Turner v. Georgia River Network, Grady Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners v. Georgia River Network, 773 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 2015). · Go Syfert
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Turner v. Georgia River Network, Grady Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners v. Georgia River Network, 773 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 2015). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
112 citation events (112 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Amazing Amusements Grp., Inc. v. Robert E. Wilson, 835 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)
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297 Ga. at 308 Interpreting statutory language using golden rule and plain meaning38 citing casesexplaining two of the tenets of statutory construction: “expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies exclusion of another) and expressum facit cessare tacitum (if some things are expressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those not mentioned were intended to be e…5 citing courts put it this way · passage not found verbatim in the opinion (83%) · 35 listed here
  • Amazing Amusements Grp., Inc. v. Robert E. Wilson, 835 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).published 4 cites
    ([T]he golden rule of statutory construction requires us to follow the literal language of the statute unless it produces contradiction, absurdity, or such an inconvenience as to ensure that the legislature meant someth…)
  • Mildred Toomer in Her Capacity as Adm'r of the Est. of Milton McBride v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., No. A22A0160 (Ga. Ct. App. June 24, 2022).published 3 cites
    “the doctrine of separation of powers is an immutable constitutional principle which must be strictly enforced. under that doctrine, statutory construction belongs to the courts, legislation to the legislature. we can no…”
  • Clark v. Deal (& Vice Versa), 785 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. 2016).published 4 cites
    “expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies exclusion of another) and expressum facit cessare taciturn (if some things are expressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those not mention…”
  • Russell Allen Sims v. Shara Sims, No. A26A1408 (Ga. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2026).published
    “their ordinary, logical, and common meanings”
  • Sharon Vinson v. Matthew Brown, No. A25A1182 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2025).published
    When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”1 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text)…
  • Clarence Howard Leavy, IV v. Amanda Cornelius, 920 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 2025).published
    “courts cannot construe [statutes] to force an outcome that the legislature did not expressly authorize”
  • The Kane Clinic, LLC v. Jullyene Santos Keitt, No. A24A1285 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2025).published
    On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what i…
  • Baldwin Cnty. v. Dep't of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities for the State of Georgia, No. A23A1636 (Ga. Ct. App. June 5, 2024).published
    Thus, while it is certainly true that, prior to its elimination, DHR was one of the few state-level agencies granted authority to provide fire-protection services, the statutory basis for that duty after DHR was eliminated explicitly subst…
  • Rhonda Rene Lawson v. George Weidman, III as Adm'r of the Est. of Sanna Elizabeth Weidman, No. A23A1623 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2023).published
    “we assign words in a statute their ordinary, logical, and common meanings”
  • John Richard Tibbetts v. Worth Cnty. Sch. Dist., 885 S.E.2d 291 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023).published
    “the literal language of [a] statute unless it produces contradiction, absurdity, or such an inconvenience as to ensure that the legislature meant something else”
Show 25 more citing cases
  • Funvestment Grp., LLC v. Robyn A. Crittenden, in Her Off. Capacity as Comm'r of the Georgia Dep't of Revenue, No. A22A0193 (Ga. Ct. App. June 23, 2022).published
    In order for [an exemption to apply to such monies], the legislature would need to take action[.] (Citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308-309 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) (2015); see Women’s Surgic…
  • Steven Hunter Morse v. Suntrust Bank, N.A., 873 S.E.2d 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).published
    “can not add a line to the law”
  • Tracy Shuler v. Geraldine Akpan, 870 S.E.2d 235 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).published
    T., 325 Ga. App. 590, 592 ( 754 SE2d 380 ) (2014) (punctuation omitted); accord Belknap, 351 Ga. App. at 751 (1); Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 518 (1). 20 See Kennedy v. Carlton, 294 Ga. 576, 578 (2) ( 757 SE2d 46 ) (2014) (concluding that the…
  • Jason Jermoine Tucker v. State, 869 S.E.2d 142 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).published
    “ordinary, logical, and common meanings”
  • Dennis Henry v. Griffin Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, 868 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).published
    “ordinary, logical, and common meanings”
  • Phillip D. Faircloth v. Elizabeth K. Glass, as Rep. of Ashley Glass, No. A19A2393 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020).published
    Absent clear evidence that a contrary meaning was intended by the legislature, we assign words in a statute their ordinary, logical, and common meanings.15 Further, “[a]ll statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full kn…
  • Jeffrey S. Leeper v. Safebuilt Georgia, Inc., No. A19A1175 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2019).published
    (in statutory construction, the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another)
  • Patton v. Vanterpool, 806 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. 2017).published 2 cites
    “courts cannot construe [statutes] to force an outcome that the legislature did not expressly authorize”
  • Massey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 800 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).published
    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) (2015).
  • Ussery v. Goodrich Restoration, Inc., 800 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).published
    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) (2015).
  • State v. Riggs, 799 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. 2017).published 2 cites
    The separation of powers prohibits us from “add[ing] a line to [a] law [enacted by the legislature].” Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308-309 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) (2015). 2.
  • Harris v. Mahone, 797 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).published
    Bd, *422 of Tax Assessors v. Pace Indus., Inc., 307 Ga. App. 532, 535 ( 705 SE2d 678 ) (2011) (“Our interpretation of [a] statute must square with common sense and sound reasoning.” (punctuation omitted)). 26 Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., 310…
  • Hooper Et Al. v. Hedgepath, 796 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).published
    Context establishes the conditions for applying the canon, but where those conditions exist, the principle that specification of the one implies the exclusion of the other validly describes how people express themselves and understand verb…
  • Lucas v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 793 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).published 2 cites
    Lucas also contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of BCI because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether BCI is liable for Wilson’s negligent conduct under theories of respondeat superior and…
  • Georgia Lottery Corp. v. Mre-bop Operations, LLC, No. A25A2074 (Ga. Ct. App. July 8, 2026).published 2 cites
    (explaining two of the tenets of statutory construction: “expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies exclusion of another) and expressum facit cessare tacitum (if some things are expressly men…)
  • Ultra Grp. of Companies, Inc. v. Daljeet Singh, No. A25A0044 (Ga. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2024).published 2 cites
    The parties—in their respective petitions for review to the superior court—purported to proceed under two different statutory schemes: OCGA §§ 50-27- 76 and 50-27-102, which govern appeals from COAM disputes to the Fulton County Superior C…
  • Shelley Namdar-yeganeh v. Cyndi Namdar-yeganeh, 894 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023).published 2 cites
    See Court of Appeals Rule 33.2 (a) (2). 12 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Turner v. Georgia River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308-309 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) (2015).
  • Spann v. Davis, 866 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. 2021).published 4 cites
    (one of our “longstanding tenets of statutory construction [is] ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies 14 exclusion of another)’” (citation omitted))
  • Wilson Bush, as Adm'r of the Est. of Jerry Michael Singleton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. A21A1136 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2021).published 2 cites
    See Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) (2015) (citing “longstanding tenets of statutory construction: ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies exclusion of another) and expressum f…
  • In the Matter of Barry Dean Carothers, 863 S.E.2d 35 (Ga. 2021).published 4 cites
    See Turner v. Georgia River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) 13 (2015) (noting the longstanding tenet of statutory construction that “‘if some things are expressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those not mentioned wer…
  • Star Residential, LLC v. Hernandez, 860 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 2021).published 4 cites
    (Some “longstanding tenets of statutory construction [are] expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies exclusion of another) and expressum facit cessare tacitum (if some things are expressly me…)
  • Herbert L. Cousin, Jr. v. Adrian C. Tubbs, No. A19A1805 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020).published 2 cites
    See note 28, supra. 39 Jackson v. Sanders, 299 Ga. 332, 334 ( 788 SE2d 387 ) (2016). 40 Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 41 Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 ( 773 SE2d 70…
  • State v. Davis, 814 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. 2018).published 4 cites
    See Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) (2015) (statute); Goddard v. City of Albany, 285 Ga. 882, 884 (1) ( 684 SE2d 635 ) (2009) (city charter and ordinance); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading L…
  • Bell v. Gilder Timber Co. Et Al., 785 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).published 2 cites
    See generally Turner v. Georgia River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 ( 773 SE2d 706 ) (2015).
  • Kevin Chad Hardy v. State, 872 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).published 2 cites
    (absent clear evidence that the General Assembly intended a contrary meaning, we assign words in a statute their “ordinary, logical, and common meanings)
297 Ga. at 309 “ocga 12-7-6 (b) (15) (a) simply does not provide for the establishment of a buffer for state waters that are adjacent to banks without wrested vegetation.”2 citing cases2 citing courts quote it
773 S.E.2d at 708 cited at this page2 citing cases
  • State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cofield, No. 7:22-cv-00087 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2024).
    Turner v. Ga River Network, 773 S.E.2d 706, 708 (Ga. 2015) (citations omitted).
  • Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Willard, No. 1:20-cv-01207 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2021).
    Absent clear evidence that a contrary meaning was intended by the legislature, we assign words in a statute their ordinary, logical, and common meanings.” Turner v. Ga. River Network, 773 S.E.2d 706, 708 (Ga. 2015).
The doctrine of separation of powers is an immutable constitutional principle which must be strictly enforced. Under that doctrine, statutory construction belongs to the courts, legislation to the legislature. We can not add a line to the law.no pin page on record · 2 citing cases listed
  • Mildred Toomer in Her Capacity as Adm'r of the Est. of Milton McBride v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., No. A22A0160 (Ga. Ct. App. June 24, 2022).published 3 cites
    (The doctrine of separation of powers is an immutable constitutional principle which must be strictly enforced. Under that doctrine, statutory construction belongs to the courts, legislation to the legislature. We can n…)
  • CLARK v. LEIGH (& Vice Versa), No. S26A0349, S26X0350 (Ga. June 16, 2026).published
    (The doctrine of separation of powers is an immutable constitutional principle which must be strictly enforced. Under that doctrine, statutory construction belongs to the courts, legislation to the legislature. We can n…)
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
TURNER
v.
GEORGIA RIVER NETWORK Et Al.; GRADY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. GEORGIA RIVER NETWORK Et Al.
S14G1780, S14G1781.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jun 15, 2015.
Published opinion
773 S.E.2d 706
Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Isaac Byrd, Deputy Attorney General, John E. Hennelly, James D. Coots, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Britt C. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, for Turner., William W. Sapp, Nathaniel H. Hunt; Charles M. Cork III, for Georgia River Network., Cook, Noell, Tolley & Bates, Edward D. Tolley, Devin H. Smith; Kevin S. Cauley, for Grady County Board of Commissioners., King & Spalding, Patricia T. Barmeyer, Lewis B. Jones; Stack & Associates, Donald D. J. Stack, Kevin H. Jeselnik, amici curiae.
Benham, Thompson, Hines, Hunstein, Blackwell, Melton, Nahmias.
Cited by 48 opinions  |  Published
4 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 89%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (3) · Supreme Court of Georgia (2)

Lead Opinion

BENHAM, Justice.

This appeal arises from our grant of petitions for certiorari filed by appellants Judson H. Turner, the Director of the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and the Grady County Board of Commissioners (Grady County), requesting our review of the Court of Appeals’s decision in Georgia River Network v. Turner, 328 Ga. App. 381 (762 SE2d 123) (2014). Appellees Georgia River Network and American Rivers are both non-profit organizations. The relevant facts show that in 2010, Grady County received federal approval to construct a 960-acre fishing lake.[1] The project also entailed building a large dam and inundating 129 acres of wetlands and nine miles of streams to create the lake. To proceed with the project, Grady County was required to apply for a buffer variance through the EPD in order to disturb the stream waters that would be affected by the project. Appellees challenged the variance, arguing that Grady County’s application was deficient because it failed to address buffers for the[*307] wetlands that would also be affected by the project. The Director granted the variance over appellees’ objections. In a separate letter, the EPD advised appellees that wetlands did not require buffers because they generally lack wrested vegetation and were not subject to a variance request. Appellees sought review of the Director’s decision from an administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Office of State Administrative Hearings. The ALJ overturned the variance, reasoning that OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) of the Erosion and Sedimentation Act requires a buffer for all state waters, including wetlands. The Director and Grady County filed appeals challenging the ALJ’s decision in the superior courts of Fulton County and Grady County, respectively. On the substantive issue of the construction and interpretation of OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A),[2] both trial courts determined that the Director’s construction of the statute was correct and that the buffer requirement only applies to state waters that have wrested vegetation. Accordingly, the trial courts reversed the judgment of the ALJ. Appellees then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) states as follows: “There is established a 25 foot buffer along the banks of all state waters, as measured horizontally from the point where vegetation has been wrested by normal stream flow or wave action. . . .” Citing to principles of statutory construction, the Court of Appeals concluded that this buffer requirement applies to state waters[3] whether or not their banks have wrested vegetation. The Court of Appeals explained that the language regarding how the buffer is to be measured did not create an additional exception to OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A),[4] but merely explained the location of the buffer. 328 Ga. App. at 391. In addition, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute was internally inconsistent and that its finding that the buffer applied to all state waters, without regard to the existence of wrested vegetation, would avoid any absurd or unintended result contrary to the legislature’s purpose in enacting the legislation. Id. at 392. Based on this analysis, the Court of Appeals found the ALJ had not erred and reversed the decisions of the trial courts. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of[*308] OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A). Because we find that it did err, its judgment is reversed.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires this Court to look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly (OCGA § 1-3-1), and the golden rule of statutory construction requires us to follow the literal language of the statute unless it produces contradiction, absurdity, or such an inconvenience as to [e]nsure that the legislature meant something else. Absent clear evidence that a contrary meaning was intended by the legislature, we assign words in a statute their ordinary, logical, and common meanings.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Judicial Council of Georgia v. Brown & Gallo, LLC, 288 Ga. 294, 296-297 (702 SE2d 894) (2010). Here, the Court of Appeals erred because the literal language of the statute does not require a buffer for state waters alongside banks without wrested vegetation. The language at issue states in pertinent part: “There is established a 25 foot buffer along the banks of all state waters, as measured horizontally from the point where vegetation has been wrested. . . .” Had the legislature placed a period after the word “waters” rather than a comma and had gone no further, then there would be no other conclusion but that buffers are established along the banks of all state waters, regardless of the existence of wrested vegetation. But that is not what the legislature did. By adding the phrase “as measured horizontally from the point where vegetation has been wrested,” the General Assembly expressly defined how the buffer “is established.” Since the legislature offered no other method for the buffer to be established but for measuring it horizontally from the point of wrested vegetation, the buffer necessarily cannot be applied to state waters that are adjacent to banks without wrested vegetation. No further interpretation or analysis is required.

Our plain reading of OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) is in keeping with longstanding tenets of statutory construction: “expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing implies exclusion of another) and expressum facit cessare taciturn (if some things are expressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those not mentioned were intended to be excluded)....” See Hammock v. State, 277 Ga. 612 (3) (592 SE2d 415) (2004). The courts cannot construe OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) to force an outcome that the legislature did not expressly authorize. “The doctrine of separation of powers is an immutable constitutional principle which must be strictly enforced. Under that doctrine, statutory construction belongs to the courts, legislation to[*309] the legislature. We can not add a line to the law.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9 (1) (644 SE2d 814) (2007). OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) simply does not provide for the establishment of a buffer for state waters that are adjacent to banks without wrested vegetation.[5] In order for the buffer requirement to apply to state waters alongside banks without wrested vegetation, the legislature would need to take action to amend the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as regards its construction of the statute is reversed.[6]

Judgment reversed.

Thompson, C. J., Hines, P. J., Hunstein and Blackwell, JJ., and Chief Judge H. Gibbs Flanders concur. Melton, J., dissents. Nahmias, J., disqualified.
1

See Georgia River Network v. Turner, supra, 328 Ga. App. at 383-384 for a full recitation of the facts.

2

There were also issues concerning whether the appellees had a statutory right and standing to seek review of the Director’s decision, but those issues are not before us in this appeal.

3

The Court of Appeals noted that the parties did not dispute that “wetlands” fall within the statutory definition of “state waters” and stated that it would not reach that issue as it had not been fully litigated. Id. at 390, n. 4. We likewise do not address this issue on appeal.

4

There are six statutory exceptions to the bufferrequirementwhichappearatOCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) (i)-(vi). These exceptions are not at issue in this appeal.

5

The dissent suggests that it would be absurd to attribute to OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) its plain meaning because that would leave state waters with no vegetation along their banks unprotected. The dissent is wrong in two respects. First, it appears that the principal purpose of the buffer requirement is to protect state waters in a specific way • — ■ by protecting whatever natural vegetation grows alongside state waters. See OCGA § 12-7-3 (2) (defining “buffer” as “the area of land immediately adjacent to the banks of state waters in its natural state of vegetation, which facilitates the protection of water quality and aquatic habitaf (emphasis supplied)). See also OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (B) (“a buffer shall remain in its natural, undisturbed state of vegetation until all land-disturbing activities on the construction site are completed,” and after “the final stabilization of the site is achieved, a buffer may be thinned or trimmed of vegetation as long as a protective vegetative cover remains to protect water quality and aquatic habitat and a natural canopy is left in sufficient quantity to keep shade on the stream bed”). Where there is no natural vegetation, there is nothing to preserve, and so the decision of the General Assembly to limit the buffer requirements to state waters with wrested vegetation is not absurd.

Secondly, the dissent fails to consider the fact that OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) is not the only means by which the EPD protects state waters both with and without wrested vegetation. The establishment of buffers for state waters alongside banks with wrested vegetation is only one of many tools or “best management practices,” available to accomplish the intent of the Erosion and Sedimentation Act as stated in OCGA § 12-7-2. See, e.g., OCGA § 12-7-6 (a) (1), 12-7-6 (b) (1)-(14). See also Manual for Erosion and Sediment Control in Georgia, Georgia Soil and Water Conservation Commission (6th ed. 2014) (manual is specifically referenced by OCGA § 12-7-6(b)).ThereisnobasisforthecourtstoextrapolatetheapplicationofOCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) beyond its literal terms based on an incorrect assumption that state waters without wrested vegetation are left without “some level of protection” from land-disturbing activities because the establishment of a buffer is not required under one subsection of the Act. Moreover, the courts are not equipped to decide what the “best management practices” are for wetlands, trout streams, or any other state waters.

6

Our review is limited to Division 3 of the Court of Appeals’s decision. We express no opinion regarding the substantive decisions made in Division 2 of the Court of Appeals’s decision.

Dissent

MELTON, Justice,

dissenting.

As OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) is currently written, there is no guidance as to the measurement of a buffer zone for state waters lacking wrested vegetation. This raises an ambiguity, and, in the presence of such an ambiguity, this Court must give strong deference[*310] to the interpretation of the statute made by the Director of the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources. In this case, however, the EPD’s interpretation that OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) requires no buffer at all for state waters without wrested vegetation is unreasonable, given the explicit purpose of the statute to lend some level of protection to all state waters. As a result, I must respectfully dissent.

The Erosion and Sedimentation Act of 1975 was intended to protect state waters and related wildlife and vegetation from the detrimental effects of sediment and erosion caused by land disturbing activities. OCGA § 12-7-2 plainly states:

It is found that soil erosion and sediment deposition onto lands and into waters within the watersheds of this state are occurring as a result of widespread failure to apply proper soil erosion and sedimentation control practices in land clearing, soil movement, and construction activities and that such erosion and sediment deposition result in pollution of state waters and damage to domestic, agricultural, recreational, fish and wildlife, and other resource uses. It is therefore declared to be the policy of this state and the intent of this chapter to strengthen and extend the present erosion and sediment control activities and programs of this state and to provide for the establishment and implementation of a state-wide comprehensive soil erosion and sediment control program to conserve and protect the land, water, air, and other resources of this state.

For this reason, the Legislature established buffer zones to protect state waters from land disturbing activities in their proximity. OCGA § 12-7-3 (2) defines a “buffer” as “the area of land immediately adjacent to the banks of state waters in its natural state of vegetation, which facilitates the protection of water quality and aquatic habitat”'7 (Emphasis supplied.) The particular buffer at issue[*311] in this matter is set forth in OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A), which requires “a 25 foot buffer along the banks of all state waters, as measured horizontally from the point where vegetation has been wrested by normal stream flow or wave action.” (Emphasis supplied.) The problem with this statute, however, is that it does not provide a measurement for a buffer zone along the banks of state waters without wrested vegetation. As a result, the EPD is called upon to interpret the statute in a way to effectuate its underlying meaning and purpose in the context where no wrested vegetation exists.

In the presence of such an overt ambiguity, strong deference must be given to the interpretation of the statute given by the appropriate administrative agency. As set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (II) (104 SCt 2778, 81 LE2d 694) (1984):

The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.)

With this in mind, deference must be given to the determination by the Director of the EPD that state waters without wrested vegetation are entitled to no buffer at all. The required deference, however, is strong, but not absolute. Here, the EPD’s extreme interpretation of OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) is unreasonable and manifestly contrary to the statute, which is intended to “protect water quality and aquatic habitat” of all state waters. Providing no buffer[*312] at all to state waters without sufficient wrested vegetation works to the detriment of the statutory purpose, and, as such, cannot be considered reasonable.

Decided June 15, 2015. Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Isaac Byrd, Deputy Attorney General, John E. Hennelly, James D. Coots, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Britt C. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, for Turner. William W. Sapp, Nathaniel H. Hunt; Charles M. Cork III, for Georgia River Network. Cook, Noell, Tolley & Bates, Edward D. Tolley, Devin H. Smith; Kevin S. Cauley, for Grady County Board of Commissioners. King & Spalding, Patricia T. Barmeyer, Lewis B. Jones; Stack & Associates, Donald D. J. Stack, Kevin H. Jeselnik, amici curiae.

The arbitrariness of the EPD’s interpretation becomes even more evident when one considers OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (16), which provides, in part: “[t]here is established a 50 foot buffer, as measured horizontally from the point where vegetation has been wrested by normal stream flow or wave action, along the banks of any state waters classified as ‘trout streams’ pursuant to Article 2 of Chapter 5 of this title.” Under the EPD’s interpretation, trout would be protected based solely on whether they were swimming in a stream with wrested vegetation — a distinction that makes no sense and one which the Legislature would not have intended.

Accordingly, though I do believe that the EPD may reasonably interpret the ambiguity present in OCGA § 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A),[8] that interpretation must extend at least some level of buffer protection to state waters without wrested vegetation. Otherwise, the purpose of the Erosion and Sedimentation Act to protect water quality and aquatic habitat for all state waters is inappropriately undermined.

7

In footnote 5, the majority opinion argues that the statute is intended to protect the natural vegetation growing along state waters. It later states: “Where there is no natural vegetation, there is nothing to preserve, and so the decision of the General Assembly to limit the buffer requirements to state waters with wrested vegetation is not absurd.” This argument is logically untenable, as it rests on the idea that there will never be any natural vegetation along any state waters without wrested vegetation. The absence of wrested vegetation, or vegetation which has been pulled away from the banks by flowing water, does not mean that there is no natural vegetation left. To the contrary, where there is no wresting action, the natural vegetation remains, likely growing from the water and up the banks. Even if the purpose of the statute is to protect the natural vegetation growing along state waters, the absence of wrested[*311] vegetation, which would suggest conditions appropriate for the continued presence of natural vegetation, would not he an appropriate reason to have no buffer at all. To the contrary, it would make it even more unreasonable to resort to an interpretation that provides no buffer to protect natural vegetation.

8

The majority mischaracterizes this plain statement by arguing that this opinion proposes that the courts should make decisions regarding water management practices and the size of buffer zones. As plainly stated, this opinion leaves those decisions to the expertise of the EPD. However, where an administrative agency makes an unreasonable interpretation of a vague statute, as in this case, it is the duty of the courts to require the EPD to reassess its interpretation.