Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981). · Go Syfert
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Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

A state agency is considered an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity purposes (an agency's agreement to comply with federal law does not constitute a waiver of immunity).

Nursing home associations sought retroactive monetary relief from a state agency for Medicaid underpayments resulting from delayed implementation of cost-related reimbursement regulations. The plaintiffs argued that the state's agreement to abide by federal laws and the agency's status as a body corporate capable of being sued constituted a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court holds that a state waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be expressed through the most explicit language or overwhelming implications. Participation in a federal program and a customary agreement to obey federal regulations are insufficient to constitute an express waiver of sovereign immunity.

1,201 citation events (379 in the last 25 years) across 106 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hollingsworth v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, No. 1:24-cv-00412 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2024)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#15 42 U.S.C. § 1396a cited 2× in this case · 1,571 total citations of statute #4 45 C.F.R. § 250.30 cited 1× in this case · 84 total citations of statute #1 46 C.F.R. § 250.30 cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 150 Waiver of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment48 citing cases“can hardly be deemed an express waiver of eleventh amendment immunity.”4 citing courts quote it · also cited as 101 S. Ct. at 1034; 67 L. Ed. 2d at 136 · 47 listed here
  • Hollingsworth v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, No. 1:24-cv-00412 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2024).
    ([M]ere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in f…)
  • Webber, No. 1:24-cv-00401 (D. Me. July 14, 2026).
    Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (“[A] State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation”); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (“Although a State’s…
  • Lawson v. Kansas Dep't of Child. & Families, No. 2:25-cv-02171 (D. Kan. Oct. 9, 2025).
    Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981).
  • Jennifer Harmon v. Second Jud. Circuit of the State of Missouri, No. 23-2691 (8th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025).published
    Services v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981).
  • Horizon Bank SSB v. Patrick, No. 1:23-cv-00691 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2024).
    Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam) (noting that a state does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit in its own courts).
  • McKay v. Missouri Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 4:23-cv-00495 (E.D. Mo. July 28, 2023). 2 cites
    “Although a State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. (citing Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450…
  • East v. Wasko, No. 4:22-cv-04126 (D.S.D. Feb. 14, 2023).
    Servs, v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 65 1, 673 (1974))}. “[N]either such participation in itself, nor a concomitant agreement to obey federal law, is sufficient to waive the pr…
  • Wriston v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Resources, No. 2:20-cv-00614 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 13, 2021).
    (Id. at 11.) The Supreme Court of the United States has instructed that the “mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court.” Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47 (citing Florida Dept. of Healt…
  • Braun v. Walz, No. 0:20-cv-00333 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2021).
    Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 , 99 n.9 (1984) (citing Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam)); see also Coll.
  • eScholar, LLC v. Nebraska Dep't of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 3d 414 (D. Neb. 2020).published
    Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam).
Show 37 more citing cases
  • Gorenc v. Klaassen, 421 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (D. Kan. 2019).published
    Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981)) (noting the immunity provided under the Eleventh Amendment “applies equally to state agencies” and “it applies to state officials acting in their official capacities because cour…
  • Medsense, LLC v. Univ. Sys. of Maryland, 420 F. Supp. 3d 382 (D. Md. 2019).published
    Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam)).
  • Poe v. Fuller, No. 5:17-cv-00913 (W.D. La. Sept. 3, 2019).
    Hence, this Court cannot assert jurisdiction over an MLSSA claim for money damages unless the State of Louisiana has waived its sovereign immunity.9 9 Although a state can also be sued if Congress has validly abrogated the state’s sovereig…
  • Slack v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 2016-0130 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2018).published
    The first reason is that an explicit but general agreement to obey federal law is “a customary condition for any participation in a federal program” and “can hardly be deemed an express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Fla. Dep’t of…
  • Erica Moore v. Univ. of Mississippi, No. 17-60348 (5th Cir. Mar. 8, 2018).unpublished
    Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (quotation marks omitted); see also Magnolia Venture Capital Corp v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 151 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1998).
  • FCS Advisors, LLC v. State of Missouri, No. 2:17-cv-04089 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2017).
    Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981); see also In re Innes, 184 F.3d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Several Supreme Court decisions provide that neither receipt of federal funds, participation in a federal program, no…
  • Christ the King Manor Inc v. Sec'y US Dep't of Hea, No. 12-3401 (3d Cir. Sept. 19, 2013).published
    Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981). relief that the State Defendant’s implementation” of the SPA “violates federal law,” that claim is barred by sovereign immunity under Edelman and Green.
  • Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Sec'y of Exec. Off. of Health & Human Servs., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 105 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2010).published
    (no private right of action to enforce 42 U.S.C. §1396 (a)(30)(A))
  • Norville v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 862 A.2d 477 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).published
    Vol.). “[T]he state’s partial waiver of the county boards’ sovereign immunity does not constitute a waiver of their constitutional immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.” Jones, 689 F.Supp. at 538 (citing Florida…
  • Ernst v. Roberts, 379 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2004).published 2 cites
    Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 , 110 S.Ct. 1868 , 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990) (citations omitted); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 , 105 S.Ct. 3142 , 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (“Thus, in order for a state statu…
  • United Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State, 793 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).published
    Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 , 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034 , 67 L.Ed. 2d 132, 136 (1981).
  • Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2001).published
    Mere participation by a state in a federal program does not, however, establish the state's consent to be sued in federal court; the state's decision to waive its immunity as a condition of participating in the federal program also require…
  • McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2001).published
    Bank, 527 U.S. at 686 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)), waiver based on participation in a federal program will be found only if stated in "'express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] le…
  • Doran by & Through Doran v. Condon, 983 F. Supp. 886 (D. Neb. 1997).published
    Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 150 [ 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034 , 67 L.Ed.2d 132 ] (1981) (per curiam).
  • Waller v. Muskogee Cnty. Bd. of Com'rs, 67 F.3d 312 (10th Cir. 1995).published
    "Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overriden it ... a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the relief sought." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 , 167 n. 14 (1985). "[W]e will f…
  • Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 834 F. Supp. 358 (D. Wyo. 1993).published
    Id. at 150, 101 S.Ct. at 1034 .
  • Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990).published 2 cites
    A State does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit only in its own courts, see, e. g., Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam), and…
  • Hill v. State of Fla. DHRS, 715 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Fla. 1989).published
    Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 150 [ 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034 , 67 L.Ed.2d 132 ] (1981).
  • Hill v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 715 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Fla. 1989).published
    Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 150 [ 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034 , 67 L.Ed.2d 132 ] (1981).
  • Alfred Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986).published 2 cites
    The Supreme Court rejected essentially the same contention in a case involving a Florida agency authorized to "sue and be sued." See Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Association, 450 U.S. 147…
  • Magnolia Venture v. MS Dept of Econ., No. 19-20116 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 1998).published
  • Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982).published
  • Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).published
  • Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).published
  • Janc v. Coordinating Bd. for Higher Educ. (In Re Janc), 251 B.R. 525 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000).published
  • Kirwin v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, 665 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).published
  • Brady v. Michelin Reifenwerke, 613 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D. Miss. 1985).published
  • Laird v. Chrysler Corp., 460 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1983).published
  • Shinholster v. Graham, 527 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D. Fla. 1981).published
  • Abril v. Commonwealth of VA, 145 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 1998).published
  • Lopes v. Commonwealth, 811 N.E.2d 501 (Mass. 2004).published
  • Heritage Operations Grp., LLC v. Norwood, No. 1:17-cv-08609 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2018).
  • Herndon 136007 v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., No. 1:20-cv-01091 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2021).
  • Carey v. Maine Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, No. KENcv-17-17 (Me. Super. Ct Jan. 3, 2018).unpublished
  • Jordon v. Norfolk State Univ. (In Re Jordon), 275 B.R. 755 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002).published
  • Slack v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 325 F. Supp. 3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 2018).published
  • Thompson v. Regents of Univ., 206 F. App'x 714 (9th Cir. 2006).unpublished
At page 149 Analyzing state consent to federal jurisdiction under eleventh amendment8 citing casessue and be sued" clause in Mexican agency's enabling legislation permitted "some judicial remedies" against the agency, but did not expose it "to the subject matter jurisdiction of courts of the United States1 citing court put it this way
  • Hilda Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth. & John Ransom, 268 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2001).published
    (sue and be sued" clause in Mexican agency's enabling legislation permitted "some judicial remedies" against the agency, but did not expose it "to the subject matter jurisdiction of courts of the United States)
  • McKay v. Missouri Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 4:23-cv-00495 (E.D. Mo. July 28, 2023). 2 cites
    “Although a State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. (citing Fla. Dep’t of Health v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450…
  • Williams v. Corr., No. 3:22-cv-00236 (D. Conn. Nov. 4, 2022).
    And “in the absence of a state's consent, a suit in federal court in which a state or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant for damages is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” See Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabi…
  • Entergy, Arkansas v. State of Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2000).published
    A state does not submit to federal jurisdiction by consenting to suit in its own courts, see Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900), by stating its intent to "sue and be sued," Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Serv. v. Florida…
  • Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).published 2 cites
    Nor does it consent to suit in federal court merely by stating its intention to “sue and be sued,” Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 149-150 (1981) (per curiam), or even by auth…
  • Long v. Hannigan, 990 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1993).unpublished
    Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-150 (1981); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
  • Baltas v. Dones, No. 3:22-cv-00038 (D. Conn. Apr. 27, 2022).
  • Bellows, No. 2:25-cv-00390 (D. Vt. Feb. 10, 2026).
At page 151 Dissenting opinions on prior precedent's correctness5 citing casesJUSTICE MARSHALL dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, substantially for the reasons stated in his dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415…opening of page *151 (no citing court says what it cites this page for) · 4 listed here
At page 147 holding that an agency of state government is part of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes3 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
  • Peebles v. Auburn Univ. (CONSENT), 532 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (M.D. Ala. 2021).published
    (holding that an agency of state government is part of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes)
  • Bd. of Ed. of Baltimore Cty. v. Zimmer-rubert, 973 A.2d 233 (Md. 2009).published
    Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50 , 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034 , 67 L.Ed.2d 132, 135-36 (1981) (per curiam) (holding that a Florida law providing that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services “is a *211 ‘body co…
  • State v. Arbaugh, 595 S.E.2d 289 (W. Va. 2004).published 2 cites
    Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 154 , 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1036-37 , 67 L.Ed.2d 132, 139 (per curiam) (footnotes omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring).
At page 154 Protecting individual rights through the integrity of the law3 citing casespresumption is supported by much more than the desire to foster an appearance of certainty and impartiality in the administration of justice, or the interest…opening of page *154 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022).published
    The Court adheres to precedent not just for institutional reasons, but because it recognizes that stability in the law is “an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual.” Florida Dept. of Health and Re…
  • South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).published 2 cites
    It has been argued that we should not overrule so recent a decision, lest our action “appear to be . . . occasioned by nothing more than a change in the Court’s personnel,” and the rules we announce no more than “ ‘the opinions of a small…
  • Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).published
101 S. Ct. at 1035 cited at this page2 citing cases
At page 153 “appear to be . . . occasioned by nothing more than a change in the court's personnel,”2 citing casesthe opinion's own words at *153, quoted by 1 later opinions
  • Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).published 4 cites
    Indeed, the majority candidly explains why this particular contingency, which until now has been almost universally understood not to be sufficient to warrant overruling a precedent, see, e. g., Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative S…
  • Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).published
101 S. Ct. at 1032 cited at this page1 citing case
  • Taylor v. Com. of Virginia, 951 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Va. 1996).published
    Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 450 U.S. at 150 , 101 S.Ct. at 1032 (citations omitted).
Other citing cases4 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES Et Al.
v.
FLORIDA NURSING HOME ASSOCIATION Et Al.
80-532.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 20, 1981.
Published opinion
450 U.S. 147
1981 U.S. LEXIS 72
Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Jordan, Blackmun.
Cited by 441 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: #46,157 of 633,719
Citer courts: D. Maryland (2) · D. Nebraska (1)

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

Petitioners, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and its Secretary, seek review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordering them to make payments to various nursing homes. These payments represent the amount that Florida was found to have underpaid these nursing homes in the course of its Medicaid reimbursements from July 1, 1976, to October 18, 1977. Because we conclude that the court below misapplied the prevailing standard for finding a waiver of the State’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, we grant a writ of certiorari and reverse.

[*148] I

In 1972, Congress amended the Medicaid Program to provide that every “skilled nursing facility and intermediate care facility” must be reimbursed by participating States on a “cost related basis.” 86 Stat. 1426, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (13)(E). This amendment was to take effect on July 1, 1976, ibid., and had the effect of altering some reimbursement arrangements based on “flat rates” established by the States. Regulations implementing this change were not promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) until 1976. As a result, the regulations provided that HEW would not enforce the new “cost related” reimbursement requirement until January 1, 1978. 46 CFR §250.30 (a)(3) (iv) (1976).[1]

In March 1977, respondents, an association of Florida nursing homes and various individual nursing homes in southern Florida, brought suit in federal court against the Secretary of HEW and petitioners. They argued that the delay in enforcement created by the implementing regulations was inconsistent with the statutory directive that cost-related reimbursements begin on July 1, 1976. In addition to prospective relief, they sought retroactive relief in the form of payments by the State of the difference between the reimbursement they had received since July 1, 1976, and the amounts they would have received under a cost-related system. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held the regulations invalid, relying on its previous decision in Golden Isles Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Califano, 442 F. Supp. 201 (1977), aff’d, 616 F. 2d 1355 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Golden Isles Con[*149] valescent Center, Inc., 449 U. S. 872 (1980). These two cases were consolidated for consideration of the availability of retroactive relief, and the District Court held that such relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling that the regulations were invalid, but reversed the District Court’s determination that retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 616 F. 2d 1355 (1980).[2] The court acknowledged that retroactive monetary relief against a State in federal court is forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment “if not consented to by the state.” Id., at 1362. It found the requisite consent, however, based on two acts of the State. First, Florida law provides that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is a “body corporate” with the capacity to “sue and be sued,” Fla. Stat. § 402.34 (1979). 616 F. 2d, at 1363. In addition to this general waiver of sovereign immunity, the court found a specific waiver of the Eleventh Amendment’s immunity from suit in federal court in an agreement under the Medicaid Program in which the Department agreed to “recognize and abide by all State and Federal Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines applicable to participation in and administration of, the Title XIX Medicaid Program.” Ibid. “By contracting with appellants to be bound by all federal laws applicable to the Medicaid program, the state has expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consented to suit in federal court regarding any action by providers alleging a breach of these laws.” Ibid.

II

The analysis in this case is controlled by our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). There we applied[*150] the Eleventh Amendment to retroactive grants of welfare benefits and discussed the proper standard for a waiver of this immunity by a State. On the latter issue we stated that “we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” Id., at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). We added that the “mere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts.” 415 U. S., at 673.

The holding below, finding a waiver in this case, cannot be reconciled with the principles set out in Edelman. As the Court of Appeals recognized, the State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services “does not constitute a waiver by the state of its constitutional immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court.” 616 F. 2d, at 1363. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 441 (1900). And the fact that the Department agreed explicitly to obey federal law in administering the program can hardly be deemed an express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. This agreement merely stated a customary condition for any participation in a federal program by the State, and Edelman already established that neither such participation in itself, nor a concomitant agreement to obey federal law, is sufficient to waive the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.[3] 415 U. S., at 673-674.

We therefore reverse the decision below.

It is so ordered.

[*151] Justice Marshall dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, substantially for the reasons stated in his dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 688 (1974). Justice Blackmun also dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals substantially for the reasons stated in Justice Marshall’s dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 688 (1974).
1

In a commentary accompanying the new regulations, the Secretary noted that no States would be able to accumulate needed data in time to meet the statutory deadline of July 1, 1976. For this reason, cost-related reimbursement was not required under the regulations until January 1, 1978, but the States were “encouraged to meet each requirement of the regulations as soon as possible.” 41 Fed. Reg. 27305 (1976).

2

The Golden Isles case and this case remained consolidated on appeal. The decision below, however, produced two separate petitions for cer-tiorari. The first, Taylor v. Golden Isles Convalescent Center, Inc., cert. denied, 449 U. S. 872 (1980), involved jurisdictional and venue issues. The present petition relates only to the availability of retroactive relief.

3

Petitioners argue that under Florida law a waiver of immunity can only be accomplished by a state statute. See Fla. Const., Art. 10, § 13. No such waiver is present here.

In addition, it is worth noting that in October 1976 Congress repealed[*151] a provision requiring States participating in Medicaid to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pub. L. 94-552, 90 Stat. 2540. This repeal was made retroactive to January 1, 1976.

Concurrence

Justice Stevens,

concurring.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is in square conflict with this Court’s holding in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651. Apparently recognizing this fact, respondents urge the Court to grant certiorari and hear argument on the question whether Edelman should be overruled.[1] I find this question less easily answered than do my Brothers, all of whom were Members of the Court when Edelman was decided. Each has voted today consistently with his vote in Edelman itself.

The arguments in favor of overruling Edelman are appealing, particularly because I share the opinion of Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun that Edelman was incorrectly decided.[2] I have previously relied[*152] on rather slender grounds for distinguishing Edelman,3 when wiser judges might have forthrightly urged rejection of the precedent.[4] And I joined the Court’s decision to overrule Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, insofar as it concerned the financial responsibility of municipal corporations. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 714 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Moreover, the reflections of some former Members of the Court on the doctrine of stare decisis suggest that they would not have hesitated to overrule a decision that stands as an impediment to providing an adequate remedy for citizens injured by their government.[5] Nevertheless, I find greater force in the countervailing arguments.

First, I would note that Edelman did not announce a rule of law fundamentally at odds with our current understanding of the scope of constitutionally protected civil rights,[6] [*153] nor did it rest upon a discredited interpretation of the relevant historical documents.[7] Rather, the rule of the Edel-man case is of only limited significance and has been a part of our law for only a few years. Its limiting effect on the jurisdiction of federal courts is not so restrictive that Congress may not mitigate its impact by unambiguously conditioning state participation in federal programs on a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment defense. The Edelman rule represents an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that had previously been endorsed by some of our finest Circuit Judges;[8] it therefore cannot be characterized as unreasonable or egregiously incorrect.[9]

Of even greater importance, however, is my concern about the potential damage to the legal system that may be caused by frequent or sudden reversals of direction that may appear to have been occasioned by nothing more significant than a change in the identity of this Court’s personnel.[10] Granting that a zigzag is sometimes the best course,[11] I am firmly convinced that we have a profound obligation to give recently decided cases the strongest presumption of validity. That[*154] presumption is supported by much more than the desire to foster an appearance of certainty and impartiality in the administration of justice, or the interest in facilitating the labors of judges.[12] The presumption is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual. Citizens must have confidence that the rules on which they rely in ordering their affairs — particularly when they are prepared to take issue with those in power in doing so— are rules of law and not merely the opinions of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high office.[13] It is the unpopular or beleaguered individual — not the man in power— who has the greatest stake in the integrity of the law.[14]

[*155] For me, the adverse consequences of adhering to an arguably erroneous precedent in this case are far less serious than the consequences of further unravelling the doctrine of stare decisis. I therefore join the Court’s disposition.

1

Respondents initially argued that the Court of Appeals’ decision was distinguishable from Edelman and that certiorari therefore should be denied. However, after the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, recommended that the Court grant cer-tiorari and summarily reverse the lower court’s decision, respondents requested that the Court instead grant certiorari and consider overruling Edelman. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent Nursing Homes 4-13.

2

In 1972,1 sat as a member of a three-judge District Court that rejected essentially the same Eleventh Amendment argument that the Court accepted in Edelman. See Mothers and Childrens Rights Organization v. Sterrett, No. 70 F. 138 (ND Ind., Apr. 14, 1972), summarily aff’d, 409[*152] U. S. 809; cited in Edelman, 415 U. S., at 670, n. 13. I am therefore quite certain that I would have joined Justice Marshall’s dissent if I had been a Member of the Court when Edelman was decided.

3

See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 458-460 (Stevens, J., concurring).

4

In his 1949 Cardozo lecture, Justice Douglas stated:

“The idea that any body of law, particularly public law, should appear to stay put and not be in flux is an interesting phenomenon that Frank has explored in Law and the Modern Mind. He points out how it is — in law and in other fields too — that men continue to chant of the immutability of a rule in order to 'cover up the transformation, to deny the reality of change, to conceal the truth of adaptation behind a verbal disguise of fixity and universality.’ But the more blunt, open, and direct course is truer to democratic traditions. It reflects the candor of Cardozo. The principle of full disclosure has as much place in government as it does in the market place. A judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why it does it will breed understanding. And confidence based on understanding is more enduring than confidence based on awe.” W. Douglas, Stare Decisis 30-31 (1949) (footnote omitted).

5

See W. Douglas, supra; A. Goldberg, Equal Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme Court 67-97 (1971).

6

Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 489-495, overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537.

7

Cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 71-73, overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1.

8

The opinion in Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 228 (CA2 1972), which adopted the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment subsequently approved by this Court in Edelman, was written by Judge McGowan (sitting by designation) and was joined by Chief Judge Friendly and Judge Timbers. See 415 U. S., at 66A-665, 666, n. 11.

9

The principal justifications for refusing to apply the doctrine of stare decisis in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658; see id., at 695-701, are therefore not available in this case.

10

Scholars have suggested that the identity of the Court’s personnel was a factor underlying the decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 853-855, to overrule Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183. See, e. g., J. Nowak, J. Young, & R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 159-163 (1978).

11

See, e. g., West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, overruling Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586.

12

These concerns are not, however, insubstantial:

“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.” B. Caxdozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).

13

This, of course, is not a novel suggestion. As the first Justice White noted in his dissent in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 652:

“The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one hedged about by precedents which are binding on the court without regard to the personality of its members. Break down this belief in judicial continuity, and let it be felt that on great constitutional questions this court is to depart from the settled conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine them all according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench, and our Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value and become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of the people.”

14

The Chief Justice recently reminded us of this fact by quoting a statement ascribed to Sir Thomas More:

“This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast — Man’s laws, not God’s — and if you cut them down . . . d’you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? . . . Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.” See TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 195, quoting R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967).

Dissent

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This suit is brought by Florida citizens against Florida officials. In that circumstance I am of the view, expressed in dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 687 (1974), that Florida “may not invoke the Eleventh Amendment, since that Amendment bars only federal court suits against States by citizens of other States.”