Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, § 1 (2026)

Labor performed; limitation on lien; filing

✓ text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
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Section 1. A person to whom a debt is due for personal labor performed in the erection, alteration, repair or removal of a building or structure upon land or improvement or alteration to real property, by virtue of an agreement with, or by consent of, the owner of such building or structure, or of a person having authority from or rightfully acting for such owner in procuring or furnishing such labor, shall, under the provisions of this chapter, other than section four, have a lien upon such building or structure and upon such interest in such real property, land, building, structure, or improvement owned by the party authorizing or consenting to said work, for not more than thirty days' work actually performed for the ninety days next prior to his filing a statement as provided in section eight.

A person or his assignee, agent, authorized representative or third party beneficiary, to whom amounts are due or for whose benefit amounts are computed and due for, or on the basis of, the personal labor of such person, may file a lien to secure the payment of such unpaid amounts including interest and agreed penalties for failure to pay the same.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 23 cases, 1959–2012 · leading case: Trs. of the Iron Workers Dist. Council of New England, Pension, Health, & Welfare, Annuity, Vacation, Educ. Funds v. Oxford Sutton Dev., LLC, 24 Mass. L. Rptr. 421 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2008).
Trs. of the Iron Workers Dist. Council of New England, Pension, Health, & Welfare, Annuity, Vacation, Educ. Funds v. Oxford Sutton Dev., LLC, 24 Mass. L. Rptr. 421 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2008). · cites it 18× “50 on Oxford’s property pursuant to G.L.c. 254, §§1 and 8 (Lien). In the Lien document, the Plaintiffs certified that they gave “a just and true account, with all just credits given, of the amount $86,110.”
In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 84 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988). “§ 9-301(2) expresses a strong policy in favor of a secured party who provides the funds for a debtor to purchase the collateral.”
Chestnut-Adams Ltd. P'ship v. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Funds, 612 N.E.2d 236 (Mass. 1993). “G. L. c. 254, § 1. Trustees of non-ERISA funds cannot establish a lien under that chapter.”
Mammoet Usa, Inc. v. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co., 831 N.E.2d 349 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). “We recognize that the term “improvement” is not qualified by the word “other” in G. L. c. 254, § 1, but we have no occasion to address the significance, if any, of *43 this difference between § 1 and § 4 (as well as § 2) in the instant circumstances, except to observe that it…”
Hickey v. Thomas G. Gallagher, Inc. (In re H & a Constr. Co.), 65 B.R. 213 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). “M.G.L. c. 254, § 1 et seq., requiring contractors to pay in full all ma-terialmen or subcontractors from funds they receive from an owner.”
Nat'l Lumber Co. v. Lombardi, 834 N.E.2d 267 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). “The statutory framework, set forth in G. L. c. 254, §§ 1 et seq., specifies the procedures for establishing and enforcing a mechanic’s lien in detail.”
Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2000). “” See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, § 1 (Supp.2000).”
Interstate Elec. Servs. Corp. v. Cummings Props., LLC, 825 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). “(Anderson), and Cummings Properties, LLC (Cummings), appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court enforcing a mechanic’s lien, see G. L. c. 254, §§ 1 et seq., in favor of the plaintiff, Interstate Electrical Services Corporation (Interstate), and from a judge’s order…”
Superior Mech. Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Ins. of the West, 965 N.E.2d 890 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). “Nor has Superior argued that the claim is one for labor, cognizable under G. L. c. 254, § 1. Given that Superior claimed it had never been paid by PinnCon, we questioned whether PinnCon provided the requisite proof of payment of its subcontractors in its application and…”
Waite Hardware Co. v. Ardini & Pfau, Inc., 162 N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 1959). “case, running to suppliers- of labor and material, unless it can be implied from the fact that the usual purpose of a payment bond is to assure the payment of *638 such suppliers, particularly where, in the case of public works, there is a broad area of freedom, for the property…”
Rosano-Davis, Inc. v. Sastre, 2004 Mass. App. Div. 55 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 2004). · cites it 2× “Rosano-Davis perfected no mechanic’s lien as to the project site pursuant to M.G.L.c. 254, §1 et seq. Its complaint asserted two counts: breach of contract, and “implied contract,” or quantum meruit.”
Madigan v. Trace Constr., Inc., 878 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). “Cases under G. L. c. 254, § 1, 8 a section which has contained the term “by consent of the owner” since 1855, see St.”
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