(a)This section applies to any petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death. A writ of habeas corpus pursuant to this section is the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death. A petition filed in any court other than the court which imposed the sentence should be promptly transferred to that court unless good cause is shown for the petition to be heard by another court. A petition filed in or transferred to the court which imposed the sentence shall be assigned to the original trial judge unless that judge is unavailable or there is other good cause to assign the case to a different judge.
(b)After the entry of a judgment of death in the trial court, that court shall offer counsel to the prisoner as provided in Section 68662 of the Government Code.
(c)Except as provided in subdivisions (d) and (g), the initial petition must be filed within one year of the order entered under Section 68662 of the Government Code.
(d)An initial petition which is untimely under subdivision (c) or a successive petition whenever filed shall be dismissed unless the court finds, by the preponderance of all available evidence, whether or not admissible at trial, that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted or is ineligible for the sentence. A stay of execution shall not be granted for the purpose of considering a successive or untimely petition unless the court finds that the petitioner has a substantial claim of actual innocence or ineligibility. “Ineligible for the sentence of death” means that circumstances exist placing that sentence outside the range of the sentencer’s discretion. Claims of ineligibility include a claim that none of the special circumstances in subdivision (a) of Section
190.2 is true, a claim that the defendant was under the age of 18 at the time of the crime, or a claim that the defendant has an intellectual disability, as defined in Section 1376. A claim relating to the sentencing decision under Section 190.3 is not a claim of actual innocence or ineligibility for the purpose of this section.
(e)A petitioner claiming innocence or ineligibility under subdivision (d) shall disclose all material information relating to guilt or eligibility in the possession of the petitioner or present or former counsel for petitioner. If the petitioner willfully fails to make the disclosure required by this subdivision and authorize disclosure by counsel, the petition may be dismissed.
(f)Proceedings under this section shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible, consistent with a fair adjudication. The superior court shall resolve the initial petition within one year of filing unless the court finds that a delay is necessary to
resolve a substantial claim of actual innocence, but in no instance shall the court take longer than two years to resolve the petition. On decision of an initial petition, the court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision.
(g)If a habeas corpus petition is pending on the effective date of this section, the court may transfer the petition to the court which imposed the sentence. In a case where a judgment of death was imposed prior to the effective date of this section, but no habeas corpus petition has been filed prior to the effective date of this section, a petition that would otherwise be barred by subdivision (c) may be filed within one year of the effective date of this section or within the time allowed under prior law, whichever is earlier.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
22
cases (
14 in the last 5 years), 2017–2024 · leading case:
In re Friend, 489 P.3d 309 (Cal. 2021).
In re Friend, 489 P.3d 309 (Cal. 2021).
· cites it 6× “(Pen. Code, §§ 1509, 1509.1.) The question before us concerns the scope of these restrictions on successive petitions.”
Stephen Redd v. Patricia Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).
· cites it 13× “513); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1509 (b). Redd requested the appointment of postconviction habeas counsel 26 years ago.”
People v. Potts, 436 P.3d 899 (Cal. 2019).
· cites it 2× “) Among other things, Proposition 66 sets forth new procedures governing habeas corpus petitions ( Pen. Code, §§ 1509, 1509.1 ), new rules for granting extensions of time for briefing ( id.”
In re Robinson, 35 Cal. App. 5th 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
“( Pen. Code, §§ 1509, 1509.1.) 1 This case presents a threshold question: Do Proposition 66's procedures for appealing the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from the superior court to the Court of Appeal apply to a petition originally filed with the Supreme Court…”
State of Arizona v. Kevin Artice Miles, 414 P.3d 680 (Ariz. 2018).
“shall be dismissed unless the court finds, by the preponderance of all available evidence, whether or not admissible at trial, that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted or is ineligible for the sentence " (emphasis added) ); N.”
Stephen Redd v. Patricia Guerrero, 122 F.4th 1203 (9th Cir. 2024).
· cites it 7× “(quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1509 (f)). So Briggs directly supports the panel’s objective prediction of how the California Supreme Court would interpret the statutes at issue here—as imposing permissible, flexible standards for the appointment of counsel, tied to both practical…”
(DP) Tobin v. Davis, No. 1:18-cv-01375 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020).
· cites it 3× “4th 770 , 780- 20 81 (1998), and Cal. Pen. Code § 1509 (d)). He suggests this is so because “[n]one of the evidence 21 or law relied upon by [him] in this claim was unavailable at the time of the state habeas petition.”
Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017).
“Such claims go to the heart of our concerns over the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of the death penalty.”
(DP) Letner v. Davis, No. 1:18-cv-01459 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2022).
· cites it 2× “64-1 at 3-6; Penal Code § 1509; California Rule of Court 4.”
Prince v. Davis, No. 3:16-cv-00871 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2019).
· cites it 2× “at “Prince also cannot show the unexhausted claims raised in 14 the Petition are not plainly meritless, given the requirements of California Penal Code 15 section 1509,” in that “[n]either these unexhausted claims nor any of the exhausted claims 16 included in the Petition…”
Weaver v. Davis, No. 3:18-cv-02888 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2020).
· cites it 2× “) Section 1509(d) provides in relevant part that “a successive petition 28 whenever filed shall be dismissed unless the court finds, by the preponderance of all 1 available evidence, whether or not admissible at trial, that the defendant is actually innocent 2 of the crime of…”
In re Robinson, No. B293216 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2019).
“(Pen. Code, §§ 1509, 1509.1.)1 This case presents a threshold question: Do Proposition 66’s procedures for appealing the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from the superior court to the Court of Appeal apply to a petition originally filed with the Supreme Court…”
Cal. Penal Code § 1509(b): 1 case
Stephen Redd v. Patricia Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).
“513); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1509 (b). Redd requested the appointment of postconviction habeas counsel 26 years ago.”
Cal. Penal Code § 1509(d): 2 cases
(DP) Tobin v. Davis, No. 1:18-cv-01375 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020).
“4th 770 , 780- 20 81 (1998), and Cal. Pen. Code § 1509 (d)). He suggests this is so because “[n]one of the evidence 21 or law relied upon by [him] in this claim was unavailable at the time of the state habeas petition.”
Cal. Penal Code § 1509(f): 2 cases
Stephen Redd v. Patricia Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023).
“513); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1509 (b). Redd requested the appointment of postconviction habeas counsel 26 years ago.”
Stephen Redd v. Patricia Guerrero, 122 F.4th 1203 (9th Cir. 2024).
“(quoting Cal. Penal Code § 1509 (f)). So Briggs directly supports the panel’s objective prediction of how the California Supreme Court would interpret the statutes at issue here—as imposing permissible, flexible standards for the appointment of counsel, tied to both practical…”
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