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Alaska Stat.Chapter 33.16

Alaska Stat. § 33.16.090 (2026)

Eligibility for discretionary parole and minimum terms to be served

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1987–2025 50citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 50 opinions since 1987, 10 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (20 cases).

Sec. 33.16.090. Eligibility for discretionary parole and minimum terms to be served.
 (a) A prisoner sentenced to an active term of imprisonment of at least 181 days may, in the discretion of the board, be released on discretionary parole if the prisoner
     (1) has served the amount of time specified under (b) of this section, except that
          (A) a prisoner sentenced to one or more mandatory 99-year terms under AS 12.55.125(a) or one or more definite terms under AS 12.55.125(l) is not eligible for consideration for discretionary parole;

          (B) a prisoner is not eligible for consideration of discretionary parole if made ineligible by order of a court under AS 12.55.115;

          (C) a prisoner imprisoned under AS 12.55.086 is not eligible for discretionary parole unless the actual term of imprisonment is more than one year;

          (D) a prisoner sentenced to a single sentence within or below a presumptive range set out in AS 12.55.125(c), (d)(2) — (4), (e)(3) and (4), or (i) who has not been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release is not eligible for consideration of discretionary parole;

          (E) a prisoner sentenced to a single sentence, including a consecutive or partially consecutive sentence, that is not eligible for a good time deduction under AS 33.20.010(a)(3) and that has not been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release is not eligible for consideration of discretionary parole; or

     (2) is at least 60 years of age, has served at least 10 years of a sentence for one or more crimes in a single judgment, and has not been convicted of an unclassified felony or a sexual felony as defined in AS 12.55.185.

 (b) A prisoner eligible under (a)(1) of this section who is sentenced
     (1) to a single sentence under AS 12.55.125(a) or (b) may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the mandatory minimum term under AS 12.55.125(a) or (b),
          (A) two-thirds of the active term of imprisonment imposed, or any term set under AS 12.55.115, whichever is greatest, for a conviction under AS 11.41.100 or 11.41.110;

          (B) one-half of the active term of imprisonment imposed, or any term set under AS 12.55.115, whichever is greatest, for a conviction for an offense not listed in (A) of this paragraph;

     (2) to a single sentence under AS 12.55.125(c), (d)(2) — (4), (e)(3) and (4), or (i), and has been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release during the second half of the sentence, may not be released on discretionary parole until
          (A) the prisoner has served that portion of the active term of imprisonment required by the three-judge panel; and

          (B) in addition to the factors set out in AS 33.16.100(a), the board determines that
                (i) the prisoner has successfully completed all rehabilitation programs ordered by the three-judge panel that were made available to the prisoner; and

                (ii) the prisoner would not constitute a danger to the public if released on parole;

     (3) to a single enhanced sentence under AS 12.55.155(a) that is above the applicable presumptive range may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the greater of the following:
          (A) an amount of time, less good time earned under AS 33.20.010, equal to the upper end of the presumptive range plus one-fourth of the amount of time above the presumptive range; or

          (B) any term set under AS 12.55.115;

     (4) to a single sentence under any other provision of law may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served at least one-fourth of the active term of imprisonment, any mandatory minimum sentence imposed under any provision of law, or any term set under AS 12.55.115, whichever is greatest;

     (5) to concurrent sentences may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the greatest of
          (A) any mandatory minimum sentence or sentences imposed under any provision of law;

          (B) any term set under AS 12.55.115; or

          (C) the amount of time that is required to be served under (1) — (4) or (7) of this subsection for the sentence imposed for the primary crime, had that been the only sentence imposed;

     (6) to consecutive or partially consecutive sentences may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served the greatest of
          (A) the composite total of any mandatory minimum sentence or sentences imposed under any provision of law, including AS 12.55.127;

          (B) any term set under AS 12.55.115; or

          (C) the amount of time that is required to be served under (1) — (4) or (7) of this subsection for the sentence imposed for the primary crime, had that been the only sentence imposed, plus one-quarter of the composite total of the active term of imprisonment imposed as consecutive or partially consecutive sentences imposed for all crimes other than the primary crime;

     (7) to a single sentence under AS 12.55.125(d) for an offense under AS 11.71.030(a)(2) or (9), and has not been allowed by the three-judge panel under AS 12.55.175 to be considered for discretionary parole release, may not be released on discretionary parole until the prisoner has served one-half of the active term of imprisonment imposed.

 (c) As used in this section,
     (1) “active term of imprisonment” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.127;

     (2) “primary crime” has the meaning given in AS 12.55.127.




The 20 cases that cite Alaska Stat. § 33.16.090 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENRocky N. Seaman v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 33.16.090 22×subsections: (b)(1) 5× (b)(8) 5× (b) 3× (b)(3) 3×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“In this appeal, we are asked to interpret the term “active term of imprisonment” as it applies to a defendant’s eligibility for discretionary parole under AS 33.16.090. The Department of Corrections interprets this term to include a defendant’s total term of imprisonment without…”
2
GREENThomas v. State, 413 P.3d 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 33.16.090 5×subsections: (b)(1) 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“Under AS 33.16.090(b)(1), a defendant convicted of murder is eligible to be considered for discretionary parole after serving one-third of their active term of imprisonment.”
3
GREENState v. Korkow, 314 P.3d 560 (Alaska 2013).
cites § 33.16.090 7×subsections: (b)(1) 6×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“115 expressly empowers a sentencing court to restrict eligibility for discretionary parole beyond that required by AS 33.16.090 and AS 88.16.100, which, in relevant part, bar release on discretionary *564 parole until one-third of the prisoner's active term has been served.”
4
GREENState v. Malloy, 46 P.3d 949 (Alaska 2002).
cites § 33.16.090 4×subsections: (b) 3×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“115 provides: "The court may, as part of a sentence of imprisonment, further restrict the eligibility of a prisoner for discretionary parole for a term greater than that required under AS 33.16.090 and 33.16.100." 12 . Malloy, 1 P.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court may impose a mandatory term and restrict parole eligibility within the otherwise authorized range, because that increase is not a harsher maximum triggering a jury trial right.
Later courts cite it for
“donr-lun ... recognizes that an increased sentence resulting from a finding of statutory aggravating circumstances is not a harsher maximum sentence -and thus does not trigger a right to jury trial under donlun.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENLuckart v. State, 314 P.3d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 33.16.090 17×subsections: (b) 4× (b)(2) 4× (b)(8) 2× (b)(6)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“Instead, a defendant's eligibility for discretionary parole is governed by the provisions of AS 33.16.090. Under AS 38.16.090(b), the question of whether, or when, a defendant becomes eligible to apply for discretionary parole does not hinge directly on whether the defendant…”
6
GREENCheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 33.16.090 3×subsections: (b) 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“We turn now to Cheely’s argument that Judge Souter had insufficient reason to restrict his parole eligibility. When a sentencing judge restricts parole eligibility, the judge must set forth with particularity his or her reasons for concluding that the parole eligibility…”
7
GREENReyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 33.16.090 2×subsections: (b) (c)cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“AS 33.16.090(b) declares (with certain exceptions not pertinent here) that “a prisoner is not eligible for discretionary parole during the term of a presumptive sentence”.”
Later courts cite it for
“one principle of double jeopardy law is that 'once a sentence has been meaningfully imposed, it may not, at a later time, be increased.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENHeavyrunner v. State, 172 P.3d 819 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 33.16.090 6×subsections: (b)(7)(C) 2× (b) (b)(7) (c)(1)cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“AS 33.16.090 no longer defines parole eligibility based on "presumptive terms" and "sentence enhancements".”
9
GREENNewell v. State, 771 P.2d 873 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 33.16.090 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“the defendant be sentenced for a term exceeding one year, may (1) designate in the sentence of imprisonment imposed a minimum term at the expiration of which the prisoner is eligible for parole, which term shall be at least one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the court;…”
10
GREENForster v. State, 236 P.3d 1157 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 33.16.090 1×subsections: (b)cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“See former AS 33.16.090(b) (2004) ("A prisoner sentenced to a mandatory 99-year-term under AS 12.”
11
GREENXeuy Sikeo v. State, 258 P.3d 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 33.16.090 2×subsections: (a)(1) (b)(2)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“See AS 33.16.090(a)(1). 7 . See AS 33.20.010(a)(2).”
12
GREENDayton v. State, 120 P.3d 1073 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 33.16.090 1×subsections: (b)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“090(b) (pre-2005) (prisoners who received a presumptive term were not eligible for discretionary parole during that pre-sumplive term, although they could apply for parole after serving a portion of any extra years of imprisonment that were added to the presumptive term because…”
13
GREENHampel v. State, 911 P.2d 517 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 33.16.090 2×subsections: (c)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“As evidence that the relationship between Alaska’s good-time credit statute and its discretionary parole statutes is ambiguous, Hampel points to legislative commentary on AS 33.16.090, which mentions that "this section resolves a major ambiguity present in current law.”
14
GREENMark Wayne King v. State of Alaska, 487 P.3d 242 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 33.16.090 4×subsections: (a)(1)(D) (b)(2) (b)(6)(A) (b)(7)(A)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“Moreover, under Alaska’s parole statutes, when a defendant receives a presumptive term of imprisonment for one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, plus one or more additional mandatory consecutive terms of imprisonment under AS 12.”
15
GREENStern v. State, 827 P.2d 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 33.16.090 1×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“When a sentencing judge restricts parole eligibility, the judge must specifically address the issue of parole restriction, setting forth with particularity his or her reasons for concluding that the parole eligibility prescribed by AS 33.”
The case’s holding
An indictment must be dismissed for improper grand jury evidence only when the remaining admissible evidence is weak and the improper evidence likely was the decisive factor in the indictment.
Later courts cite it for
“the probative force of the admissible evidence was so weak and the unfair prejudice engendered by the improper evidence was so strong that it appears likely that the improper evidence was the decisive factor in the grand jury's decision to indict.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENKirby v. State, 748 P.2d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 33.16.090 1×subsections: (b)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“AS 33.16.090(b); AS 12.55.125(g)(3). He is, however, entitled to reduction for statutory good-time.”
The case’s holding
A first offender with unusual rehabilitation potential is entitled to referral to a three-judge panel when the court finds the factor should adjust the presumptive term.
17
GREENNathanial L. Kangas v. State of Alaska, 463 P.3d 189 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 33.16.090 1×subsections: (b)(7)(A)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“­ 127(c)(2)(A) and AS 33.16.090(b)(7)(A), respectively. – 17 – 2667 But under AS 12.”
Later courts cite it for
“when an appellate court reviews claims of error involving jury instructions, the question is not whether the challenged jury instruction might contain language that could be misinterpreted. rather, the question is whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, properly informed the jury of the applicable law.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENRidgely v. State, 739 P.2d 1299 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 33.16.090 1×subsections: (d)cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“125(a); AS 33.16.090(d). Even then, they will be entitled to release on discretionary parole only if it appears, based on all available information, that they will conform their behavior to the requirements of the law and that they will not pose a danger to the community.”
19
GREENGustafson v. State, 854 P.2d 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 33.16.090 1×subsections: (b)cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“Nevertheless, the superior court’s written judgement states that Gustafson’s term of imprisonment “is all or partially presumptive”, and that Gus-tafson “is ineligible for parole, except as provided in AS 33.16.090(b) and (c).” Gustafson points out, correctly, that he did not…”
Later courts cite it for
“turns on the nature of the informant's involvement with the incident being investigated and his or her motivation for coming to the authorities.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENScholes v. State, 274 P.3d 496 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 33.16.090 2×subsections: (b) (b)(2)cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 33.16.090
“12 Under AS 33.16.090(b), ouly the three-judge panel had the authority to make Scholes eligible for discretionary parole during his sentence.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198720062025

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1992. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Alaska Ct. App.46Alaska3D. Alaska1
By subsection
(a)2 cases
Rocky N. Seaman v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).“In this appeal, we are asked to interpret the term “active term of imprisonment” as it applies to a defendant’s eligibility for discretionary parole under AS 33.16.090. The Department of Corrections interprets this term to include a defendant’s total term of imprisonment without…”
Larry Mikell v. State of Alaska, 568 P.3d 750 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025).
(a)(1)3 cases
Xeuy Sikeo v. State, 258 P.3d 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).“See AS 33.16.090(a)(1). 7 . See AS 33.20.010(a)(2).”
Adrian T. Olmstead v. State of Alaska, 477 P.3d 656 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).
Terry Allen Turner v. State of Alaska, 552 P.3d 1077 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024).
(a)(1)(A)1 case
James S. Stoneking v. State of Alaska, 567 P.3d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025).
(a)(1)(D)1 case
Mark Wayne King v. State of Alaska, 487 P.3d 242 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).“Moreover, under Alaska’s parole statutes, when a defendant receives a presumptive term of imprisonment for one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, plus one or more additional mandatory consecutive terms of imprisonment under AS 12.”
(a)(2)3 cases
Winona M. Fletcher v. State of Alaska, 532 P.3d 286 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023).
Winona M. Fletcher v. State of Alaska, 532 P.3d 286 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023).
Philip C. Wilson v. State of Alaska, 579 P.3d 816 (Alaska Ct. App. 2025).
(b)20 cases
State v. Malloy, 46 P.3d 949 (Alaska 2002).“115 provides: "The court may, as part of a sentence of imprisonment, further restrict the eligibility of a prisoner for discretionary parole for a term greater than that required under AS 33.16.090 and 33.16.100." 12 . Malloy, 1 P.”
Cheely v. State, 861 P.2d 1168 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).“We turn now to Cheely’s argument that Judge Souter had insufficient reason to restrict his parole eligibility. When a sentencing judge restricts parole eligibility, the judge must set forth with particularity his or her reasons for concluding that the parole eligibility…”
Rocky N. Seaman v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
Forster v. State, 236 P.3d 1157 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).“See former AS 33.16.090(b) (2004) ("A prisoner sentenced to a mandatory 99-year-term under AS 12.”
Dayton v. State, 120 P.3d 1073 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).“090(b) (pre-2005) (prisoners who received a presumptive term were not eligible for discretionary parole during that pre-sumplive term, although they could apply for parole after serving a portion of any extra years of imprisonment that were added to the presumptive term because…”
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(b)(1)8 cases
Thomas v. State, 413 P.3d 1207 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018).“Under AS 33.16.090(b)(1), a defendant convicted of murder is eligible to be considered for discretionary parole after serving one-third of their active term of imprisonment.”
State v. Korkow, 314 P.3d 560 (Alaska 2013).“115 expressly empowers a sentencing court to restrict eligibility for discretionary parole beyond that required by AS 33.16.090 and AS 88.16.100, which, in relevant part, bar release on discretionary *564 parole until one-third of the prisoner's active term has been served.”
Rocky N. Seaman v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
KORKOW v. State, 258 P.3d 932 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Thomas v. State, No. 2579 A-12853 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2018).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(b)(1)(A)2 cases
Winona M. Fletcher v. State of Alaska, 532 P.3d 286 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023).
Winona M. Fletcher v. State of Alaska, 532 P.3d 286 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023).
(b)(2)4 cases
Luckart v. State, 314 P.3d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).“Instead, a defendant's eligibility for discretionary parole is governed by the provisions of AS 33.16.090. Under AS 38.16.090(b), the question of whether, or when, a defendant becomes eligible to apply for discretionary parole does not hinge directly on whether the defendant…”
Xeuy Sikeo v. State, 258 P.3d 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Scholes v. State, 274 P.3d 496 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012).“12 Under AS 33.16.090(b), ouly the three-judge panel had the authority to make Scholes eligible for discretionary parole during his sentence.”
Mark Wayne King v. State of Alaska, 487 P.3d 242 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
(b)(3)1 case
Rocky N. Seaman v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
(b)(3)(A)1 case
Rocky N. Seaman v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
(b)(5)(C)1 case
Terry Allen Turner v. State of Alaska, 552 P.3d 1077 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024).
(b)(6)1 case
Luckart v. State, 314 P.3d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
(b)(6)(A)1 case
Mark Wayne King v. State of Alaska, 487 P.3d 242 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
(b)(7)1 case
Heavyrunner v. State, 172 P.3d 819 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).“AS 33.16.090 no longer defines parole eligibility based on "presumptive terms" and "sentence enhancements".”
(b)(7)(A)3 cases
Nathanial L. Kangas v. State of Alaska, 463 P.3d 189 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020).“­ 127(c)(2)(A) and AS 33.16.090(b)(7)(A), respectively. – 17 – 2667 But under AS 12.”
Gray v. State, 267 P.3d 667 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Mark Wayne King v. State of Alaska, 487 P.3d 242 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
(b)(7)(C)1 case
Heavyrunner v. State, 172 P.3d 819 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
(b)(8)2 cases
Rocky N. Seaman v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
Luckart v. State, 314 P.3d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
(c)5 cases
Reyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).“AS 33.16.090(b) declares (with certain exceptions not pertinent here) that “a prisoner is not eligible for discretionary parole during the term of a presumptive sentence”.”
Hampel v. State, 911 P.2d 517 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).“As evidence that the relationship between Alaska’s good-time credit statute and its discretionary parole statutes is ambiguous, Hampel points to legislative commentary on AS 33.16.090, which mentions that "this section resolves a major ambiguity present in current law.”
George v. State, 836 P.2d 960 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
Brown v. State, 926 P.2d 1195 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
Ferguson v. State, 242 P.3d 1042 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
(c)(1)2 cases
Rocky N. Seaman v. State of Alaska, 499 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021).
Heavyrunner v. State, 172 P.3d 819 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
(d)1 case
Ridgely v. State, 739 P.2d 1299 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).“125(a); AS 33.16.090(d). Even then, they will be entitled to release on discretionary parole only if it appears, based on all available information, that they will conform their behavior to the requirements of the law and that they will not pose a danger to the community.”
(e)2 cases
Luckart v. State, 314 P.3d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
Gwalthney v. State, 964 P.2d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.