sovereign immunity in Massachusetts

2024Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, "[t]he Commonwealth 'cannot be impleaded in its own courts except with its consent, and, when that consent is granted, it can be impleaded only in the manner and to the extent expressed . . . [by] statute.'" Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981), quoting Broadhurst v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 373 Mass. 720, 722 (1977).

2024Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, "[t]he Commonwealth 'cannot be impleaded in its own courts except with its consent, and, when that consent is granted, it can be impleaded only in the manner and to the extent expressed . . . [by] statute.'" Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981), quoting Broadhurst v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 373 Mass. 720, 722 (1977).

2022DeRoche, supra. "But even a strict interpretation must be reasonable, . . . and our focus remains on the intent of the Legislature." Todino, supra. Sovereign immunity remains "in effect unless consent to suit has been 'expressed by the terms of a statute, or appears by necessary implication from them.'" Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 763 (1997), quoting C & M Constr.

2020For example, "the antidiscrimination statute, G.L. c. 151B, waives the sovereign immunity of the 'Commonwealth and all political subdivisions ... thereof' by including them in the statutory definition of persons and employers subject to the statute." Bain v. City of Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 763 (1997), quoting G.L. c. 151B, § 1(1) and (5).

2022A city's liability for prejudgment interest "implicates the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which protects the public treasury from unanticipated money judgments." Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. 234, 238 (2007).

2022A city's liability for prejudgment interest "implicates the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which protects the public treasury from unanticipated money judgments." Todino v. Wellfleet, 448 Mass. 234, 238 (2007).

2018Historically, however, the principle had no application when the negligent actors were employees of State or local government, because their employers were shielded from such lawsuits based upon the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. *244 Morash & Sons v. Commonwealth , 363 Mass. 612 , 618-619, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973).

2018Historically, however, the principle had no application when the negligent actors were employees of State or local government, because their employers were shielded from such lawsuits based upon the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. *244 Morash & Sons v. Commonwealth , 363 Mass. 612 , 618-619, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973).

2025Claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities. "[T]o avoid a State's sovereign immunity to a damages suit, a plaintiff must sue the State official in his individual and not his official capacity." O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 415 Mass. 132 , 141 n.13 (1993) (holding that damages are only available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against State officials if sued in their individual capacities); Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 593, 596 (2001) (affirming summary judgment in favor of individual defendants sued in their official capacities under MCRA and for i

2018See O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County , 415 Mass. 132 , 141 n.13 (1993) ("to avoid a State's sovereign immunity to a damages suit, a plaintiff must sue the State official in his individual and not his official capacity"); Vining v. Commonwealth , 63 Mass. App. Ct. 690 , 690-692 (2005) (emphasizing sovereign immunity).

2022DeRoche, supra. "But even a strict interpretation must be reasonable, . . . and our focus remains on the intent of the Legislature." Todino, supra. Sovereign immunity remains "in effect unless consent to suit has been 'expressed by the terms of a statute, or appears by necessary implication from them.'" Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 763 (1997), quoting C & M Constr.

2019Two years ago, in a ' 9 case, the Supreme Judicial Court decided Brown v. Office of the Commissioner of Probation, 475 Mass. 675 (2016), in which the Court found that sovereign immunity barred a Superior Court from awarding post‑judgment interest on an award of attorney's fees and costs against a public agency.[1] The MCAD concedes that post‑judgment --------------------------- [1]Brown distinguished an earlier case on which the MCAD relies, DeRoche v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 447 Mass. 1 (2006), finding that DeRoche "affirmed an order requiring the payment of postjudgm

2000The Trust Fund contends that this fraud action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 1 “Massachusetts is one of only five remaining States which retain the common law immunity at both the State and local levels.” Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 212 (1977).

2000The Trust Fund contends that this fraud action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 1 “Massachusetts is one of only five remaining States which retain the common law immunity at both the State and local levels.” Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 212 (1977).

2024Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, "[t]he Commonwealth 'cannot be impleaded in its own courts except with its consent, and, when that consent is granted, it can be impleaded only in the manner and to the extent expressed . . . [by] statute.'" Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981), quoting Broadhurst v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 373 Mass. 720, 722 (1977).

2024Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, "[t]he Commonwealth 'cannot be impleaded in its own courts except with its consent, and, when that consent is granted, it can be impleaded only in the manner and to the extent expressed . . . [by] statute.'" Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981), quoting Broadhurst v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 373 Mass. 720, 722 (1977).

2013See Brum v. Dartmouth, supra, citing Matthews v. Rakiey, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995) (right to immunity from suit “would be ‘lost forever’ if an order denying it were not appealable until the close of litigation”).

2006See Carleton v. Framingham, 418 Mass. 623, 627 (1994); Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 695 (1999); Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 318 (2002); G.

2012See Lopes v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 175 (2004) (“Sovereign immunity bars a private action against a State in its own courts absent consent by the Legislature . . .”).

2012See Lopes v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 175 (2004) (Lopes) (“Sovereign immunity bars a private action against a State in its own courts absent consent by the Legislature or abrogation of sovereignty by Congress acting under its Fourteenth Amendment powers”).

2000Retrospective Payment of the 2.75 Percent in Lost Benefits Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Commonwealth may be sued for retrospective monetary relief only when it has consented to such a suit, and such consent must either “be expressed by the terms of a statute, or appear by necessary implication from them.” Ware v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 89, 91 (1991), quoting C&M Constr.

2000Retrospective Payment of the 2.75 Percent in Lost Benefits Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Commonwealth may be sued for retrospective monetary relief only when it has consented to such a suit, and such consent must either “be expressed by the terms of a statute, or appear by necessary implication from them.” Ware v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 89, 91 (1991), quoting C&M Constr.

2025Claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities. "[T]o avoid a State's sovereign immunity to a damages suit, a plaintiff must sue the State official in his individual and not his official capacity." O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 415 Mass. 132 , 141 n.13 (1993) (holding that damages are only available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against State officials if sued in their individual capacities); Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 593, 596 (2001) (affirming summary judgment in favor of individual defendants sued in their official capacities under MCRA and for i

2008Id., quoting O'Malley v. Sheriff of Worcester, 415 Mass. 132 , 141 n.13 (1993) (“[T]o avoid a State’s sovereign immunity to a damages suit, a plaintiff must sue the State official in his individual and not his official capacity” (alteration in original)).

2022Compare id. ("[MBTA] is funded in part from the Commonwealth's treasury, . . . [and] [u]nder the doctrine of sovereign immunity, . . . the MBTA is not amenable to suit without the Commonwealth's express consent"), with Karlin v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 399 Mass. 765, 766-767 (1987) ("As an independent entity, supported by its own nontax revenue sources and without the Commonwealth's credit pledged on its behalf, the [Turnpike] Authority's circumstances do not present the need for the protection of public funds which underlay the reason for governmental immunity").

2022Compare id. ("[MBTA] is funded in part from the Commonwealth's treasury, . . . [and] [u]nder the doctrine of sovereign immunity, . . . the MBTA is not amenable to suit without the Commonwealth's express consent"), with Karlin v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 399 Mass. 765, 766-767 (1987) ("As an independent entity, supported by its own nontax revenue sources and without the Commonwealth's credit pledged on its behalf, the [Turnpike] Authority's circumstances do not present the need for the protection of public funds which underlay the reason for governmental immunity").

2012G.L.c. 258, §§2, 10(c); Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274 , 286 n.9 (1985).

2012The Act does not completely abrogate the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity but “simply removéis] the defense of immunity in certain tort actions against the Commonwealth, municipalities, and other governmental subdivisions.” Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 285 (1985) (quoting Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 804 (1982)).

2025See Magliacane v. Gardner, 483 Mass. 842 , 848-849 (2020); Cormier v. Lynn, 479 Mass. 35, 37-39 (2018). [9] This liability cap does not apply to the MBTA.

2020See Cormier v. Lynn, 479 Mass. 35, 39 (2018).

2022Co. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 392 (1985).

2000Co. v. Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 390, 392 (1985), which itself quoted Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981).

2020L. c. 235, § 8, absent an unequivocal statutory waiver." Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees of Suffolk County, 465 Mass. 584, 598 (2013).

2020L. c. 235, § 8, absent an unequivocal statutory waiver." Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees of Suffolk County, 465 Mass. 584, 598 (2013).

2016Sovereign immunity advances important public policies, see Randall v. Haddad, 468 Mass. 347, 358 (2014), and cases cited, and the “rules of construction governing statutory waivers of sovereign immunity accordingly are stringent” (citation omitted).

2015The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the Commonwealth “cannot be impleaded into its own courts except with its consent.” Randall v. Haddad, 468 Mass. 347, 354 (2014) (Randall), quoting Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 42 (1981).

2012See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 745, 754-756 (1999).

2012“The Constitution, by delegating to Congress the power to establish the supreme law of the land when acting within its enumerated powers, does not foreclose a State from asserting immunity to claims arising under federal law merely because that law derives not from the State itself but from the national power.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999).

2012See Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, supra at 659.

1998The principle of that decision presents an application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as explained in Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 411 Mass. 657, 659 (1992), a doctrine which, despite different historical bases, is normally treated as "applying to the ~Com monwealth and to municipalities without important distinction.

2007Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661, 664 (1953). “[T]he ‘rules of construction governing statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are stringent.’ ” DeRoche v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, supra, quoting C & M Constr.

1992Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661, 664 (1953).

2023The dissent's theory fails to honor the Legislature's comprehensive approach to evaluating eligibility for relief as well as its overarching purpose of effectuating only a limited waiver of the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity.5 See Irwin, 465 Mass. at 842 .

2015See Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 835 (2013) (“Because the erroneous convictions statute provides only a limited waiver on the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity, we conclude that the doctrine of present execution applies to claims brought under that statute, and thus that interlocutory appeal is appropriate”).

2023Andrade v. Somerville, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 425 , 429 (2017), quoting Smith v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 31, 33 (2006).

2011Smith, 66 Mass.App.Ct. at 33 , observed that “[g]iven the volume of persons served and records generated by RMV, § 10(e) embodies a legislative determination that even lamentable clerical errors, such as the one here, should be immunized from litigation." From this history, I infer that the Legislature intended for § 10(e) to preserve the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity for certain types of acts and omissions that arguably had enj oyed immunity from suit on the doctrinally treacherous theoiy that the Commonwealth owed a duty to the public, rather than to the plaintiff.

2012In particular, the MTCA preserves the City’s immunity with respect to “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . libel, slander . . . [or] invasion of privacy.” G.L.c. 258, § 10(c); see also Lafayette Place Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 427 Mass. 509, 534 (1998) (MTCA excepts intentional torts from its waiver of sovereign immunity); Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. at 284-85 (1985) (municipalities are not liable for intentional torts of employees).

2003Under G.L.c. 258, §1, “public employer” means “the commonwealth and any county, city, town, educational collaborative, or district, including any... commission, . . . institution, agency or authority thereof which exercises direction and control over the public employee, but not. . . the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the Massachusetts Port Authority, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, or any other independent body politic and corporate.” The Supreme Judicial Court in Lafayette Place Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Authority struggled with the problem of determining the mean

2004See Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (Medicaid Act does not abrogate States’ immunity); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (§ 1983 does not abrogate States’ immunity).

1981In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-345 (1979), however, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that § 1983 abrogates the traditional sovereign immunity of the States.

2004See South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 504-506, 510 (1986) (concluding that language in 25 U.S.C. § 935 , providing that “the laws of the several States shall apply to [the Catawba Tribe and its members] in the same manner they apply to other persons or citizens within their jurisdiction,” obligated the Catawba Tribe to comply with a State’s statute of limitations with respect to that tribe’s land claim).

2003The plaintiffs rely for this proposition on South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986), a case involving the Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act, 25 U.S.C. 931-38, a statute which terminated the federal government’s supervisory responsibilities for the tribe, revoked the tribe’s constitution, and distributed its assets, including former reservation lands, to the enrolled members of the tribe.

1997Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

1977See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).

1992In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court observed, “Massachusetts is one of only five remaining States which retain the common law *78 [governmental] immunity at both the State and local levels.” Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 212 (1977). 10 Where, as here, the immunity issue arises in the context of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Judicial Court, in 1973, quoting from Troy & Greenfield R.R. v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 43, 46 (1869), said that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, that the Commonwealth cannot be im-pleaded in its own courts, except by its own consent cle

1992In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court observed, “Massachusetts is one of only five remaining States which retain the common law *78 [governmental] immunity at both the State and local levels.” Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 212 (1977). 10 Where, as here, the immunity issue arises in the context of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Judicial Court, in 1973, quoting from Troy & Greenfield R.R. v. Commonwealth, 127 Mass. 43, 46 (1869), said that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence, that the Commonwealth cannot be im-pleaded in its own courts, except by its own consent cle

1981As is *45 made clear by the concurring opinions of Justices Marshall and Brennan in Quern v. Jordan, supra at 350-366 , however, the majority reaffirmed the Court’s prior holding in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674-677 (1974), that States are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983, and thus are not liable for retroactive awards of damages in suits based on the statute.

1977See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).