Just. v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Just. v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996).
Supreme Court of FloridaPublished opinionNo. 86264May 23, 1996

Just. v. State

Quick Summary

A trial court must strike unannounced special conditions of probation and may not reimpose them upon resentencing if the original sentence is reversed for failing to orally pronounce them.

A defendant was convicted of forgery and sentenced to probation. While the oral pronouncement included only three specific conditions, the subsequent written judgment included numerous additional special conditions. The court addressed whether a trial court may reimpose special conditions of probation at resentencing if the original sentence was reversed because those conditions were not orally pronounced. Because a written sentence must conform to the oral pronouncement and special conditions must be announced in open court to satisfy due process, the court held that the trial court must strike unannounced conditions and may not reimpose them upon resentencing.

121 citation events (66 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
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Citations from separate opinions of courts that could overrule this case. This is a warning signal, not a treatment change. The flag color above is unaffected.
Concurrence Michael Levandoski v. State of Florida, 245 So. 3d 643 (Fla. 2018)
“As we stated in Justice v. State , 674 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1996), "where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced conditions and cannot reimpose them upon resentencing." Id. at 126 .”
Dissent State v. Stang, 41 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 2010)
“See, e.g., Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2007); Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265 (Fla.2003); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123 (Fla.1996).”
Cited for
At page 126Striking unannounced probation conditions after reversal19 citing cases[W]e hold that where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced conditions and cannot reimpose them upon re-sentencing.2 citing courts put it this way
  • Carter v. State, 787 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).published
    ([W]e hold that where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced…)
  • Scott Joseph Ranne v. State of Florida, 432 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026).published
    See Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007) (“[A] court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written sentencing document.” (citing Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1268 (Fla. 2003); Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d…
  • Kathleen Maier Coello v. State of Florida, 383 So. 3d 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024).published
    To permit this would mean a lack of finality . . . .” Id. (emphasis supplied) (quoting Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. 1996)).
  • Flournoy v. Florida Dep't of Corr., No. 1:19-cv-23223 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2019).
    The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “a court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written sentencing document.” Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007) (citing Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 126…
  • Rodriguez v. State, 223 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).published
    See Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla. 2003); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla. 1996).
  • Lopez v. State, 2 So. 3d 1057 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).published
    Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600, 604 (Fla.2007) (citing Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla.2003); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996)). “[A] defendant [may not] claim a sentence is illegal based on an alleged discrepan…
  • Burkhart v. State, 974 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).published
    See Lippman v. State, 633 So.2d 1061, 1064 (Fla.1994); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996).
  • Brown v. State, 965 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).published
    See Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla.2007); Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla.2003); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996).
  • McCloud v. State, 965 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).published
    See Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla.2003); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996).
  • Young v. State, 699 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1997).published
    We expressly answered this question in Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996), holding that "where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appea…
Show 9 more citing cases
  • Roberdd Douchard v. State of Florida, 357 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).published
    See Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. 1996).
  • Davis v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Sarasota Cnty.), No. 8:20-cv-01551 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2020).
    See Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007) (“[The Florida Supreme Court] has held that a court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written sentencing document.”) (citing Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fl…
  • McKinzie v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 8:18-cv-00634 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2020).
    See Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007) (“[The Florida Supreme Court] has held that a court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written sentencing document.”) (citing Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fl…
  • Kenneth Isaac Parkerson v. State of Florida, 163 So. 3d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).published
    ([W]here a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced conditions a…)
  • Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2007).published 2 cites
    See Ashley v. State, 850 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla. 2003); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla.1996).
  • Story v. State, 866 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).published
    (prohibiting imposition of stricken special conditions on resentenc-ing)
  • Michael Bartolone v. State of Florida, 327 So. 3d 331 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).published
    “If this does not occur, and discretionary costs are made a condition of probation, they are to be stricken, and cannot be re-imposed.” Id.; see also Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. 1996).
  • Roberts v. State, 813 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).published
  • Michael Levandoski v. State of Florida, 245 So. 3d 643 (Fla. 2018).published
At page 125Distinguishing general and special probation conditions17 citing cases“generally, courts have held that a written order must conform to the oral pronouncement ... because the written sentence is usually just a record of the actual sentence required to be pronounced in open court.”2 citing courts quote it · 16 listed here
  • Edward Vigliotti v. State of Florida, No. 6D2024-2270 (Fla. 6th DCA July 17, 2026).published
    (Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(b) . . . mandates that the sentence or other final disposition ‘shall be pronounced in open court.’)
  • Parson v. State of Florida, 415 So. 3d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).published
    “that a written order must conform to the oral pronouncement . . . because the written sentence is usually just a record of the actual sentence required to be pronounced in open court”
  • Gazoombi v. State of Florida, 406 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).published
    Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. 1996).
  • Philip Wallace Stauderman v. State of Florida, 261 So. 3d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).published
    P. 3.700(a), (b); Akins, 69 So. 3d at 269 (" 'Generally, courts have held that a written order must conform to the oral pronouncement . . . because the written sentence is usually just a record of the actual sentence required to be pronoun…
  • Angel L. Santiago, Jr. v. State, 227 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).published
    Following a hearing, the trial court denied Santiago’s motion, finding that the transcript was in error and that the written judgment and sentence is correct and complies with the court’s oral pronouncement. 1 “Generally, courts have held…
  • State v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2011).published
    “the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails”
  • N.C. v. Anderson, 837 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).published 3 cites
    Petitioner contends that failing to require oral pronouncement of the disposition violates due process, citing to State v. Williams, 712 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla.1998), and Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla.1996).
  • Burch v. State, 823 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).published 2 cites
    See Carter v. State, 787 So.2d 193, 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Justice, 674 So.2d at 125 (Fla.1996).
  • State v. Williams, 712 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1998).published
    Justice, 674 So.2d at 125.
  • Ealy v. State, 681 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).published
    Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla.1996).
Show 6 more citing cases
  • Tran v. State, 965 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).published
    See Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 125-26 (Fla.1996).
  • N.C. v. Anderson, 882 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2004).published
    (acknowledging that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(b) "mandates that the sentence or other final disposition `shall be pronounced in open court.')
  • Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000).published 4 cites
    See State v. Williams, 712 So.2d 762, 762-64 (Fla.1998) (correcting error without mentioning preservation requirement); Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla.1996) (same).
  • Tory v. State, 686 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).published
    See Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla. 1996); Ealy v. State, 681 So.2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
  • Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000).published
  • Ralph Waldo Emerson, IV v. State of Florida, 412 So. 3d 917 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).published
At page 124“where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced conditions and cannot reimpose them upon resentencing.”2 citing cases3 citing courts quote it
  • Clussman v. State, 89 So. 3d 1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).published
    (holding “special conditions of probation must be imposed at sentencing and may not be imposed at resentencing)
  • Velez-Pizzini v. State, 58 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).published
    (holding that where a trial court fails to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appear in the written sentence order, the court on remand must strike the unannounced conditions and cannot…)
Other citing cases14 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Show 4 more citing cases
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Laurie G. JUSTICE
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 86264.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 23, 1996.
Published opinion
674 So. 2d 123
1996 Fla. LEXIS 1009
1996 WL 271193
Terrence E. Kehoe of the Law Offices of Terrence E. Kehoe, Orlando, for Petitioner., Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
Anstead, Grimes, Harding, Kogan, Only, Overton, Shaw, Wells.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

We have for review Justice v. State, 658 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), which passed upon the following question certified to be of great public importance:

WHERE A SENTENCE IS REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ORALLY PRONOUNCE CERTAIN SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION WHICH LATER APPEARED IN THE WRITTEN SENTENCE, MUST THE COURT SIMPLY STRIKE THE UNANNOUNCED CONDITIONS, OR MAY THE COURT ELECT TO “REIMPOSE” THOSE CONDITIONS AT RESENTENCING?

Id. at 1034.

The decision under review also expressly and directly conflicts with numerous opinions out of the First, Second, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal.[1] We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), (4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that special conditions of probation must be imposed at sentencing and may not be imposed at resentencing.

TRIAL AND APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS

The petitioner, Laurie Justice, was found guilty of two counts of forgery. At sentencing, the trial court placed Justice on probation and imposed three probation conditions — that Justice pay certain costs, that she not have a checking account, and that she be fingerprinted in open court. However, a subsequent written judgment was entered which contained numerous probation conditions not orally pronounced at sentencing.

Upon appeal, the district court held that a remand was required to resolve the discrepancy between the probation conditions imposed at sentencing and those contained in the written sentencing order. The court also held that the trial court could reimpose the unannounced conditions at resentencing. Justice, 658 So.2d at 1029. Judge Griffin dissented as to this latter holding and the[*125] entire panel certified the question for review here.

ANALYSIS

Initially, we note the distinction that has been made in the case law between general and special conditions of probation. In State v. Hart, 668 So.2d 589 (Fla.1996), we held the order of probation form found in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e) constitutes sufficient notice to probationers of those general terms of probation contained in conditions one through eleven of the form, such that oral pronouncement of these general conditions at sentencing by the trial court is unnecessary. However, under Hart, any other special conditions of probation not contained in paragraphs one through eleven of the rule 3.986(e) form, or in the Florida Statutes on probation, must be orally pronounced and imposed at sentencing.

Justice’s probation order contains numerous special probation conditions that were not orally pronounced, and that are not found within the Florida Statutes or contained within the general conditions of the rule 3.986(e) form. Consequently, under Hart, the trial court erred in adding special conditions of probation in the subsequent probation order that were not orally pronounced at the original sentencing hearing.

The requirement that special conditions of probation be pronounced in open court at the time of sentencing arises in part from Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(b), which mandates that the sentence or other final disposition “shall be pronounced in open court.” The requirement also addresses due process concerns that a defendant have notice and an opportunity to object. See generally Olvey v. State, 609 So.2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Application of the dictates of rule 3.700 to conditions of probation is consistent with our prior holdings that probation is among the sanctions that may be imposed in sentencing in criminal proceedings. See Lippman v. State, 633 So.2d 1061 (Fla.1994); Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368 (Fla.1991); see also Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988) (characterizing probation as one of the “five basic sentencing alternatives”).

Most of the decisions which strike special conditions of probation not imposed at the sentencing hearing appear to be grounded on a judicial policy that the actual oral imposition of sanctions should prevail over any subsequent written order to the contrary. Vasquez v. State, 663 So.2d 1343, 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see, e.g., Rowland v. State, 548 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Generally, courts have held that a written order must conform to the oral pronouncement as mandated by rule 3.700 because the written sentence is usually just a record of the actual sentence required to be pronounced in open court. Vasquez, 663 So.2d at 1349. Consequently, when the written order conflicts with the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails. Id.; see Johnson v. State, 627 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that trial court’s oral pronouncement that defendant would receive credit for time served since arrest controlled over re-sentencing form which erroneously credited him with only partial time served since arrest); Kelly v. State, 414 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (holding that mandatory minimum sentence orally pronounced but not incorporated in written sentence was valid part of sentence because written sentence is merely record of actual sentence pronounced in open court).

Some cases have held that the subsequent imposition of new conditions or terms to a sentence or order of probation violates a defendant’s constitutional right against double jeopardy. In Lippman v. State, 633 So.2d 1061 (Fla.1994), the trial court modified the defendant’s probation eight months into the defendant’s probationary term.[2] In our review, we first indicated that the additional conditions imposed by the trial court eonsti-[*126]tuted enhancements of the original sentence rather than modifications. Id. at 1064. We then held that the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense includes “the protection against enhancements or extensions of the conditions of probation.” Id. Accordingly, we concluded that the trial court’s enhancement of the terms of the defendant’s probation violated the double jeopardy prohibition. Id.; see also Clark v. State, 579 So.2d 109 (Fla.1991) (holding that absent proof of violation, trial court cannot change order of probation or community control by enhancing terms thereof, even if defendant has agreed in writing to allow modification and has waived notice and hearing).

Disallowing the reimposition of special conditions of probation not previously announced is also consistent with the sentencing policy announced in Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990), and the mandate of section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1995). In Pope, we refused to permit trial courts to depart from the sentencing guidelines after a reversal of a departure sentence because of the failure to initially provide written reasons for departing.[3] Our ruling was guided by the policy of avoiding multiple appeals, multiple resentencings, and unwarranted efforts to justify an original departure. Id.4 Judge Griffin’s dissent in this case correctly refers to those same concerns:

An order of probation, like any other aspect of sentencing, ought not be a work in progress that the trial court can add to or subtract from at will so long as he or she brings the defendant back in and informs the defendant of the changes. To permit this would mean a lack of finality for no good reason and multiple appeals. It is not too much to ask of a sentencing judge to decide on and recite the special conditions of probation at the sentencing hearing, just as is done with the balance of the sentence. If the court has omitted a condition it wishes it had imposed, its chance has passed unless the defendant violates probation.

Justice, 658 So.2d at 1032, 1035-36 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). We agree with this reasoning. Further, just as we have barred the imposition of special conditions of probation after the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, we find that it would be improper and unfair for unannounced special conditions of probation to be added upon resentencing.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we hold that where a sentence is reversed because the trial court failed to orally pronounce certain special conditions of probation which later appeared in the written sentence, the court must strike the unannounced conditions and cannot reimpose them upon resentencing. Accordingly, we quash the decision below and approve the decisions from the First, Second, and Fourth Districts referred to herein that are consistent with our opinion today.

It is so ordered.

GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., concurs in result only.
1

First District: see, e.g., Jamail v. State, 637 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Christobal v. State, 598 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Cumbie v. State, 597 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Rowland v. State, 548 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Second District: see, e.g., Williams v. State, 653 So.2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), quashed, 667 So.2d 191 (Fla.1996); Nank v. State, 646 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Peterson v. State, 645 So.2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Turchario v. State, 616 So.2d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Tillman v. State, 592 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Fourth District: see, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 663 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 4th DCA), review dismissed, 666 So.2d 145 (Fla.1995); Bartlett v. State, 638 So.2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Skiff v. State, 627 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

2

The court modified the defendant’s probation by: (1) extending the term from two to seven years; (2) ordering the defendant to pay for and successfully complete the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender program; (3) prohibiting the defendant's participation in any job or activity where he would wear a police-type uniform or use police-type equipment; and (4) restricting the defendant’s contact with his immediate family until the entire family entered a program for family members of mentally-disordered sex offenders and all therapists approved contact with the family. Id. at 1063.

3

Just as the rule in this case — oral pronouncement of sentence is required — is derived from the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, so is the rule in Pope. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(ll) provides: "Any sentence outside the permitted range must be accompanied by a written statement delineating the reasons for the departure."

4

As in Pope, a trial court does not get a second bite at the apple when it fails to file written findings in a death case. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (1995), requires a trial court, in the event it imposes a sentence of death, to set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based. The failure of a trial court to do this causes a defendant's sentence to be reduced to life imprisonment. § 775.082(1), Fla Stat. (1995). Upon remand, a trial court cannot refurbish its sentencing order and then still sentence the defendant to death. One policy underlying this requirement is that it forces the trial court to consider, with calm and deliberate reflection, the evidence adduced, and to carefully consider and apply the legal standards for determining an appropriate sentence.