Revised Code of Washington
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.110 (2026)
✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) Except as otherwise ordered by the court, the entry of an order appointing a general receiver or a custodial receiver with respect to all of a person's property shall operate as a stay, applicable to all persons, of:
(a) The commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the person over whose property the receiver is appointed that was or could have been commenced before the entry of the order of appointment, or to recover a claim against the person that arose before the entry of the order of appointment;
(b) The enforcement, against the person over whose property the receiver is appointed or any estate property, of a judgment obtained before the order of appointment;
(c) Any act to obtain possession of estate property from the receiver, or to interfere with, or exercise control over, estate property;
(d) Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien or claim against estate property except by exercise of a right of setoff, to the extent that the lien secures a claim against the person that arose before the entry of the order of appointment; or
(e) Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the person that arose before the entry of the order of appointment.
(2) The stay shall automatically expire as to the acts specified in subsection (1)(a), (b), and (e) of this section sixty days after the entry of the order of appointment unless before the expiration of the sixty-day period the receiver, for good cause shown, obtains an order of the court extending the stay, after notice and a hearing. A person whose action or proceeding is stayed by motion to the court may seek relief from the stay for good cause shown. Any judgment obtained against the person over whose property the receiver is appointed or estate property following the entry of the order of appointment is not a lien against estate property unless the receivership is terminated prior to a conveyance of the property against which the judgment would otherwise constitute a lien.
(3) The entry of an order appointing a receiver does not operate as a stay of:
(a) The continuation of a judicial action or nonjudicial proceeding of the type described in RCW 7.60.025(1) (b), (ee), or (ff), if the action or proceeding was initiated by the party seeking the receiver's appointment;
(b) The commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding against the person over whose property the receiver is appointed;
(c) The commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding to establish paternity, or to establish or modify an order for alimony, maintenance, or support, or to collect alimony, maintenance, or support under any order of a court;
(d) Any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in estate property if the interest perfected would be effective against a creditor of the person over whose property the receiver is appointed holding at the time of the entry of the order of appointment either a perfected nonpurchase money security interest under chapter 62A.9A RCW against the property involved, or a lien by attachment, levy, or the like, whether or not such a creditor exists. If perfection of an interest would require seizure of the property involved or the commencement of an action, the perfection shall instead be accomplished by filing, and by serving upon the receiver, or receiver's counsel, if any, notice of the interest within the time fixed by law for seizure or commencement;
(e) The commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power;
(f) The enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power, or with respect to any licensure of the person over whose property the receiver is appointed;
(g) The exercise of a right of setoff, including but not limited to (i) any right of a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency to set off a claim for a margin payment or settlement payment arising out of a commodity contract, forward contract, or securities contract against cash, securities, or other property held or due from the commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle the commodity contract, forward contract, or securities contract, and (ii) any right of a swap participant to set off a claim for a payment due to the swap participant under or in connection with a swap agreement against any payment due from the swap participant under or in connection with the swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property of the debtor held by or due from the swap participant to guarantee, secure, or settle the swap agreement; or
(h) The establishment by a governmental unit of any tax liability and any appeal thereof.
Notes:
Purpose—Captions not law—2004 c 165: See notes following RCW 7.60.005.
(1) Except as otherwise ordered by the court, the entry of an order appointing a general receiver or a custodial receiver with respect to all of a person's property shall operate as a stay, applicable to all persons, of:
(a) The commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the person over whose property the receiver is appointed that was or could have been commenced before the entry of the order of appointment, or to recover a claim against the person that arose before the entry of the order of appointment;
(b) The enforcement, against the person over whose property the receiver is appointed or any estate property, of a judgment obtained before the order of appointment;
(c) Any act to obtain possession of estate property from the receiver, or to interfere with, or exercise control over, estate property;
(d) Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien or claim against estate property except by exercise of a right of setoff, to the extent that the lien secures a claim against the person that arose before the entry of the order of appointment; or
(e) Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the person that arose before the entry of the order of appointment.
(2) The stay shall automatically expire as to the acts specified in subsection (1)(a), (b), and (e) of this section sixty days after the entry of the order of appointment unless before the expiration of the sixty-day period the receiver, for good cause shown, obtains an order of the court extending the stay, after notice and a hearing. A person whose action or proceeding is stayed by motion to the court may seek relief from the stay for good cause shown. Any judgment obtained against the person over whose property the receiver is appointed or estate property following the entry of the order of appointment is not a lien against estate property unless the receivership is terminated prior to a conveyance of the property against which the judgment would otherwise constitute a lien.
(3) The entry of an order appointing a receiver does not operate as a stay of:
(a) The continuation of a judicial action or nonjudicial proceeding of the type described in RCW 7.60.025(1) (b) or (ee), if the action or proceeding was initiated by the party seeking the receiver's appointment;
(b) The commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding against the person over whose property the receiver is appointed;
(c) The commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding to establish paternity, or to establish or modify an order for alimony, maintenance, or support, or to collect alimony, maintenance, or support under any order of a court;
(d) Any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in estate property if the interest perfected would be effective against a creditor of the person over whose property the receiver is appointed holding at the time of the entry of the order of appointment either a perfected nonpurchase money security interest under chapter 62A.9A RCW against the property involved, or a lien by attachment, levy, or the like, whether or not such a creditor exists. If perfection of an interest would require seizure of the property involved or the commencement of an action, the perfection shall instead be accomplished by filing, and by serving upon the receiver, or receiver's counsel, if any, notice of the interest within the time fixed by law for seizure or commencement;
(e) The commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power;
(f) The enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power, or with respect to any licensure of the person over whose property the receiver is appointed;
(g) The exercise of a right of setoff, including but not limited to (i) any right of a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency to set off a claim for a margin payment or settlement payment arising out of a commodity contract, forward contract, or securities contract against cash, securities, or other property held or due from the commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle the commodity contract, forward contract, or securities contract, and (ii) any right of a swap participant to set off a claim for a payment due to the swap participant under or in connection with a swap agreement against any payment due from the swap participant under or in connection with the swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property of the debtor held by or due from the swap participant to guarantee, secure, or settle the swap agreement; or
(h) The establishment by a governmental unit of any tax liability and any appeal thereof.
Notes:
Effective dates—2024 c 321 ss 319 and 401-432: See note following RCW 64.90.485.
Purpose—Captions not law—2004 c 165: See notes following RCW 7.60.005.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15
cases (14 in the last 5 years), 2020–2026 · leading case: Charles Feick, App V. The Brutsche Fam. Revoc. Trust, Resps (Wash. Ct. App. 2022).
Charles Feick, App V. The Brutsche Fam. Revoc. Trust, Resps (Wash. Ct. App. 2022). “Assuming violating the statute could have this result, the superior court did in fact order a stay of proceedings under RCW 7.60.110 as part of its order appointing a receiver.”
United States v. Docklight Brands Inc (W.D. Wash. 2024). “The Receiver opposes, arguing that (1) under RCW 7.60.110, ongoing state 2 court receivership proceedings stay the Government’s action against Docklight; (2) 3 under the Burford abstention doctrine, the Court should discretionarily decline to 4 exercise jurisdiction, see Burford…”
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust v. Michael & Bonnie Shields (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “80913-0-I/3 pursuant to RCW 7.60.110. On August 15, 2014, Deutsche Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action against Shields, also in King County Superior Court, but the action was assigned to a different judge.”
Nat'l Prods. Inc v. Innovative Intelligent Prods. LLC (W.D. Wash. 2025). “285 at 1) (See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.110 ) (“[T]he entry of an order 13 appointing a general receiver or a custodial receiver with respect to all of a person's property 14 shall operate as a stay”).”
Nat'l Prods. Inc v. Innovative Intelligent Prods. LLC (W.D. Wash. 2026). “285 at 1) 18 (See Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.110 ) (“[T]he entry of an order appointing a general receiver or a 19 custodial receiver with respect to all of a person's property shall operate as a stay[.”
Jc Aviation Investements, Llc, V. Htp, Inc. (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). “Under RCW 7.60.110(1)(a), certain actions against a person over whose property the receiver is appointed are automatically stayed.”
In The Receivership Of: Applied Restoration, Inc. (Wash. Ct. App. 2023). “” RCW 7.60.110(1)(c). A. April Billing The April billing funds were addressed in the order granting the second motion for turnover, the order denying reconsideration of that turnover order, and the superior court’s order denying revision of the order denying reconsideration.”
In The Receivership Of: Castle Walls Llc (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). “Pursuant to RCW 7.60.110(1)(c), the trial court’s appointment of a general receiver operates as an automatic stay, applicable to all persons, of “[a]ny act to obtain possession of estate property from the receiver, or to interfere with, or exercise control over, estate property.”
In The Receivership Of: Castle Walls Llc (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). “Pursuant to RCW 7.60.110(1)(c), the trial court’s appointment of a general receiver operates as an automatic stay, applicable to all persons, of “[a]ny act to obtain possession of estate property from the receiver, or to interfere with, or exercise control over, estate property.”
IBEW Pac. Coast Pension Fund v. Harris Elec., Inc (W.D. Wash. 2021). “) On May 3, 2018, 14 IBEW filed a notice of Harris’s receivership, and the case was automatically stayed 15 pursuant to RCW 7.60.110. (Not. of Receivership (Dkt.”
Buffalo Airways Ltd v. Airstrike Firefighters LLC (W.D. Wash. 2024). “; see also RCW 7.60.110. By contrast, 22 23 1 proceedings in this Court against Defendants William Douglass and Scott 2 Schorzman remain active.”
Buffalo Airways Ltd v. Airstrike Firefighters LLC (W.D. Wash. 2024). “24; RCW 7.60.110. All 12 parties have stipulated to withdrawal of counsel.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.110(1) — 1 case
United States v. Docklight Brands Inc (W.D. Wash. 2024). “The Receiver opposes, arguing that (1) under RCW 7.60.110, ongoing state 2 court receivership proceedings stay the Government’s action against Docklight; (2) 3 under the Burford abstention doctrine, the Court should discretionarily decline to 4 exercise jurisdiction, see Burford…”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.110(1)(a) — 3 cases
Charles Feick, App V. The Brutsche Fam. Revoc. Trust, Resps (Wash. Ct. App. 2022). “Assuming violating the statute could have this result, the superior court did in fact order a stay of proceedings under RCW 7.60.110 as part of its order appointing a receiver.”
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust v. Michael & Bonnie Shields (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “80913-0-I/3 pursuant to RCW 7.60.110. On August 15, 2014, Deutsche Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action against Shields, also in King County Superior Court, but the action was assigned to a different judge.”
Jc Aviation Investements, Llc, V. Htp, Inc. (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). “Under RCW 7.60.110(1)(a), certain actions against a person over whose property the receiver is appointed are automatically stayed.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.110(1)(c) — 3 cases
In The Receivership Of: Applied Restoration, Inc. (Wash. Ct. App. 2023). “” RCW 7.60.110(1)(c). A. April Billing The April billing funds were addressed in the order granting the second motion for turnover, the order denying reconsideration of that turnover order, and the superior court’s order denying revision of the order denying reconsideration.”
In The Receivership Of: Castle Walls Llc (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). “Pursuant to RCW 7.60.110(1)(c), the trial court’s appointment of a general receiver operates as an automatic stay, applicable to all persons, of “[a]ny act to obtain possession of estate property from the receiver, or to interfere with, or exercise control over, estate property.”
In The Receivership Of: Castle Walls Llc (Wash. Ct. App. 2024). “Pursuant to RCW 7.60.110(1)(c), the trial court’s appointment of a general receiver operates as an automatic stay, applicable to all persons, of “[a]ny act to obtain possession of estate property from the receiver, or to interfere with, or exercise control over, estate property.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.110(2) — 3 cases
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust v. Michael & Bonnie Shields (Wash. Ct. App. 2020). “80913-0-I/3 pursuant to RCW 7.60.110. On August 15, 2014, Deutsche Bank filed a judicial foreclosure action against Shields, also in King County Superior Court, but the action was assigned to a different judge.”
Jc Aviation Investements, Llc, V. Htp, Inc. (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). “Under RCW 7.60.110(1)(a), certain actions against a person over whose property the receiver is appointed are automatically stayed.”
Charles Feick, App V. The Brutsche Fam. Revoc. Trust, Resps (Wash. Ct. App. 2022). “Assuming violating the statute could have this result, the superior court did in fact order a stay of proceedings under RCW 7.60.110 as part of its order appointing a receiver.”
— Wash. Rev. Code § 7.60.110(3)(e) — 1 case
United States v. Docklight Brands Inc (W.D. Wash. 2024). “The Receiver opposes, arguing that (1) under RCW 7.60.110, ongoing state 2 court receivership proceedings stay the Government’s action against Docklight; (2) 3 under the Burford abstention doctrine, the Court should discretionarily decline to 4 exercise jurisdiction, see Burford…”
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