Language commands three departments of government to refrain from imprisoning for debt.

- The unambiguous language of this paragraph leaves no room for equivocation, exception, or doubt. It simply means that the sovereign people, speaking through their Constitution, command the three departments of the government - legislative, executive, and judicial - and all officials of those departments to refrain from imprisoning a single person for debt. Messenger v. State, 209 Ga. 340, 72 S.E.2d 460 (1952). For comment, see 4 Mercer L. Rev. 371 (1953).

Inhibition of Constitution applies to any and all imprisonment for debt, irrespective of the period of its duration or the means whereby it is accomplished. Messenger v. State, 209 Ga. 340, 72 S.E.2d 460 (1952). For comment, see 4 Mercer L. Rev. 371 (1953).

Criminal laws cannot be invoked to enforce payment of debts.

- However equitable it may seem that the victim of the transaction should be paid the money which the victim was induced to part with by fraudulent representations, there is no provision in the law of the state for hanging over the head of a convicted criminal the threatened enforcement of an imposed sentence for the purpose of coercing the criminal to pay a debt. Criminal laws cannot be invoked to enforce the payment of debts. Ray v. State, 40 Ga. App. 145, 149 S.E. 64 (1929).

Deputy did not show entitlement to official immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) as to the claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution because plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that the deputy violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIII and O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20; thus, there were material fact issues precluding summary judgment. Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2007).

Court without authority to order part of fine to be paid as debt.

- The fact that the court was without authority to order a part of the fine to be paid as a debt would not render the whole sentence void. Only that part which attempted to make such illegal distribution would be void. Though part of a sentence is unauthorized by law, that part will not make void the whole, but that which is good may be enforced. Ray v. State, 40 Ga. App. 145, 149 S.E. 64 (1929).

When the judgments are to be construed as imposing a chain gang and jail sentence, to be discharged on the payment of a fine of $100.00, and an additional sum of $400.00 to the prosecutrix, as a penalty, then the defendant was entitled to be released upon the payment of the $100.00 fine, the court being without authority to order the defendant to pay, as a part of the penalty, an additional sum to the prosecutrix. Ray v. State, 40 Ga. App. 145, 149 S.E. 64 (1929).

Failure to pay taxes not punishable by imprisonment.

- While there is no constitutional inhibition against criminalizing the failure to make an income tax return, income tax obligations constitute "debts" and any statute which characterizes the failure to pay income tax as an offense punishable by imprisonment violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. State v. Higgins, 254 Ga. 88, 326 S.E.2d 728 (1985).

Cited in Walden v. Sellers, 174 Ga. 774, 163 S.E. 897 (1932); Summers v. State, 63 Ga. App. 445, 11 S.E.2d 409 (1940); Howard v. State, 222 Ga. 525, 150 S.E.2d 834 (1966); Lindsey v. Solutions Exch., Inc., 178 Bankr. 895 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).

Editor's notes.

- In addition to the cases noted under this heading, see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXII, which specifically authorizes imprisonment for contempt of court.

Imprisonment for contempt is lawful. Smith v. McLendon, 59 Ga. 523 (1877); Clements v. Tillman, 79 Ga. 451, 5 S.E. 194, 11 Am. St. R. 441 (1887); Lamar v. Lamar, 123 Ga. 827, 51 S.E. 763, 107 Am. St. R. 169, 3 Ann. Cas. 294 (1905); Samel v. Dodd, 142 F. 68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 201 U.S. 646, 26 S. Ct. 761, 50 L. Ed. 903 (1906).

Imprisonment for civil contempt in alimony case is permissible.

- Imprisonment for civil contempt in a case involving alimony when the contemnor, although ordered imprisoned, may be purged prior to the imprisonment, was constitutionally permissible. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 246 Ga. 266, 271 S.E.2d 175 (1980).

Unconditional imprisonment for nonpayment of alimony permissible.

- A finding of criminal contempt with the sanction of unconditional imprisonment for nonpayment of alimony is constitutionally permissible. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 246 Ga. 266, 271 S.E.2d 175 (1980).

Contempt order was abuse of discretion and amounted to imprisonment for debt.

- The court erred in confining defendant to the custody of the sheriff until the defendant was purged of contempt by paying the entire sum of $8,667.00, found to be the amount of alimony in arrears; it was an abuse of discretion to require the defendant to pay the entire amount when the evidence disclosed the defendant was unable to comply, and amounted to imprisonment for debt. Blalock v. Blalock, 214 Ga. 586, 105 S.E.2d 721 (1958).

Failure to pay the $60,000 required under a consent decree provided no grounds for a contempt ruling when the consent decree was not interlocutory and incarcerating the debtor for contempt would have violated the clear prohibition in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIII. Hill v. Paluzzi, 261 Ga. App. 123, 581 S.E.2d 730 (2003).

Imprisonment for refusal to pay support, not for debt.

- A person who refuses to pay alimony or child support when the person is able to do so is imprisoned for the person's refusal to abide by the court's order, not for debt. Ensley v. Ensley, 239 Ga. 860, 238 S.E.2d 920 (1977).

A parent who willfully refuses to pay child support which the parent is able to pay and which is required by an order of court may be found guilty of either civil or criminal contempt of court, or both, and dealt with as provided by law. Ensley v. Ensley, 239 Ga. 860, 238 S.E.2d 920 (1977).

Settlement agreement in divorce proceeding.

- An order of specific performance as to a merely private debt in the form of an unincorporated settlement agreement in a divorce proceeding cannot be deemed to be a more adequate remedy than an action at law for breach of contract damages, since that order cannot constitutionally be enforced by contempt and would not obviate the necessity of the obligee's resort to successive lawsuits for the obligor's future breaches. Eickhoff v. Eickhoff, 263 Ga. 498, 435 S.E.2d 914 (1993).

Privatization of probation services.

- In a suit brought by misdemeanor defendants challenging the privatization of probation services under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g)(1), the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that § 42-8-100(g)(1) was not unconstitutional on the statute's face and did not offend due process or equal protection nor condone imprisonment for debt. Sentinel Offender Svcs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).

Imposition of payment of child support arrears as a condition of probation after conviction for abandonment does not violate this paragraph. Geiger v. State, 140 Ga. App. 800, 232 S.E.2d 109 (1976).

Condition of restitution imposed for suspending sentence is legal and constitutional.

- The payment of restitution to an injured party as a condition imposed for suspending a sentence upon conviction of an offense against the laws of this state does not prevent the sentence from being valid and legal, and is not violative of this paragraph. Maurier v. State, 112 Ga. App. 297, 144 S.E.2d 918 (1965).

No intent to protect debtor who violates penal statute in creating debt.

- The framers of the Constitution did not intend, by protecting the citizen against imprisonment for a mere debt, to thereby render one who happened to owe a debt immune from prosecution, if in creating the debt the person violated, at the same time and in the same Act, a penal statute in which all the citizens of the commonwealth are interested; any other rule would protect one who obtained money by false pretense, or even by robbery. Duncan v. State, 172 Ga. 186, 157 S.E. 670 (1931).

This paragraph is not violated by imprisoning person who becomes another's debtor by fraudulent practice. Lamar v. State, 120 Ga. 312, 47 S.E. 958 (1904).

Provision aimed at fraudulent conduct and not failure to pay debts.

- The offense declared in former Code 1933, §§ 26-7408 and 26-7409 was not for failure to perform service or pay debts, but for fraudulently procuring money, or other thing of value. The fraudulent conduct of the defendant was the gist of the crime, not merely the defendant's failure to perform the defendant's contract. Bullard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 33, 2 S.E.2d 725 (1939).

Punishment under fraudulent conversion statute not imprisonment for debt.

- The legislative purpose of former Code 1933, § 26-1808 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-8-4) was to punish for the fraudulent conversion, and not for a failure to comply with a contractual obligation. It follows that this section was not unconstitutional for violating due process, creating involuntary servitude, or imprisoning for debt. Smith v. State, 229 Ga. 727, 194 S.E.2d 82 (1972).

Imprisonment as a sentence for a conviction of theft by conversion does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, prohibiting imprisonment for debt, because the Constitution does not forbid imprisonment for criminal conduct merely because the criminal conduct also results in civil debt. Connally v. State, 265 Ga. 563, 458 S.E.2d 336 (1995).

Former Code 1933, § 26-1704 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20) did not authorize imprisonment for debt as prohibited by this paragraph. Cobb v. State, 246 Ga. 567, 272 S.E.2d 299 (1980).

Act making overdrawing bank account criminal offense does not violate this paragraph. Duncan v. State, 172 Ga. 186, 157 S.E. 670 (1931).

Imprisonment for giving bad check not imprisonment for debt.

- A person who might be imprisoned for the act of giving a bad check for an antecedent debt is not imprisoned for debt but, rather, for an independent act. Cobb v. State, 246 Ga. 567, 272 S.E.2d 299 (1980).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 674 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 813 et seq.

ALR.

- Alimony or maintenance as debt within constitutional or statutory provisions against imprisonment for debt, 30 A.L.R. 130.

Constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt as applicable to nonpayment of tax, fee, or other obligation to government, 40 A.L.R. 77.

Constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt as applicable in bastardy proceeding, 118 A.L.R. 1109.

Constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt as applicable to nonpayment of tax, 48 A.L.R.3d 1324.

Validity and construction of statute providing criminal penalties for failure of contractor who has received payment from owner to pay laborers or materialmen, 78 A.L.R.3d 563.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs, 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.

Constitutionality of "bad checks" statute, 16 A.L.R.4th 631.

Validity, construction, and effect of body execution statutes allowing imprisonment based on judgment, debt, or the like - modern cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 232.