11 U.S.C. § 943
Confirmation
Section 943(a) of the House amendment makes clear that a special taxpayer may object to confirmation of a plan. Section 943(b) of the House amendment is derived from section 943 of the House bill respecting confirmation of a plan under chapter 9. It must be emphasized that these standards of confirmation are in addition to standards in section 1129 that are made applicable to chapter 9 by section 901 of the House amendment. In particular, if the requirements of sections 1129(a)(8) are not complied with, then the proponent may request application of section 1129(b). The court will then be required to confirm the plan if it complies with the “fair and equitable” test and is in the best interests of creditors. The best interests of creditors test does not mean liquidation value as under chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act [chapter 11 of former title 11]. In making such a determination, it is expected that the court will be guided by standards set forth in Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U.S. 415 (1943) [Fla.1943, 63 S.Ct. 1141, 87 L.Ed. 1485, rehearing denied 63 S.Ct. 1444, 320 U.S. 214, 87 L.Ed. 1851, motion denied 64 S.Ct 783, 321 U.S. 754, 88 L.Ed. 1054] and Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940), as under present law, the bankruptcy court should make findings as detailed as possible to support a conclusion that this test has been met. However, it must be emphasized that unlike current law, the fair and equitable test under section 1129(b) will not apply if section 1129(a)(8) has been satisfied in addition to the other confirmation standards specified in section 943 and incorporated by reference in section 901 of the House amendment. To the extent that American United Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940) [Fla.1940, 61 S.Ct. 157, 85 L.Ed. 91, 136 A.L.R. 860, rehearing denied 61 S.Ct. 395, 311 U.S. 730, 85 L.Ed. 475] and other cases are to the contrary, such cases are overruled to that extent.
Section 946 [enacted as section 943] is adopted from current section 94 [section 414 of former title 11]. The test for confirmation is whether or not the plan is fair and equitable and feasible. The fair and equitable test tracts current chapter X [chapter 10 of former title 11] and is known as the strict priority rule. Creditors must be provided, under the plan, the going concern value of their claims. The going concern value contemplates a “comparison of revenues and expenditures taking into account the taxing power and the extent to which tax increases are both necessary and feasible” Municipal Insolvency, supra, at p. 64, and is intended to provide more of a return to creditors than the liquidation value if the city’s assets could be liquidated like those of a private corporation.
In addition to the confirmation requirements incorporated from section 1129 by section 901, this section specifies additional requirements. Paragraph (1) requires compliance with the provisions of the title made applicable in chapter 9 cases. This provision follows section 94(b)(2) [section 414(b)(2) of former title 11]. Paragraph (2) requires compliance with the provisions of chapter 9, as does section 94(b)(2). Paragraph (3) adopts section 94(b)(4), requiring disclosure and reasonableness of all payments to be made in connection with the plan or the case. Paragraph (4), copied from section 92(b)(6) [probably should be “94(b)(6)” which was section 414(b)(6) of former title 11], requires that the debtor not be prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan. Paragraph (5) departs from current law by requiring that administrative expenses be paid in full, but not necessarily in cash. Finally, paragraph (6) requires that the plan be in the best interest of creditors and feasible. The best interest test was deleted in section 94(b)(1) of current chapter IX from previous chapter IX [chapter 9 of former title 11] because it was redundant with the fair and equitable rule. However, this bill proposes a new confirmation standard generally for reorganization, one element of which is the best interest of creditors test; see section 1129(a)(7). In that section, the test is phrased in terms of liquidation of the debtor. Because that is not possible in a municipal case, the test here is phrased in its more traditional form, using the words of art “best interest of creditors.” The best interest of creditors test here is in addition to the financial standards imposed on the plan by sections 1129(a)(8) and 1129(b), just as those provisions are in addition to the comparable best interest test in chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(7). The feasibility requirement, added in the revision of chapter IX last year, is retained.
Section 103(e) of this title, referred to in subsec. (b)(1), was redesignated section 103(f) and a new section 103(e) was added by Pub. L. 106–554, § 1(a)(5) [title I, § 112(c)(5)(A)],
2005—Subsec. (b)(5). Pub. L. 109–8 substituted “507(a)(2)” for “507(a)(1)”.
1988—Subsec. (b)(6), (7). Pub. L. 100–597 added par. (6) and redesignated former par. (6) as (7).
1984—Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 98–353, § 497(1), struck out “to be taken” after “necessary”.
Subsec. (b)(5). Pub. L. 98–353, § 497(2), substituted provisions requiring the plan to provide payment of cash in an amount equal to the allowed amount of a claim except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to different treatment of such claim, for provisions which required the plan to provide for payment of property of a value equal to the allowed amount of such claim except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has waived such payment on such claim.
Amendment by Pub. L. 109–8 effective 180 days after
Amendment by Pub. L. 100–597 effective
Amendment by Pub. L. 98–353 effective with respect to cases filed 90 days after