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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.140 (2026)

Severability of statute provisions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1951–2025 79citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 79 opinions since 1951, 6 of them in the last five years.

  1.140.  Severability of statute provisions. — The provisions of every statute are severable. If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.

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(1949 S.B. 1001 § 1.14, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

CROSS REFERENCE:

Revisor may omit severability clauses from statutes, 3.030

(1951) If by striking out a void part of the statute, the remainder by reason of its generality will have a broader scope as to subject or territory and its operation would not be in accord with legislative intent, the whole could be made void by the invalidity of such part. Preisler v. Calcaterra, 362 Mo. 662, 243 S.W.2d 62.

(1951) Sections 295.090, 295.180 and 295.200 are severable from the remainder of this law (§§ 295.010 to 295.210) so that the constitutionality of such sections need not be determined in mandamus proceedings to compel payment of compensation of members of state board of mediation. Remainder of law provides a complete, sensible and valid enactment consistent with the state and federal constitutions and federal labor legislation, and therefore capable of being carried into execution as intended by the legislature. State ex rel. State Board of Mediation, 362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75.

(1961) Where severance clause in use tax law stated that the legislature declared that if any exemption from taxation contained in the act was invalid under the constitution it intended to and thereby imposed the same tax on the exempted use as was imposed on the use of other property subject to the tax, held to prevent the act containing invalid exemptions from being wholly unconstitutional. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 52; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. M.E. Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 62.

(1966) The absence of a severability clause is of no significance in a determination of whether an entire statute must fall because of invalidity of a portion of the statute. St. Louis County v. City of Florissant (Mo.), 406 S.W.2d 281.

(1998) License fee provision of ordinance regulating tobacco product sales, adopted without voter approval in violation of Hancock Amendment, was not so essentially and inseparably connected with other substantive provisions in ordinance that ordinance would not accomplish its purpose if license fee was eliminated, therefore the fee provision was severable, and savings clause indicated legislative intent to retain any provisions not violative of the constitution. Avanti Petroleum, Inc. v. St. Louis County, 974 S.W.2d 506 (Mo.App. E.D.)

The 20 cases that cite Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.140 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCity of St. Peters v. Bonnie A. Roeder, 466 S.W.3d 538 (Mo. 2015).
cites § 1.140 28×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have…”
Later courts cite it for
“when the ordinance conflicts with a statute, the ordinance is void.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENWeinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006).
cites § 1.140 18×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“The controlling authority, section 1.140, RSMo, states as follows: The provisions of every statute are severable.”
The case’s holding
A photo identification requirement for voting must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest because the right to vote is a fundamental right.
Later courts cite it for
“identification such as a united states passport or birth certificate” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENKilmer v. Hui Chan Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545 (Mo. 2000).
cites § 1.140 30×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“The severability issue is governed by section 1.140, RSMo 1994, which states: The provisions of every statute are severable.”
The case’s holding
A statute requiring a criminal conviction as a prerequisite to a civil dram shop claim violates the open courts provision by creating an arbitrary barrier to judicial redress.
Later courts cite it for
“proximate cause is commonly defined by the courts as that cause that, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced the result complained of, and without which the result would not have occurred.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. 2013).
cites § 1.140 15×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“When analyzing severability, this Court’s “first point of reference” is section 1.140, RSMo. Associated Indus. of Missouri v.”
The case’s holding
The Eighth Amendment requires a sentencer to consider the individual age and maturity of a juvenile offender before imposing a sentence of life without parole.
Later courts cite it for
“has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence during a criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion.” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENJason D. Dodson v. Robert P. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542 (Mo. 2016).
cites § 1.140 6×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent…”
The case’s holding
A statutory cap on noneconomic damages is constitutional when applied to wrongful death claims because these statutory causes of action did not exist at common law when the constitution was adopted.
Later courts cite it for
“are not generally recoverable in negligence actions because negligence, a mere omission of the duty to exercise care, is the antithesis of willful or intentional conduct.” · 5 citing courts
6
GREENTrout v. State, 231 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. 2007).
cites § 1.140 16×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“Section 1.140 sets out the rules for severability, which begin with the presumption that provisions of a bill that are invalidated shall be severed from the remainder of the bill.”
Later courts cite it for
“standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 1.140 14×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“I write separately, however, because the majority addresses other issues, particularly severability under section 1.140, RSMo, that are unnecessary for resolution at this point in the proceedings and that were not raised, briefed, or argued by the parties.”
8
GREENMissouri Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348 (Mo. 2013).
cites § 1.140 13×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“The statutory severability provision, section 1.140, RSMo Supp.2011, applies when a provision is unconstitutional in substance.”
Later courts cite it for
“the test for whether a bill violates the single subject rule is whether the bill's provisions fairly relate to, have a natural connection with, or are a means to accomplish the subject of the bill as expressed in the title.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENHammerschmidt v. Boone Cnty., 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1994).
cites § 1.140 10×cited by 67 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“Section 1.140, RSMo 1986. Where, as here, the procedure by which the legislature enacted a bill violates the Constitution, severance is a more difficult issue.”
The case’s holding
A subject includes all matters that reasonably relate to the general core purpose of the proposed legislation.
Later courts cite it for
“a 'subject' within the meaning of article iii, section 23, includes all matters that fall within or reasonably relate to the general core purpose of the proposed legislation.” · 8 citing courts
10
REDSimpson v. Kilcher, 749 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1988).
cites § 1.140 6×cited by 42 cases
Overruled by Kilmer v. Hui Chan Mun on other grounds: 1 citing opinion limits it to other grounds and 1 says overruled outright.
Where it cites § 1.140
“Section 1.140, RSMo 1986, provides: "The provisions of every statute are severable .”
The case’s holding
A criminal conviction required by statute to establish a cause of action does not unconstitutionally impair judicial analysis or obstruct the courts.
Later courts cite it for
“impair judicial analysis' because no analysis is necessary.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENRizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. 2006).
cites § 1.140 6×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“” Further, section 1.140, RSMo 2000, states that if a provision of a statute is found unconstitutional, the remaining provisions are valid unless they are “so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the…”
Later courts cite it for
“relating to political subdivisions.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENPlanned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732 (Mo. 2007).
cites § 1.140 5×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“Further, Missouri’s statute on construction of statutes states that an entire statute should not be invalidated: unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot…”
Later courts cite it for
“its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENCity of Normandy v. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d 183 (Mo. 2017).
cites § 1.140 6×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“Pursuant to this Court’s authority under section 1.140, RSMo 2000, section 479.359.”
Later courts cite it for
“by presenting no evidence of substantial justification for the presumed special laws, the state failed to overcome the presumption of constitutional invalidity.” · 1 citing court
14
GREENLegends Bank v. State, 361 S.W.3d 383 (Mo. 2012).
cites § 1.140 6×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“Section 1.140, RSMo 2000, does not support the doctrine of severability of bills enacted in violation of the procedural mandates of article III, sections 21 and 23.”
Later courts cite it for
“contracts for purchasing, printing, and services for statewide elected officials,” · 3 citing courts
cites § 1.140 4×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“It provides: If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so…”
The case’s holding
Courts may review the single-subject compliance of an initiative petition prior to an election by determining if all provisions relate to a readily identifiable and reasonably narrow central purpose.
Later courts cite it for
“our single function is to ask whether the constitutional requirements and limits of power, as expressed in the provisions relating to the procedure and form of initiative petitions, have been regarded.” · 10 citing courts
16
GREENAssociated Indus. of Missouri v. Dir. of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1996).
cites § 1.140 6×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“On the merits, our first point of reference is the severability statute, § 1.140, RSMo 1994, which states: The provisions of eveiy statute are sev-erable.”
The case’s holding
A statute invalid as applied to some taxpayers is severed only if the legislature would have enacted the remaining restricted form; otherwise the entire statute falls.
Later courts cite it for
“a general mandate and was not explicitly limited to a determination of available remedies.” · 1 citing court
17
GREENState ex rel. Missouri High. & Transp. Comm'n v. Appelquist, 698 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 1.140 6×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent…”
18
GREENBd. of Educ of City of St. Louis v. State, 47 S.W.3d 366 (Mo. 2001).
cites § 1.140 4×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“The circuit court properly followed the mandate of the severance statute, section 1.140, when it struck the offending subsections of section 162.”
Later courts cite it for
“a statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be invalidated unless it 'clearly and undoubtedly' violates some constitutional provision and 'palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution.” · 9 citing courts
19
GREENGramex Corp. v. Von Romer, 603 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1980).
cites § 1.140 8×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“Section 1.140, RSMo 1978 states: “Severability of statute provisions.”
Later courts cite it for
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 1.140 6×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 1.140
“This remedy, at least in this case, is contrary to the mandate of the severance statute, section 1.140, RSMo, that "all statutes .”
Later courts cite it for
“relating to solid waste management,” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
195019872025

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 6 cases in 1996–1997. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Mo.58E.D. Mo.7Mo. Ct. App.68th Cir.4W.D. Mo.4
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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