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Va. CodeTitle 65.2. Workers' CompensationChapter 4. Occupational Diseases

Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-400 (2026)

"Occupational disease" defined

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1992–2023 111citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 111 opinions since 1992, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (B) (24 cases).

A. As used in this title, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term "occupational disease" means a disease arising out of and in the course of employment, but not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment.

B. A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only if there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances:

1. A direct causal connection between the conditions under which work is performed and the occupational disease;

2. It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment;

3. It can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause;

4. It is neither a disease to which an employee may have had substantial exposure outside of the employment, nor any condition of the neck, back or spinal column;

5. It is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee; and

6. It had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and flowed from that source as a natural consequence, though it need not have been foreseen or expected before its contraction.

C. Hearing loss and the condition of carpal tunnel syndrome are not occupational diseases but are ordinary diseases of life as defined in § 65.2-401.

Code 1950, § 65-42; 1952, c. 603; 1968, c. 660, § 65.1-46; 1970, c. 470; 1986, c. 378; 1991, c. 355; 1997, cc. 15, 405.

The 20 cases that cite Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-400 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENLee Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Miller, 563 S.E.2d 374 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 65.2-400 18×subsections: (B) 8× (C) 4×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“2-401, a claimant must prove by "clear and convincing evidence, (not a mere probability)," that the disease (1) "arose out of and in the course of [her] employment as provided in Code § 65.2-400 . .."; (2) "did not result from causes outside of the employment"; and (3) "follows…”
The case’s holding
A physician's express statement of causation is not required to establish a direct causal connection between employment and an occupational disease (Lee County School Board v. Miller).
Later courts cite it for
“a finding of causation need not be based exclusively on medical evidence. 'the testimony of a claimant may also be considered in determining causation, especially where the medical testimony is inconclusive.” · 5 citing courts
2
GREENPerdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan, 461 S.E.2d 431 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 65.2-400 20×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“McCutchan suffered a compensable occupational disease as defined by Code § 65.2-400. On appeal from a denial of benefits, Crystal F.”
The case’s holding
Carpal tunnel syndrome is a compensable occupational disease because it lacks the obvious, sudden mechanical or structural change required to be classified as an injury.
Later courts cite it for
“under the workers' compensation act (” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENHolly Farms Foods, Inc. v. Carter, 422 S.E.2d 165 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 65.2-400 16×subsections: (B)(4) 2×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“1 (now Code §§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401); (2) that the commission erred in its December 26, 1990, opinion in remanding the matter for the further taking of evidence on the periods of disability as the claimant bears the burden of proving *32 such periods of disability; (3) that the…”
The case’s holding
A claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence to a reasonable medical certainty that an occupational disease arose out of and in the course of employment.
Later courts cite it for
“a claimant still has the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits . . . .” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENMarcus v. Arlington Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 425 S.E.2d 525 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 65.2-400 15×subsections: (A) 2×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“An occupational disease is ‘ ‘a disease arising out of and in the course of employment, but not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment.”
The case’s holding
A commission determination regarding causation is a binding finding of fact on appeal if supported by credible evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“the commission's determination regarding causation is a finding of fact and is binding on appeal when supported by credible evidence.” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENTex Tech Indus., Inc. v. Ellis, 605 S.E.2d 759 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 65.2-400 11×subsections: (B) 5× (C) 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“On appeal, employer contends claimant did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that her CTS, defined as an ordinary disease of life in Code §§ 65.2-400 *500 and -401, arose out of her employment and did not result from causes outside the employment.”
Later courts cite it for
“a finding of causation need not be based exclusively on medical evidence, and a claimant is not required to produce a physician's medical opinion in order to establish causation.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENFairfax Cnty. Fire & Rescue v. Mottram, 559 S.E.2d 698 (Va. 2002).
cites § 65.2-400 18×subsections: (B) 4× (A) 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“In this workers' compensation claim, the issue is whether posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a disease and, if so, whether it is an ordinary disease of life or an occupational disease as defined in Code § 65.2-400. Because we conclude that the evidence establishes that the…”
7
GREENPiedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 438 S.E.2d 769 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 65.2-400 9×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“2-401, and found that claimant’s evidence was sufficient to meet the requirements of Code §§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401. The commission found that claimant suffered her last injurious exposure to the causative hazards of the disease while working at Piedmont.”
The case’s holding
A disease is any deviation from or interruption of the normal structure or function of any part of the body manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms.
Later courts cite it for
“as any deviation from or interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, organ, or system (or combination thereof) of the body that is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs and whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown.” · 9 citing courts
8
GREENStenrich Grp. v. Jemmott, 467 S.E.2d 795 (Va. 1996).
cites § 65.2-400 8×subsections: (B)(4) 2×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“— As used in this title: “Injury” means only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment or occupational disease as defined in [§§ 65.2-400 to -407] of this title and does not include a disease in any form, except when it results naturally and…”
The case’s holding
Job-related impairments resulting from cumulative trauma caused by repetitive motion are not compensable under the Act (as a matter of law).
Later courts cite it for
“job-related impairments resulting from cumulative trauma caused by repetitive motion, however labeled or however defined, are, as a matter of law, not compensable under the present provisions of the act” · 16 citing courts
9
GREENStancill v. Ford Motor Co., 421 S.E.2d 872 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 65.2-400 11×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“On October 19, 1990, Stancill filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission for temporary total benefits, alleging that he had developed a rotator cuff tear that constituted an occupational disease as defined by Code § 65.2-400 1 (formerly Code § 65.1-46).”
The case’s holding
Commission causation findings bind a reviewing court only if supported by credible evidence; findings resting on misperception of uncontradicted medical evidence cannot sustain denial of an occupational disease claim.
Later courts cite it for
“the deference that we give to the commission's fact finding on medical questions is based upon the 'unwisdom of an attempt by . . . courts uninitiated into the mysteries of the medical science debate to choose between conflicting expert medical opinions.” · 9 citing courts
10
REDMerillat Indus., Inc. v. Parks, 421 S.E.2d 867 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 65.2-400 24×subsections: (B)(4) 2×cited by 7 cases
Reversed by Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks (1993): the Supreme Court of Virginia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“1-46 *48 (now Code § 65.2-400) has been met, the commission may conclude that a claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease.”
11
GREENFarmington Country Club, Inc. v. Marshall, 622 S.E.2d 233 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 65.2-400 4×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“2d 374, 377-78 (2002) (noting physician's express statement of causation not required to permit commission to find necessary " direct causal connection" between work and occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400 (emphasis added)), the medical and other evidence as a whole,…”
The case’s holding
A subsequent medical condition is not a compensable consequence if the injury caused an intermediate condition that then caused the subsequent condition.
Later courts cite it for
“causation of a medical condition may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence, including medical evidence or 'the testimony of a claimant.” · 14 citing courts
12
GREENA New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 495 S.E.2d 510 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 65.2-400 16×subsections: (A) 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“Appellant defended against the claim on the sole ground that allergic contact dermatitis is not a compensable disease under the Act. Following a hearing, a deputy commissioner concluded that claimant's allergic contact dermatitis was a compensable occupational disease under Code…”
Later courts cite it for
“currently provides coverage for impairments arising out of and in the course of employment that fall into one of two categories: (1) 'injuries by accident' and (2) 'occupational disease.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENOgden Aviation Servs. v. Saghy, 526 S.E.2d 756 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 65.2-400 9×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“In response to Stenrich, in 1997 the General Assembly amended Code § 65.2-400 to provide that “condition[s] of carpal tunnel syndrome are not occupational diseases but are ordinary diseases of life as defined in [Code] § 65.”
The case’s holding
Carpal tunnel syndrome may be compensable as an injury by accident or an occupational disease depending on how the condition develops.
Later courts cite it for
“accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,” · 1 citing court
14
GREENA New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 511 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1999).
cites § 65.2-400 10×subsections: (B) 4× (A) 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“A deputy commissioner of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) awarded benefits to Webb, finding that the contact dermatitis is an occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400. Upon review, the full Commission affirmed the award of benefits to Webb.”
The case’s holding
Allergic contact dermatitis caused by an immune system reaction to specific substances is a compensable occupational disease rather than a cumulative trauma injury.
Later courts cite it for
“reaction of the body's immune system to the substance to which that person is sensitive.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENClinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed, 577 S.E.2d 538 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 65.2-400 2×cited by 156 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“Code § 65.2-400 defines an "occupational disease” generally, but provides no criteria for diagnosing specific diseases.”
The case’s holding
The doctrine of stare decisis binds courts to the essential rationale of a decision rather than merely its literal holding (ratio decidendi).
Later courts cite it for
“decision of one panel 'becomes a predicate for application of the doctrine of stare decisis' and cannot be overruled except by the court of appeals sitting en banc or by the virginia supreme court.” · 29 citing courts
16
GREENTomes v. James City (Cnty. Of) Fire, 573 S.E.2d 312 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 65.2-400 2×cited by 89 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“In this case, claimant acted appropriately upon receiving a communication of a possible occupational disease from Dr. Munzel.”
The case’s holding
A claimant is not barred from filing a subsequent claim for a condition that has worsened even if a prior claim for the same condition was denied.
Later courts cite it for
“we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below” · 17 citing courts
17
GREENQuisenberry v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 818 S.E.2d 805 (Va. 2018).
cites § 65.2-400 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“The majority opinion's creation of a duty that was not recognized at common law interferes with the "quid pro quo" of the Act by allowing those who cohabitate with employees to bring a negligence action that an employee is barred from bringing under the Act. It is debatable…”
Later courts cite it for
“the finding of a legal duty is a prerequisite to a finding of negligence.” · 9 citing courts
18
GREENGreif Companies (GENESCO) v. Sipe, 434 S.E.2d 314 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 65.2-400 3×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“Sipe filed for workers’ compensation benefits from Greif, alleging that the tendinitis is either an occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400 or a compensable ordinary disease of life under Code § 65.”
The case’s holding
A court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party when reviewing a commission finding that a claimant made a reasonable marketing effort.
Later courts cite it for
“what constitutes a reasonable marketing effort depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” · 48 citing courts
19
GREENRocco Turkeys, Inc. v. Lemus, 465 S.E.2d 156 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 65.2-400 12×subsections: (A) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“Although the Act does not expressly define disease or state whether CTS is a disease under either Code §§ 65.2-400 or -401, the legislative history of the occupational disease statutes demonstrates that the legislature in 1970 intended to expand the definition of disease to…”
Later courts cite it for
“carpal tunnel syndrome, which is a condition that exhibits a characteristic set of symptoms caused by compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel, will qualify as a disease when it develops as the body's response to environmental factors, infective agents, or inherent defects of the body. carpal tunnel syndrome may be caused by a number of precipitating factors or events, such as repetitive motion, cumulative trauma, obesity, rubella, pregnancy, rheumatoid arthritis, gout, and hypothyroidism, or a traumatic injury.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENWells v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 425 S.E.2d 536 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 65.2-400 8×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 65.2-400
“Wells first contends that the commission erred in finding that he suffered from an ordinary disease of life, rather than from an occupational disease as defined by Code § 65.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199220072023

One bar per year. Tallest: 24 cases in 1995. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Va. Ct. App.100Va.9Va. Cir. Ct.1E.D. Va.1
By subsection
(A)19 cases
Marcus v. Arlington Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 425 S.E.2d 525 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).“An occupational disease is ‘ ‘a disease arising out of and in the course of employment, but not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment.”
A New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 495 S.E.2d 510 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).“Appellant defended against the claim on the sole ground that allergic contact dermatitis is not a compensable disease under the Act. Following a hearing, a deputy commissioner concluded that claimant's allergic contact dermatitis was a compensable occupational disease under Code…”
A New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 511 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1999).“A deputy commissioner of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) awarded benefits to Webb, finding that the contact dermatitis is an occupational disease under Code § 65.2-400. Upon review, the full Commission affirmed the award of benefits to Webb.”
Fairfax Cnty. Fire & Rescue v. Mottram, 559 S.E.2d 698 (Va. 2002).“In this workers' compensation claim, the issue is whether posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a disease and, if so, whether it is an ordinary disease of life or an occupational disease as defined in Code § 65.2-400. Because we conclude that the evidence establishes that the…”
Lindenfeld v. City of Richmond Sheriff's Off., 492 S.E.2d 506 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
Showing the top 5 of 19. More in the list view →
(B)24 cases
Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Miller, 563 S.E.2d 374 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).“2-401, a claimant must prove by "clear and convincing evidence, (not a mere probability)," that the disease (1) "arose out of and in the course of [her] employment as provided in Code § 65.2-400 . .."; (2) "did not result from causes outside of the employment"; and (3) "follows…”
Tex Tech Indus., Inc. v. Ellis, 605 S.E.2d 759 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).“On appeal, employer contends claimant did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that her CTS, defined as an ordinary disease of life in Code §§ 65.2-400 *500 and -401, arose out of her employment and did not result from causes outside the employment.”
A New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 511 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1999).
Fairfax Cnty. Fire & Rescue v. Mottram, 559 S.E.2d 698 (Va. 2002).
Showing the top 5 of 24. More in the list view →
(B)(1)9 cases
Lourdes Iglesias v. QVC Suffolk Inc., No. 1292181 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2019).
Randolph Campbell (Deceased) v. Rubatez Corp, No. 2944003 (Va. Ct. App. July 17, 2001).
Farnaz Farnia v. Prime Receivable, LLC, No. 0956004 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2000).
Ned N. Cary, Jr. v. Anheuser Busch, No. 0781971 (Va. Ct. App. July 8, 1997).
Bert Ray Forbes v. Creative Screen Print, No. 0150972 (Va. Ct. App. June 10, 1997).
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(B)(3)1 case
Sandra S. Burress v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., No. 2345013 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2002).
(B)(4)4 cases
Stenrich Grp. v. Jemmott, 467 S.E.2d 795 (Va. 1996).“— As used in this title: “Injury” means only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment or occupational disease as defined in [§§ 65.2-400 to -407] of this title and does not include a disease in any form, except when it results naturally and…”
Holly Farms Foods, Inc. v. Carter, 422 S.E.2d 165 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).“1 (now Code §§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401); (2) that the commission erred in its December 26, 1990, opinion in remanding the matter for the further taking of evidence on the periods of disability as the claimant bears the burden of proving *32 such periods of disability; (3) that the…”
Merillat Indus., Inc. v. Parks, 421 S.E.2d 867 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).“1-46 *48 (now Code § 65.2-400) has been met, the commission may conclude that a claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease.”
Genie Co. v. Marsha Hammer, 527 S.E.2d 470 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
(B)(5)1 case
Genie Co. v. Marsha Hammer, 527 S.E.2d 470 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
(C)17 cases
Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Miller, 563 S.E.2d 374 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
Tex Tech Indus., Inc. v. Ellis, 605 S.E.2d 759 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 544 S.E.2d 354 (Va. 2001).
S&S Elec., Inc. v. Michael Markulik, 738 S.E.2d 512 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
S. Express v. Clara Louise Green, 495 S.E.2d 500 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Showing the top 5 of 17. More in the list view →

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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