Sec. 109.001. TEMPORARY ORDERS DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL. (a) In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, on the motion of any party or on the court's own motion and after notice and hearing, the court may make any order necessary to preserve and protect the safety and welfare of the child during the pendency of an appeal as the court may deem necessary and equitable. In addition to other matters, an order may:
(1) appoint temporary conservators for the child and provide for possession of the child;
(2) require the temporary support of the child by a party;
(3) enjoin a party from molesting or disturbing the peace of the child or another party;
(4) prohibit a person from removing the child beyond a geographical area identified by the court;
(5) require payment of reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses; or
(6) suspend the operation of the order or judgment that is being appealed.
(b) A temporary order under this section enjoining a party from molesting or disturbing the peace of the child or another party:
(1) may be rendered without:
(A) the issuance of a bond between the parties; or
(B) an affidavit or a verified pleading stating specific facts showing that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result; and
(2) is not required to:
(A) define the injury or state why the injury is irreparable; or
(B) include an order setting the suit for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought.
(b-1) A motion seeking an original temporary order under this section:
(1) may be filed before trial; and
(2) may not be filed by a party after the date by which that party is required to file the party's notice of appeal under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(b-2) The trial court retains jurisdiction to conduct a hearing and sign a temporary order under this section until the 60th day after the date any eligible party has filed a notice of appeal from final judgment under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(b-3) The trial court retains jurisdiction to modify and enforce a temporary order under this section unless the appellate court, on a proper showing, supersedes the court's order.
(b-4) On the motion of a party or on the court's own motion, after notice and hearing, the trial court may modify a previous temporary order rendered under this section if:
(1) the circumstances of a party have materially and substantially changed since the rendition of the previous order; and
(2) modification is equitable and necessary for the safety and welfare of the child.
(b-5) A party may seek review of the trial court's temporary order under this section by:
(1) petition for writ of mandamus; or
(2) proper assignment in the party's brief.
(c) A temporary order rendered under this section is not subject to interlocutory appeal.
(d) The court may not suspend under Subsection (a)(6) the operation of an order or judgment terminating the parent-child relationship in a suit brought by the state or a political subdivision of the state permitted by law to bring the suit.
(e) The remedies provided in this section are cumulative of all other remedies allowed by law.
Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, Sec. 1, eff. April 20, 1995. Amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 539, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.
Amended by:
Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 421 (S.B. 1237), Sec. 4, eff. September 1, 2017.
Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., Ch. 732 (H.B. 554), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2019.
Acts 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 593 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 22, eff. September 1, 2025.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
68
cases (
18 in the last 5 years), 1996–2026 · leading case:
Marcus v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
Marcus v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
· cites it 8× “Appellate Attorney’s Fees In his second issue in the appeal, Marcus asserts the trial court abused its discretion by awarding appellate attorney’s fees because the order does not comply with Texas Family Code section 109.001 and is not conditioned on a successful appeal.”
In re Moore, 511 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016).
· cites it 6× “Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001 (c). We construe this to mean only that an accelerated appeal of a temporary order, separate from the appeal from the final judgment, is statutorily prohibited.”
London v. London, 192 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006).
· cites it 4× “She contends Jeff never properly requested suspension of the child support obligation while the case was pending in the court of appeals under Texas Family Code sections 109.001 or 109.”
BREJON v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
· cites it 3× “See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001 (Vernon 2008) (providing authority and procedure for temporary orders “to preserve and protect the safety and welfare of the child during the pendency of the appeal”).”
Smith v. Smith, 63 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002).
· cites it 4× “" Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001(a) (Vernon 1996 & Supp.”
In re Norris, 371 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012).
· cites it 4× “See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001 (West 2008).”
Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997).
· cites it 2× “Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001 (Vernon 1996).”
In re Merriam, 228 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007).
· cites it 2× “709 with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001(c) (Vernon 2002) and Tex.”
In re Rico Daniel Reardon, 514 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017).
“Laws 113 , 136-37 (current version at Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001 ). 3 . See Act of May 24, 1973, 64th Leg.”
In re Garza, 153 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001(c) (temporary orders for the protection of the children pending appeal may not be appealed); In re Boyd, 34 S.”
In the Interest of Gonzalez, 981 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998).
· cites it 3× “Tex. Fam.Code ANN. § 109.001 (Vernon 1996) (emphasis added).”
In re Roxsane R., 249 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008).
“, Tex Fam.Code Ann. §§ 109.001, 1S3.001-.002 (Vernon 2002).”
Tex. Fam. Code § 109.001(a): 17 cases
Smith v. Smith, 63 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002).
“" Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001(a) (Vernon 1996 & Supp.”
In re Norris, 371 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012).
“See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001 (West 2008).”
In re Moore, 511 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016).
“Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001 (c). We construe this to mean only that an accelerated appeal of a temporary order, separate from the appeal from the final judgment, is statutorily prohibited.”
Marcus v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
“Appellate Attorney’s Fees In his second issue in the appeal, Marcus asserts the trial court abused its discretion by awarding appellate attorney’s fees because the order does not comply with Texas Family Code section 109.001 and is not conditioned on a successful appeal.”
Tex. Fam. Code § 109.001(a)(2): 1 case
Tex. Fam. Code § 109.001(a)(5): 16 cases
In re Moore, 511 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016).
“Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001 (c). We construe this to mean only that an accelerated appeal of a temporary order, separate from the appeal from the final judgment, is statutorily prohibited.”
Marcus v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
“Appellate Attorney’s Fees In his second issue in the appeal, Marcus asserts the trial court abused its discretion by awarding appellate attorney’s fees because the order does not comply with Texas Family Code section 109.001 and is not conditioned on a successful appeal.”
BREJON v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001 (Vernon 2008) (providing authority and procedure for temporary orders “to preserve and protect the safety and welfare of the child during the pendency of the appeal”).”
Tex. Fam. Code § 109.001(a)(6): 1 case
London v. London, 192 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006).
“She contends Jeff never properly requested suspension of the child support obligation while the case was pending in the court of appeals under Texas Family Code sections 109.001 or 109.”
Tex. Fam. Code § 109.001(b): 3 cases
Marcus v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
“Appellate Attorney’s Fees In his second issue in the appeal, Marcus asserts the trial court abused its discretion by awarding appellate attorney’s fees because the order does not comply with Texas Family Code section 109.001 and is not conditioned on a successful appeal.”
In the Interest of Gonzalez, 981 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998).
“Tex. Fam.Code ANN. § 109.001 (Vernon 1996) (emphasis added).”
Tex. Fam. Code § 109.001(b)(2): 1 case
Tex. Fam. Code § 109.001(c): 11 cases
In re Merriam, 228 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007).
“709 with Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001(c) (Vernon 2002) and Tex.”
In re Garza, 153 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001(c) (temporary orders for the protection of the children pending appeal may not be appealed); In re Boyd, 34 S.”
In re Moore, 511 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016).
“Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001 (c). We construe this to mean only that an accelerated appeal of a temporary order, separate from the appeal from the final judgment, is statutorily prohibited.”
BREJON v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
“See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 109.001 (Vernon 2008) (providing authority and procedure for temporary orders “to preserve and protect the safety and welfare of the child during the pendency of the appeal”).”
Marcus v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009).
“Appellate Attorney’s Fees In his second issue in the appeal, Marcus asserts the trial court abused its discretion by awarding appellate attorney’s fees because the order does not comply with Texas Family Code section 109.001 and is not conditioned on a successful appeal.”
Tex. Fam. Code § 109.001(e): 1 case
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