immunity doctrine in Wyoming

1978This section shall apply to any governmental body or agency in the state securing liability insurance coverage." In Jivelekas v. City of Worland, Wyo. 1976, 546 P.2d 419 , when we were sitting in *1160 a three-judge panel, the writer of the majority proposed abolition of the immunity doctrine, to which the Chief Justice and I disagreed.

1978This section shall apply to any governmental body or agency in the state securing liability insurance coverage.” In Jivelekas v. City of Worland, Wyo. 1976, 546 P.2d 419 , when we were sitting in a three-judge panel, the writer of the majority proposed abolition of the immunity doctrine, to which the Chief Justice and I disagreed.

2012This Court, in Blake, adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974): * * * [T]he common law soon recognized the necessity of permitting officials to perform their official functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability.

2012This Court, in Blake, adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974): * * * [T]he common law soon recognized the necessity of permitting officials to perform their official functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability.

1990Obviously, an immunity defense would have been asserted if a Bivens proceeding against this prosecutor had ever been instituted. [32] In historical perspective, as related in Davidson, 752 F.2d 817 (Gibbons, J., dissenting), the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was anesthetized by the United States Supreme Court as administered principally by White, 114 U.S. 307 , 5 S.Ct. 923 , 29 L.Ed. 199 and then finally come back to life sixty years later. [33] An observation made in Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522-23 , 105 S.Ct. at 2813 that "the judicial process is largely self-correcting: procedural rules, appeals, a

1990Obviously, an immunity defense would have been asserted if a Bivens proceeding against this prosecutor had ever been instituted. [32] In historical perspective, as related in Davidson, 752 F.2d 817 (Gibbons, J., dissenting), the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was anesthetized by the United States Supreme Court as administered principally by White, 114 U.S. 307 , 5 S.Ct. 923 , 29 L.Ed. 199 and then finally come back to life sixty years later. [33] An observation made in Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522-23 , 105 S.Ct. at 2813 that "the judicial process is largely self-correcting: procedural rules, appeals, a

1990"The immunity rule is designed to promote `principled and fearless decision-making' by removing a judge's [and county district attorney's] `fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.'" Fanale, 385 F.2d at 868 (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 , 87 S.Ct. at 1218 ). "`[P]rosecutors performing their official duties are quasi-judicial officials, not non-judicial functionaries and should be able to vigorously proceed with their tasks unhampered by the fear of unlimited civil litigation.'" Gartin, 281 N.W.2d at 30 .

1990"The immunity rule is designed to promote 'principled and fearless decision-making’ by removing a judge’s [and county district attorney’s] ‘fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.’ ” Fanale, 385 F.2d at 868 (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 , 87 S.Ct. at 1218 ). " '[P]rosecutors performing their official duties are quasi-judicial officials, not non-judicial functionaries and should be able to vigorously proceed with their tasks unhampered by the fear of unlimited civil litigation.' ” Gartin, 281 N.W.2d at 30 .

1990"The immunity rule is designed to promote `principled and fearless decision-making' by removing a judge's [and county district attorney's] `fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.'" Fanale, 385 F.2d at 868 (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 , 87 S.Ct. at 1218 ). "`[P]rosecutors performing their official duties are quasi-judicial officials, not non-judicial functionaries and should be able to vigorously proceed with their tasks unhampered by the fear of unlimited civil litigation.'" Gartin, 281 N.W.2d at 30 .

1990"The immunity rule is designed to promote `principled and fearless decision-making' by removing a judge's [and county district attorney's] `fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.'" Fanale, 385 F.2d at 868 (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 , 87 S.Ct. at 1218 ). "`[P]rosecutors performing their official duties are quasi-judicial officials, not non-judicial functionaries and should be able to vigorously proceed with their tasks unhampered by the fear of unlimited civil litigation.'" Gartin, 281 N.W.2d at 30 .

1990Obviously, an immunity defense would have been asserted if a Bivens proceeding against this prosecutor had ever been instituted. [32] In historical perspective, as related in Davidson, 752 F.2d 817 (Gibbons, J., dissenting), the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was anesthetized by the United States Supreme Court as administered principally by White, 114 U.S. 307 , 5 S.Ct. 923 , 29 L.Ed. 199 and then finally come back to life sixty years later. [33] An observation made in Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522-23 , 105 S.Ct. at 2813 that "the judicial process is largely self-correcting: procedural rules, appeals, a

1990In historical perspective, as related in Davidson, 752 F.2d 817 (Gibbons, J., dissenting), the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was anesthetized by the United States Supreme Court as administered principally by White, 114 U.S. 307 , 5 S.Ct. 923 , 29 L.Ed. 199 and then finally come back to life sixty years later. .

1990In Maxey By Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals discerned that Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 did not "sweep so broadly" to deny proper discovery. "[D]iscovery is permissible" for which it is "`narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim * * *.'" Maxey By Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282-83 (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir.1987)).

1990In Maxey By Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals discerned that Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 did not "sweep so broadly” to deny proper discovery. "[Djiscov-ery is permissible” for which it is '"narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim * * *.' ” Maxey By Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282-83 (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir.1987)).

1990"The immunity rule is designed to promote `principled and fearless decision-making' by removing a judge's [and county district attorney's] `fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.'" Fanale, 385 F.2d at 868 (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 , 87 S.Ct. at 1218 ). "`[P]rosecutors performing their official duties are quasi-judicial officials, not non-judicial functionaries and should be able to vigorously proceed with their tasks unhampered by the fear of unlimited civil litigation.'" Gartin, 281 N.W.2d at 30 .

1990"The immunity rule is designed to promote 'principled and fearless decision-making’ by removing a judge’s [and county district attorney’s] ‘fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption.’ ” Fanale, 385 F.2d at 868 (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 , 87 S.Ct. at 1218 ). " '[P]rosecutors performing their official duties are quasi-judicial officials, not non-judicial functionaries and should be able to vigorously proceed with their tasks unhampered by the fear of unlimited civil litigation.' ” Gartin, 281 N.W.2d at 30 .

1990In Maxey By Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals discerned that Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 did not "sweep so broadly" to deny proper discovery. "[D]iscovery is permissible" for which it is "`narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim * * *.'" Maxey By Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282-83 (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir.1987)).

1990In Maxey By Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals discerned that Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 did not "sweep so broadly" to deny proper discovery. "[D]iscovery is permissible" for which it is "`narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim * * *.'" Maxey By Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282-83 (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir.1987)).

1989Concerning the second issue, Harlow states that: “If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” 457 U.S. at 818-19 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 . 4 Wyoming law is rather skimpy concerning the effect of a commutation order.

1989Concerning the second issue, Harlow states that: “If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” 457 U.S. at 818-19 , 102 S.Ct. at 2738 . 4 Wyoming law is rather skimpy concerning the effect of a commutation order.

1989Brown, 160 N.W.2d at 806-07 .

1989Brown, 160 N.W.2d at 806-07 .

1989O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985).

1989O’Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo.1985).

1989Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo.1986).

1987From that stage of vacuous authority, this court, with two different justices sit ting, considered parental immunity in Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29 , 269 P.2d 302 (1954).

1987From that stage of vacuous authority, this court, with two different justices sit ting, considered parental immunity in Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29 , 269 P.2d 302 (1954).

1987A demurrer was filed and sustained, and on appeal one justice voted to retain the immunity doctrine as a justification for complaint denial, a second justice, Justice Blume, contended that the demurrer was well placed because it pleaded the husband-and-wife status and did not plead insurance, with leave remaining upon remand to replead, and the third justice dissented, contending that the Married Women's Act made fundamental changes in the law, and that "There is * * * no rule of law or morals that gives a husband the right to inflict a personal injury on his wife." 135 P.2d at 958 .

1987A demurrer was filed and sustained, and on appeal one justice voted to retain the immunity doctrine as a justification for complaint denial, a second justice, Justice Blume, contended that the demurrer was well placed because it pleaded the husband- and-wife status and did not plead insurance, with leave remaining upon remand to replead, and the third justice dissented, contending that the Married Women’s Act made fundamental changes in the law, and that “There is * * * no rule of law or morals that gives a husband the right to inflict a personal injury on his wife.” 135 P.2d at 958 .

1986We will not explore the due process argument except to note that the United States Supreme Court has minimized the impact of the due process clause on sovereign immunity in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553, 557 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980): “[E]ven if one characterizes the immunity defense as a statutory deprivation [of a property interest], it would remain true that the State’s interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to *166 any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly ar

1986We will not explore the due process argument except to note that the United States Supreme Court has minimized the impact of the due process clause on sovereign immunity in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 , 100 S.Ct. 553, 557 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980): “[E]ven if one characterizes the immunity defense as a statutory deprivation [of a property interest], it would remain true that the State’s interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to *166 any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly ar

1978In my remarks of disagreement, because of the timing of such holding and my view that the legislature should set up a uniform system of handling state tort liability, I made the following remarks: "`* * * "Whatever that branch does, consideration must be given to the economics of insurance premiums versus appropriated funds." [ Awe v. University of Wyoming, Wyo. 1975, 534 P.2d 97, 107 .] It may be more feasible to divert insurance premiums into a state-administered tort liability fund.

1978In my remarks of disagreement, because of the timing of such holding and my view that the legislature should set up a uniform system of handling state tort liability, I made the following remarks: “ ‘ * * * “Whatever that branch does, consideration must be given to the economics of insurance premiums versus appropriated funds.” [Awe v. University of Wyoming, Wyo.1975, 534 P.2d 97, 107 .] It may be more feasible to divert insurance premiums into a state-administered tort liability fund.

1976In rejecting sovereign immunity, I would hold, as we did in Collins v. Memorial Hospital , supra, [8] that the doctrine is court-created and thus may be court-abrogated; I would reject and deny the doctrine of immunity for the state, county and municipal governments, as well as every division, subdivison and agency of the state, counties or municipalities.

1976In rejecting sovereign immunity, I would hold, as we did in Collins v. Memorial Hospital, supra, 8 that the doctrine is court-created and thus may be court-abrogated; I would reject and deny the doctrine of immunity for the state, county and municipal governments, as well as every division, subdivison and agency of the state, counties or municipalities.

1974The principle is clearly recognized in the case of Vendrell v. School District No. 26C Malheur County, 226 Or. 263 , 360 P.2d 282, 291 , although that case arises under a statute authorizing the purchase of liability insurance but not requiring it.

1974The principle is clearly recognized in the case of Vendrell v. School District No. 26C Malheur County, 226 Or. 263 , 360 P.2d 282, 291 , although that case arises under a statute authorizing the purchase of liability insurance but not requiring it.

1965In that case liability attaches to the municipality notwithstanding its violated duties appertain to the performances of a governmental function. * * * ” Engle v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465 , 25 A.2d 446, 448 , “ 'There is an exception to the application of the general rule in cases of injuries caused by a- failure of municipal duty to keep highways and streets in safe condition for public travel.’ ” Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411 , 83 N.E.2d 389, 391 , “ 'the duty imposed upon municipalities * * * [by code] to keep its streets free from nuisance, is an exc

1965In that case liability attaches to the municipality notwithstanding its violated duties appertain to the performances of a governmental function. * * *" Engle v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465 , 25 A.2d 446, 448 , "`There is an exception to the application of the general rule in cases of injuries caused by a failure of municipal duty to keep highways and streets in safe condition for public travel.'" Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411 , 83 N.E.2d 389, 391 , "`the duty imposed upon municipalities * * * [by code] to keep its streets free from nuisance, is an exceptio

1965In that case liability attaches to the municipality notwithstanding its violated duties appertain to the performances of a governmental function. * * *" Engle v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465 , 25 A.2d 446, 448 , "`There is an exception to the application of the general rule in cases of injuries caused by a failure of municipal duty to keep highways and streets in safe condition for public travel.'" Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411 , 83 N.E.2d 389, 391 , "`the duty imposed upon municipalities * * * [by code] to keep its streets free from nuisance, is an exceptio

1965In that case liability attaches to the municipality notwithstanding its violated duties appertain to the performances of a governmental function. * * *" Engle v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465 , 25 A.2d 446, 448 , "`There is an exception to the application of the general rule in cases of injuries caused by a failure of municipal duty to keep highways and streets in safe condition for public travel.'" Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411 , 83 N.E.2d 389, 391 , "`the duty imposed upon municipalities * * * [by code] to keep its streets free from nuisance, is an exceptio

1965In that case liability attaches to the municipality notwithstanding its violated duties appertain to the performances of a governmental function. * * *" Engle v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465 , 25 A.2d 446, 448 , "`There is an exception to the application of the general rule in cases of injuries caused by a failure of municipal duty to keep highways and streets in safe condition for public travel.'" Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411 , 83 N.E.2d 389, 391 , "`the duty imposed upon municipalities * * * [by code] to keep its streets free from nuisance, is an exceptio

1965In that case liability attaches to the municipality notwithstanding its violated duties appertain to the performances of a governmental function. * * *" Engle v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465 , 25 A.2d 446, 448 , "`There is an exception to the application of the general rule in cases of injuries caused by a failure of municipal duty to keep highways and streets in safe condition for public travel.'" Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411 , 83 N.E.2d 389, 391 , "`the duty imposed upon municipalities * * * [by code] to keep its streets free from nuisance, is an exceptio

1965In that case liability attaches to the municipality notwithstanding its violated duties appertain to the performances of a governmental function. * * *" Engle v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465 , 25 A.2d 446, 448 , "`There is an exception to the application of the general rule in cases of injuries caused by a failure of municipal duty to keep highways and streets in safe condition for public travel.'" Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411 , 83 N.E.2d 389, 391 , "`the duty imposed upon municipalities * * * [by code] to keep its streets free from nuisance, is an exceptio

1965In that case liability attaches to the municipality notwithstanding its violated duties appertain to the performances of a governmental function. * * *" Engle v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465 , 25 A.2d 446, 448 , "`There is an exception to the application of the general rule in cases of injuries caused by a failure of municipal duty to keep highways and streets in safe condition for public travel.'" Wall v. City of Cincinnati, 150 Ohio St. 411 , 83 N.E.2d 389, 391 , "`the duty imposed upon municipalities * * * [by code] to keep its streets free from nuisance, is an exceptio