U.S. Code » Title 29 » Chapter CHAPTER 9— PORTAL-TO-PORTAL PAY

29 U.S.C. § 256

Determination of commencement of future actions

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In determining when an action is commenced for the purposes of section 255 of this title, an action commenced on or after May 14, 1947 under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act,11 See References in Text note below. shall be considered to be commenced on the date when the complaint is filed; except that in the case of a collective or class action instituted under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, or the Bacon-Davis Act,1 it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant—(a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to become a party plaintiff is filed on such date in the court in which the action is brought; or(b) if such written consent was not so filed or if his name did not so appear—on the subsequent date on which such written consent is filed in the court in which the action was commenced.(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 7, 61 Stat. 88.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, referred to in text, is act June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§ 201 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 201 of this title and Tables.

The Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts, referred to in text, are defined for purposes of this chapter in section 262 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 469 cases (202 in the last 5 years), 1947–2026 · leading case: Daniel Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Daniel Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018). · cites it 4× “29 U.S.C. § 256 . From that point on, there is no statutory distinction between the roles or nomenclature assigned to the original and opt-in plaintiffs.”
Knox v. John Varvatos Enters. Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 644 (S.D. Ill. 2017). · cites it 4× “JV contends that conditional approval is inappropriate because Knox did not file a "written consent to become a party plaintiff" as is seemingly required by the text of 29 U.S.C. § 256 . See Def. Mem. at 2. Although this consent may be relevant for statute of limitations…”
Linda Stone v. Troy Constr. LLC, 935 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “]" 29 U.S.C. § 256 . It is an oddity that a plaintiff who files a complaint in her own name, unless she files a separate written consent, is not treated as consenting to join the very lawsuit she initiated.”
James Frye v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., Inc, 495 F. App'x 669 (6th Cir. 2012). · cites it 3× “29 U.S.C. § 256 . Here, the parties agree that Frye received his last paycheck from Baptist Memorial on April 27, 2007, but he failed to file a written consent to collective action.”
Contrera v. Langer, 290 F. Supp. 3d 269 (S.D. Ill. 2018). · cites it 5× “The provision at issue, 29 U.S.C. § 256 , states that an action is deemed commenced under the FLSA (a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if [a plaintiff] is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to become a party plaintiff is…”
Thompson v. Linda & A., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D.D.C. 2011). · cites it 3× “2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 256 , 255(a)). Under the FLSA statute of limitations, a plaintiff must sue within two years of when the action accrued or, in the case of a willful violation, within three years.”
Soler v. G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). · cites it 4× “29 U.S.C. § 256 (a); see Brown v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co.”
Lee v. Metrocare Servs., 980 F. Supp. 2d 754 (N.D. Tex. 2013). · cites it 4× “24-26; see also 29 U.S.C. § 256 . 10 The statute of limitations concerns the commencement of the action.”
Lauren Houston v. Country Club, Inc., 887 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018). “See 29 U.S.C. § 256 (b) ("[A]n action commenced .”
Betts v. Cent. Ohio Gaming Ventures, LLC, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (S.D. Ohio 2019). · cites it 2× “29 U.S.C. § 256 . Rather, the statute of limitations continues to run on each individual claim until each opt-in plaintiff files his or her consent to join the action.”
Roble v. Celestica Corp., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (D. Minn. 2007). · cites it 2× “29 U.S.C. § 256 (b); Redman v. U.S. West Business Resources, Inc.”
Valerio v. RNC Indus., LLC, 314 F.R.D. 61 (E.D.N.Y 2016). “See 29 U.S.C. § 256 ; Ritz v. Mike Rory Corp.”
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29 U.S.C. § 256(b): 3 cases
Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
Lee v. Vance Exec. Prot., Inc., 7 F. App'x 160 (4th Cir. 2001).
King v. Fedcap Rehab. Servs., Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2022).
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