14 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1955–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tara Cartier Donald Coates v. Paul D. Lussier, Individually and in His Official Capacitygreen2 sentences2003Therefore, before taking the issue of qualified immunity away from the jury as a matter of law, the trial court must first determine that there are no material issues of fact relevant to the existence of probable cause.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, supra, 248 Conn. 521 ; see also Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1992). 1994In that case, summary judgment [appropriately would] be denied and [the] factual issues involving the immunity doctrine would be submitted to the jury.” Cartier v. Lussier, supra, 845-46 . | 1 | 3 |
Grady v. Town of Somersgreen2 sentences2021Usually, it is called either official immunity or qualified immunity; see, e.g., Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 326 , 984 A.2d 684 (2009) (referring to ‘‘a municipal employee’s qualified immunity for discretionary acts’’); though, sometimes, it is indiscriminately and inaccurately lumped together with the corporate (municipal entity) immunity under the rubric of ‘‘governmental’’ or ‘‘munici- pal’’ immunity. 2021Usually, it is called either official immunity or qualified immunity; see, e.g., Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 326 , 984 A.2d 684 (2009) (referring to ‘‘a municipal employee’s qualified immunity for discretionary acts’’); though, sometimes, it is indiscriminately and inaccurately lumped together with the corporate (municipal entity) immunity under the rubric of ‘‘governmental’’ or ‘‘munici- pal’’ immunity. | 1 | 1 |
Soares v. State of Connecticutgreen1 sentence1999In that case, summary judgment [appropriately would] be denied and [the] factual issues involving the immunity doctrine would be submitted to the jury.” Cartier v. Lussier, supra, 845-46 ; see also Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1994); Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Mary Velardi and Frances Velardi v. Cornelius R. Walsh, Jr. And Robert L. Boekgreen1 sentence1999In that case, summary judgment [appropriately would] be denied and [the] factual issues involving the immunity doctrine would be submitted to the jury.” Cartier v. Lussier, supra, 845-46 ; see also Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1994); Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
John C. Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, John R. Colli, Jr., Russell C. Gabrielson, and John R. Colli, IIIgreen1 sentence1993In Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, 834 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1987), the plaintiff fire fighter publicly admonished the board of fire commissioners for engaging in discriminatory practices and violations of the Freedom of Information Act. | 1 | 1 |
Shore v. Town of Stoningtongreen2 sentences1992Although there are numerous exceptions and qualifications of the immunity doctrine; see Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Heigl v. Board of Education, 218 Conn. 1, 5 , 587 A.2d 423 (1991); note, “The Official Responsibility Rule and its Implications for Municipal Liability in Connecticut: Shore v. Town of Stonington, ” 15 Conn. L. 1992Although there are numerous exceptions and qualifications of the immunity doctrine; see Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Heigl v. Board of Education, 218 Conn. 1, 5 , 587 A.2d 423 (1991); note, “The Official Responsibility Rule and its Implications for Municipal Liability in Connecticut: Shore v. Town of Stonington, ” 15 Conn. L. | 1 | 1 |
Fanale v. Sheehygreen1 sentence1975Ed. 2d 288 ; and that this policy has been applied in extending immunity to a prosecuting attorney; Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.); for acts done in “his official capacity” on grounds that “his office is vested with a vast quantum of discretion which is necessary for the vindication of the public interest. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
green
2 sentences1997Id. 1993“If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Id., 818-19 . | 2 | 1993–1997 |
Yonkers Board Of Education v. United States
green
1 sentence2009The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained: “Denials of motions to dismiss on grounds of immunity . . . are not [immediately] appealable . . . unless the immunity defense can be decided solely as a matter of law”; United States v. Board of Education, 893 F.2d 498 , 502 (2d Cir. 1990); “in light of the record on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Almonte v. Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100 , 105 (2d Cir. 2007). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Almonte v. City Of Long Beach
green
1 sentence2009The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained: “Denials of motions to dismiss on grounds of immunity . . . are not [immediately] appealable . . . unless the immunity defense can be decided solely as a matter of law”; United States v. Board of Education, 893 F.2d 498 , 502 (2d Cir. 1990); “in light of the record on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Almonte v. Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100 , 105 (2d Cir. 2007). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sevastian v. Sevastian
green
2 sentences2006The court further concluded that the immunity doctrine does not distinguish between tribal activities that are commercial or governmental in nature.” (Citation omitted.) Sevastian v. Sevastian, 73 Conn. App. 605, 609 , 808 A.2d 1180 (2002). 2006The court further concluded that the immunity doctrine does not distinguish between tribal activities that are commercial or governmental in nature.” (Citation omitted.) Sevastian v. Sevastian, 73 Conn. App. 605, 609 , 808 A.2d 1180 (2002). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.
green
2 sentences2001"The immunity of privilege is lost if the defendants can be shown to have made the claimed defamatory utterances for a purpose other than that for which the immunity was designed to afford protection." Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605 , 617 , 116 A.2d 440 (1955). 2001"The immunity of privilege is lost if the defendants can be shown to have made the claimed defamatory utterances for a purpose other than that for which the immunity was designed to afford protection." Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605 , 617 , 116 A.2d 440 (1955). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Evon v. Andrews
green
1 sentence1994Evon v. Andrews , supra. As already noted, the plaintiff has charged the defendant-Gionfriddo with fraudulent conduct in the commission of an intentional tort. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Wadsworth v. Town of Middletown
green
2 sentences1994Wadsworth v. Middletown, 94 Conn. 435 , 439 , 109 A. 246 ." Stiebitz v. Mahoney , 144 Conn. 443 , 448 (1957). "[W]here the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness or intent to injure". . . the immunity doctrine cannot be successfully invoked. 1994Wadsworth v. Middletown, 94 Conn. 435 , 439 , 109 A. 246 ." Stiebitz v. Mahoney , 144 Conn. 443 , 448 (1957). "[W]here the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness or intent to injure". . . the immunity doctrine cannot be successfully invoked. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Stiebitz v. Mahoney
green
1 sentence1994Wadsworth v. Middletown, 94 Conn. 435 , 439 , 109 A. 246 ." Stiebitz v. Mahoney , 144 Conn. 443 , 448 (1957). "[W]here the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness or intent to injure". . . the immunity doctrine cannot be successfully invoked. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Heigl v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences1992Although there are numerous exceptions and qualifications of the immunity doctrine; see Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Heigl v. Board of Education, 218 Conn. 1, 5 , 587 A.2d 423 (1991); note, “The Official Responsibility Rule and its Implications for Municipal Liability in Connecticut: Shore v. Town of Stonington, ” 15 Conn. L. 1992Although there are numerous exceptions and qualifications of the immunity doctrine; see Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Heigl v. Board of Education, 218 Conn. 1, 5 , 587 A.2d 423 (1991); note, “The Official Responsibility Rule and its Implications for Municipal Liability in Connecticut: Shore v. Town of Stonington, ” 15 Conn. L. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pierson v. Ray
green
2 sentences1975It is pointed out that the immunity rule is designed to promote “principled and fearless decision-making” by removing a judge’s “fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption”; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S. Ct. 1213 , 18 L. 1975It is pointed out that the immunity rule is designed to promote “principled and fearless decision-making” by removing a judge’s “fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption”; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 , 87 S. Ct. 1213 , 18 L. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Moore v. Stevenson
green
1 sentence1955Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14, 29 ; McNally v. Burleigh, 91 Me. 22, 23 , *618 39 A. 285 ; MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 221 , 17 N.W. 815 , 18 N.W. 209 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 850. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Thomas v. Schram
neutral
1 sentence1955Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14, 29 ; McNally v. Burleigh, 91 Me. 22, 23 , *618 39 A. 285 ; MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 221 , 17 N.W. 815 , 18 N.W. 209 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 850. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Maclean v. Scripps
green
1 sentence1955Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14, 29 ; McNally v. Burleigh, 91 Me. 22, 23 , *618 39 A. 285 ; MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 221 , 17 N.W. 815 , 18 N.W. 209 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 850. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
McNally v. Burleigh
neutral
2 sentences1955Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14, 29 ; McNally v. Burleigh, 91 Me. 22, 23 , *618 39 A. 285 ; MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 221 , 17 N.W. 815 , 18 N.W. 209 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 850. 1955Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14, 29 ; McNally v. Burleigh, 91 Me. 22, 23 , *618 39 A. 285 ; MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 221 , 17 N.W. 815 , 18 N.W. 209 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 850. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.