29 U.S.C. § 254

Relief from liability and punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Walsh-Healey Act, and the Bacon-Davis Act for failure to pay minimum wage or overtime compensation

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(a) Activities not compensableExcept as provided in subsection (b), no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,11 See References in Text note below. on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of any of the following activities of such employee engaged in on or after May 14, 1947—(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities,which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. For purposes of this subsection, the use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer’s business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee.(b) Compensability by contract or customNotwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) which relieve an employer from liability and punishment with respect to any activity, the employer shall not be so relieved if such activity is compensable by either—(1) an express provision of a written or nonwritten contract in effect, at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer; or(2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such activity, at the establishment or other place where such employee is employed, covering such activity, not inconsistent with a written or nonwritten contract, in effect at the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer.(c) Restriction on activities compensable under contract or custom

For the purposes of subsection (b), an activity shall be considered as compensable under such contract provision or such custom or practice only when it is engaged in during the portion of the day with respect to which it is so made compensable.

(d) Determination of time employed with respect to activities

In the application of the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], of the Walsh-Healey Act, or of the Bacon-Davis Act,¹ in determining the time for which an employer employs an employee with respect to walking, riding, traveling, or other preliminary or postliminary activities described in subsection (a) of this section, there shall be counted all that time, but only that time, during which the employee engages in any such activity which is compensable within the meaning of subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 4, 61 Stat. 86; Pub. L. 104–188, [title II], § 2102, Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat. 1928.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (d), is act June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§ 201 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 201 of this title and Tables.

The Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (d), are defined for purposes of this chapter in section 262 of this title.

Amendments

1996—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–188 in closing provisions inserted at end “For purposes of this subsection, the use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer’s business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee.”

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1996 Amendment

Pub. L. 104–188, [title II], § 2103, Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat. 1928, provided that: “The amendment made by section 2101 [probably means section 2102 of Pub. L. 104–188, amending this section] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 20, 1996] and shall apply in determining the application of section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 [this section] to an employee in any civil action brought before such date of enactment but pending on such date.”

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 546 cases (173 in the last 5 years), 1948–2026 · leading case: Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).

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Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981). · cites it 14× “86 , 29 U. S. C. § 254 , which provides: "(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, .”

Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc., 596 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010). · cites it 16× “Even assuming that Rutti might have been entitled to compensation for his commute under the April 3, 1995 letter at the time it was written, his claim to compensation does not survive the passage of the Employee Commuter Flexibility Act ("ECFA"), 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a)(2). The…”

Richard Chambers v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 428 F. App'x 400 (5th Cir. 2011). · cites it 14× “; 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a). Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers are not liable under the FLSA for failing to compensate employees for: (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is…”

Pietrzycki v. Heights Tower Serv., Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 822 (E.D. Ill. 2017). · cites it 13× “Plaintiffs contend that, under an amendment to the FLSA called the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (the "PPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 254 , this custom, practice, or contract is sufficient to make all Drive Time into hours worked.”

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003). · cites it 5× “29 U.S.C. § 254 (a) (1999). Not all “preliminary or postliminary” activities can go uncompensated, however.”

United Transp. Union Local 1745 v. City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 1999). · cites it 12× “” 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a). By contrast, travel that is “part of [an employee’s] principal activity” is compensable hours worked.”

Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2007). · cites it 4× “Section 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a), exempts certain activities from compensation under the FLSA, 29 U.”

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). · cites it 3× “86 -87 (codified at 29 U. S. C. § 254 (a)). Other than its express exceptions for travel to and from the location of the employee’s “principal activity,” and for activities that are preliminary or postliminary to that principal activity, the Portal-to-Portal Act does not purport…”

Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014). · cites it 5× “86 -87 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a)). At issue here is the exemption for "activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities.”

Adams v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 217 (Fed. Cl. 2005). · cites it 10× “Portal-to-Portal Act Provisions and Their Interpretation The relevant Portal-to-Portal Act provisions are set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 254 and except the following activities from FLSA liability because they are noncompensable: (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the…”

Amaya v. DGS Constr., 278 A.3d 1216 (Md. 2022). · cites it 7× “Specifically, Court concluded that 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a) of PPA—which provides, among other things, that time spent traveling to actual place of performance of principal activity or activities which employee is employed to perform is not compensable—has not been implicitly adopted…”

Dooley v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 307 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2004). · cites it 9× “With respect to the plaintiffs’ second argument, I rule, below, that the plaintiffs’ travel to the first appraisal site, and from the last appraisal site, is not a principal activity within the meaning of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254 , and is therefore not…”

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— 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) — 8 cases

Amos v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 442 (Ct. Cl. 1987).

James P. Mitchell, Sec'y of Labor, United States Dep't of Labor v. Se. Carbon Paper Co., Inc., 228 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1955).

Segura v. J.W. Drilling, Inc., 2015 NMCA 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).

Segura v. J.W. Drilling, Inc., 2015 NMCA 085 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).

Lichy v. CenterLine Commc'ns LLC (D. Mass. 2018).

— 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) — 1 case

Bobo v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 690 (Fed. Cl. 1997).

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