individual claim in Colorado

2026And generally, “an entire case must be decided before any ruling in that case can be appealed.” Wilson, ¶ 8 (quoting People v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 37 ). ¶ 19 C.R.C.P. 54(b) is an exception to the general rule and provides that, when there are multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are involved, the district court “may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” 9 ¶ 20 A district court’s certification u

2026And generally, “an entire case must be decided before any ruling in that case can be appealed.” Wilson, ¶ 8 (quoting People v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 37 ). ¶ 19 C.R.C.P. 54(b) is an exception to the general rule and provides that, when there are multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are involved, the district court “may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” 9 ¶ 20 A district court’s certification u

2024Id. at ¶ 11 (citing Lytle v. Kite, 728 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. 1986)). ¶ 18 We review the first two requirements de novo, but “the third ‘is committed to the trial court’s sound judicial discretion.’” Wolf v. Brenneman, 2024 CO 31 , ¶ 16 (Wolf I) (quoting Harding Glass Co., 640 P.2d at 1125-26 ).

2018See Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Colo. 1982) (describing a three-step process to determine whether Rule 54(b) certification is proper); see also Lytle v. Kite, 728 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. 1986) (“[T]he first prong of the 27 Harding Glass requirements does not apply to a certified decision involving multiple parties.”). ¶ 53 Our jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of a decision certified under Rule 54(b) depends upon the correctness of the certification.

2019The Law Governing Attorney Fees ¶ 57 “[I]f the parties agree, in a contract clause known as a fee- shifting provision, . . . the prevailing party will be entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs.” S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. & Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 2014 COA 171, ¶ 10 , 343 P.3d 1044, 1047 . ¶ 58 A party can recover all of its attorney fees for a lawsuit containing “multiple claims ‘involv[ing] a common core of facts’ or ‘based on related legal theories,’ [when] counsel’s efforts on an individual claim [cannot] be distinguished from work on the whole 25 of th

2018Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)).

1988"The prohibition against judicial intervention in or control of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion flows from the doctrine of separation of powers." People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935, 938 (Colo. 1982).

1988“The prohibition against judicial intervention in or control of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion flows from the doctrine of separation of powers.” People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935, 938 (Colo.1982).

2019The Law Governing Attorney Fees ¶ 57 “[I]f the parties agree, in a contract clause known as a fee- shifting provision, . . . the prevailing party will be entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs.” S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. & Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 2014 COA 171, ¶ 10 , 343 P.3d 1044, 1047 . ¶ 58 A party can recover all of its attorney fees for a lawsuit containing “multiple claims ‘involv[ing] a common core of facts’ or ‘based on related legal theories,’ [when] counsel’s efforts on an individual claim [cannot] be distinguished from work on the whole 25 of th

2018Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)).

2026Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am. USA, 2019 COA 44, ¶ 58 (citation omitted).

2026Roofing, Inc., 74 P.3d 499, 503 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 13 When a lawsuit contains multiple claims for relief, a party that has won some claims but lost others can recover all of its attorney fees if the claims involve a “common core of facts” or are “based on related legal theories” such that counsel’s efforts on an individual claim cannot be distinguished from work on the whole of the litigation.

2026See People v. Jimenez, 217 P.3d 841, 870 (Colo. App. 2008). 20 ¶ 49 Perez argues that Nguyen doesn’t apply to this case for three reasons: (1) Nguyen only discussed the element of attempt to commit bodily injury for assault, and FDUI needs an individual analysis; (2) Nguyen doesn’t explain how identical punishment for nonidentical behavior comports with equal protection; and (3) Nguyen’s rationale doesn’t account for whether imposing identical punishments for FDUI and FDWAI disrespects the jury’s determination that Perez was less culpable.

2026See, e.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 123-24, 139 (1989) (affirming appellate court’s order of mandamus requiring the federal district to remand 29 a criminal prosecution to the state court because the defendant was not entitled to Supremacy Clause immunity). ¶ 57 We are not told why Peters opted not to test her immunity claim by removing the prosecution to federal court — especially given that she now asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resolve her immunity claim.

2025See Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 10 (“While this [c]ourt is not bound to interpret our rules of civil procedure the same way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted its rules, we do look to the federal rules and federal decisions interpreting those rules for guidance.”). ¶ 51 Most importantly, in Campbell-Ewald, the Supreme Court expressly stated that it was not deciding “whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment fo

2025See Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 10 (“While this [c]ourt is not bound to interpret our rules of civil procedure the same way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted its rules, we do look to the federal rules and federal decisions interpreting those rules for guidance.”). ¶ 51 Most importantly, in Campbell-Ewald, the Supreme Court expressly stated that it was not deciding “whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment fo

2024Martinelli addresses both the government’s clai m of official information privilege and an officer’s individual claim of a constitutional right to privacy or their “right to co nfidentiality. ” 199 Colo. at 169-70, 173, 612 P.2d at 1088, 1091 . 52 ¶ 111 Regarding official information privilege, when determining “the extent to which the privilege applies to the materials sought to be discovered,” the trial court must, through its in camera review, conduct an ad hoc balancing of “(a) the discoverant’s interests in disclosure of the materials; and (b) the government’s interest s in their confiden

2024Martinelli addresses both the government’s clai m of official information privilege and an officer’s individual claim of a constitutional right to privacy or their “right to co nfidentiality. ” 199 Colo. at 169-70, 173, 612 P.2d at 1088, 1091 . 52 ¶ 111 Regarding official information privilege, when determining “the extent to which the privilege applies to the materials sought to be discovered,” the trial court must, through its in camera review, conduct an ad hoc balancing of “(a) the discoverant’s interests in disclosure of the materials; and (b) the government’s interest s in their confiden

2024Factors that the trial court should consider when balancing these interests for police misconduct claims include (1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2) the impact upon persons who have given information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which governmental self-evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an actual or potent

2019Compare Rhino Fund, LLLP v. Hutchins, 215 P.3d 1186, 1195 (Colo. App. 2008) (“An action will lie for the conversion of money where there is an obligation to return or otherwise particularly treat specific money.”) (emphasis added), with Huffman, 205 P.3d at 509 (explaining that an employee with stock options has no presently enforceable property right for a civil theft claim where the stock options are not presently enforceable); Ladd v. Ladd Constr., LLC, No. TTDCV074007051S, 2008 WL 4416048 , at *1 (Conn. Super.

2019Compare Rhino Fund, LLLP v. Hutchins, 215 P.3d 1186, 1195 (Colo. App. 2008) (“An action will lie for the conversion of money where there is an obligation to return or otherwise particularly treat specific money.”) (emphasis added), with Huffman, 205 P.3d at 509 (explaining that an employee with stock options has no presently enforceable property right for a civil theft claim where the stock options are not presently enforceable); Ladd v. Ladd Constr., LLC, No. TTDCV074007051S, 2008 WL 4416048 , at *1 (Conn. Super.

2015The parties do not contest the certification on appeal, and we conclude that (1) "the decision to be certified is a ruling upon an entire claim for relief"; (2) the decision "is final in the sense of an ultimate disposition of an individual claim"; and (3) the trial court properly concluded that there was no "just reason for delay in entry of a final judgment on the claim." Harding Glass Co., Inc. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Colo. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Seefried v. Hummel, 148 P.3d 184, 188 (Colo. App. 2005) (dismissing appeal as to claim dismissed without prejudice,

2015The parties do not contest the certification on appeal, and we conclude that (1) "the decision to be certified is a ruling upon an entire claim for relief"; (2) the decision "is final in the sense of an ultimate disposition of an individual claim"; and (3) the trial court properly concluded that there was no "just reason for delay in entry of a final judgment on the claim." Harding Glass Co., Inc. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Colo. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Seefried v. Hummel, 148 P.3d 184, 188 (Colo. App. 2005) (dismissing appeal as to claim dismissed without prejudice,

2011In Benzing , we explained that "the court may analyze the substantive claims and defenses that will be raised to determine whether class certification is appropriate...." 206 P.3d at 818 ; see also LaBerenz, 181 P.3d at 334 (permitting a preliminary hearing "addressed not to the merits of the plaintiff's individual claim, but to whether he or she is asserting a claim that, assuming its merit, will satisfy the requirements of" C.R.C.P. 23).

2009Lytle v. Kite, 728 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo.1986); In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511, 514 (Colo.App.2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo.2006).

2008See also Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 , 1229 n. 4 (Colo.2003) (noting that, based on Howard and Love, the Attorney General would have had standing as an individual to challenge the constitutionality of the General Assembly's redistricting bill); id. at 1244 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (joining part IV of the majority's opinion, including n. 4).

2008See also Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 , 1229 n. 4 (Colo.2003) (noting that, based on Howard and Love, the Attorney General would have had standing as an individual to challenge the constitutionality of the General Assembly's redistricting bill); id. at 1244 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (joining part IV of the majority's opinion, including n. 4).

2007See Harding Glass, supra, 640 P.2d at 1125.

2007Harding Glass, supra, 640 P.2d at 1125 (citations omitted; quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 851 U.S. 427 , 486, 76 S.Ct. 895, 900 , 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956)).