Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988)
A district court may dismiss claims subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement rather than merely staying the proceedings.
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their claims and a transfer of venue. The district court dismissed a subcontractor's claims because a broad arbitration clause required the dispute to be submitted to arbitration. The court also transferred the case to Alaska, which the appellate court found was not an abuse of discretion. Regarding the individual plaintiffs' fraud claims, the court held that the trial judge must provide the plaintiff with notice of the deficiencies of his or her complaint and an opportunity to amend the complaint prior to dismissal. Because the plaintiffs failed to correct the identified deficiencies, the dismissal was proper. Finally, the court held that shareholders lack standing to assert RICO claims for harm derivative of the corporation.
At page 638Trial court power to dismiss for failure to state claim116 citing cases“a trial court may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim. the court must give notice of its intention to dismiss and give the plaintiff some opportunity to respond unless the plaintiffs cannot possibly win relief.”
- Sherez v. State of Hawai'i Dep't of Educ., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Haw. 2005).published(A trial court may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim. The court must give notice of its intention to dismiss and give the plaintiff some opportun…)
- Bosinger v. Phillips Plastics Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Cal. 1999).published(fraud claims must be submitted to arbitration unless the arbitration clause itself was fraudulently induced.)
- Metcalf v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 1:24-cv-00015 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2024). Co., 864 F.2d 635 , 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Sparling”); Fitzgerald v. First East 27 Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Ireland v. Buffet, No. 28 122CV00497JLTBAM, 2023 WL 2938377 , at *1 (E.D.
- Hinojo v. Zuckerberg, No. 1:23-cv-01184 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2023). Co., 864 F.2d 635 , 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Sparling”); Fitzgerald v. First East 7 Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Ireland v. Buffet, No. 8 122CV00497JLTBAM, 2023 WL 2938377 , at *1 (E.D.
- Sobaszkiewicz v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 4:18-cv-07553 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2020).“the arbitration clause was broad enough to bar all of the plaintiff's claims since 14 it required active to submit all claims to arbitration.”
- Bauerle v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 689 F. App'x 502 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished“the plaintiffs could not possibly win relief and therefore the dismissal was appropriate even though it was on the court's own motion.”
- Bayardo Sandy v. Bank of Am. Corp., 678 F. App'x 579 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished“the plaintiffs could not possibly win relief and therefore the dismissal was appropriate even though it was on the court's own motion,”
- Fulk, No. 3:26-cv-05864 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 10, 2026).Sparling v. Hoffman 22 Construction Co. Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds, Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472 , 475 (2024)); Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986 , 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (court may sua…
- Flores v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-00955 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2024).(noting that, while the FAA expressly authorizes staying proceedings pending arbitration, the FAA “does not limit the 22 court’s authority to grant a dismissal” when all of the plaintiff’s claims are barred by an arbitra…)
- Mayes v. Int'l Markets Live, No. 2:22-cv-01269 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2023).Stay or Dismissal of Actions in Arbitration 20 Generally, the FAA requires a stay of trial court proceedings upon request by one of the 21 parties while arbitration is pending. 9 U.S.C. § 3 . “[N]otwithstanding the language of § 3, a 22 di…
Show 106 more citing cases
- Randall v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc, No. 2:23-cv-00095 (E.D. Wash. July 19, 2023).(finding the district 13 court “acted within its discretion when it dismissed [the plaintiff’s] claims)
- Kersting v. UnitedHealth Grp., No. 3:23-cv-00159 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2023).In its discretion, see Sparling, 864 F.2d at 638, the Court therefore 8 || DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this action.
- Mcbride v. Grays Harbor Cnty., No. 3:23-cv-05141 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 4, 2023).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 , 2 1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
- William Forrest v. Keith Spizzirri, 62 F.4th 1201 (9th Cir. 2023).published Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen.
- Martin v. Resortcom Int'l, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-00247 (D. Nev. Dec. 6, 2022).Dist dge Je inifer A. Dorsey 16 Detember 6, 2022 17 18 19 23 Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Green Tree 20} Fin.
- Kane v. Mednax Servs. Inc, No. 2:22-cv-00159 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2022).(finding the district court “acted within its discretion when it dismissed [the 11 plaintiff’s] claims)
- Abrams v. Enright, No. 3:22-cv-05731 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 18, 2022).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 , 21 1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
- Sloboda v. Turner, No. 2:22-cv-01104 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2022).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 , 22 1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
- King v. Robertson, No. 3:21-cv-00471 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2022).Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., 17 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988).
- Bonds v. Piland, No. 3:22-cv-05522 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2022).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 , 23 1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
- Domingo v. Underground Constr. Co., No. 1:22-cv-00487 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2022).See Johnmohammadi, 755 F.3d at 1074 ; Sparling, 864 F.2d at 638. 14 With respect to QSI, Domingo does not explain the significance of QSI not being a 15 signatory to the arbitration agreement or the relevance of 37 days remaining on the st…
- California Crane Sch., Inc. v. Google LLC, 621 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2022).publishedCo. Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988).
- Samuel Love v. Mark G. Stainbrook, No. 2:22-cv-02878 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2022).(a district 10 court may, on its own initiative, dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim)
- Shuler v. Mansfield, No. 3:21-cv-05713 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2021).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 , 14 1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
- Chlentzos-Williams v. Burien Dist. Court, No. 3:21-cv-05563 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2021).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 10 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
- Campbell v. Anesthesia Mgmt. Solutions LLC, No. 5:20-cv-03538 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2021).Puerto Rico 1986); Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Hoffman v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 734 F.Supp. 192, 195 (D.N.J. 1990); Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D.
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- Bliss v. State of Alaska, No. 3:19-cv-00236 (D. Alaska Dec. 11, 2019).
- Realty Executives Int'l Servs. LLC v. Devonshire W. Canada Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-02671 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2019).
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- Jackson v. Applied Materials Corp., No. 5:20-cv-06007 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021).
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- Telford v. Montana Land Exch., No. 2:19-cv-00002 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2019).
- Mohazzabi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:18-cv-02137 (D. Nev. Sept. 25, 2019).
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- R & C Oilfield Servs., LLC v. Am. Wind Transp. Grp., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01201 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2020).
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- John Lampros v. Nancy Baker, 650 F. App'x 354 (9th Cir. 2016).unpublished
- Ruiz v. Millennium Square Residential Ass'n, 466 F. Supp. 3d 162 (D.D.C. 2020).published
- Coup v. Scottsdale Plaza Resort, LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 931 (D. Ariz. 2011).published
At page 640Dismissal of RICO claim for failure to state a claim25 citing cases“short and plain statement of the claim.”
- Hunter v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 2:19-cv-00543 (D. Nev. Jan. 31, 2020).(If the factual 22 elements of a cause of action are scattered throughout the complaint but are not organized into 23 a ‘short and plain statement of the claim,’ dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a) is proper.)
- Lasko v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01802 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2019).(If the 13 factual elements of a cause of action are scattered throughout the complaint but are not 14 organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim,” dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 15 8(a) is proper.)
- Ralston, No. 2:25-cv-03462 (D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 2026).Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 1 Thus, a complaint may be dismissed where it lacks a cognizable legal theory, lacks 2 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory, or contains allegations disclosing 3 some absolute def…
- Stanz v. Brown, No. 3:22-cv-01164 (S.D. Cal. June 8, 2023).A shareholder “must show either an injury distinct from that to other 3 shareholders or a special duty between [the defendants and the shareholder] if they are to 4 having standing to assert RICO claims based on injury to the corporation.”…
- Fitzgerald v. GEM Funding, LLC, No. 5:21-cv-08641 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2022).Sparling, 864 F.2d at 640.
- Bivens Gardens Off. Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banes of Florida, Inc., 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 1998).published
- Popkin v. Jacoby (In re Sunrise Sec. Litig.), 916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990).published
- Dale Frank Maisano v. Sam Lewis, 983 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1993).unpublished
- Edward Ahn v. Hanil Dev., Inc., 471 F. App'x 615 (9th Cir. 2012).unpublished
- Akhtar Hamid, on Behalf of Himself & All Others Similarly Situated v. Price Waterhouse, Price waterhouse/u.k. Price Waterhouse World Firm Ltd. Price waterhouse/u.s. Ernst & Young Abu Dhabi, Emirate of Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. Bank of Am. Corp., Bankamerica Corp. Bank of Am. Nt & Sa Hill & Knowlton Concorde Fin. & Investments, Grp Investments Interredec, Inc. Interredec S. Co. First Am. Corp., First Am. Bankshares Paul Adams Jack Beddow A. Vincent Scoffone T. Bertram Lance Indep. Bank Manuel Noriega Fulvio Dobrich Robert Altman Clark Clifford Clifford & Warnke, Akhtar Hamid, on Behalf of Himself & All Others Similarly Situated v. Price Waterhouse, Price waterhouse/u.k. Price Waterhouse World Firm Ltd. Price waterhouse/u.s. Ernst & Young Abu Dhabi, Emirate of Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. Bank of Am. Corp., Bankamerica Corp. Bank of Am. Nt & Sa Hill & Knowlton Concorde Fin. & Investments, Grp Investments Interredec, Inc. Interredec S. Co. T. Bertram Lance Indep. Bank Manuel Noriega Fulvio Dobrich Robert Altman Clark Clifford Clifford & Warnke, & First Am. Corp., First Am. Bankshares, Inc. Paul G. Adams Jack Beddow A. Vincent Scoffone Akhtar Hamid, on Behalf of Himself & All Others Similarly Situated v. Price Waterhouse, Price waterhouse/u.k. Price Waterhouse World Firm Ltd. Price waterhouse/u.s. Ernst & Young Abu Dhabi, Emirate of Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. Bank of Am. Corp., Bankamerica Corp. Bank of Am. Nt & Sa Hill & Knowlton T. Bertram Lance Indep. Bank Manuel Noriega Robert Altman Clark Clifford Clifford & Warnke, First Am. Bankshares, Inc. Jack W. Beddow Paul G. Adams A. Vincent Scoffone, & Concorde Fin. & Investments Interredec, Inc. Interredec S. Co., Inc. Wesley Co., Inc. River Oaks, Inc. River Oaks Investments, Inc. Sterling Bluff, Inc. Grp Investments N.V., 51 F.3d 1411 (1st Cir. 1995).published
Show 15 more citing cases
- Niemi v. Lasshofer, 728 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2013).published
- Schrag v. Dinges, 825 F. Supp. 954 (D. Kan. 1993).published
- Lui Ciro, Inc. v. Ciro, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1365 (D. Haw. 1995).published
- Qantel Corp. v. Niemuller, 771 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).published
- Ins. Consultants of Am., Inc. v. Se. Ins. Grp., 746 F. Supp. 390 (D.N.J. 1990).published
- John L. Motley Assocs., Inc. v. Rumbaugh, 104 B.R. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1989).published
- David Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corporat, 759 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2014).published
- Tommy Desoto v. Christopher Condon, 371 F. App'x 822 (9th Cir. 2010).unpublished
- Uthe Tech. Corp. v. Aetrium, Inc., No. 16-16664 (9th Cir. July 2, 2018).unpublished
- Hamid v. Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995).published
- Grizzard v. Terada, 159 F. App'x 786 (9th Cir. 2005).unpublished
- Jerome Daroya v. Mary Josephine Daroya-Lushina, No. 2:22-cv-02695 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2022).
- Jerome Daroya v. Mary Josephine Daroya-Lushina, No. 2:22-cv-02695 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2022).
- Tucker v. Stewart, 72 F. App'x 597 (9th Cir. 2003).unpublished
- Oelker v. Idaho State Bar (ISB), No. 2:24-cv-01699 (D. Nev. Oct. 1, 2024).
At page 639Scope of arbitration waiver and transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 140423 citing casesHoffman only waived the arbitration clause in favor of ongoing state court proceedings, not the federal action.
- Hoffman Constr. Co. of Oregon v. Active Erectors & Installers, Inc., 969 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1992).published (Hoffman only waived the arbitration clause in favor of ongoing state court proceedings, not the federal action.)
- United States v. Approx. $325,690.00, No. 2:24-cv-00381 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025).Cal. Oct. 10, 2008) 21 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. 22 Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988)). 23 “The defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience before th…
- Mitek Sys., Inc. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 34 F.4th 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2022).published Sparling v. Hoffman Construction Co., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988); see also In re Nissim Corp., 316 F. App’x 991, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (non-precedential).
- Beaton v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 1:21-cv-01575 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2022).Cal. Oct. 10, 2008) 23 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. 24 Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988)). 25 The party moving to transfer venue under § 1404(a) bears the burden…
- D.L. Markham v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No. 2:21-cv-00007 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2022).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988)); Jones, 211 F. 15 3d at 498–99; see also Martinez v. Knight Transp., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01730-DAD-SKO, 16 2017 WL 2722015 , at *2 (E.D.
- D.L. Markham v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No. 4:22-cv-00974 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2022).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988)); Jones, 211 F. 15 3d at 498–99; see also Martinez v. Knight Transp., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01730-DAD-SKO, 16 2017 WL 2722015 , at *2 (E.D.
- Baird v. Osteostrong Franchising, LLC., No. 2:20-cv-02010 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2022).Cal. Oct. 10, 2008) 13 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. 14 Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988)). 15 Where the forum-selection clause is found to be valid, the Court mus…
- Hope v. Lunarlandowner.com, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-01783 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2022).Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 14 1988)). 15 III.
- Kerr v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-00687 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2021).Cal. Oct. 10, 2008) 23 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. 24 Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988)). 25 III.
- Kerr v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:21-cv-07649 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2021).Cal. Oct. 10, 2008) 23 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. 24 Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1988)). 25 III.
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- Lenk v. Semiconductor Component Indus. LLC, No. 5:20-cv-08099 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2021).
At page 641Determining standing and applying choice of law rules20 citing casesAny harm to the Sparlings due to their status as guarantors of the bonds given by the corporation is also derivative of the harm to the corporation. Thus, this status does not give the Sparlings standing.
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- Hall CA-NV, LLC v. Ladera Dev. LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00124 (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2021).“there are apparently no washington cases on the 24 issue.”
- Kanaway Seafoods, Inc. v. Pac. Predator, No. 3:22-cv-00027 (D. Alaska Mar. 10, 2023).“unless [a] choice of law provision itself 20 was obtained by a misrepresentation it will be given effect”
- Clifton Berglee v. First Nat'l Bank, 990 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1993).unpublished
- Soo Ja Oh v. Resolution Trust Corp., 26 F.3d 131 (9th Cir. 1994).unpublished
- Int'l Bus. MacHines Corp. v. Dr. Christopher H. Bajorek, Chris Bajorek v. Int'l Bus. MacHines Corp., 191 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999).published
- James L. Ticknor Janet Ticknor Larry Ticknor Tickco Holding, L.L.C. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001).published
- Dale Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc'ns, 722 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2013).published
- Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chem. Co., 904 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1995).published
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At page 637District court power to dismiss inadequate complaint sua sponte7 citing casesrejecting the argument that dismissal, rather than a stay, was improper where party invoking arbitration sought only a stay
- William Forrest v. Keith Spizzirri, 62 F.4th 1201 (9th Cir. 2023).published Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen.
- Lloyd v. Hovensa LLC., 243 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.V.I. 2003).published
- Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 167 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.R.I. 2001).published
- Jason Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998).published
- Est. of Fuller v. Maxfield & Oberton Holdings, LLC, 906 F. Supp. 2d 997 (N.D. Cal. 2012).published
- Bishop v. Boral Indus., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-02701 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2020).
- Arabian Motors Grp. W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Co., 495 F. Supp. 3d 541 (E.D. Mich. 2020).published
[T]he plaintiffs could not possibly win relief and [therefore] the dismissal was appropriate even though it was on the court’s own motion.
- Bauerle v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 689 F. App'x 502 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished([T]he plaintiffs could not possibly win relief and [therefore] the dismissal was appropriate even though it was on the court’s own motion.)
- Bayardo Sandy v. Bank of Am. Corp., 678 F. App'x 579 (9th Cir. 2017).unpublished([T]he plaintiffs could not possibly win relief and [therefore] the dismissal was appropriate even though it was on the court’s own motion,)
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v.
HOFFMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. Industrial Indemnity Company of the Northwest
Michael and Jean Sparling are the sole shareholders of Active Erectors & Installers, Inc. (Active). The Sparlings and Active appeal from the dismissal of their complaint. They contend that for various reasons Active’s claims should not have been dismissed; that the change of venue from Washington to Alaska was improper; that the complaint adequately alleged a claim for fraud; that the Sparlings’ claims were not derivative of Active’s; and that the award of attorney’s fees under Alaska law was improper. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 6, 1984 the Sparlings and Active filed suit in U.S. District Court in Washington against Hoffman Construction Co. and Industrial Indemnity Co. of the Northwest. The controversy arose out of a construction contract between Active, a subcontractor, and Hoffman, the general contractor, for the construction of a high school in Homer, Alaska. Active provided payment and performance bonds to Hoffman on which Industrial was the surety. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
This complaint was captioned “Complaint to Cancel Bond and for Damages.” The appellants later claimed that the gist of the four causes of action in this complaint was that Hoffman fraudulently induced Active to enter this contract and give the bonds, and tortiously interfered with known business relations of the Sparlings. This is not apparent from the complaint.
Hoffman moved for a more definite statement, to stay proceedings until the matter was arbitrated, and to transfer the action to Alaska. The plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint (even though they could have amended their complaint without leave of the court) and lodged their proposed amended complaint. This complaint would have added RICO claims by Active and the Sparlings.
[*637] Without having ruled on the motion to amend, the district judge in Washington dismissed all of Active’s claims because the contract between Active and Hoffman required such claims to be submitted to arbitration.
The judge also granted Hoffman’s motion to transfer the case to Alaska pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a). The plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hoffman moved the district court in Alaska for a 12(b)(6) dismissal or for summary judgment on the Sparlings’ claims. At the hearing on this motion on June 2, 1986, Judge Fitzgerald informed the Spar-lings’ counsel that the complaint was being dismissed for failure to plead fraud with particularity. The judge informed the Sparlings’ counsel of an additional defect in the complaint. He granted the Sparlings twenty days to amend the complaint. He warned that the Sparlings were “going to run out of opportunities to replead this.” Referring to the proposed amended complaint, the judge said “I have looked at the amended complaint, and this is going to be the last time out.” The next day the order was filed requiring the Sparlings to serve and file an amended complaint within twenty days.
Instead of complying with this order, twenty-seven days later the Sparlings filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit. This appeal was voluntarily dismissed on September 22, 1986.
On July 15, 1986, Hoffman moved to dismiss with prejudice all claims because of the Sparlings’ failure to comply with the order to amend the complaint. In response the Sparlings argued that the district judge’s ruling at the June second hearing was unclear, and that they did not know whether the court was granting them leave to amend and whether the court found the proposed amended complaint defective. By an order filed December 19,1986, the judge denied Hoffman’s motion to dismiss and granted the Sparlings twenty days to amend their complaint.
On January 7,1987 the Sparlings filed an amended complaint identical to the proposed amended complaint which the judge found defective in June, 1986. This complaint contained allegations on the first four causes of action nearly identical to the original complaint which was dismissed, and not in any respect revised to correct the deficiencies mentioned by the judge.
On January 30, 1987 Hoffman again moved to dismiss the complaint because the Sparlings had failed to comply with the order that they amend their complaint to plead fraud with particularity, and because the Sparlings had no standing to assert the corporation’s RICO claim. After a hearing, Judge Kleinfeld dismissed the first four claims with prejudice because the Sparlings had not corrected the deficiencies despite “plenty of opportunity for discovery, amendment and a warning from Judge Fitzgerald.” He dismissed the Spar-lings’ RICO claim, holding that it was a corporate claim and that the Sparlings had therefore not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed Industrial Indemnity.
The court granted Hoffman’s motion for attorney’s fees. Only part of the fees claimed were awarded because the court found the Sparlings’ claims were not frivolous or in bad faith and because the fees seemed high and were not itemized. This award was based on Alaska law “because the contract so provides” and “[ejven if it did not, Alaska law would control under conflict of laws principles.”
DISCUSSION
I. The Dismissal of Active’s Claims
The district court dismissed Active’s claims because Active had agreed to submit these claims to arbitration. Active argues that this dismissal was improper for several reasons.
A.
First, Active contends that dismissal was improper because Hoffman only requested a stay pending arbitration, not a dismissal. The fact that a dismissal was not requested, however, does not make it[*638] improper. “A trial court may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim. . . .” Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir.1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 593 (1969)). The court must give notice of its intention to dismiss and give the plaintiff some opportunity to respond unless the “[plaintiffs cannot possibly win relief.” Wong, 642 F.2d at 362.
In opposition to the motion for a stay the plaintiffs argued that the arbitration clause did not apply because the plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to enter the contract. As the district court pointed out, however, fraud claims must be submitted to arbitration unless the arbitration clause itself was fraudulently induced. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1805-06, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). The plaintiffs did not claim that the clause itself was fraudulently induced. Thus the plaintiffs could not possibly win relief and the dismissal was appropriate even though it was on the court’s own motion.
B.
Second, Active argues that the district court lacked discretion to dismiss Active’s claims because the provision for stay in 9 U.S.C. section 3 is the defendant’s only remedy where there is an arbitration clause. In Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 586 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.1978), this court affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment where the contract provided that a request for arbitration within six months after a controversy arose was a condition precedent to the institution of litigation and where “ ‘[t]he language contained in the arbitration provision is sufficiently broad to bar all of plaintiff’s claims.’ ” Id. at 147-48 (quoting the district court opinion). The plaintiff in Martin Marietta argued that 9 U.S.C. section 3 required the defendant to apply for a stay pending compliance with the contractual arbitration clause. This court held that 9 U.S.C. section 3 gives a court authority, upon application by one of the parties, to grant a stay pending arbitration, but does not preclude summary judgment when all claims are barred by an arbitration clause. Thus, the provision did not limit the court’s authority to grant a dismissal in this case.
The district court acted within its discretion when it dismissed Active’s claims. As in Martin Marietta, the arbitration clause was broad enough to bar all of the plaintiff’s claims since it required Active to submit all claims to arbitration.
C.
Third, Active contends that dismissal was improper because a motion to amend the complaint to add a RICO claim was pending, and Active was entitled to the amendment as a matter of right under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Active’s motion to amend was unnecessary. Active could have amended without leave of the court, since no responsive pleading had been filed. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1480 (1971). The court should have granted this unnecessary request. See Kirk v. United States, 232 F.2d 763, 770 (9th Cir.1956); Stewart v. RCA Corp., 790 F.2d 624, 631 (7th Cir.1986). Allowing the amendment, however, would not have altered the outcome. RICO claims are arbi-trable. Shearson/American Express Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2345, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987). The arbitration provision in the Active-Hoffman contract by its terms applies to any dispute which arises. This provision is broad enough to encompass RICO claims. It is similar to the one the Supreme Court held required submission of RICO claims to arbitration in Shearson. See 107 S.Ct. at 2335-36. Thus, the trial judge’s dismissal of Active’s claims necessarily included the proposed RICO claim.
D.
Fourth, Active argues dismissal was improper because Active was a “necessary party” under Rule 19(a) of the Federal[*639] Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 19, however, does not require that a party without a claim nonetheless be allowed to assert one.
E.
Fifth, Active argues that dismissal was improper because Hoffman waived arbitration in favor of proceedings in Alaska State Court. The arbitration clause in the contract states that it may be waived if the parties mutually agree. The scope of such a waiver would be governed by the agreement. Hoffman only waived the arbitration clause in favor of ongoing state court proceedings, not the federal action.
The trial court did not err in dismissing Active.
II. Transfer to Alaska
The Appellants contend that the transfer to Alaska was improper. We review a transfer under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a) for abuse of discretion. “Weighing of factors for and against transfer involves subtle considerations and is best left to the discretion of the trial judge.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir.1979). Section 1404(a) gives the district court discretion to order a transfer “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”
The district judge found that there were competing factors for and against transfer, which he listed, but the fact that the owner of the project appeared to be a likely third party defendant and probably would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington “decidedly tilts the scales in favor of the Alaska venue.” He held that “[t]he ability to join all appropriate parties and avoid duplicative litigation, along with the convenience arguments raised by Defendant as well as the fact that many third party witnesses ... will have to travel no matter where the trial is held, require the transfer of this case to the Alaska venue.”
The Sparlings argue that the court was factually wrong on the issue of ability to join all appropriate parties, because the contract between the owner and Hoffman contained a forum selection clause providing that claims arising out of the contract could only be filed and prosecuted in Kenai, Alaska, and the owner could not therefore be made a party to a suit in Anchorage. In their brief on the motion for reconsideration, the appellants pointed out this alleged error, and the judge denied the motion. It is not clear that the court was wrong. For example, if the suit had proceeded to the merits, Hoffman might have been able to show that the forum selection clause should not be enforced because enforcement would require Hoffman to litigate the issues in two fora, and therefore “enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust.” See Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 868 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1916, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972)). Alternatively, the owner might have waived the forum selection clause in favor of the Anchorage venue.
The judge carefully considered and listed the factors weighing for and against the transfer before ordering it. He did not change the order after being informed of his alleged mistake regarding one factor. Given the possibility that the owner could have been made a party in Alaska, and the careful consideration the trial judge gave to the competing factors, we cannot say the transfer was an abuse of discretion.
III. Dismissal of the Sparlings’ Fraud Claims
The Sparlings argue that the June second ruling dismissing the original complaint for failure to plead fraud with particularity was improper. They claim that the judge was required to allow the amendment and consider the proposed amended complaint before ruling on the motion to dismiss. Thus, they argue, the dismissal with prejudice seven months later for failure to comply with the June third order to amend their complaint within twenty days was improper.
This argument is meritless. At the June second hearing the judge told the Spar-[*640]lings’ counsel that he had “looked at the amended complaint and this [was] going to be the last time out” and that they must file a new complaint within twenty days. Thus, he told them that the proposed amended complaint was deficient and allowed them to file a new one. Nonetheless, seven months later when they finally filed an amended complaint, they simply refiled this complaint! Furthermore, the complaint that they ultimately filed was almost identical to the original complaint dismissed on June second. It was not improved in any respect to comply with the order to plead fraud with particularity.
The dismissal was proper. The Sparlings failed to comply with the order to amend, instead improperly appealing the order. Nonetheless, six months later the court gave them another chance to amend their complaint. Instead of complying with the June third order by correcting the deficiencies they refiled the complaint the judge told them was defective at the June second hearing.
The Sparlings also argue that the dismissal was improper because, if every “cause of action” in the complaint is examined, all of the factual elements of fraud may be found. Even if this were true, the complaint would be deficient under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
IY. Dismissal of the Sparlings’ RICO Claim
The court dismissed the Sparlings’ RICO claim for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, holding that “it is the corporation’s claim and not the Sparlings’ claim.”
The Sparlings contend that as shareholders in Active and as guarantors of the bonds given by Active they have standing to assert the RICO claim. They claim that this argument is supported by Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 495, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), and Haroco v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606, 105 S.Ct. 3291, 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985). Those cases, however, did not discuss shareholder or guarantor standing to assert RICO claims based on injuries to the corporation. Rather they dealt with the type of injury required to state a RICO claim.
This Circuit apparently has not considered the issue of shareholder or guarantor standing to assert RICO claims. Those circuits that have considered the issue, however, are unanimous in holding that there is no shareholder standing to assert RICO claims where the harm is derivative of harm to the corporation. See Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29-30 (1st Cir.1987); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987, 107 S.Ct. 579, 93 L.Ed.2d 582 (1986); Crocker v. FDIC, 826 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1075, 99 L.Ed.2d 235 (1988); Gaff v. FDIC, 814 F.2d 311, 315, vacated in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir.1987).
The First, Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits look to general corporate law to determine if a RICO claim is for harm derivative of the harm to the corporation or for individual harm. If it is derivative, the shareholder has no standing to assert the RICO claim. See Roeder, 814 F.2d at 29-30; Rand, 794 F.2d at 84; Crocker, 826 F.2d at 349; Gaff, 814 F.2d at 315. The Seventh Circuit has accepted the principle as well: “The investors in the firm suffer when the firm incurs a loss, yet only the firm may vindicate the rights at issue.... These principles should apply to RICO cases....” Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir.1985).
The Sparlings argue that their harm is not derivative, but direct. This argument has no merit. The Sparlings must show either an injury distinct from that to other shareholders or a special duty between Hoffman and the Sparlings if they are to have standing to assert RICO claims based on injury to the corporation. See, e.g., Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Alaska 1986); Hunter v. Knight, Vale & Gregory, 18 Wash.App. 640, 644-45, 571 P.2d 212, 215-16 (1977) (citing 13 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 5927 (perm.[*641] ed. rev.1970)). The wrong alleged is a fraud on the corporation. Because they are the sole shareholders they cannot show an injury distinct from that to other shareholders. Nor was there a special relationship between the Sparlings and Hoffman which would create the kind of duty required. Thus, the court was correct in ruling that they had no standing as shareholders to assert a RICO claim.
Any harm to the Sparlings due to their status as guarantors of the bonds given by the corporation is also derivative of the harm to the corporation. Thus, this status does not give the Sparlings standing. See generally Arctic Contractors, Inc. v. State, 573 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Alaska 1978).
V. Attorney’s Fees
The appellants contend that Washington law controls this case, and the Judge thus erred in awarding attorney’s fees under Alaska law. We review the District Court’s choice of law de novo. Pereira v. Utah Transport, Inc., 764 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir.1985), cert. dismissed, 475 U.S. 1040, 106 S.Ct. 1253, 89 L.Ed.2d 362 (1986).
Because the complaint was originally filed in Washington, Washington’s choice of law rules apply. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639, 84 S.Ct. 805, 820, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); General Accident Ins. Co. v. Namesnik, 790 F.2d 1397, 1398, amended, 799 F.2d 539 (9th Cir.1986). Washington law gives effect to an express choice of law clause in a contract as long as application of the chosen law does not violate Washington’s fundamental public policy. McGill v. Hill, 31 Wash.App. 542, 547, 644 P.2d 680, 683 (1982).
The general contract between Hoffman and the owner provided that “[a]ny litigation which may be brought upon this contract or upon any claims arising out of this contract, shall be governed by the laws of the State of Alaska.” This provision was incorporated into the subcontract between Hoffman and Active. The appellants argue that the contractual provision does not apply to fraud and RICO claims, and since those were the bases of the complaint the choice of law provision should not control the award of attorney’s fees. There are apparently no Washington cases on the issue. Assuming Washington courts would accept the traditional view, unless the choice of law provision itself was obtained by a misrepresentation it will be given effect. See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 201 comment c (1971). The appellants do not argue that the clause was obtained by misrepresentation. Thus it must be given effect.
The plaintiff’s claims were based on the allegation that Hoffman misrepresented the true scope of the work, inducing Active to sign the subcontract to its detriment. The choice of law provision applies to these claims. The award of attorney’s fees under Alaska law was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The court did not err in dismissing Active’s claims because Active agreed to submit such claims to arbitration. The transfer to Alaska was not an abuse of discretion. The dismissal of the Sparlings’ fraud claims for failure to correct the defect in their fraud pleading was not error. The dismissal of the Sparlings’ RICO claim for lack of standing was proper. The application of Alaska law to the attorney’s fees decision was correct because of the choice of law provision in the contract.
AFFIRMED.