Kansas Statutes Annotated homeSearch Kansas
K.S.A.Chapter 08

K.S.A. § 8-1599 (2026)

Transportation of liquor in opened containers unlawful; exceptions; penalty; report of prior convictions; city or county not prohibited from enacting comparable ordinance or resolution, requirements

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) ACTIVE · 8 IN 5Y cited 2000–2026 24citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 24 opinions since 2000, 8 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (5 cases).

8-1599. Transportation of liquor in opened containers unlawful; exceptions; penalty; report of prior convictions; city or county not prohibited from enacting comparable ordinance or resolution, requirements. (a) As used in this section, "alcoholic beverage" means any alcoholic liquor, as defined by K.S.A. 41-102, and amendments thereto, or any cereal malt beverage, as defined by K.S.A. 41-2701, and amendments thereto.

(b) No person shall transport in any vehicle upon a highway or street any alcoholic beverage unless such beverage is:

(1) In the original unopened package or container, the seal of which has not been broken and from which the original cap, cork or other means of closure has not been removed;

(2) (A) in the locked rear trunk or rear compartment, or any locked outside compartment which is not accessible to any person in the vehicle while it is in motion; or

(B) if a motor vehicle is not equipped with a trunk, behind the last upright seat or in an area not normally occupied by the driver or a passenger; or

(3) in the exclusive possession of a passenger in a vehicle which is a recreational vehicle, as defined by K.S.A. 75-1212, and amendments thereto, or a bus, as defined by K.S.A. 8-1406, and amendments thereto, who is not in the driving compartment of such vehicle or who is in a portion of such vehicle from which the driver is not directly accessible.

(c) Violation of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $200 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.

(d) Except as provided in subsection (f) upon conviction or adjudication of a second or subsequent violation of this section, the judge, in addition to any other penalty or disposition ordered pursuant to law, shall suspend the person's driver's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the streets and highways of this state for one year.

(e) Upon suspension of a license pursuant to this section, the court shall require the person to surrender the license to the court, which shall transmit the license to the division of motor vehicles of the department of revenue, to be retained until the period of suspension expires. At that time, the licensee may apply to the division for return of the license. If the license has expired, the person may apply for a new license, which shall be issued promptly upon payment of the proper fee and satisfaction of other conditions established by law for obtaining a license unless another suspension or revocation of the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle is in effect.

(f) As used in this section, "highway" and "street" have the meanings provided by K.S.A. 8-1424 and 8-1473, and amendments thereto.

(g) In lieu of suspending the driver's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this state of any person convicted of violating this section, as provided in subsection (d), the judge of the court in which such person was convicted may enter an order which places conditions on such person's privilege of operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state, a certified copy of which such person shall be required to carry any time such person is operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state. Any such order shall prescribe the duration of the conditions imposed, which in no event shall be for a period of more than one year for a second violation.

Upon entering an order restricting a person's license hereunder, the judge shall require such person to surrender such person's driver's license to the judge who shall cause it to be transmitted to the division of vehicles, together with a copy of the order. Upon receipt thereof, the division of vehicles shall issue without charge a driver's license which shall indicate on its face that conditions have been imposed on such person's privilege of operating a motor vehicle and that a certified copy of the order imposing such conditions is required to be carried by the person for whom the license was issued any time such person is operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state. If the person convicted is a nonresident, the judge shall cause a copy of the order to be transmitted to the division and the division shall forward a copy of it to the motor vehicle administrator, of such person's state of residence. Such judge shall furnish to any person whose driver's license has had conditions imposed on it under this section a copy of the order, which shall be recognized as a valid Kansas driver's license until such time as the division shall issue the restricted license provided for in this section.

Upon expiration of the period of time for which conditions are imposed pursuant to this subsection, the licensee may apply to the division for the return of the license previously surrendered by such licensee. In the event such license has expired, such person may apply to the division for a new license, which shall be issued immediately by the division upon payment of the proper fee and satisfaction of the other conditions established by law, unless such person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this state has been suspended or revoked prior thereto. If any person shall violate any of the conditions imposed under this subsection, such person's driver's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this state shall be revoked for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than one year by the judge of the court in which such person is convicted of violating such conditions.

(h) It shall be an affirmative defense to any prosecution under this section that an occupant of the vehicle other than the defendant was in exclusive possession of the alcoholic liquor.

(i) The court shall report to the division every conviction of a violation of this section or of a city ordinance or county resolution that prohibits the acts prohibited by this section. Prior to sentencing under the provisions of this section, the court shall request and shall receive from the division a record of all prior convictions obtained against such person for any violations of any of the motor vehicle laws of this state.

(j) For the purpose of determining whether a conviction is a first, second or subsequent conviction in sentencing under this section:

(1) "Conviction" includes being convicted of a violation of an ordinance of any city, or resolution of any county, which prohibits the acts that this section prohibits;

(2) only convictions occurring in the immediately preceding five years, including prior to the effective date of this act, shall be taken into account, but the court may consider other prior convictions in determining the sentence to be imposed within the limits provided for a first, second or subsequent offender, whichever is applicable; and

(3) it is irrelevant whether an offense occurred before or after conviction for a previous offense.

(k) This section shall not be construed as preventing any city from enacting ordinances, or any county from adopting resolutions, declaring acts prohibited by this section as unlawful or prohibited in such city or county and prescribing penalties for violation thereof, but such ordinance or resolution shall provide for suspension or restriction of driving privileges as provided by this section and the convicting court shall be required to report convictions for violations of such ordinance or resolution as provided by subsection (i).

(l) This section shall be part of and supplemental to the uniform act regulating traffic on highways.

History: L. 1949, ch. 242, § 93; L. 1981, ch. 201, § 1; L. 1993, ch. 259, § 12; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 274; L. 1994, ch. 353, § 15; L. 2006, ch. 206, § 8; July 1.

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 8-1599 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Stevenson, 321 P.3d 754 (Kan. 2014).
cites § 8-1599 7×subsections: (b) 2× (b)(2)(B)cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“, K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8-1599 provides an exception allowing the transportation of an open container behind the last upright seat in a vehicle without a trunk.”
The case’s holding
The odor of alcohol emanating from a vehicle alone does not establish probable cause to search the vehicle for an open container.
Later courts cite it for
“country common sense would likewise lead one to believe that an intoxicated person would be more likely to have an open container in the vehicle from which he or she had been drinking than a sober person who had passed the field sobriety tests.” · 3 citing courts
2
REDState v. Stevenson, 262 P.3d 689 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 8-1599 14×subsections: (b) 6×cited by 2 cases
Reversed by State v. Stevenson (2014): the Supreme Court of Kansas's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 8-1599
“" Depending on the particular vehicle, the container, the container's contents, whether the container is open, and where the container is located in the vehicle determine whether there is a violation of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8-1599. Clearly, the plain language of the statute allows…”
Later courts cite it for
“the very strong odor of alcohol emanating from inside the vehicle, where the sole occupant of the vehicle had been excluded as the source of the odor, constituted probable cause to search the vehicle for open containers of alcohol.” · 1 citing court
3
YELLOWState v. Stevens, 172 P.3d 570 (Kan. 2007).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 66 cases
Overruled by State v. Ahrens on other grounds: 4 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-1567(a)(3), and transporting an open container of alcoholic beverage in violation of K.S.A. 8-1599. The same day, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the breath test.”
The case’s holding
A conviction for driving under the influence is supported by evidence that the defendant was unable to satisfactorily complete field sobriety tests (State v. Stevens).
Later courts cite it for
“was unable to satisfactorily complete the field sobriety tests” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENUnited States v. Howton, 260 F. App'x 813 (6th Cir. 2008).
cites § 8-1599 2×cited by 10 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 8-1599
“l cap, cork or other means of closure has not been removed; (2) (A) in the locked rear trunk or rear compartment, or any locked outside compartment which is not accessible to any person in the vehicle while it is in motion; or (B) if a motor vehicle is not *817 equipped with a…”
Later courts cite it for
“we decline to address the defendant's pro se arguments because the defendant was represented by counsel in this matter.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Bee, 207 P.3d 244 (Kan. 2009).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“65-4152, and one count of driving with an open container in violation of K.S.A. 8-1599. On January 26, 2004, Bee entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine and the State dismissed the four other counts.”
The case’s holding
Where a statute specifically mandates revocation of probation for a drug offender who refuses treatment, that specific provision controls over the general requirement to consider intermediate sanctions before revocation.
Later courts cite it for
“so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Davis, 207 P.3d 281 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-1567, transportation of liquor in open container (open container) under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8-1599, and failing to stop when emerging from alley, building, private road, or driveway (failure to stop) under K.”
7
REDState v. Stevens, 138 P.3d 1262 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 11 cases
Reversed in part by State v. Stevens (2007): the Supreme Court of Kansas's own opinion in this case ("Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.").
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-1567(a)(3) and transporting an open container of alcoholic beverage in violation of K.S.A. 8-1599. The jury convicted Stevens *327 of the operating or attempting to operate a vehicle under the influence of alcohol charge and acquitted him of the open container charge.”
8
GREENState v. Perkins, 290 P.3d 636 (Kan. 2012).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-1567(a), transporting an open container of alcoholic beverage in violation of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8-1599, and driving while suspended (DWS) in violation of K.”
Later courts cite it for
“a dui conviction, like any conviction, can be supported by direct or circumstantial evidence.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Keenan, 325 P.3d 1192 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-1012, and K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-1599, respectively. Motion to Suppress Hearing Keenan filed a motion to suppress the statements, observations, and all evidence that followed the officers’ entry into his house.”
Later courts cite it for
“keenan first encountered madl outside his house, and while the pursuit may not have been the equivalent of an action movie, the united states supreme court has still deemed the short trip from the doorway of a house to the interior to qualify as hot pursuit. 427 u.s. at 42-43 .” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Trostle, 201 P.3d 724 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“40-3104(d); (3) one count of transporting an open container, in violation of K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8-1599; and (4) one count of driving on the left side of the roadway, in violation of K.”
11
GREENState v. Montgomery, 122 P.3d 392 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 8-1599 1×subsections: (b)cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“Transporting an open container K.S.A. 8-1599(b) prohibited Montgomery from transporting the opened containers of alcoholic beverage found in her van following the accident.”
Later courts cite it for
“when a defendant purposefully waives arraignment . . . the waiver is an effective substitute for the arraignment and there is no need for further arraignment proceedings to begin the running of the speedy-trial clock” · 2 citing courts
12
NEUTRALState v. Kornelson, 466 P.3d 892 (Kan. 2020).
cites § 8-1599 1×subsections: (b)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-1017(a)(4) (operating vehicle without required interlock device); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1599(b) (illegal transportation).”
13
NO FLAGState v. George, 564 P.3d 843 (Kan. Ct. App. 2025).
cites § 8-1599 2×subsections: (b)cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 8-1599
“George also argues that K.S.A. 8-1599, the statute regulating open alcohol containers in moving vehicles, only prohibits such conduct on public roads.”
14
NO FLAGState v. Blyth, 464 P.3d 393 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-235, and transporting an open container in violation of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1599. 2 Blyth filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming the deputies did not have a reasonable suspicion that she had committed any traffic violation or crime to justify the traffic stop.”
15
NO FLAGCity of Emporia v. Estrada, 485 P.3d 1206 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-1567[a]), for transporting an open container of alcohol in violation of City Ordinance 25-21 §106(a), (K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-1599[b]), and for driving left of center in violation of City Ordinance 25-21 §42, (K.”
16
NO FLAGState v. McCullough, 485 P.3d 1209 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 8-1599
“40-3104; • misdemeanor transportation of alcoholic beverage in opened containers in a vehicle, in violation of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1599; and 2 • a traffic infraction for failure to obey the instructions of an official traffic control device, in violation of K.”
17
NO FLAGState v. Zeiner, No. 122682 (Kan. Ct. App. June 11, 2021).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 8-1599
“I join my colleagues in accepting the State's concession.”
18
NO FLAGState v. Price, 444 P.3d 1017 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“8-1567, as a second offense misdemeanor, and transporting an open container of alcohol, a misdemeanor violation of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 8-1599. Price, through her lawyer, filed numerous pretrial motions.”
19
NO FLAGUnited States v. Wheaton, 337 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (D. Kan. 2018).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 8-1599
“K.S.A. 8-1599. After returning to the patrol car with the gun, Atkins then returned to Defendant's vehicle to conduct a search of the entire vehicle.”
20
NO FLAGNakia Durham v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. 0650221 (Va. Ct. App. July 25, 2023).
cites § 8-1599 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 8-1599
“284A; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1599 ; Ky. Rev. Stat.”

Show all 24 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
200020132026

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2009. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Kan. Ct. App.14Kan.510th Cir.16th Cir.1D. Kan.1Me.1Va. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(b)5 cases
State v. Stevenson, 321 P.3d 754 (Kan. 2014).“, K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8-1599 provides an exception allowing the transportation of an open container behind the last upright seat in a vehicle without a trunk.”
State v. Stevenson, 262 P.3d 689 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).“" Depending on the particular vehicle, the container, the container's contents, whether the container is open, and where the container is located in the vehicle determine whether there is a violation of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 8-1599. Clearly, the plain language of the statute allows…”
State v. Montgomery, 122 P.3d 392 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005).“Transporting an open container K.S.A. 8-1599(b) prohibited Montgomery from transporting the opened containers of alcoholic beverage found in her van following the accident.”
State v. Kornelson, 466 P.3d 892 (Kan. 2020).“8-1017(a)(4) (operating vehicle without required interlock device); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1599(b) (illegal transportation).”
State v. George, 564 P.3d 843 (Kan. Ct. App. 2025).“George also argues that K.S.A. 8-1599, the statute regulating open alcohol containers in moving vehicles, only prohibits such conduct on public roads.”
(b)(2)(B)1 case
State v. Stevenson, 321 P.3d 754 (Kan. 2014).

Show all 24 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

Kansas Statutes Annotated Home  |  Search Kansas  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com