144.110
Restriction on parole of persons sentenced to minimum terms. (1) In any felony case, the court
may impose a minimum term of imprisonment of up to one-half of the sentence it
imposes.
(2)
Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 144.120 and 144.780:
(a) The State
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision shall not release a prisoner on
parole who has been sentenced under subsection (1) of this section until the
minimum term has been served, except upon affirmative vote of a majority of
three board members or, if the chairperson requires all voting members to
participate, a majority of all voting members.
(b) The board
shall not release a prisoner on parole:
(A) Who has been
convicted of murder defined as aggravated murder under the provisions of ORS
163.095, except as provided in ORS 163.105;
(B) Who has been
convicted of murder in the first degree under the provisions of ORS 163.107,
except as provided in ORS 163.107 (3) or 163.155 (6) to (8); or
(C) Who has been
convicted of murder in the second degree under the provisions of ORS 163.115,
except as provided in ORS 163.115 (5)(c) to (f) or 163.155 (6) to (8). [1977
c.372 §4; 1991 c.126 §5; 1999 c.782 §1; 2001 c.104 §47; 2007 c.717 §3; 2015
c.820 §43; 2019 c.635 §14]
Note: Section 28, chapter 790, Oregon
Laws 1989, provides:
Sec. 28. The provisions of ORS 144.110,
144.120, 144.122, 144.125, 144.130, 144.135, 144.185, 144.223, 144.245 and
144.270 apply only to offenders convicted of a crime committed prior to
November 1, 1989, and to offenders convicted of aggravated murder or murder
regardless of the date of the crime. [1989 c.790 §28; 1999 c.782 §2]
Notes of Decisions
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 260 P.3d 448 (Or. 2011).
· cites it 120× “" Engweiler had argued that that statute irreconcilably conflicted with the application of ORS 144.110 and ORS 163.105 to juvenile aggravated murderers, because the assumption underlying the latter two statutesthat an aggravated murderer will be sentenced to no less than a…”
Anderson v. Bd. of Parole, 740 P.2d 760 (Or. 1987).
· cites it 40× “135 provides: "The board shall state in writing the detailed bases of its decisions under ORS 144.110 to 144.125." [1] *762 Petitioner also claims that the challenged order of the Board "fails to meet the standards established by the Attorney General's Model Rules of Procedure…”
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Powers, 221 P.3d 818 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 24× “We reject relator’s argument that the board may not rely on ORS 144.110 (1989). B. The scope of ORS 144.”
Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 335 P.3d 828 (Or. 2014).
· cites it 8× “That board decision was governed by ORS 144.110, which provided: “(1) In any felony case, the court may impose a minimum term of imprisonment of up to one-half of the sentence it imposes.”
Janowski v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 245 P.3d 1270 (Or. 2010).
· cites it 9× “ORS 144.110, which deals with restrictions on paroling persons who have been sentenced to minimum terms, provides the most relevant context for our analysis, because it cross-references ORS 163.”
State v. Warner, 630 P.2d 385 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 18× “610 and ORS 144.110 respectively, to run concurrently with the 20 year robbery sentence.”
Moen v. Peterson, 824 P.2d 404 (Or. 1991).
· cites it 10× “Petitioner’s trial counsel did not inform petitioner of the possibility of a minimum sentence under ORS 144.110; “3. Petitioner was aware prior to entry of his no contest plea of the possibility of a minimum sentence under ORS 144.”
State v. Turner, 676 P.2d 873 (Or. 1984).
· cites it 10× “Defendant was further ordered to serve a minimum 10-year term of imprisonment pursuant to ORS 144.110. For the kidnapping in the first degree conviction, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed 20 years with a mandatory 10-year minimum term (ORS…”
State v. MacY, 671 P.2d 92 (Or. 1983).
· cites it 10× “Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 10-year mandatory minimum on one count imposed under ORS 144.110(1). On appeal, he contended (1) the trial court had no authority to impose a mandatory minimum under ORS 114.”
Engweiler v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 175 P.3d 408 (Or. 2007).
· cites it 6× “2 Pursuant to ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1983), the Board of Parole (the board) 3 was prohibited from releasing on parole any person convicted of aggravated murder, *539 except as provided in the statute providing those minimum terms.”
State v. Reams, 636 P.2d 913 (Or. 1981).
· cites it 8× “" [9] In Segner the Court of Appeals noted that: "ORS 144.110(1) provides that: "`In any felony case, the court may impose a minimum term of imprisonment of up to one-half of the sentence it imposes.”
State v. Walker, 683 P.2d 1006 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 20× “610(4) does not authorize a period of minimum sentencing which extends beyond the limit expressly provided in ORS 144.110, when minimum sentences are imposed under both these statutes.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(1) — 66 cases
State v. MacY, 671 P.2d 92 (Or. 1983).
“Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 10-year mandatory minimum on one count imposed under ORS 144.110(1). On appeal, he contended (1) the trial court had no authority to impose a mandatory minimum under ORS 114.”
State v. Reams, 636 P.2d 913 (Or. 1981).
“" [9] In Segner the Court of Appeals noted that: "ORS 144.110(1) provides that: "`In any felony case, the court may impose a minimum term of imprisonment of up to one-half of the sentence it imposes.”
State v. Turner, 676 P.2d 873 (Or. 1984).
“Defendant was further ordered to serve a minimum 10-year term of imprisonment pursuant to ORS 144.110. For the kidnapping in the first degree conviction, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed 20 years with a mandatory 10-year minimum term (ORS…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(1)(a) — 1 case
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 260 P.3d 448 (Or. 2011).
“" Engweiler had argued that that statute irreconcilably conflicted with the application of ORS 144.110 and ORS 163.105 to juvenile aggravated murderers, because the assumption underlying the latter two statutesthat an aggravated murderer will be sentenced to no less than a…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(2) — 13 cases
Anderson v. Bd. of Parole, 740 P.2d 760 (Or. 1987).
“135 provides: "The board shall state in writing the detailed bases of its decisions under ORS 144.110 to 144.125." [1] *762 Petitioner also claims that the challenged order of the Board "fails to meet the standards established by the Attorney General's Model Rules of Procedure…”
Janowski v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 245 P.3d 1270 (Or. 2010).
“ORS 144.110, which deals with restrictions on paroling persons who have been sentenced to minimum terms, provides the most relevant context for our analysis, because it cross-references ORS 163.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(2)(a) — 20 cases
Anderson v. Bd. of Parole, 740 P.2d 760 (Or. 1987).
“135 provides: "The board shall state in writing the detailed bases of its decisions under ORS 144.110 to 144.125." [1] *762 Petitioner also claims that the challenged order of the Board "fails to meet the standards established by the Attorney General's Model Rules of Procedure…”
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 260 P.3d 448 (Or. 2011).
“" Engweiler had argued that that statute irreconcilably conflicted with the application of ORS 144.110 and ORS 163.105 to juvenile aggravated murderers, because the assumption underlying the latter two statutesthat an aggravated murderer will be sentenced to no less than a…”
Janowski v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 245 P.3d 1270 (Or. 2010).
“ORS 144.110, which deals with restrictions on paroling persons who have been sentenced to minimum terms, provides the most relevant context for our analysis, because it cross-references ORS 163.”
Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 335 P.3d 828 (Or. 2014).
“That board decision was governed by ORS 144.110, which provided: “(1) In any felony case, the court may impose a minimum term of imprisonment of up to one-half of the sentence it imposes.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(2)(b) — 13 cases
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 260 P.3d 448 (Or. 2011).
“" Engweiler had argued that that statute irreconcilably conflicted with the application of ORS 144.110 and ORS 163.105 to juvenile aggravated murderers, because the assumption underlying the latter two statutesthat an aggravated murderer will be sentenced to no less than a…”
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Powers, 221 P.3d 818 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
“We reject relator’s argument that the board may not rely on ORS 144.110 (1989). B. The scope of ORS 144.”
Engweiler v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 175 P.3d 408 (Or. 2007).
“2 Pursuant to ORS 144.110(2)(b) (1983), the Board of Parole (the board) 3 was prohibited from releasing on parole any person convicted of aggravated murder, *539 except as provided in the statute providing those minimum terms.”
Janowski v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 245 P.3d 1270 (Or. 2010).
“ORS 144.110, which deals with restrictions on paroling persons who have been sentenced to minimum terms, provides the most relevant context for our analysis, because it cross-references ORS 163.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(2)(b)(A) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(2)(e) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(b)(A) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.110(l)(b) — 1 case
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Powers, 221 P.3d 818 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
“We reject relator’s argument that the board may not rely on ORS 144.110 (1989). B. The scope of ORS 144.”
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