Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1983).
Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 81-5586Mar 25, 1983

Hall v. United States

Quick Summary

Federal officials are entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

A taxpayer sues an IRS District Director, claiming that the approval of a jeopardy tax assessment violated her constitutional rights. The district court grants summary judgment based on absolute official immunity. The appellate court must determine the correct standard of immunity for federal officials accused of constitutional violations. The court applies the doctrine of qualified, good faith immunity, which protects officials whose conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Because the law regarding the specific tax assessment procedures was not clearly established at the time of the action, the official could not reasonably be expected to know his conduct was unlawful. The court affirms the summary judgment in favor of the IRS official.

132 citation events (80 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Cited for
At page 251Determining personal involvement in constitutional rights deprivation78 citing casesholding that a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights2 citing courts put it this way
  • Anthony, No. 5:25-cv-02437 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2026).
    Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Mhoon v. Metro.
  • Towns 927505 v. Alger Corr. Facility, No. 2:25-cv-00088 (W.D. Mich. May 21, 2025).
    Dated: May 21, 2025 /s/Maarten Vermaat Maarten Vermaat United States Magistrate Judge federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)). 7
  • Pierce 743193 v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., No. 2:25-cv-00024 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2025).
    See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be gra…
  • Johnson v. Chambers-Smith, No. 3:24-cv-00044 (N.D. Ohio June 7, 2024).
    Plaintiff must also allege “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)).
  • Colvin v. Wilson, No. 5:23-cv-00142 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 20, 2023).
    (holding that a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights)
  • Arivett v. Childress, No. 5:23-cv-11335 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2023).
    The plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 198…
  • Killian v. King, No. 2:23-cv-11577 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2023).
    Plaintiffs must allege “more than just mere negligence.” Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted), and that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Fra…
  • Andrew Samuel Hango v. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, No. 3:23-cv-00518 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2023).
    See Nwaebo v. Hawk-Sawyer, 83 F. App’x 85, 86 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)); Kesterson v. Fed.
  • McGath v. Steward Trumbull Mem'l Hosp., Inc., No. 4:22-cv-02130 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2023).
    Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., Mhoon v. Metro.
  • Scott v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:23-cv-00102 (S.D. Ohio June 9, 2023).
    Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983).
Show 68 more citing cases
  • Morseman v. Helton, No. 4:22-cv-00172 (W.D. Ky. May 22, 2023).
    (holding that a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights)
  • Morris v. White, No. 4:22-cv-13081 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2023).
    The plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 198…
  • Leach v. Dewine, No. 3:22-cv-00528 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2023).
    Plaintiff must also allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F.App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 198…
  • Johnson v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-04179 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2023).
    Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983).
  • Hamer v. Allen, No. 4:22-cv-11317 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2023).
    They must also establish that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1983)…
  • Sorezo v. Smith, No. 2:22-cv-12849, 2023 WL 162196 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2023).
    The plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 198…
  • Nelson v. Louis, No. 2:22-cv-12168 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2023).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Evans v. Franklin Cnty. Corr. Ctr., II, No. 2:22-cv-03669 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2022).
    Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983).
  • Culberson v. Franklin Cnty. Corr. Ctr., II, No. 2:22-cv-03671, 2022 WL 17600955 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2022).
    Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983).
  • Leviton v. MDOC, No. 2:21-cv-13054 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2022).
    Moreover, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6t…
  • Dennis v. Howard, No. 2:22-cv-11118 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2022).
    Plaintiffs must allege “more than just mere negligence.” Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted), and that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Fra…
  • Miller v. Horn, No. 5:21-cv-12879 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2022).
    The plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 198…
  • Honzu v. Warden Ross Corr. Inst., No. 2:22-cv-00292, 2022 WL 3018095 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2022).
    Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983).
  • Bushner v. McConahay, No. 1:22-cv-00484 (N.D. Ohio July 18, 2022).
    Plaintiff must also allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F.App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 198…
  • Blaylock v. Adams, No. 2:22-cv-10831 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2022).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Springfield v. Trott, No. 2:22-cv-10344 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2022).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Dean v. Rhea, No. 1:21-cv-02356 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2022).
    Plaintiff must also allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F.App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 198…
  • Cook v. Shaffer, No. 4:21-cv-01549 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2022).
    Ed. 2d 561 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)); Kesterson v. Fed.
  • Boyd v. Miniard, No. 2:21-cv-11926 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2021).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Butler v. Pickell, No. 1:21-cv-10817, 2021 WL 3566276 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2021).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Heyward v. Cooper, No. 3:19-cv-02499 (N.D. Ohio July 27, 2021).
    Heyward fails to allege facts which support a plausible inference that Damschroder, as an administrative assistant, was “personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.…
  • Allard v. Midland Cnty. Jail, No. 2:21-cv-10114 (E.D. Mich. July 22, 2021).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Thomason v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-01842 (N.D. Ohio June 10, 2021).
    See Nwaebo v. Hawk-Sawyer, No. 03-3801, 2003 WL 22905316 , at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 28, 2003) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 (4:20CV 1842) (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)); Kesterson v. Fed.
  • Gilford v. Aqua Ohio, No. 4:21-cv-00174 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2021).
    The plaintiff must also allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F.App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.…
  • Haywood v. Winn, No. 2:20-cv-12976 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2021).
    That is, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th…
  • Day v. Chambers-Smith, No. 4:20-cv-01583 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2021).
    The plaintiff must also allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 Fed.Appx. 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Ci…
  • Hammoud v. Williams, No. 4:20-cv-01668, 2020 WL 7046815 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2020).
    Appx. 85, 86 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)).
  • Clark v. Brown, No. 2:20-cv-12894 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2020).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Durden v. Bouchard, No. 2:20-cv-12161 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2020).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Arnold v. St. Clair Cnty. Intervention Ctr., No. 1:20-cv-11410 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2020).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Horacek v. Carter, No. 1:20-cv-11682 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 2020).
    In addition, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251…
  • Patton v. Louisville Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, No. 3:18-cv-00346 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2019).
    Allegations premised on mere conclusions and opinions fail to state an adequate claim, Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987), and bare and conclusory allegations that a defendant personally deprived the plaintif…
  • Thomas Ridgeway v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 510 F. App'x 412 (6th Cir. 2013).unpublished
    See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 , 96 S.Ct. 598 , 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1983). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individ…
  • Lee v. Michigan Parole Bd., 104 F. App'x 490 (6th Cir. 2004).unpublished
    See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 , 96 S.Ct. 598 , 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983).
  • Shedden v. United States, 101 F. App'x 114 (6th Cir. 2004).unpublished
    See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 , 96 S.Ct. 598 , 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983).
  • Nwaebo v. Hawk-Sawyer, 100 F. App'x 367 (6th Cir. 2004).unpublished
    See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 , 96 S.Ct. 598 , 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1983).
  • Mueller v. Gallina, 311 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Mich. 2004).published
    See Nwae-bo v. Hawk-Sawyer, 83 Fed.Appx. 85, 86 (6th Cir.2003) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 , 96 S.Ct. 598 , 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1983)); Kesterson v. Fed.
  • Nwaebo v. Hawk-Sawyer, 83 F. App'x 85 (6th Cir. 2003).unpublished
    Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-77 , 96 S.Ct. 598 , 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1983).
  • In re Davis, 55 F. App'x 306 (6th Cir. 2003).unpublished
    Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1983).
  • Frazier v. State of Michigan, 41 F. App'x 762 (6th Cir. 2002).unpublished
    Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1983).
  • Modla v. United States, 779 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1985).unpublished
  • Ledbetter v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of California, Sacramento, 952 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1991).unpublished
  • Noel Edward Plunkett v. Mark H. Luttrell, 52 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1995).published
  • Johnson v. United States, 680 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).published
  • Fluellen v. United States Dep't of Just. Drug Enf't Admin., 816 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Mich. 1993).published
  • Kesterson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 60 F. App'x 591 (6th Cir. 2003).unpublished
  • Raines v. Ashcroft, 70 F. App'x 300 (6th Cir. 2003).unpublished
  • Gallagher v. Lane, 75 F. App'x 440 (6th Cir. 2003).unpublished
  • Sato v. Tabor, 579 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1983).published
  • Austin v. Hall, No. 4:20-cv-00036 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 4, 2020).
  • Vinson-Jackson v. Guirquis, No. 2:21-cv-10942 (E.D. Mich. July 19, 2021).
  • Muir v. Champman, No. 2:21-cv-12624 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2022).
  • Clement v. Macomb Corr. Facility, No. 2:22-cv-10853 (E.D. Mich. June 24, 2022).
  • Villanueva v. Washington, No. 2:23-cv-12872 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2023).
  • Ross v. Washington, No. 2:23-cv-11785 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2024).
  • Covington v. Hamblen Cnty. Jail, No. 2:20-cv-00104 (E.D. Tenn. June 17, 2020).
  • Van Buren v. Walmart Stores of Am., No. 3:19-cv-00533 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 4, 2019).
  • Reed v. Christiansen, No. 2:25-cv-10358 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2025).
  • Strong v. Unknown Part(y)(ies) 1, No. 2:23-cv-12500 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2025).
  • Kuzma v. Flaugher, No. 2:23-cv-12848 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2025).
  • Moore v. Guastella, No. 2:23-cv-10974 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2025).
  • Ackerman 315935 v. Hooson, No. 1:25-cv-00180 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2025).
  • VanLeer v. Wayne Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 1:25-cv-10858 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2025).
  • Herron 299600 v. MDOC, No. 2:25-cv-00060 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2025).
  • Holbrook 382196 v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., No. 2:25-cv-00090 (W.D. Mich. May 16, 2025).
  • Austin v. Corizon Health Care, No. 2:24-cv-10023 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2025).
  • Rendon, No. 5:25-cv-12503 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2026).
  • Stephenson, No. 2:26-cv-12684 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2026).
At page 249Immunity of federal officials from state tort claims7 citing casesfederal officials only absolutely immune against state tort claims in federal court if acting within discretionary authority1 citing court put it this way
At page 250Determining good faith based on legal clarity3 citing cases“Although we reject McHugh’s contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity,2 we hold that he is entitled to the defense of qualified, good faith immunity.”the opinion's own words at *250 · 2 listed here
Elizabeth Jane HALL
v.
UNITED STATES of America
No. 81-5586.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Mar 25, 1983.
Published opinion
Edwin F. Kagin (argued), Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff-appellant., William E. Johnson (argued), Frankfort, Ky., John F. Murray (Lead Counsel), Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Paup, Michael Roach (argued), Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Engel, Lively, Phillips.
Cited by 108 opinions  |  Published
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

This action was filed against the United States, two officials of the Internal Revenue Service and a Kentucky State police officer seeking injunctive relief, $20,000 in actual damages and one million dollars in punitive damages. The original complaint asserted jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The amended complaint also relied' upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 and various provisions of the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgments in favor of defendants. The plaintiff, Mrs. Elizabeth Jane Hall, appeals.

This litigation is a sequel to Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir.1974), aff’d sub nom. Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 96 S.Ct. 473, 46 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976), in which the issuance of an injunction against the sale of plaintiff’s automobile and other personal property levied upon by the IRS was upheld. The case now is before us on the related issue of the potential personal liability of the defendants. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the orders of the district court dismissing the action as to all the defendants, except as to the injunctive relief heretofore granted.

I

Subsequent to the arrest of appellant’s husband in Texas on drug-related charges, Kentucky state troopers, pursuant to a valid warrant, searched the home of appellant on January 31,1973. The search uncovered controlled substances. The following day the Acting District Director for the IRS, defendant Thomas P. McHugh, notified appellant by letter that he found her involved in illicit drug activities, thereby rendering ineffectual the collection of income tax for the period January 1, 1973, through January 30,1973. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6851, District Director McHugh declared appellant’s taxable period for the first 30 days of 1973 “immediately terminated” and her income for that period “immediately due and payable.” McHugh assessed the tax in the amount of $52,680.25.

When appellant contended that she was unable to pay the assessed amount, the IRS levied on all her property, including her automobile and bank account. In response, Mrs. Hall brought suit in district court seeking injunctive and monetary relief. Because the IRS never provided Mrs. Hall with a deficiency notice as required by 26 U.S.C. § 6861, this court affirmed the grant of injunctive relief by the district court to restrain the United States from selling the automobile. Hall, supra, 493 F.2d at 1212. The decision of this court subsequently was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Laing, supra, 423 U.S. at 185, 96 S.Ct. at 486.

That part of appellant’s action seeking damages was held in abeyance, pending resolution of the injunction issue. On the present appeal, appellant asserts that the actions of the defendants in regard to the federal income tax assessment and levy violated her constitutional rights as secured by the fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.

On successive motions for summary judgment on the pleadings, the district court dismissed the claims as to each defendant. District Judge James F. Gordon found that District Director McHugh was protected by official immunity since he approved the recommendation of termination and jeopardy assessment while acting within the scope of his official duties. The district court found no evidence connecting McHugh with any conspiracy to deprive Mrs. Hall of her constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for IRS official Elmer Snider since appellant was unable to produce anything outside her pleadings to show that Snider acted improperly or in conspiracy with State officials. The claim against the United States was dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity. The claim against state police officer Donald Powers was dismissed on the ground, among others, that the plaintiff was unable to point to any wrongdoing committed by officer Powers.

[*249] II

Appellant avers that the district court erred in concluding that District Director McHugh was entitled to the defense of official immunity.[1] Although we cannot agree with the conclusion of the district court that McHugh’s actions were protected by the doctrine of official immunity, we hold that the defense of qualified, good faith immunity applies.

. The district court held that McHugh was afforded official immunity under the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959). In Barr the Court held that federal officials enjoy absolute immunity from suit for common law torts based on acts within their discretionary authority. In Granger v. Marek, 583 F.2d 781, 784-85 (6th Cir.1978), this court followed the Barr rule and held that, as applied to common law torts, the rule survived the decision of the Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), in which the Court held that federal officials were afforded only a qualified, good faith immunity from suits for constitutional torts. We recently reaffirmed our adherence to the Barr rule in the context of common law torts committed by federal officials in Queens v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 689 F.2d 80, 84 (6th Cir.1982).

Appellant asserts that District Director McHugh violated her fifth amendment rights due to his approval of the faulty termination and jeopardy assessments. Since appellant has alleged constitutional violations, as opposed to common law tort violations, we conclude that the Barr rule is not dispositive of the immunity issue.

In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) the Court held that only a defense of qualified, good faith immunity was available to high state officials for violations of constitutional rights. Under the doctrine of qualified, good faith immunity, a government official performing acts within the scope of official conduct is insulated from a suit in civil damages if (1) at the time and in light of all the circumstances there existed reasonable grounds for the belief that the action taken was appropriate and (2) the officer acted in good faith. 416 U.S. at 247-48, 94 S.Ct. at 1692. In Butz v. Economou, supra, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) the Court resolved any doubt that the standard enunciated in Scheuer applied equally to federal officials. In Butz it was held that there was only a qualified, good faith immunity for federal officials charged with constitutional violations, absent some special showing of a need for a full exemption of liability. 438 U.S. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 2911. In so holding, the Court distinguished its ruling in Barr, supra, finding that case dispositive only as to federal officials whose conduct does not exceed constitutional limits. 438 U.S. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 2911.

Inherent in the doctrine of qualified, good faith immunity is both an “objective” and “subjective” aspect. Harlow v.[*250] Fitzgerald, - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2737, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The former element refers to the presumptive knowledge of the official, whereas the latter encompasses the official’s subjective intent in performing the challenged conduct. Taken together, the defense of qualified, good faith immunity will not lie if the official “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within the sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1000, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), reh’g denied, 421 U.S. 961, 95 S.Ct. 1589, 43 L.Ed.2d 790 (1975). See Harlow, supra, - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2737 n. 25 noting that despite its specific context of school discipline, Wood stands as a general statement of the qualified immunity standard.

Most recently the Supreme Court refined the limits of qualified, good faith immunity, placing “[r]eliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law.” Harlow, supra, - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2739. Under this approach summary judgment should issue on the grounds of qualified, good faith immunity if the official’s conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights at the time the challenged action occurred. Accordingly, if the law at that time was not clearly established then the official cannot be held to have known that his actions violated the rights of others. Id.

Although we reject McHugh’s contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity,[2] we hold that he is entitled to the defense of qualified, good faith immunity. From the record it is clear that the approval of termination assessments falls within the scope of the District Director’s office. Further, the determination of jeopardy pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6851 can be deemed to be within the discretion of McHugh’s office.[3] Cf. Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 125 n. 56 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091, 96 S.Ct. 887, 47 L.Ed.2d 103 (1976); Homan Mfg. Co. v. H.A. Long, 242 F.2d 645, 655 (7th Cir.1957).

Based on the prior history of the present case, we conclude the actions of District Director McHugh did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known at the time the action occurred. As noted by the Supreme Court in disposing of the injunction issue, it was uncertain whether the IRS, when assessing and collecting the unreported tax due after the termination of a taxpayer’s period, must follow the procedures mandated by 26 U.S.C. § 6861 for the assessment and collection of a deficiency whose collection is in jeopardy. See Laing, supra, 423 U.S. at 166-67, 96 S.Ct. at 477. Accordingly, since McHugh could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of the proper procedure not yet been declared, it cannot be concluded that his conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. See Harlow, supra, - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2739 (“If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.”) See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,[*251] 565, 98 S.Ct. 855, 861, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); Wood, supra, 420 U.S. at 321, 95 S.Ct. at 1000.

Since defendant McHugh established sufficiently his entitlement to the defense of qualified, good faith immunity, and appellant relied merely on her pleadings to defeat the defense, see Bryant v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 490 F.2d 1273, 1275 (6th Cir.1974), it was proper for the district court to enter summary judgment for the defendant. See Harlow, supra, - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2739; Butz, supra, 438 at 508, 98 S.Ct. at 2911, Granger, supra, 583 F.2d at 785-86.

Ill

As to defendant Elmer Snider, a group manager for the IRS, the district court never reached the issue of immunity, finding such inquiry unnecessary in light of appellant’s failure to state a claim for relief. We agree.

The record shows that an IRS official, not named in this action, was responsible for the preparation of the tax termination assessment. Defendant Snider was only one of many who “signed off” on the paperwork as it proceeded toward final approval by District Director McHugh. It is also apparent from the record that McHugh did not approve the assessment on the basis of any recommendation given by Mr. Snider. The only link between Snider and the appellant relates to a brief appearance made by Snider with lawyers for appellant shortly after the assessment was levied.

With respect to this appearance the record demonstrates that attorneys for appellant wanted to discuss the matter with Mr. McHugh, since he was the one who signed the assessment. However, Mr. McHugh was unavailable, and Mr. Snider merely “appeared in McHugh’s place. Beyond this encounter, appellant has not pointed to any evidence that Snider personally deprived her of any statutory or constitutional rights. Further, appellant is unable, except for bare conclusive allegations, to connect Snider with any conspiracy with State officials to constitute action under color of state law. It is clear that Mr. Snider’s only connection to the present action is his mere approval of a routine field audit.

Accordingly, failure of appellant to come forward to show genuine issues of material fact warrants summary judgment for defendant Snider. See Bryant, supra, 490 F.2d at 1275.

IV

Appellant also contends that the district court erred in dismissing the claim against the United States on the grounds that it is protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Appellant argues that the United States has waived its immunity from suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., or, alternatively, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be abolished. We find these contentions to be without merit.

The United States is immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity except as it consents to be sued. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1351, 63 L.Ed.2d 607, reh’g denied, 446 U.S. 992, 100 S.Ct. 2979, 64 L.Ed.2d 849 (1980); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976). Further, “[a] waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’ ” Mitchell, supra, 445 U.S. at 538, 100 S.Ct. at 1351 quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). In an action for money damages it is clear that the Administrative Procedure Act cannot serve as a basis for a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-07, 97 S.Ct. 980, 983-85, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977); Newson v. Vanderbilt University, 653 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir.1981). The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., which waives to some extent the Government’s immunity, is of no avail to appellant’s claim of waiver since § 2680(c) of that Act pro[*252]vides an exception to a claim for relief arising from the assessment and collection of taxes. It is clear that the United States has not waived its immunity to suits of this nature. See Stankevitz v. IRS, 640 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir.1981); Mack v. Alexander, 575 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir.1978).

Appellant cites Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949), as authority to abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, Larson does not stand for such a proposition, but, rather, the Court stated that such a repudiation was left to the will of Congress. 337 U.S. at 704-05, 69 S.Ct. at 1468-69. See Newson, supra, 653 F.2d at 1107.

V

Appellant’s final claim is that the district court erred in dismissing her claim against Kentucky state police officer Donald Powers. Appellant avers that officer Powers conspired with the other defendants to deprive her of her constitutional rights, alleging that Powers contacted the IRS and gave erroneous information which resulted in the faulty tax assessment. Appellant also claims that Powers, under color of state law, defamed her by telling friends and associates that she was involved in drug trafficking.

In dismissing the claim against officer Powers the district court held that since he was the only remaining defendant he could not be held to conspire with himself. Although it would be in error to dismiss the conspiracy claim against Powers merely because District Director McHugh was accorded qualified immunity, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), Macko v. Bryon, 641 F.2d 447, 449-50 (6th Cir.1981), the record is void of any proof as to a conspiracy between Powers and the other defendants.

The record shows that officer Powers, pursuant to his legal authority, executed a valid warrant to search the home of appellant. Further, the record demonstrates that Powers did not contact the IRS concerning appellant’s alleged involvement in drug trafficking, but another police officer contacted the IRS without the approval or authority from officer Powers. While it is true that Powers, in his individual capacity, could be liable for any wrongful acts committed in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear from the record that, beyond the bare and unsupported allegations made by the appellant, no claim can be made against this defendant. Although the appellant raises the issue that Powers defamed her by saying to her friends and associates that she had been selling narcotics, we note that the claim of defamation, standing alone, is not subject to redress under § 1983, absent more tangible harm. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1164, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), reh’g denied, 425 U.S. 985, 96 S.Ct. 2194, 48 L.Ed.2d 811 (1976).

Accordingly, the judgments of the district court are affirmed. No costs are taxed. The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal.

1

Appellant also claims that the district court erred in ruling that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986. It is clear that any action taken by defendant McHugh, as an IRS official, would be under federal law and not state law for purposes of a claim for relief under § 1983. As to a claim under either § 1985 or § 1986 the record shows that there is no evidence to connect McHugh with any conspiracy to deprive Mrs. Hall of her civil rights sufficient enough to trigger jurisdiction under § 1985 or § 1986.

The district court, however, assumed that it had jurisdiction under the doctrine announced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Although Bivens dealt with a fourth amendment violation, its logic appears equally applicable to the constitutional claims raised herein. See Laing, supra, 423 U.S. at 209-10 n. 14, 96 S.Ct. at 497-98 n. 14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Service, 521 F.2d 1392, 1393 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S.Ct. 573, 58 L.Ed.2d 654 (1978) (first amendment); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.1975) (fourteenth amendment); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 932 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118, 101 S.Ct. 931, 66 L.Ed.2d 847 (1981), reh’g denied, 450 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 1421, 67 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981) (fifth amendment).

2

We reject McHugh’s assertion that he is entitied to absolute immunity on the basis of the reasoning set forth in Harlow, supra, - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2732-33. Other courts, likewise, have held that such officials of the IRS are entitled to only qualified immunity. See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (10th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923, 98 S.Ct. 1485, 55 L.Ed.2d 516 (1978); Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir.1976); Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.1975).

3

Although the cited authorities deal with 26 U.S.C. § 6861, jeopardy assessment, such cases would equally apply to the Director’s use of the jeopardy termination provisions of § 6851(a)(1) given the closely parallel treatment accorded to both provisions. See Laing, supra, 423 U.S. at 177, 96 S.Ct. at 482.