App. 684, 44 S.E.2d 391 (1947);(decided under former Code 1933, § 19-212).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 14 Am. Jur. 2d, Certiorari, § 52 et seq.

5B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Certiorari, §§ 81, 88.

C.J.S. - 14 C.J.S., Certiorari, §§ 30 et seq., 41 et seq., 61 et seq.

ALR. - Applicability of statute of limitations or doctrine of laches to certiorari, 40 A.L.R.2d 1381.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCity of Sandy Springs Bd. of Appeals v. Traton Homes, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 599 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 5-4-6 23×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“The Board maintains that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss when Traton Homes failed to (1) meet the mandatory requirements of OCGA § 5-4-6 (b) for service of the certiorari petition and writ on the Board as the respondent and (2) name the City of Sandy…”
Later courts cite it for
“the certiorari petition and writ shall be filed in the clerk's office within a reasonable time after sanction by the superior court judge; and a copy shall be served on the respondent, within five days after such filing. . . .” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENCity of Dunwoody v. Discovery Practice Mgmt., Inc., 789 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 5-4-6 12×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“Discovery filed its first petition for writ of certiorari in the superior court on July 10, 2014, within the 30-day limitation period of OCGA § 5-4-6 (a). Pursuant to OCGA § 5-4-6 (b), the petition and *136 writ were required to be personally served upon the ZBA, as…”
Later courts cite it for
“the construction of a zoning ordinance is a question of law for the courts.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENBuckler v. DeKalb Cnty., 659 S.E.2d 398 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 5-4-6 8×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“The Petitioners filed their first petition for writ of certiorari on June 8,2005, within the 30-day limitation period of OCGA § 5-4-6 (a). Pursuant to OCGA § 5-4-5, the petition was required to be filed with a bond approved by the judicial officer who heard the case, unless the…”
4
GREENCobb Cnty. v. Herren, 496 S.E.2d 558 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 5-4-6 12×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“Cobb County filed an application for interlocutory appeal, arguing that the court erred in allowing the family to amend with a late sanction beyond the 30-day time period of OCGA § 5-4-6. We granted the application, and for the following reasons, reverse the decision of the…”
5
GREENThomas v. Douglas Cnty., 457 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 5-4-6 2×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“Citing OCGA § 5-4-6 (a), Thomas argues that writs must be applied for within 30 days after the final determination of a case and, here, the order of final sentence was not imposed until after the compliance hearing on October 15, 1992.”
The case’s holding
An order is final and appealable only when it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.
Later courts cite it for
“generally, an order is final and appealable when it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court's final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.” · 72 citing courts
6
GREENHous. Auth. of Augusta v. Gould, 826 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. 2019).
cites § 5-4-6 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“" OCGA § 5-4-6 (a). These are not the characteristics of a decision that is final, binding, and conclusive in *116 the way that a judicial decision is.”
Later courts cite it for
“the performance of judicial acts under authority conferred upon other persons, boards, or tribunals is quasi-judicial.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENFisher v. City of Atlanta, 442 S.E.2d 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 5-4-6 6×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“OCGA § 5-4-6 (b) merely requires that “the respondent” be served, as well as “the opposite party.”
8
GREENHudson v. Watkins, 484 S.E.2d 24 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 5-4-6 6×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“OCGA § 5-4-6 (a) provides that a petition for a writ must be filed “within 30 days after the final determi *456 nation of the case in which the error is alleged to have been committed.”
9
GREENMangram v. City of Brunswick, 751 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 5-4-6 8×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Mangram’s petition based on his failure to timely serve the defendants as required by OCGA § 5-4-6, and the trial court dismissed the entire action with prejudice.”
10
GREENPhillips v. Jackson, 877 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 2022).
cites § 5-4-6 4×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“See OCGA § 5-4-6 (a) (“All writs of certiorari shall be applied for within 30 days after the final determination of the case in which the error is alleged to have been committed.”
Later courts cite it for
“ordinary established procedure” · 1 citing court
11
GREENStarnes v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 503 S.E.2d 665 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 5-4-6 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“” OCGA § 5-4-6 (a). Rather than appeal through the orderly, specific vehicle of certiorari as required by OCGA §§ 5-4-1, 5-4-3, and 5-4-6, however, Starnes waited an entire year after the pension board reached an adverse decision to file a completely new action.”
Later courts cite it for
“finality of the pension board's decision under the local law and pension board bylaws is a prerequisite to appeal by certiorari.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENJordan v. City of Atlanta, 641 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 5-4-6 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“” OCGA § 5-4-6. On appeal, Jordan concedes that she failed to timely file her writ of certiorari below.”
13
GREENTaylor v. City of Atlanta, 363 S.E.2d 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 5-4-6 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“Appellee City of Atlanta moved to dismiss the writ, alleging appellant had failed to procure an answer from the respondent judge (OCGA § 5-4-7); failed to serve a copy of the petition and writ on appellee and show that service was perfected (OCGA § 5-4-6 (b)); and failed to file…”
14
GREENCity of Statesboro v. Dickens, 748 S.E.2d 397 (Ga. 2013).
cites § 5-4-6 4×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“See OCGA § 5-4-6 (a) (writ of certiorari); Wilson v.”
15
GREENPope v. Bd. of Commissioners, 546 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 5-4-6 4×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“Within the time prescribed in OCGA § 5-4-6 (b), a copy of the petition was served on the Board of Commissioners by a deputy sheriff and the Board’s attorney was served by mail.”
Later courts cite it for
“fisher was correctly decided, as 558 the civil service board did not initiate or prosecute the proceedings before it, but sat solely as a judicial dec is ion-maker in a dispute between the city and a civil servant. in this case, however, the board of commissioners performs a more expansive role. ... in such circumstances, it is the board of commissioners, as the governing authority, which is the proper defendant in certiorari. here, . . . unlike fisher , the superior court was petitioned to review a quasi-judicial decision of the board of commissioners of fulton county under ocga 48-5-295 (b).” · 1 citing court
16
GREENGasses v. City of Riverdale, 701 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. 2010).
cites § 5-4-6 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“1 On December 18,2009, the Superior Court of Clayton County dismissed appellant’s writ of certiorari for failure to comply with the service requirements of OCGA § 5-4-6 (b). The Court of Appeals denied her application for discretionary review, and this Court denied appellant’s…”
Later courts cite it for
“maintain grass, weeds, and vegetation for the welfare of the community is not constitutionally prohibited involuntary servitude.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 5-4-6 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“” OCGA § 5-4-6 (a). These are not the characteristics of a decision that is final, binding, and conclusive in the way that a judicial decision is.”
18
GREENCity of Atlanta v. Hector, 569 S.E.2d 600 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 5-4-6 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“OCGA § 5-4-6 (a) states: “All writs of certiorari shall be applied for within 30 days after the final determination of the case in which the error is alleged to have been committed.”
19
NEUTRALMack Young Ham v. City of Milton, 856 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 5-4-6 14×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“Ham provided the petition package to the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office on June 28, 2019, for service upon the City’s mayor and city manager in accordance with OCGA § 5-4-6 (b). Over the next few weeks, Ham’s counsel contacted the sheriff’s office several times to check on the…”
20
GREENArc Gaming & Tech., LLC v. Hiram Imp, Inc., 916 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 2025).
cites § 5-4-6 11×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 5-4-6
“Arc then filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to OCGA § 5-4-6. The same day it filed its appeal with the GLC, Arc also filed a motion for reconsideration with the hearing officer.”

Show all 38 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198620052025

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2019. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.31Ga.6N.D. Ga.1
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

O.C.G.A. Home  |  Search Georgia  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com