DOG LAW OF 1919
Act 339 of 1919
287.286a Sworn complaint; contents; issuance of summons; hearing; order; penalty for disobedience; costs; audit and payment of claims.
Sec. 26a.
(1) A district court magistrate or the district or common pleas court shall issue a summons similar to the summons provided for in section 20 to show cause why a dog should not be killed, upon a sworn complaint that any of the following exist:
(a) After January 10 and before June 15 in each year a dog over 6 months old is running at large unaccompanied by its owner or is engaged in lawful hunting and is not under the reasonable control of its owner without a license attached to the collar of the dog.
(b) A dog, licensed or unlicensed, has destroyed property or habitually causes damage by trespassing on the property of a person who is not the owner.
(c) A dog, licensed or unlicensed, has attacked or bitten a person.
(d) A dog has shown vicious habits or has molested a person when lawfully on the public highway.
(e) A dog duly licensed and wearing a license tag has run at large contrary to this act.
(2) After a hearing the district court magistrate or the district or common pleas court may either order the dog killed, or confined to the premises of the owner. If the owner disobeys this order the owner may be punished under section 26. Costs as in a civil case shall be taxed against the owner of the dog, and collected by the county. The county board of commissioners shall audit and pay claims for services of officers rendered pursuant to this section, unless the claims are paid by the owner of the dog.
History: Add. 1927, Act 114, Eff. Sept. 5, 1927 ;-- CL 1929, 5271 ;-- CL 1948, 287.286a ;-- Am. 1977, Act 261, Imd. Eff. Dec. 8, 1977
Notes of Decisions
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 22× “She spent the next six hours searching for the dogs. That evening, an area resident, Charles Kendziorski (Kendziorski), went to his barn to tend to his horse.”
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 22× “She spent the next six hours searching for the dogs. That evening, an area resident, Charles Kendziorski (Kendziorski), went to his barn to tend to his horse.”
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 7× “261(2)(a), and are undisputedly “property” for purposes of MCL 287.286a(1)(b). Certainly, the emotional bonds we form with animals would lead most of us to intuitively regard horses as “victims,” notwithstanding their legal status.”
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 7× “261(2)(a), and are undisputedly “property” for purposes of MCL 287.286a(1)(b). Certainly, the emotional bonds we form with animals would lead most of us to intuitively regard horses as “victims,” notwithstanding their legal status.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.286a(1) — 2 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.286a(1)(b) — 4 cases
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“261(2)(a), and are undisputedly “property” for purposes of MCL 287.286a(1)(b). Certainly, the emotional bonds we form with animals would lead most of us to intuitively regard horses as “victims,” notwithstanding their legal status.”
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“261(2)(a), and are undisputedly “property” for purposes of MCL 287.286a(1)(b). Certainly, the emotional bonds we form with animals would lead most of us to intuitively regard horses as “victims,” notwithstanding their legal status.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.286a(1)(d) — 4 cases
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“261(2)(a), and are undisputedly “property” for purposes of MCL 287.286a(1)(b). Certainly, the emotional bonds we form with animals would lead most of us to intuitively regard horses as “victims,” notwithstanding their legal status.”
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“261(2)(a), and are undisputedly “property” for purposes of MCL 287.286a(1)(b). Certainly, the emotional bonds we form with animals would lead most of us to intuitively regard horses as “victims,” notwithstanding their legal status.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.286a(2) — 2 cases
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“261(2)(a), and are undisputedly “property” for purposes of MCL 287.286a(1)(b). Certainly, the emotional bonds we form with animals would lead most of us to intuitively regard horses as “victims,” notwithstanding their legal status.”
People of Michigan v. Amanda Ashleigh-Marie Reed (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“261(2)(a), and are undisputedly “property” for purposes of MCL 287.286a(1)(b). Certainly, the emotional bonds we form with animals would lead most of us to intuitively regard horses as “victims,” notwithstanding their legal status.”
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