1. Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway except that cities may restrict such a crossing by ordinance.
2. Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.\n\nTue Dec 09 22:17:00 2025 Iowa Code 2026, Chapter 321 (137, 2) 205 MOTOR VEHICLES AND LAW OF THE ROAD, §321.334\n\n 3. Where traffic-control signals are in operation at any place not an intersection pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. [C39, §5027.04; C46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 66, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, §321.328] Referred to in §321.325, 321.329, 805.8A(9)(g) For applicable scheduled fines, see §805.8A, subsection 9 \n
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
11
cases, 1951–2016 · leading case:
Hedges v. Conder, 166 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1969).
Hedges v. Conder, 166 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1969).
· cites it 58× “01 of the Municipal Code of Des Moines, 1962, * * *" and "in failing to yield the right of way to defendant's vehicle when plaintiff was within Keosauqua Street, other than in a marked or unmarked crosswalk, in violation of Section 321.328 of the Iowa Code and Section 30-33 of…”
Ackerman Ex Rel. Ackerman v. James, 200 N.W.2d 818 (Iowa 1972).
· cites it 28× “'" Defendant specifically alleged in the divisions of his answer setting forth his affirmative defense that the minor was negligent in failing to yield the right of way in violation of section 321.”
Stewart v. Hilton, 77 N.W.2d 637 (Iowa 1956).
· cites it 19× “329 : “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 321.”
Ruby Ex Rel. Ruby v. Easton, 207 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1973).
· cites it 7× “That the evidence conclusively shows that the plaintiff was crossing a roadway at a point other than within a marked crosswalk, or within an unmarked crosswalk and an intersection, and failed to yield the right of way to the vehicle being operated by the defendant, as required…”
United States v. West, 612 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2010).
“The district court initially granted West’s motion to suppress because he did not obstruct traffic by jaywalking, as required under Iowa Code § 321.328 . On reconsideration, the court denied suppression, finding probable cause for the stop based on Iowa Code § 321.”
Wright v. Welter, 288 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1980).
· cites it 4× “Section 321.328 charges a pedestrian with a duty to yield by exercising ordinary care when attempting to cross a public highway at an unmarked point; however, section 321.”
Nichols v. Snyder, 78 N.W.2d 836 (Iowa 1956).
· cites it 2× “Furthermore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out “there is no statute requiring” the sounding of a horn when reasonably necessary, as we have here in Iowa.”
Andrew v. Clements, 45 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1951).
· cites it 2× “Section 321.328, 1946 Code. As previously stated, there are contrary statements whether the appellant was in the crosswalk.”
Manley v. Janssen, 213 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1973).
· cites it 4× “He sets out six assignments of error, which raise the following four issues: (1) Failure of the trial court to submit as a specification of plaintiff’s negligence his violation of section 321.328, The Code; (2) Failure to direct a verdict on the ground the evidence shows as a…”
United States v. West, 615 F. Supp. 2d 957 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
· cites it 3× “Iowa Code § 321.328 is identical to Davenport Municipal Code 10.”
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