Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967).
Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitPublished opinionNo. 40, Docket 31246Nov 9, 1967

Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967)

Quick Summary

Judges and prosecutors are immune from damages for official acts to promote fearless decision-making and protect them from litigation alleging malice or corruption.

A plaintiff sued a justice of the peace and a district attorney under the Civil Rights Act, alleging a conspiracy tied to adverse zoning rulings and a criminal assault conviction. The justice tried the case, and the prosecutor's assistant prosecuted it. The court considers whether the defendants are immune from damages. The court holds that the justice had jurisdiction over the assault charge and that any defects in the information did not void it. It further holds that even an error on debatable jurisdictional questions would not strip immunity. The district attorney's conduct was confined to official prosecutorial action, so he is also immune. Summary judgment for both defendants is affirmed.

71 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
Cited for
At page 868Judicial immunity under civil rights act for judicial acts11 citing cases“the immunity rule is designed to promote 'principled and fearless decision-making' by removing a judge's and county district attorney's 'fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.' " fanale, 385 f.2d at 868 (quoting pierson, 386 u.s. at 554 , 87 s.c…”1 citing court quotes it · passage not found verbatim in the opinion (79%)
  • Korotki v. Goughan, 597 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Md. 1984).published 2 cites
    Similarly, in Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.1967), Judge Hays observed, in a case brought under sections 1983 and 1985(3), that “[e]ven if the justice of the peace was in error in resolving these’ questions of jurisdiction, h…
  • Mobil Oil Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 454 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).published
    In Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1967) the plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claiming that the defendants (justice of the peace, various police officers and the prosecutor) were engaged in a conspi…
  • Arthur N. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agric., 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976).published
    The Supreme Court cited Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1967), and Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926).
  • Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).published
    See generally Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973). [16] Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F. 2d 866, 868 (CA2 1967); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F. 2d 581 (CA3 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 1021 (1967); Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F. 2d 862, 864 (CA5 1966); T…
  • Robert J. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1975).published 2 cites
    Fanale v. Sheehy, supra, 385 F.2d at 868.
  • Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975).published
    It is pointed out that the immunity rule is designed to promote “principled and fearless decision-making” by removing a judge’s “fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption”; Pierson v. Ray,…
  • Dale v. Hahn, 311 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).published
    “played [no] part except that imposed upon him by his official position”
  • Jacobson v. Schaefer, 307 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Wis. 1969).published
    In Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1967), the court noted: “The immunity rule is designed to promote ‘principled and fearless decision-making’ by removing a judge’s ‘fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigatio…
  • Dacey v. New York Cnty. Lawyers'Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).published
    Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1967); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 386 U.S. 1021 , 87 S.Ct. 1367 , 18 L.Ed.2d 457 (1967).
  • Cooney v. Park Cnty., 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990).published 2 cites
    See Fanale v. Sheehy 385 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir.1967). “[T]he decisions of this court cited by my brothers do establish a broad rule of immunity.
Show 1 more citing case
  • Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 358 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Conn. 2005).published
    (immunity rule is designed to promote principled and fearless decision-making” and district attorney is entitled to same immunity from suits under § 1983 as a justice of the peace)
At page 869Defining assault under former penal law section 2443 citing casesWaterman and Feinberg, JJ., concurring1 citing court put it this way · 2 listed here
  • Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977).published 2 cites
    See also Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting the Imbler distinction between advocacy and investigation); Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying absolute immunity in a § 1983 false imprisonm…
  • Norman F. Dacey v. New York Cnty. Lawyers' Ass'n, 423 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1970).published 2 cites
    (Waterman and Feinberg, JJ., concurring)
At page 867HAYS, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from an order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of two defendants in a suit for damages under the…1 citing caseopening of page *867 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Bishop v. Golden, 302 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).published
    Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1967); Gaito v. Strauss, 249 F.Supp. 923 (W.D.Pa.1966) and eases cited therein.
Other citing cases5 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John S. FANALE
v.
Hon. J. Webb SHEEHY, Justice of the Peace, Town of Irondequoit, County of Monroe, New York, and Hon. John C. Little, Jr., District Attorney, County of Monroe, New York, and Lennarth C. Anderson
No. 40, Docket 31246.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Nov 9, 1967.
Published opinion
385 F.2d 866
1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4563
Sam Polur, New York City (Polur & Polur, New York City, on the brief), for appellant., Hyman T. Maas, Rochester, N. Y., Town Atty., Town of Irondequoit, for appellee Sheehy., Carl L. Feinstock, Rochester, N. Y. (William J. Stevens, Rochester, N. Y., Monroe County Legal Adviser, on the brief), for appellee Little.
Feinberg, Hays, Waterman.
Cited by 37 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

HAYS, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of two defendants in a suit for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), on the ground that they were immune from suit under that Act. We affirm.

Plaintiff, John S. Fanale, brought suit against Hon. J. Webb Sheehy, Justice of the Peace, Town of Irondequoit, and John C. Little, Monroe County District Attorney, appellees herein, and several others, including police officers, zoning officials, and private citizens. He alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights in connection with certain adverse rulings by the zoning board and his conviction for third degree assault on Raymond T. Masters, with whom he was engaged in a zoning dispute. Appellee[*868] Sheehy tried the assault case and appellee Little’s assistant was the prosecutor. After a jury trial appellant was convicted and fined fifty dollars. He took no appeal.

Appellant asserts that Justice of the Peace Sheehy signed a defective information which the defendant police officers used as authority to threaten and harass him, that the information was insufficient to give the court jurisdiction, that the court lacked jurisdiction over the crime of assault in the third degree, that the court countenanced the use of perjured testimony, and that the court should have directed a verdict in his favor.

The recent case of Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), is clearly dispositive of these claims. The Court there held that a judge is immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act when he acts “within his jurisdiction” or “within the judicial role.”

Appellant’s contention that the justice of the peace court lacked jurisdiction is without support in the New York statutes and cases. As a justice of the peace, appellee Sheehy clearly had jurisdiction to try a case of assault in the third degree under Sections 56(2)[1] and 62 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure.

The alleged deficiencies in the information had no effect on its validity. The section number of the Penal Law claimed to have been violated did not have to be recited in the information. People v. Dioquardo, 303 N.Y. 514, 104 N.E.2d 881 (1952). The charge of “assault and battery” was equivalent to a charge of assault in the third degree. In re Bray, 12 N.Y.S. 366 (Sup.Ct. 1890).[2]

Even if the justice of the peace was in error in resolving these questions of jurisdiction, he is not liable under the Civil Rights Act. Where jurisdiction depends on the resolution of factual issues or involves debatable questions of law judges do not lose their immunity. See Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705, 707 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944, 69 S.Ct. 810, 93 L.Ed. 1101 (1949) ; Sarelas v. Sheehan, 326 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 932, 84 S.Ct. 1334, 12 L.Ed.2d 296 (1964).

The immunity rule is designed to promote “principled and fearless decision-making” by removing a judge’s “fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218. To accomplish this purpose exceptions must be confined to situations in which it is perfectly clear that the court acted wholly without jurisdiction.

None of the allegations of the complaint are directed specifically against District Attorney Little. Presumably his part in the alleged conspiracy consisted of the determination to undertake the prosecution of the appellant and the conduct of the prosecution through one of of his assistants. At any rate the complaint provides no basis for assuming that Little played any part except that imposed upon him by his official position.

If, then, as we hold, the complaint’s allegations as to Little are confined to official action, he, too, is entitled to immunity. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950) ; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff’d, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed. 395 (1927) (per curiam) ; Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021, 87 S.Ct. 1367, 18 L.Ed.2d 457 (1967); Gabbard v. Rose, 359 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1966); Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963); Kostal v. Ston[*869]er, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1961). cert. denied, 369 U.S. 868, 82 S.Ct. 1032, 8 L.Ed.2d 87 (1962).

Affirmed.

1

Repealed effective September 1, 1967, but in effect at the time of trial.

2

This conclusion is supported by the language of the former Penal Law, which was in effect at the time of this trial. The phrase “assault and battery” appears in no assault section other than Section 244, the section defining assault in the third degree.

Concurrence

WATERMAN, Circuit Judge

(concurring) :

I concur in the opinion of the court and I also concur in the caveat mentioned by Judge FEINBERG.

Concurrence

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge

(concurring) :

I concur in the decision of the court. As to defendant District Attorney Little, the decisions of this court cited by my brothers do establish a broad rule of immunity. However, if we were writing on a clean slate, I feel that there would be some situations — although this case is not one of them — in which even “official” acts of a prosecuting officer should not be protected by absolute immunity from civil liability. See the dissenting and concurring opinions of Judges Biggs, Freedman and Hastie in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 592-595 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021, 87 S.Ct. 1367, 18 L.Ed.2d 457 (1967).