Miller factors in Alaska

2023In State v. Thomas, for example, a New Jersey appellate court held that a juvenile offender’s sentence “evolved into” the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence after the parole board repeatedly denied the offender’s application for discretionary parole.201 The defendant in Thomas committed two murders when he was seventeen years old and was originally sentenced to a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 13 years.202 199 Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Mass. 2015). 200 Id. at 365-67 ; see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State

2023In State v. Thomas, for example, a New Jersey appellate court held that a juvenile offender’s sentence “evolved into” the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence after the parole board repeatedly denied the offender’s application for discretionary parole.201 The defendant in Thomas committed two murders when he was seventeen years old and was originally sentenced to a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 13 years.202 199 Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Mass. 2015). 200 Id. at 365-67 ; see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State

2023Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55, 60-62 (Mo. 2017) (applying Miller to a mandatory term of life with the possibility of parole after 50 years); Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313, 318-19 (Mont. 2017) (concluding that “Miller’s substantive rule requires Montana’s sentencing judges to adequately consider the mitigating characteristics of youth set forth in the Miller factors when sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole, irrespective of whether the life sentence was discretionary” and that “[l]ogically, the requirement to consider how ‘children are different’ cannot b

2023Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55, 60-62 (Mo. 2017) (applying Miller to a mandatory term of life with the possibility of parole after 50 years); Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313, 318-19 (Mont. 2017) (concluding that “Miller’s substantive rule requires Montana’s sentencing judges to adequately consider the mitigating characteristics of youth set forth in the Miller factors when sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole, irrespective of whether the life sentence was discretionary” and that “[l]ogically, the requirement to consider how ‘children are different’ cannot b

2023As Fletcher points out, and the superior court acknowledged, we have recognized such a due process exception in other circumstances where the constitutionality of a defendant’s conviction or sentence was at stake.233 231 See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 94-95 (Iowa 2013) (reviewing the defendant’s Miller claim as a constitutional challenge to an illegal sentence that may be brought at any time); Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 717-18 (Md. 2018) (holding that defendants’ claim that the Maryland parole system does not comply with Miller could be litigated as a motion to correct illegal

2023As Fletcher points out, and the superior court acknowledged, we have recognized such a due process exception in other circumstances where the constitutionality of a defendant’s conviction or sentence was at stake.233 231 See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 94-95 (Iowa 2013) (reviewing the defendant’s Miller claim as a constitutional challenge to an illegal sentence that may be brought at any time); Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 717-18 (Md. 2018) (holding that defendants’ claim that the Maryland parole system does not comply with Miller could be litigated as a motion to correct illegal

2023This is one such time.[62] The defendant in Ragland had originally been sentenced to a mandatory life without parole sentence.63 However, after Miller was issued, the governor of Iowa 60 Carter, 192 A.3d at 725 . 61 Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 113, 118-22. 62 Id. at 121. 63 Id. at 110. – 24 – 2745 commuted all juvenile life without parole sentences to sentences of life with the possibility of parole after 60 years.64 The Iowa Supreme Court struck down this post- commutation sentence as unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions because it concluded that the sentence qualified a

2023This is one such time.[62] The defendant in Ragland had originally been sentenced to a mandatory life without parole sentence.63 However, after Miller was issued, the governor of Iowa 60 Carter, 192 A.3d at 725 . 61 Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 113, 118-22. 62 Id. at 121. 63 Id. at 110. – 24 – 2745 commuted all juvenile life without parole sentences to sentences of life with the possibility of parole after 60 years.64 The Iowa Supreme Court struck down this post- commutation sentence as unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions because it concluded that the sentence qualified a

2023Indeed, in Bonilla, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Iowa’s parole system as facially constitutional partly because the parole board reassured 209 Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 772 (Iowa 2019) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 212 (2016)) (other citations omitted)); see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). – 65 – 2745 the court that the primary focus of discretionary parole hearings involving juvenile offend

2023Indeed, in Bonilla, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Iowa’s parole system as facially constitutional partly because the parole board reassured 209 Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 772 (Iowa 2019) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 212 (2016)) (other citations omitted)); see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). – 65 – 2745 the court that the primary focus of discretionary parole hearings involving juvenile offend

2023That is, we conclude that, although a sentencing court need not recite the Miller factors by rote before sentencing a juvenile to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, the sentencing court’s remarks, and the record as a whole, must clearly show that the court has properly considered the defendant’s youth 155 Evans v. State, 574 P.2d 24, 26 (Alaska 1978) (“The trial court need not recite the goals of sentencing as long as it is clear that it has considered those goals.”). 156 See, e.g., State v. Bumpus, 820 P.2d 298, 304 (Alaska 1991) (“The court of appeals correctly iden

2023That is, we conclude that, although a sentencing court need not recite the Miller factors by rote before sentencing a juvenile to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, the sentencing court’s remarks, and the record as a whole, must clearly show that the court has properly considered the defendant’s youth 155 Evans v. State, 574 P.2d 24, 26 (Alaska 1978) (“The trial court need not recite the goals of sentencing as long as it is clear that it has considered those goals.”). 156 See, e.g., State v. Bumpus, 820 P.2d 298, 304 (Alaska 1991) (“The court of appeals correctly iden

2023As Fletcher points out, and the superior court acknowledged, we have recognized such a due process exception in other circumstances where the constitutionality of a defendant’s conviction or sentence was at stake.233 231 See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 94-95 (Iowa 2013) (reviewing the defendant’s Miller claim as a constitutional challenge to an illegal sentence that may be brought at any time); Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 717-18 (Md. 2018) (holding that defendants’ claim that the Maryland parole system does not comply with Miller could be litigated as a motion to correct illegal

2023As Fletcher points out, and the superior court acknowledged, we have recognized such a due process exception in other circumstances where the constitutionality of a defendant’s conviction or sentence was at stake.233 231 See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 94-95 (Iowa 2013) (reviewing the defendant’s Miller claim as a constitutional challenge to an illegal sentence that may be brought at any time); Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 717-18 (Md. 2018) (holding that defendants’ claim that the Maryland parole system does not comply with Miller could be litigated as a motion to correct illegal

2023That is, we conclude that, although a sentencing court need not recite the Miller factors by rote before sentencing a juvenile to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, the sentencing court’s remarks, and the record as a whole, must clearly show that the court has properly considered the defendant’s youth 155 Evans v. State, 574 P.2d 24, 26 (Alaska 1978) (“The trial court need not recite the goals of sentencing as long as it is clear that it has considered those goals.”). 156 See, e.g., State v. Bumpus, 820 P.2d 298, 304 (Alaska 1991) (“The court of appeals correctly iden

2023That is, we conclude that, although a sentencing court need not recite the Miller factors by rote before sentencing a juvenile to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, the sentencing court’s remarks, and the record as a whole, must clearly show that the court has properly considered the defendant’s youth 155 Evans v. State, 574 P.2d 24, 26 (Alaska 1978) (“The trial court need not recite the goals of sentencing as long as it is clear that it has considered those goals.”). 156 See, e.g., State v. Bumpus, 820 P.2d 298, 304 (Alaska 1991) (“The court of appeals correctly iden

2023Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55, 60-62 (Mo. 2017) (applying Miller to a mandatory term of life with the possibility of parole after 50 years); Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313, 318-19 (Mont. 2017) (concluding that “Miller’s substantive rule requires Montana’s sentencing judges to adequately consider the mitigating characteristics of youth set forth in the Miller factors when sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole, irrespective of whether the life sentence was discretionary” and that “[l]ogically, the requirement to consider how ‘children are different’ cannot b

2023Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55, 60-62 (Mo. 2017) (applying Miller to a mandatory term of life with the possibility of parole after 50 years); Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313, 318-19 (Mont. 2017) (concluding that “Miller’s substantive rule requires Montana’s sentencing judges to adequately consider the mitigating characteristics of youth set forth in the Miller factors when sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole, irrespective of whether the life sentence was discretionary” and that “[l]ogically, the requirement to consider how ‘children are different’ cannot b

2023In State v. Thomas, for example, a New Jersey appellate court held that a juvenile offender’s sentence “evolved into” the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence after the parole board repeatedly denied the offender’s application for discretionary parole.201 The defendant in Thomas committed two murders when he was seventeen years old and was originally sentenced to a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 13 years.202 199 Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Mass. 2015). 200 Id. at 365-67 ; see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State

2023In State v. Thomas, for example, a New Jersey appellate court held that a juvenile offender’s sentence “evolved into” the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence after the parole board repeatedly denied the offender’s application for discretionary parole.201 The defendant in Thomas committed two murders when he was seventeen years old and was originally sentenced to a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 13 years.202 199 Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Mass. 2015). 200 Id. at 365-67 ; see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State

2023Indeed, in Bonilla, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Iowa’s parole system as facially constitutional partly because the parole board reassured 209 Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 772 (Iowa 2019) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 212 (2016)) (other citations omitted)); see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). – 65 – 2745 the court that the primary focus of discretionary parole hearings involving juvenile offend

2023Indeed, in Bonilla, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Iowa’s parole system as facially constitutional partly because the parole board reassured 209 Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 772 (Iowa 2019) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 212 (2016)) (other citations omitted)); see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). – 65 – 2745 the court that the primary focus of discretionary parole hearings involving juvenile offend

2023Based on these shortcomings, the court of appeals had considerable basis for concluding, as it did, that the record before it did not support the sentence imposed by Judge Ripley.”); Brown v. State, 693 P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska App. 1984) (“Given the lack of an appropriate sentencing explanation, we are unable to provide effective appellate review of the sentences.

2023Based on these shortcomings, the court of appeals had considerable basis for concluding, as it did, that the record before it did not support the sentence imposed by Judge Ripley.”); Brown v. State, 693 P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska App. 1984) (“Given the lack of an appropriate sentencing explanation, we are unable to provide effective appellate review of the sentences.

2023In State v. Thomas, for example, a New Jersey appellate court held that a juvenile offender’s sentence “evolved into” the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence after the parole board repeatedly denied the offender’s application for discretionary parole.201 The defendant in Thomas committed two murders when he was seventeen years old and was originally sentenced to a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 13 years.202 199 Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Mass. 2015). 200 Id. at 365-67 ; see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State

2023In State v. Thomas, for example, a New Jersey appellate court held that a juvenile offender’s sentence “evolved into” the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence after the parole board repeatedly denied the offender’s application for discretionary parole.201 The defendant in Thomas committed two murders when he was seventeen years old and was originally sentenced to a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 13 years.202 199 Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. (Diatchenko II), 27 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Mass. 2015). 200 Id. at 365-67 ; see also Hawkins v. N.Y. State

2023Instead, she has a state constitutional claim for relief — but only if the new constitutional rule articulated here (which requires the sentencing court to consider the Miller factors and provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to a discretionary de facto life without parole sentence) is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review.236 Unlike federal law, which allows for retroactive application of a ruling on collateral review only if the new rule is substantive or is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates the fundamental fairness of t

2023Instead, she has a state constitutional claim for relief — but only if the new constitutional rule articulated here (which requires the sentencing court to consider the Miller factors and provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to a discretionary de facto life without parole sentence) is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review.236 Unlike federal law, which allows for retroactive application of a ruling on collateral review only if the new rule is substantive or is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates the fundamental fairness of t

2023Morgan v. State, 217 So. 3d 266, 276 (La. 2016) (dismissing the defendant’s excessive sentence claims as procedurally barred but holding that the defendant’s claim that his sentence was unconstitutional under Graham constituted an illegal sentence claim that could be filed at any time); St.

2023Morgan v. State, 217 So. 3d 266, 276 (La. 2016) (dismissing the defendant’s excessive sentence claims as procedurally barred but holding that the defendant’s claim that his sentence was unconstitutional under Graham constituted an illegal sentence claim that could be filed at any time); St.

2023Instead, she has a state constitutional claim for relief — but only if the new constitutional rule articulated here (which requires the sentencing court to consider the Miller factors and provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to a discretionary de facto life without parole sentence) is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review.236 Unlike federal law, which allows for retroactive application of a ruling on collateral review only if the new rule is substantive or is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates the fundamental fairness of t

2023Instead, she has a state constitutional claim for relief — but only if the new constitutional rule articulated here (which requires the sentencing court to consider the Miller factors and provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to a discretionary de facto life without parole sentence) is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review.236 Unlike federal law, which allows for retroactive application of a ruling on collateral review only if the new rule is substantive or is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates the fundamental fairness of t

2023Various state courts have also issued decisions applying — and, at times, extending — the 37 Id. at 212. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 211 (alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)). 40 See, e.g., Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031 , 1034 (Conn. 2015) (discussing how the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller have “altered the landscape of juvenile sentencing practices”); State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 98 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that the court decisions alone do not “express the full scope of the changi

2023Various state courts have also issued decisions applying — and, at times, extending — the 37 Id. at 212. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 211 (alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)). 40 See, e.g., Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031 , 1034 (Conn. 2015) (discussing how the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller have “altered the landscape of juvenile sentencing practices”); State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 98 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that the court decisions alone do not “express the full scope of the changi

2023Instead, she has a state constitutional claim for relief — but only if the new constitutional rule articulated here (which requires the sentencing court to consider the Miller factors and provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to a discretionary de facto life without parole sentence) is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review.236 Unlike federal law, which allows for retroactive application of a ruling on collateral review only if the new rule is substantive or is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates the fundamental fairness of t

2023Instead, she has a state constitutional claim for relief — but only if the new constitutional rule articulated here (which requires the sentencing court to consider the Miller factors and provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to a discretionary de facto life without parole sentence) is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review.236 Unlike federal law, which allows for retroactive application of a ruling on collateral review only if the new rule is substantive or is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates the fundamental fairness of t

2023Instead, she has a state constitutional claim for relief — but only if the new constitutional rule articulated here (which requires the sentencing court to consider the Miller factors and provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to a discretionary de facto life without parole sentence) is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review.236 Unlike federal law, which allows for retroactive application of a ruling on collateral review only if the new rule is substantive or is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates the fundamental fairness of t

2023Instead, she has a state constitutional claim for relief — but only if the new constitutional rule articulated here (which requires the sentencing court to consider the Miller factors and provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation prior to sentencing a juvenile offender to a discretionary de facto life without parole sentence) is fully retroactive to cases on collateral review.236 Unlike federal law, which allows for retroactive application of a ruling on collateral review only if the new rule is substantive or is a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates the fundamental fairness of t

2023The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.[36] 32 Id. 33 Id. at 208 . 34 Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 ). 35 Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 ). 36 Id. at 210 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 ). – 14 – 2745 Although the Montgomery Court gave retroactive effect to Miller, the Court also explained that this “[did] not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandator

2023The hearing does not replace but rather gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.[36] 32 Id. 33 Id. at 208 . 34 Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 ). 35 Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 ). 36 Id. at 210 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 ). – 14 – 2745 Although the Montgomery Court gave retroactive effect to Miller, the Court also explained that this “[did] not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandator

2023These legislative amendments have typically set out a non-exhaustive list of “mitigating circumstances” based on the Miller factors that sentencing courts must consider when sentencing a juvenile offender tried as an adult.51 50 See also State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 , 61-63 (Tenn. 2022) (summarizing sentencing and parole statutes in other jurisdictions and concluding that thirty-six or nearly three-fourths of other states allow for juvenile offenders to receive a sentence with the possibility of release in less than 35 years); Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1336 (2021) (Sotomayor, J.

2023These legislative amendments have typically set out a non-exhaustive list of “mitigating circumstances” based on the Miller factors that sentencing courts must consider when sentencing a juvenile offender tried as an adult.51 50 See also State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 , 61-63 (Tenn. 2022) (summarizing sentencing and parole statutes in other jurisdictions and concluding that thirty-six or nearly three-fourths of other states allow for juvenile offenders to receive a sentence with the possibility of release in less than 35 years); Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1336 (2021) (Sotomayor, J.

2025Likewise, while the Parole Board is not mandated by 34 Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 316-19. 35 Under Alaska law, inmates eligible for good-time credits are awarded good-time credits equal to one-third of their sentence, are subject to losing those good-time credits as a sanction for prison disciplinary infractions, and are released onto mandatory parole once they have served their sentence less available good-time credits.

2025Likewise, while the Parole Board is not mandated by 34 Fletcher, 532 P.3d at 316-19. 35 Under Alaska law, inmates eligible for good-time credits are awarded good-time credits equal to one-third of their sentence, are subject to losing those good-time credits as a sanction for prison disciplinary infractions, and are released onto mandatory parole once they have served their sentence less available good-time credits.

2017Regarding this latter prongof the Miller test, the court noted that the State’s evidence against the two co-defendants was “about as intertwined as you can [possibly] get.” The court also noted that, because the evidence against the two defendants was so closely connected, and because Dutch Harbor is a relatively small community, holding Mayuyo’s trial in late July or early August would probably make it difficult to select a second jury for Balallo’s trial only a few weeks later, in September. 11 706 P.2d 336, 340 (Alaska App. 1985). –9– 2556 A trial court’s decision under Miller should be rev