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O.C.G.A.Title 51Chapter 5

O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6 (2019)

Truth as justification

Edition and currency
Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from Release 73 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Aug. 21, 2019) (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020), which replaced the older 2017 print volume for this title. Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTRelease 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session cited 1983–2026 40citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 40 opinions since 1983, 5 of them in the last five years.

The truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification of an alleged libel or slander.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2921; Code 1868, § 2928; Code 1873, § 2979; Code 1882, § 2979; Civil Code 1895, § 3839; Civil Code 1910, § 4435; Code 1933, § 105-708.)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For article, "Defamation in Georgia Local Government Law: A Brief History," see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 627 (1982).

For note, "The Great Escape: How One Plaintiff's Sidestep of a Mandatory Arbitration Clause Was Applied to a Class in Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank," see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 539 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Libel must be false as well as malicious. Jones v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 365, 236 S.E.2d 23 (1977).

Truth is perfect defense in civil action for libel or slander. Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App. 203, 138 S.E.2d 173 (1964).

When the petition in a libel action affirmatively shows that the printed matter relied on to constitute the libel is not false, but on the other hand shows it to be true, then such petition fails to state a cause of action for libel, the falsity of the printed matter being an essential element to such a cause of action. Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Harley, 100 Ga. App. 387, 111 S.E.2d 259 (1959).

If the petition shows on the petition's face that the printed matter is either true or privileged, a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to the petition will lie for the reason that the petition on the petition's face sets out no cause of action. Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Harley, 100 Ga. App. 387, 111 S.E.2d 259 (1959).

The truth of the charge may always be proved in justification of the libel or slander. Rucker v. Gandy, 158 Ga. App. 104, 279 S.E.2d 259 (1981).

Fact that medical director had tested positive for an infectious disease was true; thus, the medical director's claims for libel and slander based on communications made that stated the medical director had been diagnosed with an infectious disease could not be sustained since the truth was a perfect defense in a civil action for libel or slander. Nelson v. Glynn-Brunswick Hosp. Auth., 257 Ga. App. 571, 571 S.E.2d 557 (2002).

Memorandum in which a vice chairperson of an organization alleged that the organization's vice president and treasurer acted improperly in violation of the organization's conflict of interest rules by allowing the treasurer to receive payment for work that the treasurer performed for the organization, did not present an actionable libel claim, as the information in the memorandum qualified as opinion or was true, thus presenting a defense under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6. Koly v. Enney, 269 Fed. Appx. 861 (11th Cir. 2008)(Unpublished).

Under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6, truth was an absolute defense in a defamation action. Thus, the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits of a defamation claim and was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. Windsor v. United States, F.3d (11th Cir. May 20, 2010)(Unpublished).

Real estate developer did not show defamation on the part of home buyers because the buyers in the buyers' communications with others concerning drainage problems on the buyers' property which the buyers purchased from the developer addressed factually true information, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6, and the buyers' communications were privileged, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7, as there was no showing of malice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-5-9. Chaney v. Harrison & Lynam, LLC, 308 Ga. App. 808, 708 S.E.2d 672 (2011).

Statement that criminal charges were about to be brought against the plaintiff was in fact true at the time the statement was made and therefore could not constitute an actionable slander. Tetrault v. Shelton, 179 Ga. App. 746, 347 S.E.2d 636 (1986).

Substantial accuracy constitutes defense of truth. - Newspapers are not ordinarily held to the exact facts or to the most minute details of the transactions they publish. What is usually required is that the publication shall be substantially accurate; and if the article is published by the newspaper in good faith and the same is substantially accurate, the newspaper has a complete defense. Jones v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 365, 236 S.E.2d 23 (1977).

As long as the facts in a newspaper are not misstated, distorted, or arranged so as to convey a false and defamatory meaning, there is no liability for a somewhat less than complete report of the truth. Jones v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 365, 236 S.E.2d 23 (1977).

Defendant in defamation action cannot automatically escape liability by swearing that statements were made with belief that statements were true. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).

Rumors not basis of justification. - Rumors that the subject matter of the charge was true will not support a plea of truth. Cox v. Strickland, 101 Ga. 482, 28 S.E. 655 (1897).

An omission from an otherwise truthful communication of a reference to the underlying extenuating circumstances regarding the termination of the plaintiff's employment did not render those communications false and actionable defamations. Yandle v. Mitchell Motors, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 211, 404 S.E.2d 313, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 907, 404 S.E.2d 313 (1991).

If truth of article is proven, it is immaterial altogether whether it may have been viewed as in "poor taste" by anybody, for the defense of justification is established and the defendant is entitled to a verdict. Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Hartridge, 110 Ga. App. 203, 138 S.E.2d 173 (1964).

Character of plaintiff in issue. - In an action of slander, the plea of justification puts the plaintiff's general character in issue. Bryan v. Gurr, 27 Ga. 378 (1859).

Bad character of the plaintiff merely serves to mitigate damages, and cannot operate as a bar. Redfearn v. Thompson, 10 Ga. App. 550, 73 S.E. 949 (1912).

False identification as convicted criminal in campaign materials. - In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit by political opponents of a sheriff who, they claimed, libeled them by identifying them as criminals in campaign literature, a majority of the defamatory statements were protected by the First Amendment as rhetorical political hyperbole, except for a flier displaying a mug shot of one of the citizens with a caption falsely identifying that citizen as a "convicted" criminal; because the citizen had never been convicted, the latter statement was actionable under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1 because truth was not a defense under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6. Bennett v. Hendrix, 325 Fed. Appx. 727 (11th Cir. 2009)(Unpublished).

Plea of privilege is not waived by plea of justification. Etchison v. Pergerson, 88 Ga. 620, 15 S.E. 680 (1892).

Truth available as defense even when statement not privileged. - When a slander per se is not privileged, the defendant may defend by denying the utterance of the words, or by setting up the truth in defense. Ivester v. Coe, 33 Ga. App. 620, 127 S.E. 790 (1925); McIntosh v. Williams, 160 Ga. 461, 128 S.E. 672 (1925).

Time that knowledge of truth was ascertained by defendant is immaterial. Cox v. Strickland, 101 Ga. 482, 28 S.E. 655 (1897).

Plaintiff failed to establish that parents entertained serious doubts to the truth. - In an action in which the plaintiff, who was named by the parents of a murdered child on national television and in the parents' book about their daughter's murder as a potential suspect, filed suit against the parents, asserting both a libel and slander claim, the parents were granted summary judgment on the libel claim; the plaintiff failed to establish that when the parents wrote the book, the parents in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. Wolf v. Ramsey, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2003).

Statements in letter setting forth board member's judgments, tax liens, and crimes were true. - In a defamation suit brought by a board member of a vacation resort community owners' association against a property owner who wrote a letter detailing the board member's civil judgments, tax liens, and criminal charges, the trial court properly granted the property owner summary judgment as the statements regarding the judgments, tax liens, and criminal charges were garnered from public records and were true. Additionally, the property owner's assessment that the board member was not fit to manage the association's funds if the board member was not able to manage personal finances was the opinion of the property owner and served no basis for the defamation action. McCall v. Couture, 293 Ga. App. 305, 666 S.E.2d 637 (2008).

Defense of truth inapplicable in creditor's slander of title claim. - Trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to a limited liability company (LLC) and the company's member on a creditor's slander of title claim based on the defense of truth because the lis pendens was not valid; a prior action the LLC and member filed against a debtor, and the interests asserted therein, did not involve the real property at issue. McChesney v. IH Riverdale, LLC, 307 Ga. App. 77, 704 S.E.2d 244 (2010).

Truthful social media postings not defamation. - Judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed verdicts in a defamation case were affirmed because the plaintiff was properly found to be a public figure in the spheres of running and Christian evangelism and there was no evidence of actual malice as to the social media postings, which alleged that the plaintiff was having multiple affairs with married women and had not completed all of the long distance runs, were true; there was no evidence of violations of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93 or O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93.1. Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank, 299 Ga. 459, 788 S.E.2d 787 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 571, 196 L. Ed. 2d 447 (U.S. 2016).

Truthfulness of statements made about defendant is question of fact for the jury. Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski, 157 Ga. App. 850, 278 S.E.2d 689 (1981).

Truthfulness is a question of fact for the jury. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc. v. Cobb County, 665 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1989); Stone v. McMichen, 186 Ga. App. 510, 367 S.E.2d 839 (1988); Stalvey v. Atlanta Bus. Chronicle, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 597, 414 S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 907, 414 S.E.2d 898 (1992); Sparks v. Ellis, 205 Ga. App. 263, 421 S.E.2d 758, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 421 S.E.2d 758 (1992).

Except when the plaintiff makes acknowledgment of truthfulness. - Although truthfulness is normally a question of fact for the jury, since the party claiming to have been defamed has conclusively acknowledged the truthfulness of the communication at issue, it may be resolved as a matter of law. Kersey v. United States Shoe Corp., 211 Ga. App. 655, 440 S.E.2d 250 (1994).

Privilege inapplicable to slander of title claim. - Defense of truth, O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6, did not entitle a limited liability company and the company's member to summary judgment on an owner's slander of title claim because a prior action the LLC and member filed against the owner, the prior action, and the interests asserted therein, did not involve the owner's real property. Meadow Springs, LLC v. IH Riverdale, LLC, 307 Ga. App. 72, 704 S.E.2d 239 (2010).

Cited in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Miller, 398 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1968); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975); McKinnon v. Trivett, 136 Ga. App. 59, 220 S.E.2d 63 (1975); Spaulding v. Rich's, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 693, 247 S.E.2d 218 (1978); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 159 Ga. App. 416, 283 S.E.2d 647 (1981); Carey v. Glen Restaurants, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 638, 305 S.E.2d 171 (1983); Anderberg v. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 175 Ga. App. 14, 332 S.E.2d 326 (1985); Watkins v. Laser/Print-Atlanta, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 172, 358 S.E.2d 477 (1987); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Strickland, 185 Ga. App. 306, 363 S.E.2d 834 (1987); Wrenn v. Ledbetter, 697 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Davis v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 242 Ga. App. 907, 531 S.E.2d 764 (2000); No Witness, LLC v. Cumulus Media Partners, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2007); Brown v. Camden County, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Ga. 2008).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, §§ 251-253.

C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 161 et seq.

ALR. - Common report as defense to action for libel or slander, 43 A.L.R. 887.

Admissibility, for purpose of diminishing damages in an action for libel or slander, of particular facts reflecting upon plaintiff's character or reputation, 130 A.L.R. 854.

Joinder in defamation action, of denial and plea of truth of statement, 21 A.L.R.2d 813.

Necessity and sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations as to falsity in defamation action, 85 A.L.R.2d 460.

Reliance on facts not stated or referred to in publication, as support for defense of fair comment in defamation case, 90 A.L.R.2d 1279.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCottrell v. Smith, 788 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. 2016).
cites § 51-5-6 4×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“OCGA § 51-5-6; 7 Lucas v. Cranshaw, 289 Ga.”
The case’s holding
The requirements for slander per se apply to libel per se because the definition of slander is incorporated into the definition of libel.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that this court will not decide a constitutional question if the decision in the appeal can be made upon other grounds.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENDouglas Echols v. Spencer Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2019).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 111 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“2003), or a true statement of fact, O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6. When we consider whether a statement is defamatory, we “read and construe the publication as a whole, and in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would understand it.”
The case’s holding
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a First Amendment retaliation claim if no binding precedent clearly established that the defamatory speech violated the Constitution.
Later courts cite it for
“materially similar case that has already been decided.” · 7 citing courts
3
GREENHickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2004).
cites § 51-5-6 1×cited by 1,011 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“1987) (“It is axiomatic that truth is an absolute defense in a defamation action, O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6....”). We remand the remaining claims for consideration under Georgia law.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff must present evidence of deception, such as consumer surveys, to establish a Lanham Act claim when an advertisement is not literally false but remains misleading.
Later courts cite it for
“an issue of fact is 'material' if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” · 172 citing courts
4
GREENAcker v. Jenkins, 343 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 51-5-6 4×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“See in this regard OCGA § 51-5-6. At the summary judgment hearing plaintiff (appellant) stated: "Your Honor, I want to first get that last argument because it just simply irks me.”
The case’s holding
The party alleging error bears the burden of affirmatively showing error through the record, including the necessary transcripts.
Later courts cite it for
“the burden of doing so was clearly upon appellant.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENNelson v. Glynn-Brunswick Hosp. Auth., 571 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“OCGA § 51-5-6. The record shows that Dr. Nelson’s blood test did indicate that the hepatitis C antibodies were present in his blood.”
The case’s holding
A public disclosure invasion of privacy claim fails for lack of publicity where the defendant communicated private facts only internally or to a limited group, so summary judgment is proper.
Later courts cite it for
“in accordance with ocga 51-12-5.1, punitive damages can only be awarded as additional damages.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENStoploss Specialists, LLC v. Vericlaim, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“2d at 781 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-5-6"The truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification of an alleged libel or slander.”
7
GREENMcCall v. Couture, 666 S.E.2d 637 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“4 See OCGA § 51-5-6. “Although as a general rule the question whether a particular communication is defamatory is for the jury, if the statement is not ambiguous and reasonably can have only one interpretation, the question of defamation is one of law for the court.”
Later courts cite it for
“should not be allowed to retain the responsibility of his role in light of his inability to manage his own finances” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENChaney v. Harrison & Lynam, LLC, 708 S.E.2d 672 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“See OCGA § 51-5-6 (“The truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification of an alleged libel or slander.”
Later courts cite it for
“as a general rule, a mere statement of opinion is not considered defamatory” · 1 citing court
9
GREENS. Co. v. Hamburg, 470 S.E.2d 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“Hamburg testified that the information defendants withheld would have controlled certain promises he *840 extended to SEI’s Portuguese business partner, promises which were the primary focus of SEI’s internal investigation.”
The case’s holding
Hearsay billing summaries lack probative value to establish the specific amount of attorney fees and litigation expenses even if admitted without objection.
Later courts cite it for
“nothing more than 'hearsay, and hearsay, even when admitted into evidence without objection, lacks probative value to establish any fact.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENTetrault v. Shelton, 347 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 51-5-6 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“Shelton herself acknowledged that she had removed the shelves and had “not neatly stacked” their contents on the floor. Accordingly, it was entirely true that Mrs.”
11
GREENWolf v. Ramsey, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“Libel Claim Georgia law defines libel as “a false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of the person and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.”
12
GREENMedlin v. Carpenter, 329 S.E.2d 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“OCGA § 51-5-6. The time that knowledge of the truth was ascertained by defendant is immaterial.”
Later courts cite it for
“a cause of action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata even if some new factual allegations have been made, some new relief has been requested, or a new defendant has been added” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENWatkins v. Laser/Print-Atlanta, Inc., 358 S.E.2d 477 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“Laser/Print argues that the information imparted to Davis is not slander because Graves told Davis only that Watkins had been arrested, which was true.”
Later courts cite it for
“even assuming, arguen-do, that the statement was so privileged, this privilege is conditional rather than absolute, and it remains for a jury to determine whether the intention was such as to make the defense complete.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENSpeedway Grading Corp. v. Gardner, 425 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“; see OCGA § 51-5-6. Although as a general rule the question whether a particular communication is defamatory is for the jury, if the statement is not ambiguous and reasonably can have only one interpretation, the question of defamation is one of law for the court.”
Later courts cite it for
“although as a general rule the question whether a particular communication is defamatory is for the jury, if the statement is not ambiguous and reasonably can have only one interpretation, the question of defamation is one of law for the court.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENJim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Strickland, 363 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“OCGA § 51-5-6. Plaintiffs acknowledged that there had been no payments made for over a year but claimed that they were legally justified in not making payments, apparently relying on the principles of partial or total failure of consideration.”
Later courts cite it for
“an omission of information from a statement admittedly published will not support an action for libel.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENAnderberg v. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 332 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“OCGA § 51-5-6. Appellant’s general and conclusory allegations of malice are unsupported by any evidence and are therefore insufficient to avoid the privilege exercised by Gay.”
17
GREENStalvey v. Atlanta Bus. Chronicle, Inc., 414 S.E.2d 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“Genuine issues of material fact remain as to defendant’s liability for defamation. 2. Defendant contends publication of the above emphasized language is not libelous because the statements are substantially true.”
18
GREENMcDonald v. Few, 607 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“McDonald contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the advertisement in the “Siren” as libelous of her.”
19
GREENMeadow Springs, LLC v. Ih Riverdale, LLC, 704 S.E.2d 239 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“15 See OCGA § 51-5-6 (“The truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification of an alleged libel or slander.”
20
GREENKersey v. United States Shoe Corp., 440 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 51-5-6 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 51-5-6
“” OCGA § 51-5-6. Although truthfulness is normally a question of fact for the jury (Thrasher v.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1987. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.2811th Cir.4N.D. Ga.4M.D. Ga.2Ga.1S.D. Ga.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: Release 73 of the O.C.G.A. (Aug. 21, 2019): Georgia laws through the 2019 session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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